[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
It will be remembered, that Soult instead of retiring into Andalusia,
took a flank position at Llerena, and awaited the arrival of Drouet’s
division, which had been detached from Massena’s army. At Llerena,
although closely watched by general Hill, the French marshal, with an
army, oppressed by its losses and rendered unruly by want, maintained
an attitude of offence until assured of Drouet’s approach, when he
again advanced to Los Santos, near which place a slight cavalry
skirmish took place to the disadvantage of the French.
[Sidenote: Intercepted despatch from Soult to Marmont.]
On the 14th, Drouet, whose march had been very rapid, arrived,
and then Soult, who knew that lord Wellington expected large
reinforcements, and was desirous to forestal them, advanced to
Fuente del Maestro, whereupon Hill took measures to concentrate the
covering army on the position of Albuera. Meanwhile Marmont, who had
reorganized the army of Portugal, in six divisions of infantry and
five brigades of cavalry, received Napoleon’s orders to co-operate
with Soult; and in this view had sent Reynier with two divisions
by the pass of Baños, while himself with a considerable force of
infantry and cavalry and ten guns escorted a convoy to Ciudad
Rodrigo. General Spencer, with the first, fifth, sixth, and light
divisions, and one brigade of cavalry, was then behind the Agueda;
and Pack’s Portuguese brigade was above Almeida, which had been
again placed in a condition to resist an irregular assault. Spencer’s
orders were to make his marches correspond with those of the enemy,
if the latter should point towards the Tagus; but if the French
attacked, he was to take the line of the Coa, and to blow up Almeida
if the movements went to isolate that fortress. On the morning of the
6th, Marmont, having introduced his convoy, marched out of Rodrigo
in two columns, one moving upon Gallegos, the other upon Espeja.
The light division fell back before the latter, and Slade’s cavalry
before the former; but in this retrograde movement, the latter gave
its flank obliquely to the line of the enemy’s advance, which soon
closed upon, and cannonaded it, with eight pieces of artillery.
Unfortunately the British rear-guard got jammed in between the French
and a piece of marshy ground, and in this situation the whole must
have been destroyed, if captain Purvis, with a squadron of the fourth
dragoons, had not charged the enemy while the other troopers, with
strong horses and a knowledge of the firmest parts, got through the
marsh. Purvis then passed also, and the French horses could not
follow. Thus the retreat was effected with a loss of only twenty men.
After the action an officer calling himself Montbrun’s aide-de-camp
deserted to the allies.
General Spencer, more distinguished for great personal intrepidity
than for quickness of military conception, was now undecided as to
his measures; and the army was by no means in a safe situation, for
the country was covered with baggage, the movements of the divisions
were wide, and without concert, and general Pack who had the
charge of Almeida too hastily blew it up. In this uncertainty the
adjutant-general Pakenham pointed out that the French did not advance
as if to give battle, that their numbers were evidently small, their
movements more ostentatious than vigorous, and probably intended
to cover a flank movement by the passes leading to the Tagus: he
therefore urged Spencer either to take up a position of battle which
would make the enemy discover his real numbers and intentions,
or retire at once behind the Coa, with a view to march to lord
Wellington’s assistance. These arguments were supported by colonel
Waters, who, having closely watched the infantry coming out of Ciudad
Rodrigo, observed that they were too clean and well dressed to have
come off a long march, and must therefore be a part of the garrison.
He had also ascertained that a large body was actually in movement
towards the passes.
Spencer yielding to these representations marched in the evening by
Alfayates to Soito, and the next day behind the Coa. Here certain
intelligence, that Marmont was in the passes, reached him, and he
continued his march to the Alemtejo by Penamacor, but detached one
division and his cavalry to Coria, as flankers, while he passed with
the main body by Castello Branco, Vilha Velha, Niza, and Portalegre.
