POLITICAL STATE OF SPAIN.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.]
As the military operations were, by the defeat of the regular armies,
broken into a multitude of petty and disconnected actions, so the
political affairs were, by the species of anarchy which prevailed,
rendered exceedingly diversified and incongruous. Notwithstanding the
restoration of the captain-generals, the provincial juntas remained
very powerful; and while nominally responsible, to the Cortes and the
regency, acted independently of either, except when interested views
urged them to a seeming obedience. The disputes that arose between
them and the generals, who were, for the most part, the creatures of
the regency, or of the Cortes, were constant. In Gallicia, in the
Asturias, in Catalonia, in Valencia, and in Murcia, disputes were
increasing. Mahi, Abadia, Moscoso, Campo Verde, Lacy, Sarsfield,
Eroles, Milans, Bassecour, Coupigny, Castaños, and Blake, were
always in controversy with each other or with the juntas. Palacios
dismissed from the regency for his high monarchical opinions, was
made captain-general of Valencia, where he immediately joined the
church party against the cortes. In the Condado de Niebla the junta
of Seville claimed superior authority, and Ballesteros of his own
motion placed the county under martial law. The junta, strangely
enough, then appealed to colonel Austin the British governor of the
Algarves, but he refused to interfere.
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
[Sidenote: Letter to General Dumouriez 1811. MSS.]
The cortes often annulled the decrees of the regency, and the latter,
of whomsoever composed, always hating and fearing the cortes, were
only intent upon increasing their own power, and entirely neglected
the general cause; their conduct was at once haughty and mean,
violent and intriguing, and it was impossible ever to satisfy them.
Thus confusion was every where perpetuated, and it is proved by the
intercepted papers of Joseph, as well as by the testimony of the
British officers, and diplomatists, that with the Spaniards, the only
moral resource left for keeping up the war, was their personal hatred
of the French, partially called into action by particular oppression.
Sir John Moore, with that keen and sure judgement which marked all
his views, had early described Spain as being “_without armies,
generals, or government_.” And in 1811, after three years of war,
lord Wellington complained that “_there was no head in Spain, neither
generals, nor officers, nor disciplined troops, and no cavalry;
that the government had commenced the war without a magazine or
military resource of any kind, without money or financial resource,
and that the people at the head of affairs were as feeble as their
resources were small_.” But the miserable state of the armies and the
unquenchable vanity of the officers, have been too frequently exposed
to need further illustration. They hated and ill-used the peasantry,
while their own want of discipline and subordination rendered them
odious to their country. The poorer people, much as they detested
the French, almost wished for the establishment of Joseph, and all
spirit and enthusiasm had long been extinct.
The real points of interest affecting England in her prosecution
of the contest were, therefore, 1º. the improvement and the better
guidance of the military power; 2º. the preventing a war between
Portugal and Spain; 3º. the pretensions of the princess Carlotta of
Portugal; 4º. the dispute with the American colonies.
With respect to the first, lord Wellington had made strenuous
efforts, and his advice, and remonstrances, had at times saved the
armies in the field from destruction; some partial attempts were also
made to form troops under British officers in the Spanish service,
but to a system like that which England exercised in Portugal, the
leading Spaniards would never listen. This was one result of Mr.
Canning’s impolitic fostering of the Spanish pride, for it was by
no means apparent that the people would have objected to such an
arrangement, if it had been prudently urged, before the republican
party in the cortes, and the popular press, had filled their minds
with alarm upon the subject. The Catalans openly and repeatedly
desired to have an English general, and in 1812 colonel Green did
organize a small corps there, while Whittingham and Roche formed in
the Balearic isles large divisions; colonel Cox had before proposed
a like scheme for the north, but it was rejected by lord Wellington,
and I have been unable to trace any important service rendered by
those officers with their divisions. Their reputation was however
quite eclipsed by one Downie, who had passed from the British
commissariat into the Spanish service, and the English ministers,
taken with his boasting manner, supplied him with uniforms and
equipments for a body of cavalry, called the Estremadura Legion, of
such an expensive and absurd nature, as to induce a general officer
to exclaim on seeing them that “he blushed for the folly of his
government.”
