POLITICAL STATE OF PORTUGAL.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
[Sidenote: Vol. III.]
The power and crafty projects of the Souzas, their influence over
their weak-minded prince, their cabal to place the duke of Brunswick
at the head of the Portuguese army, the personal violence of the
patriarch, the resignation of Das Minas, and the disputes with lord
Wellington, have been already touched upon; but the extent of the
difficulties engendered by those things, cannot be understood without
a more detailed exposition.
[Sidenote: Feb. 1810.]
Mr. Villiers’s mission, like all those emanating from Mr. Canning,
had been expensive in style, tainted by intrigues, useless in
business, and productive of disorders. When Mr. Stuart arrived, he
found every thing, except the army under Beresford, in a state of
disorganization; and the influence of England was decreasing, because
of the vacillating system hitherto pursued by the British government.
As early as 1808 lord Wellington had advised the ministers not only
to adopt Portugal as the base of operations in the Peninsula, but to
assume in reality the whole administration of that country; to draw
forth all its resources, both of men and money, and to make up any
deficiency, by the power of England. This advice had been neglected,
and an entirely different policy pursued, which, in execution, was
also feeble and uncertain.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
The Portuguese constitution, like most of those springing from
the feudal system, was excellent in theory, as far as regarded
the defence of the kingdom: but it was overwhelmed with abuses in
practice; and it was a favourite maxim with the authorities that
it did not become a paternal government to punish neglect in the
subordinates. When court intrigues were to be effected, or poor men
to be oppressed, there was no want of vigour or of severity; but in
all that regarded the administration of affairs, it was considered
sufficient to give orders without looking to their execution, and
no animadversion, much less punishment, followed disobedience.
The character of the government was extreme weakness; the taxes,
partially levied, produced only half their just amount; the payments
from the treasury were in arrears; the army was neglected in all
things dependent on the civil administration, and a bad navy was
kept up, at an expense of a quarter of a million, to meet a war with
Algiers. This last question was, however, a knife with a double edge,
for in peace, a tribute paid in coin, drained the treasury already
too empty, and in war the fleet did nothing; meanwhile the feeding
of Cadiz was rendered precarious by it; and of Lisbon also, for the
whole produce of Portugal was only equal to four months’ consumption.
In commercial affairs, the usual peninsular jealousy was displayed;
the imports of British goods were prohibited to the advantage of
smugglers only, while the government which thus neglected its own
resources to the injury of both countries, clamoured for subsidies.
Finally, the power of the Souzas was so great, and the regency was
so entirely subservient to them, that although Mr. Stuart had been
assured by Mr. Canning, that a note forbidding Domingo Souza to
meddle with affairs at Lisbon, had been procured from the Brazils,
all representations, to the regency, were met by references to that
nobleman, who was in London, and the business of the mission was thus
paralysed.
In March 1809 the British government had taken ten thousand
Portuguese troops into pay. In May they were increased to twenty
thousand, and in June to thirty thousand. The cost of these forces,
and the increased pay to Portuguese officers, added to the subsidy,
amounted to two millions sterling; but this subsidy partly from
negligence, partly from the exhaustion of England in consequence of
Mr. Canning’s prodigal donations to Spain, was in arrears. However,
as this mode of proceeding was perfectly in unison with their own
method, the regency did not much regard it, but they were eager to
obtain a loan from England, in the disposal of which they would have
been quite uncontrolled, and for this very reason lord Wellington
strenuously opposed it. In revenge, the regency, by a wilful
misunderstanding of the debates of parliament, and by the distortion
of facts, endeavoured to throw a doubt upon the sincerity of England,
and this, with the encouragement given to all Portuguese malcontents
by the Whigs, whose clamour, just, as applied to the ministers, was
unjustly extended to the generals, greatly increased the disorder of
the times.
In this state of affairs Mr. Canning being happily removed from
office, lord Wellesley, who succeeded him, changed the instructions
of the diplomatic agents in the Peninsula. They were now directed to
make conditions with respect to the succours, and in Portugal they
were vigorously to interfere in all civil changes, augmentations of
revenue, and military resources; and even to demand monthly reports
of the condition of the army, and the expenditure of the subsidy.