The season was burning and the marches long, yet so hardened by
constant service were the light division, and so well organized
by general Craufurd, that, although covering from eighteen to
eight-and-twenty miles daily, they did not leave a single straggler
behind. The flanking troops, who had been rather unnecessarily
exposed at Coria, then followed, and Marmont having imposed upon
Spencer and Pack by his demonstration in front of Ciudad Rodrigo,
filed off by the pass of Perales, while Reynier moved by the passes
of Bejar and Baños, and the whole were by forced marches soon united
at the bridge of Almaraz. Here a pontoon bridge expected from Madrid
had not arrived, and the passage of the Tagus was made with only one
ferry-boat which caused a delay of four days, which would have proved
fatal to Badajos, if the battering guns employed in that siege had
been really effective.
When the river was crossed, the French army marched in two columns
with the greatest rapidity upon Merida and Medellin, where they
arrived the 18th, and opened their communications with Soult.
On the other side, lord Wellington had been attentively watching
these movements; he had never intended to press Badajos beyond the
10th, because he knew that when reinforced with Drouet’s division,
Soult alone would be strong enough to raise the siege, and hence the
hurried assaults; but he was resolved to fight Soult, and although
he raised the siege on the 10th, yet, by a deciphered intercepted
letter, that Phillipon’s provisions would be exhausted on the 20th,
he continued the blockade of the place, in hopes that some such
accident of war as the delay at Almaraz might impede Marmont. It may
be here asked, why, as he knew a few days would suffice to reduce
Badajos, he did not retrench his whole army and persist in the siege?
The answer is that Elvas being out of repair, and exhausted both of
provisions and ammunition, by the siege of Badajos, the enemy would
immediately have taken that fortress.
When Soult’s advanced guard had reached Los Santos, the covering
army, consisting of the second and fourth divisions and Blake’s
Spaniards was concentrated at Albuera, Hamilton’s Portuguese were
also directed there from Badajos; meanwhile the third and seventh
divisions maintained the blockade, and Wellington expecting a battle
repaired in person to Albuera, but, unlike Beresford, he had that
position entrenched, and did not forget to occupy the hill on the
right.
On the 14th, it was known that Marmont was at Truxillo, and that
in four days he could unite with Soult, wherefore the blockade was
also raised with a view to repass the Guadiana, yet Wellington
still lingered at Albuera hoping to fall on Soult separately, but
the cautious manner in which the latter moved, continually refusing
his left and edging with his right, towards Almendralejos, soon
extinguished this chance; on the 17th, the blockade having been
raised the day before, the allies repassed the Guadiana in two
columns. The British and Portuguese moved by the pontoon bridge near
Badajos, the Spaniards crossed at Jerumenha;—this movement, not an
easy one, was executed without any loss of men or stores, and without
accident, save that general William Stewart by some error, took the
same line as Blake, and at night fell in with the Spaniards, who
thought his division French and were like to have fired.
The 19th the united French armies entered Badajos, which was thus
succoured after two most honourable defences, and at a moment when
Phillipon, despairing of aid and without provisions, was preparing
his means of breaking out and escaping.
The 21st Godinot’s division which had marched by Valverde took
possession of Olivenza; the 22d he pushed a detachment under the
guns of Jerumenha, and the same day the whole of the French cavalry
crossed the Guadiana in two columns, advancing towards Villa Viciosa
and Elvas on one side, and Campo Mayor on the other.
Lord Wellington being now joined by the head of Spencer’s corps,
had placed his army on both sides of the Caya, with cavalry posts
towards the mouth of that river and on the Guadiana in front of
Elvas. His right wing was extended behind the Caya to the lower
bridge on that river, and his left wing had a field of battle on
some high ground resting on the Gebora, a little beyond Campo Mayor,
which fortress was occupied, and the open space between it and the
high ground strongly entrenched. On this side also cavalry were
posted in observation beyond the Gebora and about Albuquerque, the
whole position forming an irregular arch embracing the bridge of
Badajos. The wood and town of Aronches were behind the centre of
the position and the little fortified place of Ouguella was behind
the left; but the right wing was much more numerous than the left,
and the Monte Reguingo, a wooded ridge between Campo Mayor and the
Caya, was occupied by the light division, whose position could not be
recognized by the enemy.
