SECOND ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.
[Sidenote: 1811. May.]
There is no operation in war so certain as a modern siege, provided
the rules of art are strictly followed, but, unlike the ancient
sieges in that particular, it is also different in this; that no
operation is less open to irregular daring, because the course of
the engineer can neither be hurried nor delayed without danger.
Lord Wellington knew that a siege of Badajos, in form, required
longer time, and better means, than were at his disposal, but he
was forced to incur danger and loss of reputation, which is loss of
strength, or to adopt some compendious mode of taking that place. The
time that he could command, and time is in all sieges the greatest
point, was precisely that which the French required to bring up a
force sufficient to disturb the operation; and this depended on the
movements of the army of Portugal, whose march from Salamanca to
Badajos, by the pass of Baños, or even through that of Gata, could
not be stopped by general Spencer, because the mouths of those
defiles were commanded by Marmont’s positions. It was possible
also at that season, for an army to pass the Tagus by fords near
Alcantara, and hence more than twenty days of free action against the
place were not to be calculated upon.
Now the carriages of the battering guns used in Beresford’s siege
were so much damaged, that the artillery officers asked eleven days
to repair them; and the scanty means of transport for stores was much
diminished by carrying the wounded from Albuera to the different
hospitals. Thus more than fifteen days of open trenches, and nine
days of fire could not be expected. With good guns, plentiful stores,
and a corps of regular sappers and miners, this time would probably
have sufficed; but none of these things were in the camp, and it was
a keen jest of Picton to say, that “lord Wellington sued Badajos in
forma pauperis.”
The guns, some of them cast in Philip the Second’s reign, were of
soft brass, and false in their bore; the shot were of different
sizes, and the largest too small; the Portuguese gunners were
inexperienced, there were but few British artillery-men, few
engineers, no sappers or miners, and no time to teach the troops
of the line how to make fascines and gabions. Regular and sure
approaches against the body of the place, by the Pardaleras and
the Picurina outworks, could not be attempted; but it was judged
that Beresford’s lines of attack on the castle and Fort Christoval,
might be successfully renewed, avoiding the errors of that general;
that is to say, by pushing the double attacks simultaneously, and
with more powerful means. San Christoval might thus be taken, and
batteries from thence could sweep the interior of the castle, which
was meanwhile to be breached. Something also was hoped from the
inhabitants, and something from the effect of Soult’s retreat after
Albuera.
This determination once taken, every thing was put in motion with the
greatest energy. Major Dickson, an artillery officer whose talents
were very conspicuous during the whole war, had, with unexpected
rapidity, prepared a battering train of thirty twenty-four-pounders,
four sixteen-pounders, and twelve eight and ten-inch howitzers
made to serve as mortars by taking off the wheels and placing
them on trucks. Six iron Portuguese ship-guns were forwarded from
Salvatierra, making altogether fifty-two pieces, a considerable
convoy of engineer’s stores had already arrived from Alcacer do
Sal, and a company of British artillery marched from Lisbon to be
mixed with the Portuguese, making a total of six hundred gunners.
The regular engineer-officers present, were only twenty-one
in number; but eleven volunteers from the line were joined as
assistant-engineers, and a draft of three hundred intelligent men
from the line, including twenty-five artificers of the staff corps,
strengthened the force immediately under their command.
Hamilton’s Portuguese division was already before the town, and on
the 24th of May, at the close of evening, general Houston’s division,
increased to five thousand men, by the addition of the seventeenth
Portuguese regiment, and the Tavira and Lagos militia, invested San
Christoval. The flying bridge was then laid down on the Guadiana, and
on the 27th Picton’s division, arriving from Campo Mayor, crossed
the river, by the ford above the town, and joined Hamilton, their
united force being about ten thousand men. General Hill commanded the
covering army which, including the Spaniards, was spread from Merida
to Albuera. The cavalry was pushed forward in observation of Soult,
and a few days after, intelligence having arrived that Drouet’s
division was on the point of effecting a junction with that marshal,
two regiments of cavalry and two brigades of infantry, which had
been quartered at Coria, as posts of communication with Spencer, were
called up to reinforce the covering army.