Lord Wellesley also, thinking that the example of a cortes in Spain,
might create a desire for a more temperate government in Portugal,
was prepared to forward such a change, provided old forms were
preserved, and that all appeared to flow from the prince regent,
whose consent he undertook to secure. Resistance to the enemy, he
said, would be in proportion to the attachment of the people, and
hence it was advisable to make timely concessions, giving however no
more than was absolutely necessary.
The regency were strongly opposed to this notion of a cortes, and Mr.
Stuart and lord Wellington affirmed, and truly, that the docility of
the people, and their hatred of the French, were motives powerful
enough, without any other stimulus, to urge them to action. Thus the
project fell to the ground, and the time was perhaps inconvenient
to effect a revolution of this nature, which the people themselves
certainly did not contemplate, and which, as Spain had shewn, was not
a certain help to the war. Lord Wellington, who only considered what
would conduce to the success of the war, was therefore consistent
upon this occasion, but it is curious to observe the course of
the English cabinet. The enforcement in France of a military
conscription, authorized by the laws, was an unheard-of oppression
on the part of Napoleon; but in Portugal a conscription, enforced
by foreigners, was a wise and vigorous measure; and lord Wellesley
admitting that the Portuguese government had been harsh and
oppressive, as well as weak and capricious, was content to withhold
a better system from the people, expressly because they loved their
country and were obedient subjects; for he would have readily granted
it to them if they had been unruly and of doubtful patriotism.
Mr. Stuart in concert with lord Wellington diligently endeavoured
to remedy the evils of the hour, but whenever he complained of any
particular disorder, he was, by the regency, offered arbitrary power
to punish, which being only an expedient to render the British odious
to the people, he refused. The intrigues of the Fidalgos then became
apparent, and the first regency was broken up in 1810. The marquis
of Das Minas retired from it under the pretext of ill health, but
really because he found himself too weak to support Mr. De Mello, a
Fidalgo officer, who was thrust forward to oppose the legal authority
of marshal Beresford. Mr. Cypriano Freire was then made minister of
finance, and of foreign affairs, and Mr. Forjas secretary-at-war,
with a vote in the regency on matters of war. But the former soon
after Mr. Stuart’s arrival resigned his situation in consequence of
some disgust, and the Conde Redondo, having undertaken the office,
commenced, with the advice of Mr. Stuart, a better arrangement of the
taxes, especially the “_decima_” or income tax, which was neither
impartially nor strictly enforced on the rich towns, nor on the
powerful people of the Fidalgo faction. The clergy also evaded the
imposts, and the British merchants, although profiting enormously
from the war, sought exemption under the factory privileges, not only
from the taxes, which in certain cases they could legally do, but
from the billets, and from those recruiting laws affecting their
servants, which they could not justly demand, and which all other
classes in the community were liable to.
The working of the Souzas, in the Brazils, where the minister of
finance wished to have the regulation of the Portuguese treasury
under his control, soon changed this arrangement. Freire’s
resignation was not accepted, Redondo was excluded from the
government, and Forjas, who was the most efficient member of the
government, was deprived of his functions. The remaining members
then proposed to fill up Das Minas’ vacancy themselves, but this
was resisted by lord Wellington, on the ground, that, without the
prince’s order, the proceeding would be illegal, and involve the
regency in an indefensible quarrel at the Brazils. The order for
removing Redondo, and cramping the utility of Forjas, he, in concert
with Mr. Stuart, withstood; and this, for the moment, prevented a
change, which would have impeded the ameliorations begun. Such,
however, was the disorder in the finances, that Mr. Stuart proposed,
as the least difficult mode of arranging them, to take the whole
direction himself, England becoming answerable for the expenditure of
the country; lord Wellington thought this could not be done, without
assuming, at the same time, the whole government of the country,
which he had previously proposed to the British cabinet, but which
it was now too late to attempt, and Mr. Stuart’s project fell to the
ground.