If the French attacked the left of the allies, a short movement would
have sufficed to bring the bulk of the troops into action on the
menaced point, because the whole extent of country occupied did not
exceed ten or twelve miles: the communications also were good, and
from Campo Mayor open plains, reaching to Badajos, exposed the French
movements which could be distinguished both from Elvas, from Campo
Mayor, and from the many atalayas or watch-towers on that frontier.
The chief merit of this position was the difficulty of recognizing it
from the enemy’s side, and to protect the rear, the first division
was retained at Portalegre: from thence it could intercept the enemy
at Marvão or Castello de Vide if he should attempt to turn the allies
by Albuquerque; and was ready to oppose Soult if he should move
between Elvas and Estremos; but the march from Portalegre was too
long to hope for the assistance of this division in a battle near
Elvas or Campo Mayor.
The French cavalry, as I have said, passed the Guadiana on the 21st,
both by the bridge of Badajos and by two fords, where the road of
Olivenza crosses that river, below the confluence of the Caya. The
right column after driving back the outposts of the allies, was
opposed by the heavy dragoons, and by Madden’s Portuguese, and
retired without seeing the position on the Campo Mayor side; but
the horsemen of the left column, while patrolling towards Villa
Viciosa and Elvas, cut off a squadron of the eleventh dragoons,
and the second German hussars which were on the Guadiana escaped
to Elvas with difficulty and loss. The cause of this misfortune in
which nearly a hundred and fifty men were killed or taken is not
very clear, for the French aver that colonel Lallemand, by a feigned
retreat drew the cavalry into an ambuscade, and the rumours in the
English camp were various and discordant.
After this action the French troops were quartered along the Guadiana
above and below Badajos from Xeres de los Cavalheiros to Montijo, and
proceeded to collect provisions for themselves and for the fortress,
hence, with the exception of a vain attempt on the 26th to cut off
the cavalry detachments on the side of Albuquerque, no farther
operations took place.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.]
All things had seemed to tend to a great and decisive battle, and,
although the crisis glided away without any event of importance, this
was one of the most critical periods of the war. For Marmont brought
down, including a detachment of the army of the centre, thirty-one
thousand infantry, four thousand five hundred cavalry, and fifty-four
guns; Soult about twenty-five thousand infantry, three thousand
cavalry, and thirty-six guns;—to effect this, Andalusia and Castile
had been nearly stripped of troops. Bessieres had abandoned the
Asturias, Bonnet united with general Mayer, who had succeeded Serras
in Leon, was scarcely able, as we have seen, to keep the Gallicians
in check on the Orbijo, the chief armies of the Peninsular were in
presence, a great battle seemed to be the interest of the French, and
it was in their option to fight or not. Their success at Badajos,
and the surprise of the cavalry on the Caya had made ample amends
for their losses at Los Santos and Usagre, and now, when Badajos was
succoured, and the allied army in a manner driven into Portugal,
Albuera seemed to be a victory. The general result of the Estremadura
campaign had been favourable to them, and the political state of
their affairs seemed to require some dazzling action to impose upon
the peninsulars. Their army was powerful, and as they were especially
strong in cavalry, and on favourable ground for that arm, there
could scarcely be a better opportunity for a blow, which would,
if successful, have revenged Massena’s disasters, and sent lord
Wellington back to Lisbon, perhaps from the Peninsula altogether; if
unsuccessful not involving any very serious consequences, because
from their strength of horse and artillery, and nearness to Badajos,
a fatal defeat was not to be expected. But the allied army was
thought to be stronger by the whole amount of the Spanish troops,
than it really was; the position very difficult to be examined was
confidently held by lord Wellington, and no battle took place.
Napoleon’s estimation of the weight of moral over physical force
in war was here finely exemplified. Both the French armies were
conscious of recent defeats, Busaco, Sabugal, Fuentes, and the
horrid field of Albuera, were fresh in their memory; the fierce
blood there spilled, still reeked in their nostrils, and if Cæsar
after a partial check at Dyrracchiaum held it unsafe to fight a
pitched battle with recently defeated soldiers, however experienced
or brave, Soult may well be excused, seeing that he knew there were
divisions on the Caya, as good in all points, and more experienced,
than those he had fought with on the banks of the Albuera. The
stern nature of the British soldier had been often before proved
by him, and he could now draw no hope from the unskilfulness of
the general. Lord Wellington’s resolution to accept battle on the
banks of the Caya, was nevertheless, one of as unmixed greatness,
as the crisis was one of unmixed danger to the cause he supported.