While the allies were engaged at Albuera, Phillipon, the governor
of Badajos, had levelled their trenches, repaired his own damages,
and obtained a small supply of wine and vegetables from the people
of Estremadura, who were still awed by the presence of Soult’s army;
and within the place all was quiet, for the citizens did not now
exceed five thousand souls. He had also mounted more guns, and when
the place was invested, parties of the townsmen mixed with soldiers,
were observed working to improve the defences; wherefore, as any
retrenchments made in the castle, behind the intended points of
attack, would have frustrated the besiegers’ object by prolonging the
siege, lord Wellington had a large telescope placed in the tower of
La Lyppe, near Elvas, by which the interior of the castle could be
plainly looked into, and all preparations discovered.
In the night of the 29th, ground was broken for a false attack
against the Pardaleras, and the following night sixteen hundred
workmen, with a covering party of twelve hundred, sank a parallel
against the castle, on an extent of eleven hundred yards, without
being discovered by the enemy, who did not fire until after daylight.
The same night twelve hundred workmen, covered by eight hundred men
under arms, opened a parallel four hundred and fifty yards from San
Christoval, and seven hundred yards from the bridge-head. On this
line one breaching, and two counter-batteries, were raised against
the fort and against the bridge-head, to prevent a sally from that
point; and a fourth battery was also commenced to search the defences
of the castle, but the workmen were discovered, and a heavy fire
struck down many of them.
On the 31st the attack against the castle, the soil being very soft,
was pushed forward without much interruption, and rapidly; but the
Christoval attack, being carried on in a rocky soil, and the earth
brought up from the rear, proceeded slowly, and with considerable
loss. This day the British artillery company came up on mules from
Estremos, and the engineer hastened the works. The direction of
the parallel against the castle was such, that the right gradually
approached the point of attack by which the heaviest fire of the
place was avoided; yet, so great was the desire to save time, that
before the suitable point of distance was attained, a battery of
fourteen twenty-four-pounders with six large howitzers was marked out.
[Sidenote: 1811. June.]
[Sidenote: French Register of the Siege, MSS.]
On the Christoval side, the batteries were not finished before the
night of the 1st of June, for the soil was so rocky, that the miner
was employed to level the ground for the platforms; and the garrison
having mortars of sixteen and eighteen inches’ diameter mounted
on the castle, sent every shell amongst the workmen. These huge
missiles would have ruined the batteries on that side altogether,
if the latter had not been on the edge of a ridge, from whence most
of the shells rolled off before bursting, yet so difficult is it to
judge rightly in war, that Phillipon stopped this fire, thinking it
was thrown away! The progress of the works was also delayed by the
bringing of earth from a distance, and woolpacks purchased at Elvas,
were found to be an excellent substitute.
In the night of the 2d, the batteries on both sides were completed,
and armed with forty-three pieces of different sizes, of which
twenty were pointed against the castle; the next day the fire of the
besiegers opened, but the windage caused by the smallness of the
shot, rendered it very ineffectual at first, and five pieces became
unserviceable. However, before evening the practice was steadier, the
fire of the fort was nearly silenced, and the covering of masonry
fell from the castle-wall, discovering a perpendicular bank of clay.
In the night of the 3d the parallel against the castle was prolonged,
and a fresh battery for seven guns traced out at six hundred and
fifty yards from the breach. On the 4th the garrison’s fire was
increased by several additional guns, and six more pieces of the
besiegers were disabled, principally by their own fire. Meanwhile the
batteries told but slightly against the bank of clay.
At Christoval, the fort was much injured, and some damage was done
to the castle, from one of the batteries on that side; but the guns
were so soft and bad that the rate of firing was of necessity greatly
reduced in all the batteries. In the night the new battery was armed,
all the damaged works were repaired, and the next day the enemy
having brought a gun in Christoval to plunge into the trenches on
the castle side, the parallel there was deepened and traverses were
constructed to protect the troops.