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 4.]
When the British ministers found themselves unable to deal with the
Spanish regulars, they endeavoured to prop the war by the irregulars.
But the increase of this force, which however never exceeded thirty
thousand men in arms, gave offence to the regular officers, and
amidst these distractions, the soldiers, ill-organized, ill-fed, and
quite incapable of moving in the field in large bodies, lost all
confidence in their generals. The latter, as in the case of Freire
with the Murcian army, generally expected to be beaten in every
action, and cared very little about it, because the regency were sure
to affirm that they were victorious; and another of those wandering
starved naked bands, which they called armies, could be formed from
new levies in a month.
The chances of a war with Portugal were by no means slight, the
early ravages of the Spanish insurgent forces when Junot was in
Lisbon, the violence of Romana’s soldiers, and the burning of the
village of San Fernando, together with the disputes between the
people of Algarves and the Andalusians had revived all the national
hatred on both sides. The two governments indeed entered into a
treaty for recruiting in their respective territories; but it was
with the utmost difficulty that the united exertions of Mr. Stuart
and lord Wellington could prevent the Portuguese regency first,
and afterwards the court of the Brazils, from provoking a war by
re-annexing Olivença to Portugal, when it was taken from the French
by marshal Beresford. And so little were the passions of these people
subordinate to their policy that this design was formed at the very
moment when the princess Carlotta, was, strenuously, and with good
prospect of success, pushing her claim to the regency of Spain.
[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers, MSS.]
The intrigues of this princess were constant sources of evil; she
laboured against the influence of the British at Cadiz, and her agent
Pedro Souza, proffering gold to vulgar baseness, diamonds to delicate
consciences, and promises to all, was adroit and persevering. In
August 1810 a paper signed by only one member, but with an intimation
that it contained the sentiments of the whole cortes, was secretly
given to Mr. Wellesley, as a guide for his conduct. It purported
that the impossibility of releasing Ferdinand and his brother from
their captivity being apparent, the princess Carlotta should be
called to the throne, and it was proposed to marry her eldest son,
Pedro, to the princess of Wales, or some other princess of the House
of Brunswick, that a “sudden and mortal blow might be given to the
French empire.” Mr. Wellesley was also told that a note, of the same
tendency, would in the first session of the cortes be transmitted
to the English legation. This, however, did not happen, chiefly
because Arguelles openly and eloquently expressed his reasons against
the appointment of a royal person as regent, and some months later
procured a decree, rendering such persons ineligible, to pass in
the cortes. This seemed to quash Carlotta’s intrigue, nevertheless
her pretensions, although continually overborne by the English
influence, were as continually renewed, and often on the point of
being publicly admitted.
The assumption that it was hopeless to expect Ferdinand’s release was
founded partly on the great influence which it was known Napoleon had
acquired over his mind, and partly on his extreme personal timidity,
which rendered any attempt to release him hopeless. Otherwise there
were at Lisbon one Francisco Sagas, and his brother, daring men, who
were only deterred from undertaking the enterprize by a previous
experiment made at Bayonne, where they had for an hour implored
Ferdinand to escape, all things being ready, yet in vain, because
Escoiquez who ruled the prince, and was as timid as himself opposed
it. To prevent ill effects from this well-known weakness, the cortes
passed a decree to render null every act of Ferdinand while in
captivity.
[Sidenote: See Vols. I. & III.]
These intrigues of Carlotta were, however, of minor consequence
compared to the conduct of the American colonies, which was one of
the highest interest and importance. The causes and the nature of
their revolt have been already touched upon, and the violence and
injustice of the juntas, the regency, and the cortes, with relation
to them, having been also exposed in a general way, need not be
repeated here. When the Spanish insurrection first commenced, the
leading men of Mexico signed a paper which was sent to the peninsula
in November 1808, urging the immediate appointment of the duke of
Infantado to the vice-royalty. He was averse to quitting Spain, but
his wife persuaded him to consent, provided the central junta, just
then established, was not opposed to it. Mr. Stuart foreseeing
great advantage from this appointment laboured to persuade Mr.