Another spring of mischief soon bubbled up, lord Strangford, whose
diplomatic dexterity evinced by his Bruton-street despatch, had been
rewarded by the situation of minister at the Brazils, was there
bestirring himself. It had been the policy of Mr. Stuart and the
English general, to keep the regency permanent, and to support the
secretariats as they were placed in the hands of Mr. de Forjas and
the Conde de Redondo; for these men had been found by experience,
to be better qualified to co-operate with the British authorities
than any other persons, and hence lord Wellington had resisted the
prince’s orders for Cypriano Freire’s resumption of office, and
had continued the functions of Forjas and Redondo, until his own
remonstrances could reach the Brazils. In this state of affairs lord
Strangford informed Mr. Stuart that he had persuaded the prince
to accede to the following propositions. 1º. That the British
plenipotentiary at Lisbon, the count Redondo, doctor Nogueras, and
the principal Souza, should be added to the old regency. 2º. That
admiral Berkeley should be naval commander-in-chief. 3º. That all
traitorous correspondence should be prevented, and that measures
should be taken to limit the exuberant power assumed by subordinates.
This last article was directed against Forjas, and the whole went to
establish the preponderance of the Souza faction. The only useful
part was the appointment of Mr. Stuart to the regency, but this was
arranged before it was known that Mr. Villiers had been recalled, and
consequently had the same object of favouring the Souzas in view.
Mr. Stuart and lord Wellington strongly objected to this change,
although they submitted to it as not wishing to appear regardless
of the prince regent’s rights. Mr. Stuart, however, reflecting that
a government composed of men having different views and feelings,
and without any casting vote, the number being even, could not go on
usefully, was at first averse to join the regency, but was finally
persuaded to do so by lord Wellington, who justly considered that his
presence there would give the only chance of success.
Doctor Nogueras’ appointment was described, by lord Strangford, as
a tribute to democracy, the object being to counteract the power of
those very secretariats which lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart were
labouring to preserve. But lord Strangford prided himself chiefly
upon the appointment of the principal Souza, who, he said, had been
recommended to him by Mr. Villiers, an avowal of great import, as
shewing at once the spirit of the new arrangement: for this Souza
had, in a subordinate situation, hitherto opposed every proceeding
of the British in Portugal; he was the avowed enemy of Beresford,
the contriver of all confusion, and the most mischievous person in
Portugal; and his absence from that country was so desirable, that
intimations to that effect had been formally given to him, by lord
Wellesley, through Mr. Stuart. This factious person was now, however,
armed with additional power, to thwart the English authorities in
Portugal, and thus lord Strangford’s diplomacy tended, in effect, to
ruin that cause which he had been sent to the Brazils to support.
[Sidenote: See Vol. II. Appendix.]
In relating these proceedings I have, following his own letter,
announcing the change, described lord Strangford as acting
voluntarily; but in a subsequent despatch he affirmed, that it
was under Mr. Canning’s instructions, he had pressed for this
incorporating of the British minister in the regency, and that
Nogueras’ appointment sprang entirely from the prince regent’s own
will, which he did not choose to oppose. In like manner, when lord
Wellesley was intent upon assembling a cortes, lord Strangford called
it “_a great and essential measure strongly and wisely urged by the
government_,” and yet afterwards acknowledged that he neglected to
press it, because he thought it “_useless and even hurtful_,” which
inconsistency renders it difficult to determine on whom these affairs
rested. As affecting Mr. Canning’s policy, however, it is to be
observed that if he originally arranged this change, his object was
to put Mr. Villiers in the regency, not with any view to the more
complete controul of Portugal for the purposes of war, but, as the
instructions to sir John Cradock prove, to ensure a preponderance to
the diplomatic department over the military in that country.
The principal reforms, in the administration, which had been
sought for by lord Wellington, were a better arrangement of the
financial system—the execution of the laws without favour to the
fidalgos—the suppression of the “_junta di viveres_,” a negligent
and fraudulent board, for which he wished to establish a Portuguese
commissariat—the due supply of provisions and stores, for the
national troops and fortresses—the consolidation of the arsenal
department under one head—the formation of a military chest,
distinct from the treasury, which was always diverting the funds to
other purposes—the enforcing of the regulations about the means of
transport—the repairs of the roads and bridges—the reformation of
the hospitals—the succouring of the starving people, and the revival
of agriculture in the parts desolated by the war.