Fifteen pieces still played against the castle, but the bank of
clay, although falling away in flakes, always remained perpendicular.
One damaged gun was repaired on the Christoval side, but two more had
become unserviceable.
In the night the parallel against the castle was again extended,
a fresh battery was traced out, at only five hundred and twenty
yards from the breach, to receive the Portuguese iron guns, which
had arrived at Elvas; and on the Christoval side some new batteries
were opened and some old ones were abandoned. During this night the
garrison began to entrench themselves behind the castle breach,
before morning their labourers were well covered, and two additional
pieces, from Christoval, were made to plunge into the trenches
with great effect. On the other hand the fire of the besiegers had
broken the clay bank, which took such a slope as to appear nearly
practicable, and the stray shells and shots set fire to the houses
nearest the castle, but three more guns were disabled.
On the 6th there were two breaches in Christoval, and the principal
one being found practicable, a company of grenadiers with twelve
ladders were directed to assault it, while a second company turned
the fort by the east to divert the enemy’s attention. Three hundred
men from the trenches were at the same time pushed forward by
the west side to cut the communication between the fort and the
bridge-head; and a detachment, with a six-pounder, moved into the
valley of the Gebora, to prevent any passage of the Guadiana by
boats.
FIRST ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.
The storming party, commanded by major M‘Intosh, of the 85th
regiment, was preceded by a forlorn hope under Mr. Dyas, of the
51st, and this gallant gentleman, guided by the engineer Forster, a
young man of uncommon bravery, reached the glacis about midnight,
and descended the ditch without being discovered. The French had,
however, cleared all the rubbish away, the breach had still seven
feet of perpendicular wall, many obstacles, such as carts chained
together and pointed beams of wood, were placed above it, and
large shells were ranged along the ramparts to roll down upon the
assailants. The forlorn hope finding the opening impracticable, was
retiring with little loss, when the main body, which had been exposed
to a flank fire, from the town as well as a direct fire from the
fort, came leaping into the ditch with ladders, and another effort
was made to escalade at different points; the ladders were too short,
and the garrison, consisting of only seventy-five men, besides
the cannoneers, made so stout a resistance, and the confusion and
mischief occasioned by the bursting of the shells was so great, that
the assailants again retired with the loss of more than one hundred
men.
[Sidenote: Lamarre’s Sieges.]
Bad success always produces disputes, and the causes of this failure
were attributed by some to the breach being impracticable from the
first; by others to the confusion which arose after the main body
had entered. French writers affirm that the breach was certainly
practicable on the night of the 5th, but repaired on the 6th; that
as the besiegers did not attack until midnight, the workmen had
time to clear the ruins away and to raise fresh obstacles, and the
bravery of the soldiers, who were provided with three muskets each,
did the rest. But it is also evident, that whether from inexperience,
accident, or other causes, the combinations for the assault were not
very well calculated; the storming party was too weak, the ladders
few and short, and the breach not sufficiently scoured by the fire of
the batteries. The attack itself was also irregular and ill-combined,
for the leading troops were certainly repulsed before the main body
had descended the ditch. The intrepidity of the assailants was
admitted by all sides, yet it is a great point in such attacks that
the supports should form almost one body with the leaders, because
the sense of power derived from numbers is a strong incentive to
valour, and obstacles which would be insurmountable to a few, seem to
vanish before a multitude. It is also to be recollected that this was
a case where not loss of men, but time was to be considered.
During this night the iron guns were placed in battery against the
castle, but two more of the brass pieces became unserviceable, and
the following day three others were disabled. However, the bank of
clay at the castle at last offered a practicable slope, and during
the night captain Patton of the engineers examined it closely; he
was mortally wounded in returning, yet lived to make his report that
it was practicable. Nevertheless the garrison continued, as they
had done every night at both breaches, to clear away the ruins, and
with bales of wool and other materials to form defences behind the
opening. They ranged also a number of huge shells and barrels of
powder, with matches fastened to them, along the ramparts, and placed
chosen men to defend the breach, each man being supplied with four
muskets.