Frere to support it; but the latter, always narrow in his views,
refused, because Infantado was personally disliked in England! and
this, joined to the duke’s own reluctance, seemed to end the matter.
Meanwhile the disturbances in the colonies went on, and Carlotta of
Portugal, urged her claim to be regent, and ultimately, queen of
that country, as well as of Spain; and her interests were strongly
supported there, until May 1809, when Cisneros, the Spanish viceroy,
arrived at Monte Video, and spoiled her schemes.
[Sidenote: Sept.]
The cry for a free trade with England, was then raised by the
colonists, and Cisneros assented, but under conditions, presenting
a curious contrast to the affected generosity of Mr. Canning, and
affording an additional proof how little the latter knew the temper
of the people he was dealing with. After detailing the dangers of
his situation from the disposition of the colonists to revolt, and
the impoverishment of the royal treasury in consequence of the
disturbances which had already taken place, Cisneros observed that
the only mode of relief was a temporary permission to trade with
England for the sake of the duties. Necessity, he said, drove him to
this measure; he regretted it, and directed that the ordinary laws
relative to the residence of foreigners, most rigorous in themselves,
should be most rigorously executed; and he added others of such a
nature, that at first sight, they appear to be directed against some
common enemy of mankind, rather than against the subjects and vessels
of a nation which was then supporting the mother-country with troops
and treasure in the most prodigal manner. Englishmen were not to be
suffered to possess property, to have a residence, to keep an hotel,
or even to remain on shore except for a fixed period. Any property
already acquired by them was to be confiscated, and when the goods by
which he hoped to raise his revenue were landed, the owners were not
to be permitted to have them carried to the warehouses by their own
sailors!
In April 1810 the disposition to revolt spread; the Caraccas and
Porto Rico declared for independence, and the British governor of
Curaçoa expressed his approval of their proceedings. This naturally
gave great jealousy and alarm to the Spaniards, who looked upon
it as a secret continuation of Miranda’s affair. Lord Liverpool,
indeed, immediately disavowed the governor’s manifesto, but being
very desirous to retain the trade, to conciliate the Spaniards, and
to oblige the colonists to acknowledge Ferdinand and oppose France,
three things incompatible, his policy produced no good result.
Mexico indeed still remained obedient in outward appearance, but the
desire to have Infantado existed, and a strong party of the Mexicans
even purposed raising him to the throne, if Napoleon’s success
should separate the two countries; but the Spanish regency, with
characteristic folly, chose this moment to appoint Venegas, who was
the avowed enemy of Infantado, viceroy of Mexico, and thus the revolt
was forced on in that country also.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.]
This state of affairs had a bad effect upon the war in Spain in many
ways. The Spaniards, thinking to retain the colonies by violence,
sent out a small squadron at first, and at a later period employed
the succours received from England, in fitting out large expeditions
of their best troops; and that, when the enemy were most closely,
pressing them in the Peninsula. The remonstrances of the British
on this head were considered as indications of a faithless policy;
and Carlotta also wrote to Elio, the governor of Buenos Ayres, and
to the cortes, warning both, to beware of the English as “a people
capable of any baseness where their own interests were concerned.”
Hence there was a prevalent suspicion, that England had a design of
connecting itself with the colonies independently of Spain, which
greatly diminished the English influence at Cadiz.
[Sidenote: 1811. May.]
[Sidenote: Lord Wellesley’s despatch to Mr. H. Wellesley, May, 1811.
MSS.]