These things he had hoped to accomplish; but from the moment the
change effected by lord Strangford took place, unceasing acrimonious
disputes ensued between the British commander and the Portuguese
government, and no species of falsehood or intrigue, not even
personal insult, and the writing of anonymous threatening letters,
were spared by the Souza faction. In the beginning of 1811 they
had organized an anti-English party, and a plot was laid to force
the British out of the country, which would have succeeded if less
vigilance had been used by Mr. Stuart, or less vigour of control
by lord Wellington. This plot however required that the patriarch
should go to the northern provinces, a journey which the envoy always
dexterously prevented.
[Sidenote: May.]
The first complaint of the British authorities, accompanied with a
demand for the removal of the principal Souza, reached the Brazils
in February 1811, and Das Minas died about the same time; but so
strongly was the faction supported at Rio de Janeiro, that in May,
the prince regent expressed his entire approval of the Souzas’
proceedings and his high displeasure with Forjas and Mr. Stuart. His
minister, the Conde de Linhares, wrote, that the capture of Massena
with his whole army, which he expected to hear of each day, would not
make amends for the destruction of the country during the retreat of
the allies; and in an official note to lord Strangford, he declared,
that the prince regent could not permit Mr. Stuart to vote in matters
concerning the internal government of the kingdom, because he was
influenced by, and consulted persons suspected of disaffection, which
expression lord Strangford said referred solely to Forjas.
[Sidenote: June.]
The prince himself also wrote to lord Wellington, accusing Mr. Stuart
of acting separately from the commander-in-chief, and of being the
cause of all the factions which had sprung up, and he declared
that he would not remove Souza, unless Mr. Stuart was recalled.
He desired that Forjas, who he affirmed to be the real author of
the opposition complained of by the British, should be sent to the
Brazils, to answer for his conduct; and finally he announced his
intention to write in a like strain to the king of England. To this
lord Wellington answered that finding his conduct disapproved and
Souza’s applauded, he proposed to quit Portugal. Forjas immediately
sent in his resignation, admiral Berkeley proposed to do the same,
and Mr. Stuart withdrew from the council until the pleasure of his
own cabinet should be made known: the war was then on the point of
finishing, but the crisis was not perceived by the public, because
the resolution of the English general was kept secret, to avoid
disturbing the public mind, and in the hopes of submission on the
part of the prince.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
Meanwhile other embarrassments were super-added, of a nature to
leave the English general little hope of being able to continue
the contest, should he even defeat the intrigues at Rio Janeiro;
for besides the quarrel with the Souza faction, in which he and
Mr. Stuart supported Forjas, Nogueira, and Redondo, against their
enemies in the Brazils, these very persons, although the best that
could be found, and men of undoubted ability, influenced partly
by national habits, partly by fears of ultimate consequences,
continually harassed him in the execution of the details belonging
to their offices. No delinquent was ever punished, no fortress ever
stored in due time and quantity, the suffering people were uncared
for, disorders were unrepressed, the troops were starved, and the
favouring of the fidalgos constant. The “_junta de viveres_” was
supported, the formation of a military chest, and commissariat,
delayed; many wild and foolish schemes daily broached; and the
natural weakness of the government was, by instability, increased,
because the prince regent had early in 1811 intimated an intention of
immediately returning to Europe.
