POLITICAL STATE OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE WAR.
[Sidenote: 1811.]
It was very clear that merely to defend Portugal, with enormous
loss of treasure and of blood, would be a ruinous policy; and that
to redeem the Peninsula the Spaniards must be brought to act more
reasonably than they had hitherto done. But this the national
character and the extreme ignorance of public business, whether
military or civil, which distinguished the generals and statesmen,
rendered a very difficult task.
Lord Wellington, finding the English power weak to control, and its
influence as weak to sway, the councils of Spain, could only hope
by industry, patience, and the glory of his successes in Portugal,
to acquire that personal ascendancy, which would enable him to
direct the resources of the whole Peninsula in a vigorous manner,
and towards a common object. And the difficulty of attaining that
ascendancy can only be made clear by a review of the intercourse
between the British government and the Spanish authorities, from the
first bursting out of the insurrection, to the period now treated of;
a review which will disclose the utter unfitness of Mr. Canning to
conduct great affairs. Heaping treasure, stores, arms, and flattery,
upon those who were unable to bear the latter, or use the former
beneficially, he neglected all those persons who were capable of
forwarding the cause; and neither in the choice of his agents, nor
in his instructions to them, nor in his estimation of the value of
events, did he discover wisdom or diligence, although he covered his
misconduct, at the moment, by his glittering oratory.
[Sidenote: 1808.]
Soon after the Spanish deputies had first applied for the assistance
of England, Mr. Charles Stuart, who was the only regular diplomatist
sent to Spain, carried, to Coruña, such a sum, as, with previous
subsidies made up one million of dollars for Gallicia alone. The
deputies from Asturias had at the same time demanded five millions of
dollars, and one was paid in part of their demand; but when this was
known, two millions more were demanded for Gallicia, which were not
refused; and yet the first point in Mr. Canning’s instructions to Mr.
Stuart, was, _to enter into “no political engagements.”_
[Sidenote: 1811.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.]
[Sidenote: Ibid.]
Mr. Duff, the consul for Cadiz, carried out a million of dollars
for Andalusia, the junta asked for three or four millions more,
and the demands of Portugal, although less extravagant, were very
great. Thus above sixteen millions of dollars were craved, and more
than four millions, including the gift to Portugal, had been sent;
the remainder was not denied; and the amount of arms, and other
stores given, may be estimated by the fact, that eighty-two pieces
of artillery, ninety-six thousand muskets, eight hundred thousand
flints, six millions and a half of ball-cartridges, seven thousand
five hundred barrels of powder, and thirty thousand swords and belts
had been sent to Coruña and Cadiz; and the supply to the Asturias was
in proportion. But Mr. Canning’s instructions to Mr. Duff and to the
other agents were still the same as to Mr. Stuart, “_His Majesty had
no desire to annex any conditions to the pecuniary assistance which
he furnished to Spain_.”
Mr. Canning observed that he considered the amount of money as
nothing! but acknowledged that _specie_ was at this time so scarce
that it was only by a direct and secret understanding with the
former government of Spain, under the connivance of France, that
any considerable amount of dollars had been collected in England.
And “each province of Spain,” he said, “had made its own particular
application, and the whole occasioned a call for specie such as
had never before been made upon England at any period of its
existence. There was a rivalry between the provinces with reference
to the amount of sums demanded which rendered the greatest caution
necessary.” And the more so, that “the deputies were incompetent
to furnish either information or advice upon the state of affairs
in Spain;” yet Mr. Duff was commanded, while representing these
astounding things to the junta of Seville, “_to avoid any appearance
of a desire to overrate the merit and value of the exertions then
making by Great Britain in favour of the Spanish nation, or to lay
the grounds for restraining or limiting those exertions within any
other bounds than those which were prescribed by the limits of the
actual means of the country_.” In proof of Mr. Canning’s sincerity
upon this head, he afterwards sent two millions of dollars by Mr.
Frere, while the British army was left without any funds at all!
Moreover the supplies, so recklessly granted, being transmitted
through subordinates and irresponsible persons were absurdly and
unequally distributed.
This obsequious extravagance, produced the utmost arrogance on the
part of the Spanish leaders, who treated the English minister’s
humble policy with the insolence it courted. When Mr. Stuart reached
Madrid, after the establishment of the supreme junta, that body,
raising its demands upon England, in proportion to its superior
importance, required, and in the most peremptory language, additional
succours so enormous as to startle even the prodigality of the
English government.