By this dispute with America the supply of specie for the Peninsula
was endangered, which involved the very existence of the war; all
things therefore conduced to make lord Wellesley desire his brother,
Mr. Wellesley, to offer the mediation of England, and to please the
Spaniards he also removed the governor of Curaçoa; but his plans,
like lord Liverpool’s, were based upon the desire to preserve the
trade with the colonies, and this feeling pervaded and vitiated
his instructions to Mr. Wellesley. That gentleman was directed to
enter into a full discussion of the subject, on principles founded
on cordial amity and good faith; and to endeavour to convince the
regency that the British course of proceeding had hitherto been the
best for all parties. For the primary object being to keep France
from forming a party in America, the revolted colonies had been by
England received into an amicable intercourse of trade, a measure not
inconsistent with good faith to Spain, inasmuch as the colonists
would otherwise have had recourse to France, whereas now England was
considered by them as a safe and honourable channel of reconciliation
with the mother-country. There had been, it was said, no formal
recognition of the self-constituted governments, or if any had taken
place by subordinate officers they would be disavowed. Protection
and mediation had indeed been offered, but the rights of Ferdinand
had been supported, and as war between Spain and America would only
injure the great cause, a mediatory policy was pressed upon the
latter.—The blockade of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas had already
diverted money and forces from Spain, and driven the Americans to
seek for French officers to assist them. The trade was essential to
enable England to continue her assistance to Spain, and although
this had been frequently represented to the regency, the latter had
sent ships (which had been fitted out in English ports and stored at
the expense of Great Britain for the war with France) to blockade
the colonies and to cut off the English trade; and it was done
also at a moment, when the regency was unable to transport Blake’s
army from Cadiz to the Condado di Niebla without the assistance of
British vessels. “It was difficult,” Lord Wellesley said, “to state
an instance in which the prejudices and jealousy of individuals had
occasioned so much confusion of every maxim of discretion and good
policy, and so much danger to the acknowledged mutual interests of
two great states engaged in a defensive alliance against the assaults
of a foreign foe”:—“Spain could not expect England to concur in a
continuance of a system by which, at her own expense, her trade was
injured, and by which Spain was making efforts not against the French
but against the main sources of her own strength.”
[Sidenote: June.]
After these instructions, which were given before the constitution
of Spain was arranged by the cortes, Mr. Wellesley pressed the
mediation upon Mr. Bardaxi the Spanish minister, who agreed to accept
it upon condition, that Mexico, which had not yet declared a form
of government, should be excepted,—that England should immediately
break off all intercourse with the colonies, and, if the mediation
failed, should assist Spain to reconquer them. When the injustice
and bad policy of this proposition was objected to, Mr. Bardaxi
maintained that it was just and politic, and pressed it as a secret
article; he however finally offered to accept the mediation, if Mr.
Wellesley would only pledge England to break off the intercourse
of trade. This was refused, and the negotiation continued, but as
Bardaxi asserted, that lord Wellington had before agreed to the
propriety of England going to war with the colonies, Mr. Wellesley
referred to the latter, and that extraordinary man, while actually
engaged with the enemy, under most critical circumstances, was thus
called upon to discuss so grave and extensive a subject. But it was
on such occasions that all his power of mind was displayed, and his
manner of treating this question proved, that in political, and even
in commercial affairs, his reach of thought and enlarged conceptions,
immeasurably surpassed the cabinet he served. And when we consider
that his opinions, stated in 1811, have been since verified in all
points to the very letter, it is impossible not to be filled with
admiration of his foresight and judgment.
“He denied that he had ever given grounds for Bardaxi’s observation.
His opinion had always been that Great Britain should follow, as
he hoped she had, liberal counsels towards Spain, by laying aside,
at least during the existence of the war, all consideration of
merchants’ profits. He felt certain that such a policy would equally
suit her commercial interests and her warlike policy, as well as add
greatly to her character. The immediate advantages extorted from an
open trade with the colonies he had always considered ideal. Profit
was undoubtedly to be made there, and eventually the commerce would
be very great; but its value must arise from the increasing riches
of the colonies and the growth of luxury there, and the period at
which this would happen was more likely to be checked than forwarded
by the extravagant speculations of English traders. Whatever might
be the final particular relations established between Spain and her
colonies, the general result must be, the relaxation, if not the
annihilation, of their colonial commercial system, and Great Britain
was then sure to be the greatest gainer.