I have said that it was a favourite maxim with the regency that a
paternal government should not punish delinquents in the public
service, and they added to this another still more absurd, namely,
that the Portuguese troops could thrive under privations of food,
which would kill men of another nation; with these two follies they
excused neglect, whenever the repetition, that there had been no
neglect, became fatiguing to them. Besides this, collisions between
the British commissariat and the “_junta de viveres_” were frequent
and very hurtful, because the former able to outbid, and more in fear
of failure, overbought the latter; this contracted the already too
small sphere of their activity, and lord Wellington was prevented
feeding the whole Portuguese army himself by a curious obstacle. His
principal dependance for the support of his own troops was upon the
Spanish muleteers attached to the army, they were the very life and
sustenance of the war, and their patience, hardiness, and fidelity
to the British were remarkable; but they so abhorred the Portuguese
people that they would not carry provisions for their soldiers, and
lord Wellington only obtained their services, for those brigades
which were attached to the English divisions, by making them think
the food was entirely for the latter. Upon such nice management even
in apparently trifling matters did this war depend. And yet it is not
uncommon for politicians, versed only in the classic puerilities of
public schools, and the tricks of parliamentary faction, to hold the
rugged experience of Wellington’s camp as nothing in the formation of
a statesman.
The effects of these complicated affairs were soon and severely felt.
Abrantes had like to have been abandoned, from want, at the time
Massena held Santarem, and the Portuguese troops were starved during
that general’s retreat; Beresford’s operations in the Alemtejo were
impeded, and his hospitals were left without succour; at Fuentes
Onoro ammunition failed, and the Portuguese artillery were forced to
supply themselves by picking up the enemy’s bullets; the cavalry of
that nation were quite ruined, and out of more than forty thousand
regular troops, formed by Beresford, only nineteen thousand were
to be found under arms after the battle of Albuera, the rest had
deserted or died from extreme want.
When Massena retreated the provincial organization of the country was
restored, and to encourage the people to sow the devastated districts
before the season passed, Mr. Stuart had furnished seed corn on the
credit of the coming subsidy; an amnesty for deserters was also
published, the feudal imposts for the year were remitted, and fairs
were established to supply tools of husbandry; but notwithstanding
these efforts, such was the distress, that at Caldas eighty persons
died daily, and at Figueras where twelve thousand people, chiefly
from Portuguese Estremadura, had taken refuge, the daily deaths were
above a hundred, and the whole would have perished but for the active
benevolence of major Von Linstow, an officer of general Trant’s
staff. Meanwhile the country was so overrun with robbers that the
detached officers could not travel in safety upon the service of
the army, and Wellington was fearful of being obliged to employ his
troops against them. British officers were daily insulted at Lisbon,
and even assassinated while on duty with impunity; the whole army was
disgusted, the letters to England were engendering in that country
a general dislike to the war, and the British soldiers, when not
with their regiments, committed a thousand outrages on the line of
operations.
As a climax to these scenes of misery and mischief, the harvest
which had failed in Portugal, failed also in England; and no corn
was to be got from the Baltic because there was no specie to pay for
it, and bills were refused. Hence the famine spread in a terrible
manner until Mr. Stuart obtained leave to license fifty American
vessels with corn, whose cargoes were paid for out of funds provided
partly by the charity of the people of England, and partly by a
parliamentary grant which passed when Massena retreated.
In this crisis the British cabinet granted an additional subsidy
to Portugal, but from the scarcity of specie, the greatest part of
it was paid in kind, and the distress of the regency for money was
scarcely lessened; for these supplies merely stood in the place
of the plunder which had hitherto prevailed in the country. Thus
Mr. Canning’s prodigality, Mr. Vansittart’s paper system, and Mr.
Perceval’s economy, all combined to press upon the British general,
and to use his own words, he was supplied with only one-sixth part
of the money necessary to keep the great machine going which
had been set in motion. Mr. Perceval however, in answer to his
remonstrances, employed a secretary of the Treasury to prove in a
laboured paper, founded entirely upon false data, that the army had
been over-supplied, and must have money to spare. But that minister,
whose speeches breathed nothing but the final destruction of France,
designed to confine the efforts of England to the defence of Portugal
alone, without any regard to the rest of the Peninsula.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s papers, MSS.]