For the Portuguese government, following up the system which I have
already described, had reduced their troops to the lowest degree of
misery, and the fortresses were, at times, only not abandoned to the
enemy. The British government had taken the native troops into pay,
but it had not undertaken to feed them; yet such was the suffering
of those brave men that Wellington, after repeatedly refusing to
assist them from the English stores, unable longer to endure the
sight of their misfortunes, and to prevent them from disbanding, at
last fed the six brigades, or three-fourths of the whole army, the
English commissariat charging the expense to the subsidy. He hoped
that the government would then supply the remnant, but they starved
it likewise, and during the siege of Badajos these troops were of
necessity thrown for subsistence upon the magazines of Elvas, which
were thus exhausted; and what with desertion, famine, and sickness,
that flourishing army which had mustered more than forty thousand
good soldiers in line, at the time of Massena’s invasion, could
now scarcely produce fourteen thousand for a battle on which the
fate of their country depended. The British troops, although large
reinforcements had come out, and more were arriving, had so many
sick and wounded, that scarcely twenty-eight thousand sabres and
bayonets were in the field. The enemy had therefore a superiority, of
one-fourth in artillery and infantry, and the strength of his cavalry
was double that of the British.
To accept battle in such circumstances, military considerations
only being had in view, would have been rash in the extreme, but
the Portuguese government besides throwing the subsistence of the
troops upon Elvas, had utterly neglected that place, and Jerumenha,
Campo Mayor, and Ouguella, Aronches and Santa Olaya, which were the
fortresses covering this frontier; neither had they drawn forth any
means of transport from the country. The siege of Badajos had been
entirely furnished from Elvas; but all the carts and animals of
burthen that could be found in the vicinity, or as far as the British
detachments could go; and all the commissariat means to boot, were
scarcely sufficient to convey the ammunition, the stores, and the
subsistence of the native troops, day by day, from Elvas to the camp;
there was consequently no possibility of replacing these things from
the British magazines at Abrantes and Lisbon.
When the allies crossed the Guadiana in retreat, Elvas had only ten
thousand rounds of shot left, and not a fortnight’s provisions in
store, even for her own garrison; her works were mouldering in many
places, from want of care, houses and enclosures encumbered her
glacis, most of her guns were rendered unserviceable by the fire at
Badajos, the remainder were very bad, and her garrison was composed
of untried soldiers and militia. Jerumenha was not better looked
to; Olaya, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella had nothing but their walls.
It would appear then, that if Soult had been aware of this state
of affairs, he might under cover of the Guadiana, have collected
his army below the confluence of the Caya, and then by means of the
pontoon train from Badajos, and by the fords at which his cavalry did
pass, have crossed the Guadiana, overpowered the right of the allies,
and suddenly investing Elvas, have covered his army with lines,
which would have ensured the fall of that place; unless the English
general, anticipating such an attempt, had, with very inferior
numbers, defeated him between the Caya and Elvas. But this, in a
perfectly open country, offering no advantages to the weaker army,
would not have been easy. Soult also, by marching on the side of
Estremos, could have turned the right, and menaced the communications
of the allies with Abrantes, which would have obliged him to retreat
and abandon Elvas or fight to disadvantage. The position on the
Caya was therefore taken up solely with reference to the state of
political affairs. It was intended to impose upon the enemy, and it
did so; Elvas and Jerumenha must otherwise have fallen.