In this order they fearlessly awaited another attack, which was soon
made. For intelligence now arrived that Drouet’s corps was close
to Llerena, and that Marmont was on the move from Salamanca, and
hence lord Wellington, seeing that his prey was likely to escape, as
a last effort resolved to assault Christoval again. But this time
four hundred British, Portuguese, and French men of the Chasseurs
Britanniques, carrying sixteen long ladders, were destined for the
attack; the supports were better closed up; the appointed hour was
nine instead of twelve, and a greater number of detachments than
before were distributed to the right and left to distract the enemy’s
attention, to cut off his communication with the town, and to be
ready to improve any success which might be obtained. On the other
side Phillipon increased the garrison of the fort to two hundred men.
SECOND ASSAULT OF CHRISTOVAL.
The storming party was commanded by major M‘Geechy; the forlorn
hope, again led by the gallant Dyas, was accompanied by Mr. Hunt, an
engineer officer, and a little after nine o’clock the leading troops
bounding forward, were immediately followed by the support, amidst a
shattering fire of musketry which killed major M‘Geechy, Mr. Hunt,
and many men upon the glacis. The troops with loud shouts jumped
into the ditch, but the French scoffingly called to them to come on,
and at the same time rolled the barrels of powder and shells down,
while the musketry made fearful and rapid havoc. In a little time
the two leading columns united at the main breach, the supports also
came up, confusion arose about the ladders, of which only a few could
be reared, and the enemy standing on the ramparts, bayonetted the
foremost of the assailants, overturned the ladders, and again poured
their destructive fire upon the crowd below. When a hundred and forty
men had fallen the order to retire was given.
An assault on the castle breach might still have been tried, but the
troops could not have formed between the top, and the retrenchments
behind the breach, until Christoval was taken, and the guns from
thence used to clear the interior of the castle; hence the siege was
of necessity raised, because to take Christoval, required several
days more, and Soult was now ready to advance. The stores were
removed on the 10th, and the attack was turned into a blockade.
OBSERVATIONS.
1º. The allies lost, during this unfortunate siege, nearly four
hundred men and officers, and the whole of their proceedings were
against rules. The working parties were too weak, the guns and stores
too few, and the points of attack, chosen, not the best; the defences
were untouched by counter-batteries, and the breaching batteries were
at too great a distance for the bad guns employed; howitzers mounted
on trucks were but a poor substitute for mortars, and the sap was not
practised; lastly, the assaults were made before the glacis had been
crowned, and a musketry fire established against the breach.
2º. That a siege so conducted should fail against such a brave and
intelligent garrison is not strange; but it is most strange and
culpable that a government, which had been so long engaged in war as
the British, should have left the engineer department, with respect
to organization and equipment, in such a state as to make it, in
despite of the officers’ experience, bravery, and zeal, a very
inefficient arm of war. The skill displayed belonged to particular
persons, rather than to the corps at large; and the very tools with
which they worked, especially those sent from the storekeeper’s
department, were so shamefully bad that the work required could
scarcely be performed; the captured French cutting-tools were eagerly
sought for by the engineers as being infinitely better than the
British; when the soldiers’ lives and the honour of England’s arms,
were at stake, the English cutlery was found worse than the French.
3º. The neglect of rules, above noticed, was for the most part
a matter of absolute necessity; yet censure might attach to the
general, inasmuch as he could have previously sent to England for a
battering train. But then the conduct of the Portuguese and British
governments when lord Wellington was in the lines, left him so little
hope of besieging any place on the frontier, that he was hourly
in fear of being obliged to embark: moreover, the badness of the
Portuguese guns was not known, and the space of time that elapsed
between the fall of Badajos and this siege, was insufficient to
procure artillery from England; neither would the Portuguese have
furnished the means of carriage. It may however at all times be taken
as a maxim, that the difficulties of war are so innumerable that no
head was ever yet strong enough to fore-calculate them all.