Amongst the other follies of the Portuguese regency was a resolution
to issue proclamations, filled with bombastic adulation of
themselves, vulgar abuse of the French, and altogether unsuited to
the object of raising the public feeling, which flagged under their
system. To the English general’s remonstrances on this head, Forjas
replied, that praise of themselves and abuse of the French, was the
national custom, and could not be dispensed with! a circumstance
which certain English writers who have implicitly followed the
accounts of the Portuguese authors, such as Accursio de Neves, and
men of his stamp, relative to French enormities, would do well to
consider. And here it is right to observe, that so many complaints
were made of the cruelty committed by Massena’s army while at
Santarem, that lord Wellington had some thoughts of reprisals; but
having first caused strict inquiry to be made, it was discovered that
in most cases, the _ordenança_, after having submitted to the French,
and received their protection, took advantage of it to destroy the
stragglers and small detachments, and the cruelty complained of was
only the infliction of legitimate punishment for such conduct: the
projected retaliation was therefore changed for an injunction to the
_ordenanças_ to cease from such a warfare.
The character of the regency was, however, most openly shewn in
their proceedings connected with the convention of Cintra. All the
advantages which that treaty ensured to Portugal, they complacently
reaped, but overlooked or annulled those points in which the
character of England was concerned. In violation of the convention,
and in despite of the remonstrances of lord Wellington and Mr.
Stuart, they cast the French residents at Lisbon into loathsome
dungeons, without any cause of complaint; and in the affair of
Mascarheñas their conduct was distinguished alike by wanton cruelty
and useless treachery. This youth, when only fifteen, had with
many others entered the French service in Junot’s time, under the
permission of his own prince; and he and the Conde de Sabugal, were
taken by the peasantry in 1810 endeavouring to pass from Massena’s
army into Spain, Sabugal in uniform, Mascarheñas in disguise. They
were both tried as traitors. The first, a general officer, and with
powerful friends amongst the Fidalgos, was acquitted, as indeed
was only just; but he was then appointed to a situation under the
regency, which was disgraceful, as arising from faction: Mascarheñas
was a boy, and had no powerful friends, and he was condemned to
death. Lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart represented the injustice of
this sentence, and they desired that if humanity was unheeded the
government would put him to death as a spy, for being in disguise,
and so prevent the danger of reprisals, already threatened by
Massena. The young man’s mother and sisters, grovelling in the dust,
implored the regency to spare him, but to shew their hatred of lord
Wellington and Mr. Stuart, for the disputes with the regency were
then highest, the government told the miserable women, that it was
the British general and minister who demanded his death, and they
were sent, with this brutal falsehood, to weep and to ask grace
from persons who had no power to grant it. Mascarheñas was publicly
executed as a traitor, for entering the French service under the
authority of his native prince, while Sabugal was acquitted, and even
rewarded, although precisely in the same circumstances, when the
excuse of the disguise had been rejected.
In 1810 one Corea, calling himself an aide-de-camp of Massena, was
likewise seized in disguise within the British lines, and, having
given useful information, was by lord Wellington confined in St.
Julians, to protect him from the Portuguese government. After a time
he became deranged, and was released, whereupon the regency, rather
than keep him, desired that he might be sent as a prisoner of war to
England; thus for convenience admitting the very principle which they
had rejected when only honour and humanity were concerned. A process
against the marquis d’Alorna had also been commenced, but his family
being powerful it was soon dropped, and yet the government refused
madame d’Alorna leave to join her husband, thus shewing themselves
spiteful and contemptible as well as cowardly and bloody. Even the
court of Brazil was shocked. The prince rebuked the regency severely
for the death of Mascarheñas, reversed the sentences on some others,
and banished Sabugal to Terceira.
This was the political state of Portugal.
[Sidenote: 1811. May.]
Lord Liverpool’s intimation, that neither corn nor specie could be
had from England, threw lord Wellington on his own resources for
feeding his troops. He had before created a paper money by means of
commissariat bills, which, being paid regularly at certain periods,
passed current with the people when the national bonds called
“Apolocies” were at an enormous discount. He now in concert with Mr.
Stuart, entered into commerce to supply his necessities. For having
ascertained that grain in different parts of the world, especially
in South America, could be bought by bills, cheaper than it sold for
hard cash in Lisbon; and that in Egypt, although only to be bought
with specie, it was at a reduced price; they employed mercantile
agents to purchase it for the army account, and after filling the
magazines sold the overplus to the inhabitants. This transaction was,
however, greatly impeded by the disputes with North America, which
were now rapidly hastening to a rupture; the American ships which
frequented the Tagus being prevented by the non-importation act from
bringing back merchandize, were forced to demand coin, which helped
to drain the country of specie.