While a front of battle was thus presented, the rear was cleared
of all the hospitals and heavy baggage; workmen were day and night
employed to restore the fortifications of the strong places, and
guns, ammunition, and provisions were brought up from Abrantes,
by means of the animals and carts before employed in the siege of
Badajos. Until all this was effected Portugal was on the brink of
perdition, but the true peninsular character was now displayed, and
in a manner that proclaims most forcibly the difficulties overcome by
the English general, difficulties which have been little appreciated
in his own country. The danger of Elvas had aroused all the bustle of
the Portuguese government, and the regency were at first frightened
at the consequences of their own conduct; but when they found
their own tardy efforts were forestalled by the diligence of lord
Wellington, they with prodigious effrontery asserted, that he had
exhausted Elvas for the supply of the British troops, and that they
had replenished it!
His imperturbable firmness at this crisis was wonderful, and the
more admirable, because Mr. Perceval’s policy, prevailing in the
cabinet, had left him without a halfpenny in the military chest,
and almost without a hope of support in his own country: yet his
daring was not a wild cast of the net for fortune; it was supported
by great circumspection, and a penetration and activity that let no
advantages escape. He had thrown a wide glance over the Peninsula,
knew his true situation, had pointed out to the Spaniards how to push
their war to advantage, while the French were thus concentrated in
Estremadura, and at this period had a right to expect assistance from
them; for Soult and Marmont were united at Badajos, the army of the
north and the army of the centre were paralysed by the flight of the
king, and this was the moment, when Figueras having been surprised
by Rovira, and Taragona besieged by Suchet, the French armies of
Catalonia and Aragon were entirely occupied with those places. Thus,
nearly the whole of the Peninsula was open to the enterprizes of the
Spaniards. They could have collected, of Murcians and Valencians
only, above forty thousand regulars, besides partizans, with which
they might have marched against Madrid, while the Gallicians operated
in Castile, and the Asturian army supported the enterprizes of the
northern partidas.
[Sidenote: See Book XIII. Chap. I.]
This favourable occasion was not seized. Julian Sanchez, indeed,
cut off a convoy, menaced Salamanca, and blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo;
Santocildes came down to Astorga, and as I have before observed,
Mina and the northern chiefs harassed the French communications;
some stir also was made by the guerillas near Madrid, and Suchet was
harassed, but the commotion soon subsided; and a detachment from
Madrid having surprised a congregation of partidas at Peneranda,
killed many and recovered a large convoy which they had taken; and
in this complicated war, which being spread like a spider’s web over
the whole Peninsula, any drag upon one part would have made the whole
quiver to the most distant extremities, the regular armies effected
nothing. Nor did any general insurrection of the people take place in
the rear of the French, who retained all their fortified posts, while
their civil administrations continued to rule in the great towns as
tranquilly as if there was no war!
Lord Wellington’s principal measure for dissipating the storm in his
front had rested upon Blake. That general had wished him to fight
beyond the Guadiana, and was not well pleased at being refused;
wherefore the English general, instead of taking ten or twelve
thousand Spaniards, and an uneasy colleague, into the line of battle
at Campo Mayor, where he knew by experience that they would quarrel
with the Portuguese, and by their slowness, insubordination, and
folly, would rather weaken than strengthen himself, delivered to
Blake the pontoons used at Badajos, and concerted with him a movement
down the right bank of the Guadiana. He was to recross that river at
Mertola, and to fall upon Seville, which was but slightly guarded by
a mixed force of French and Spaniards in Joseph’s service; and this
blow, apparently easy of execution, would have destroyed all the
arsenals and magazines, which supported the blockade of Cadiz. Lord
Wellington had therefore good reason to expect the raising of that
siege, as well as the dispersion of the French army in its front. He
likewise urged the regency at Cadiz to push forward general Beguines
from San Roque, against Seville, while the insurgents in the Ronda
pressed the few troops, left in Grenada, on one side, and Freire,
with the Murcian army, pressed them on the other.