“In expectation of this ultimate advantage, her policy ought to have
been liberal throughout, that is, the colonies themselves should have
been checked, and the endeavours of traders and captains of ships
to separate them from Spain ought to have been repressed. England
should, when the colonies first showed a disposition to revolt, have
considered not only what they could do but what Great Britain could
assist them to effect. His knowledge of the Spanish government and
its means enabled him to say she could not reduce even one of the
weakest of her colonies, and to make the attempt would be a gross
folly and misapplication of means. Nay England could not, in justice
to the great object in the Peninsula, give Spain any effectual
assistance; for it was but too true that distant colonies could
always separate from the mother country when they willed it, and
certainly it would be the highest madness, in Spain, to attempt at
that time to prevent such a separation by force, and in England, to
assist, or even encourage her in such an attempt.
“The conduct of the latter should then have been by her influence
and advice to have prevented the disputes from coming to extremity,
and _now_ should be to divert Spain from such an absurdity as having
recourse to violence. But the reception of the deputies from America
which the Spaniards so much complained of, was useful to the latter.
It prevented those deputies from going to France, and if they had
gone, the fact, that colonies have the power to separate if they have
the will, would have been at once verified.
“Great Britain, although late, had at last _offered_ that mediation
which he wished had been _asked_ for, and it remained to consider
on what terms it ought to be accepted. It would have been better
if Spain had come forward with an explicit declaration of what her
intentions towards the colonies in respect to constitution and
commerce were. England could then have had something intelligible
to mediate upon; but now Spain only desired her to procure the
submission of Buenos Ayres and the Caraccas; and if she failed in
that impracticable object she was to aid Spain in forcing them to
submission! and he, lord Wellington, was said to have approved of
this! One would really, he exclaimed, believe that Mr. Bardaxi has
never adverted to the means and resources of his own country, to
the object they have acquired at home, nor to the efforts making by
England in the Peninsula; and that he imagines I have considered
these facts as little as he appears to have done! Great Britain
cannot agree to that condition!
[Sidenote: See Vol. III. p. 419.]
“In respect to constitution” (alluding to the acknowledgement of the
civil rights of the Americans by the cortes) “the Spaniards had gone
a great way, but not so far as some of her colonies would require,
they would probably ask her to have separate local representative
bodies for their interior concerns, such as the English colonial
assemblies, yet this important point had not been considered in
the treaty of mediation, and in respect of commerce the Spanish
government had said nothing; although it was quite certain her
prohibitory system could not continue, and the necessary consequence
of the actual state of affairs required that in the treaty of
mediation the colonies should be put, with respect to trade, exactly
on the same footing as the provinces of Old Spain. If that was not
done it would be useless to talk to the colonists of equal rights and
interests; they would feel that their interests were sacrificed to
those of the mother country.
“It was true that the latter would lose immediately, though probably
not eventually, very largely in revenue and commercial profit by such
a concession. This was the unavoidable result of the circumstances
of the times, she had therefore a fair claim to participate in
the advantages the colonies would enjoy from it. To this object
the treaty of mediation should have adverted. Spain should have
confidentially declared to Great Britain her intended course, what
system she would follow, what duties impose, and what proportion
she would demand for general imperial purposes. Upon such materials
England might have worked with a prospect of permanently maintaining
the integrity of the Spanish empire on just and fair principles; or
at all events have allayed the present disputes and so removed the
difficulties they occasioned in the Peninsula, and in either case
have insured her own real interests. Spain had however taken a narrow
view both of her own and the relative situation of others, and _if
she did not enlarge it, matters would grow worse and worse. It would
be useless for England to interfere, and after a long contest which
would only tend to weaken the mother country and deprive her of the
resources which she would otherwise find in the colonies for her war
with France, the business would end in the separation of the colonies
from Spain._”
The mediation was, however, after many discussions, finally accepted
by the cortes, Mexico only being excepted, and an English commission
of mediation, of which Mr. Stuart was the head, was even appointed
in September 1811, but from various causes it never proceeded
beyond Cadiz. The Spaniards continued to send out expeditions, Mr.
Wellesley’s remonstrances were unheeded, and although the regency
afterwards offered to open the trade under certain duties, in return
for a subsidy, nothing was concluded.