As Mr. Stuart could obtain no assistance from the English
merchants of Lisbon, to aid him in a traffic which interfered with
their profits, he wrote circular letters to the consuls in the
Mediterranean, and in the Portuguese islands, and to the English
minister at Washington, desiring them to negotiate treasury bills;
to increase the shipments of corn to Lisbon, and pay with new
bills, to be invested in such articles of British manufacture as
the non-importation law still permitted to go to America. By this
complicated process he contrived to keep something in the military
chest; and this commerce, which lord Wellington truly observed, was
not what ought to have occupied his time and attention, saved the
army, and the people, when the proceedings of Mr. Perceval would have
destroyed both. Yet it was afterwards cavilled at and censured by the
ministers, on the representations of the merchants who found their
exorbitant gains interrupted by it.
Pressed by such accumulated difficulties, and not supported in
England as he deserved, the general, who had more than once intimated
his resolution to withdraw from the Peninsula, now seriously thought
of executing it. Yet when he considered, that the cause was one
even of more interest to England than to the Peninsula; that the
embarrassments of the French might be even greater than his own, and
that Napoleon himself, gigantic as his exertions had been, and were
likely to be, was scarcely aware of the difficulty of conquering the
Peninsula while an English army held Portugal; when he considered
also, that light was breaking in the north of Europe, that the
chances of war are many, even in the worst of times, and above all,
when his mental eye caught the beams of his own coming glory, he
quelled his rising indignation, and re-tempered his mighty energies
to bear the buffet of the tempest.
But he could not remove the obstacles that choked his path, nor could
he stand still, lest the ground should open beneath his feet. If he
moved in the north, Marmont’s army and the army under Bessieres were
ready to oppose him, and he must take Ciudad Rodrigo or blockade
it before he could even advance against them. To take that place
required a battering-train, to be brought up through a mountainous
country from Lamego, and there was no covering position for the
army during the siege. To blockade and pass it, would so weaken his
forces, already inferior to the enemy, that he could do nothing
effectual; meanwhile Soult would have again advanced from Llerena,
and perhaps have added Elvas to his former conquests.
To act on the defensive in Beira, and follow up the blow against
Soult, by invading Andalusia, in concert with the Murcians and
the corps of Blake, Beguines, and Graham, while Joseph’s absence
paralysed the army of the centre; while the army of Portugal was
being reorganized in Castile; and while Suchet was still engaged with
Taragona, would have been an operation suitable to lord Wellington’s
fame and to the circumstances of the moment. But then Badajos must
have been blockaded with a corps powerful enough to have defied the
army of the centre, and the conduct of the Portuguese government
had so reduced the allied forces, that this would not have left
a sufficient army to encounter Soult. Hence, after the battle of
Albuera, the only thing to be done, was to renew the siege of
Badajos, which, besides its local interest, contained the enemy’s
bridge equipage and battering train; but which, on common military
calculations, could scarcely be expected to fall before Soult and
Marmont would succour it: yet it was only by the taking of that town
that Portugal itself could be secured beyond the precincts of Lisbon,
and a base for further operations obtained.
According to the regular rules of art, Soult should have been driven
over the mountains before the siege was begun, but there was no time
to do this, and Marmont was equally to be dreaded on the other side;
wherefore lord Wellington could only try, as it were, to snatch
away the fortress from between them, and he who, knowing his real
situation, censures him for the attempt, is neither a general nor
a statesman. The question was, whether the attempt should be made
or the contest in the Peninsula be resigned. It failed, indeed, and
the Peninsula was not lost, but no argument can be thence derived,
because it was the attempt, rather than the success, which was
necessary to keep the war alive; moreover the French did not push
their advantages as far as they might have done, and the unforeseen
circumstance of a large sum of money being brought to Lisbon, by
private speculation, at the moment of failure, enabled the English
general to support the crisis.