Blake marched the 18th, recrossed the river at Mertola the 22d,
remained inactive at Castillegos until the 30th, and sent his heavy
artillery to Ayamonte by water; then, instead of moving direct with
his whole force upon Seville, he detached only a small body, and with
a kind of infatuation wasted two successive days in assaulting the
castle of Niebla; a contemptible work garrisoned by three hundred
Swiss, who had in the early part of the war abandoned the Spanish
service. Being without artillery he could not succeed, and meanwhile
Soult, hearing of his march, ordered Olivenza to be blown up, and
taking some cavalry, and Godinot’s division which formed the left of
his army, passed the Morena by Santa Ollalla and moved rapidly upon
Seville. From Monasterio he sent a detachment to relieve the castle
of Niebla; and at the same time, general Conroux, whose division was
at Xeres de los Cavalheiro, crossed the mountain by the Aracena road,
and endeavoured to cut off Blake from Ayamonte.
Thus far, notwithstanding the failure at Niebla, the English
general’s project was crowned with success. The great army in his
front was broken up, Soult was gone, Marmont was preparing to retire,
and Portugal was safe. Blake’s cavalry under Penne Villemur, and some
infantry under Ballesteros, had also, during the attack on Niebla,
appeared in front of Seville on the right of the Guadalquivir, and
a slight insurrection took place at Carmona on the left bank. The
Serranos, always in arms, were assisted by Beguines with three
thousand men, and blockaded the town of Ronda; and Freire advancing
with his Murcians beyond Lorca, menaced general Laval, who had
succeeded Sebastiani in command of the fourth corps. In this crisis,
general Daricau, unable to keep the field, shut himself up in a great
convent, which Soult had, in anticipation of such a crisis, fortified
in the Triana suburb, before his first invasion of Estremadura. But
the Spanish troops of Joseph, shewed no disposition to quit him, the
people of Seville remained tranquil, and Blake’s incapacity ruined
the whole combination.
[Sidenote: 1811. July.]
Soult approached on the 6th of July, Ballesteros and Villemur
immediately retired, and the insurrection at Carmona ceased. Blake,
hearing of Conroux’s march, precipitately fled from Niebla, and only
escaped into Portugal by the assistance of a bridge laid for him at
San Lucar de Guadiana by colonel Austin. He then resolved to embark
some of his forces and sail to attack San Lucar de Barameda; but
scarcely had a few men got on board, when the French advanced guard
appeared, and he again fled in disorder to Ayamonte, and got into
the island of Canelas, where fortunately a Spanish frigate and three
hundred transports had unexpectedly arrived. While Ballesteros, with
the cavalry and three thousand infantry, protected the embarkation,
by taking a position on the Rio Piedra, Blake got on board with great
confusion, and sailed to Cadiz, for the French had reinforced San
Lucar de Barameda, and entered Ayamonte. The Portuguese militia, of
the Algarves, were then called out; and Ballesteros after losing some
men on the Piedra, took post in the mountains of Aroches on his
left, until the French retired, when he came back with his infantry
and entrenched himself in Canelas. On this island he remained until
August, and then embarked under the protection of the Portuguese
militia at Villa Real, while his cavalry marched up the Guadiana to
rejoin Castaños, who with a few troops still remained in Estremadura.
A small battalion left in the castle of Paymago was soon after
unsuccessfully attacked by the French, and this finished the long
partizan warfare of the Condado de Niebla.
[Sidenote: 1811. August.]
There was now nothing to prevent the French from again pressing
the allies on the Caya, except the timid operations of Freire on
the side of Grenada, and these Soult was in march to repress. With
indefatigable activity he had recalled the troops of the fourth
corps, from Estremadura, to supply the place of the detachments which
he had already sent, from Seville, Cadiz, Grenada, and Malaga, to
quell the insurrection in the Ronda; and while he thus prepared the
means of attacking Freire, Beguines was driven back to San Roque,
and the Serranos as I have before observed, disgusted with the
Spanish general’s ill conduct, were upon the point of capitulating
with the French. During these events in the Ronda, Godinot returned,
from the pursuit of Blake, to Jaen, whence on the 7th of August, he
was directed to march against Pozalçon and Baza, where the Murcian
army was posted. Meanwhile Blake, re-landing his troops at Almeria,
joined Freire; his intention was to have commenced active operations
against Grenada, but thinking it necessary to go first to Valencia
where Palacio was making mischief, he left the army, which was above
twenty-seven thousand strong, under Freire, and before he could
return it was utterly dispersed.
ROUT OF BAZA.
General Quadra, who commanded the right wing of the Murcians, was at
Pozalçon, and it is said, had orders to rejoin Freire, but disobeyed.
The centre and left under Freire himself, were at Venta de Bahul in
front of Baza. The 8th, Soult, at the head of a mixed force of French
and Spanish troops in Joseph’s service, drove back the advanced
guards from Guadix. The 9th he appeared in front of Bahul, where
he discerned the Spanish army on strong ground, their front being
covered by a deep ravine. As his object was to cut off the retreat
upon Lorca, and the city of Murcia, he only shewed a few troops at
first, and skirmished slightly, to draw Freire’s attention, while
Godinot attacked his right at Pozalçon and got in his rear. Godinot
wasted time. His advanced guard, alone, had defeated Quadra with
great loss, but instead of entering Baza, he halted for the night
near it; and during the darkness, the Spaniards, who had no other
line of retreat, and were now falling back in confusion before Soult,
passed through that place, and made for Lorca and Caravalha. Soult’s
cavalry, however, soon cut this line, and the fugitives took to the
by-roads, followed and severely harassed by the French horse.
At this time the whole province was in a defenceless state, but the
people generally took arms to protect the city of Murcia. That
place was entrenched, and the French marshal, whose troops were few,
and fatigued by constant marching, not thinking fit to persevere,
especially as the yellow fever was raging at Carthagena, returned
to Grenada, whence he sent detachments to disperse some insurgents
who had gathered under the Conde de Montijo in the Alpuxaras. Thus
Grenada was entirely quieted.
Here it is impossible to refrain from admiring Soult’s vigour and
ability. We see him in the latter end of 1810, with a small force
and in the depth of winter, taking Olivenza, Badajos, Albuquerque,
Valencia d’Alcantara, and Campo Mayor; defeating a great army,
and capturing above twenty thousand men. Again when unexpectedly
assailed by Beresford in the north, by the Murcians in the east, by
Ballesteros in the west, and by Lapeña and Graham in the south, he
found means to repel three of them, to persevere in the blockade
of Cadiz, and to keep Seville tranquil, while he marched against
the fourth. At Albuera he lost one of the fiercest battles upon
human record, and that at a moment when the king by abandoning his
throne had doubled every embarrassment; nevertheless, holding fast
to Estremadura, he still maintained the struggle, and again taking
the offensive obliged the allies to repass the Guadiana. If he did
not then push his fortune to the utmost, it must be considered that
his command was divided, that his troops were still impressed with
the recollection of Albuera, and that the genius of his adversary
had worked out new troubles for him in Andalusia. With how much
resolution and activity he repressed those troubles I have just
shewn; but above all things he is to be commended for the prudent
vigour of his administration, which, in despite of the opposition
of Joseph’s Spanish counsellors, had impressed the Andalusians with
such a notion of his power and resources, that no revolt of any real
consequence took place, and none of his civic guards or “Escopeteros”
failed him in the hour of need.
Let any man observe the wide extent of country he had to maintain;
the frontiers fringed as it were with hostile armies, the interior
suffering under war requisitions, the people secretly hating the
French, a constant insurrection in the Ronda, and a national
government and a powerful army in the Isla de Leon. Innumerable
English and Spanish agents prodigal of money, and of arms,
continually instigating the people of Andalusia to revolt; the coast
covered with hostile vessels, Gibraltar sheltering beaten armies
on one side, Cadiz on another, Portugal on a third, Murcia on a
fourth; the communication with France difficult, two battles lost,
few reinforcements, and all the material means to be created in the
country. Let any man, I say, consider this, and he will be convinced
that it was no common genius that could remain unshaken amidst such
difficulties; yet Soult not only sustained himself, but contemplated
the most gigantic offensive enterprises, and was at all times an
adversary to be dreaded. What though his skill in actual combat was
not so remarkable as in some of his contemporaries; who can deny
him firmness, activity, vigour, foresight, grand perception, and
admirable arrangement? It is this combination of high qualities that
forms a great captain.