Ten millions of dollars instantly, five hundred thousand yards of
cloth, four million yards of linen for shirts and for the hospitals,
three hundred thousand pair of shoes, thirty thousand pair of boots,
twelve million of cartridges, two hundred thousand muskets, twelve
thousand pair of pistols, fifty thousand swords, one hundred thousand
arobas of flour, besides salt meat and fish! These were their
demands! and when Mr. Stuart’s remonstrance obliged them to alter the
insulting language of their note, they insisted the more strenuously
upon having the succours; observing that England had as yet only
done enough to set their force afloat, and that she might _naturally
expect demands like the present to follow the first_. They desired
also that the money should be furnished at once, by bills on the
British treasury, and at the same time required the confiscation of
Godoy’s property in the English funds!
Such was Mr. Canning’s opening policy, and the sequel was worthy
of the commencement. His proceedings with respect to the Erfurth
proposals for peace, his injudicious choice of Mr. Frere, his leaving
of Mr. Stuart without instructions for three months at the most
critical period of the insurrection, and his management of affairs
in Portugal and at Cadiz, during sir John Cradock’s command, have
been already noticed; and that he was not misled by any curious
accordance in the reports of his agents, is certain, for he was early
and constantly informed of the real state of affairs by Mr. Stuart.
That gentleman was the accredited diplomatist, and in all important
points, his reports were very exactly corroborated by the letters of
sir John Moore, and by the running course of events; yet Mr. Canning
neither acted upon them nor published them, but he received all
the idle, vaunting, accounts of the subordinate civil and military
agents, with complacency, and published them with ostentation; thus
encouraging the misrepresentations of ignorant men, increasing the
arrogance of the Spaniards, deceiving the English nation, and as far
as he was able misleading the English general.
Mr. Stuart reached Coruña in July 1808, and on the 22d of that month
informed Mr. Canning that the reports of successes in the south
were not to be depended upon, seeing that they increased exactly
in proportion to the difficulty of communicating with the alleged
scenes of action, and with the dearth of events, or the recurrence
of disasters in the northern parts. He also assured him, that the
numbers of the Spanish armies, within his knowledge, were by no means
so great as they were represented.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 1.]
On the 26th of July he gave a detailed history of the Gallician
insurrection, by which he plainly shewed that every species of
violence, disorder, intrigue, and deceit were to be expected from
the leading people; that the junta’s object was to separate Gallicia
from Spain; and that so inappropriate was the affected delicacy of
abstaining from conditions, while furnishing succours; that the
junta of Gallicia was only kept in power, by the countenance of
England, evinced in her lavish supplies, and the residence of her
envoy at Coruña. The interference of the British naval officers
to quell a political tumult had even been asked for, and had been
successful; and Mr. Stuart himself had been intreated to meddle in
the appointments of the governing members, and in other contests
for power, which were daily taking place. In fine, before the end
of August the system of folly, peculation, waste, and improvidence
which characterized Spanish proceedings, was completely detected by
Mr. Stuart, and laid before Mr. Canning, without in the slightest
degree altering the latter’s egregious system, or even attracting his
notice; nay, he even intimated to the ambitious junta of Seville,
that England would willingly acknowledge its supremacy, if the
consent of the other provinces could be obtained; thus holding out a
premium for the continuation of that anarchy, which it should have
been his first object to suppress.
Mr. Stuart was kept in a corner of the peninsula, whence he could not
communicate freely with any other province, and where his presence
materially contributed to cherish the project of separating Gallicia;
and this without the shadow of a pretence, because there was also a
British admiral and consul, and a military mission at Coruña, all
capable of transmitting the necessary local intelligence. But so
little did Mr. Canning care to receive his envoy’s reports, that
the packet, conveying his despatches, was ordered to touch at Gihon
to receive the consul’s letters, which caused the delay of a week
when every moment was big with important events; a delay not to be
remedied by the admiral on the station, because he had not even been
officially informed that Mr. Stuart was an accredited person!
[Sidenote: See Vol. I.]
When the latter, thinking it time to look to the public affairs,
on his own responsibility, proceeded to Madrid, and finally
to Andalusia, he found the evils springing from Mr. Canning’s
inconsiderate conduct every where prominent. In the capital the
supreme junta had regarded England as a bonded debtor; and the
influence of her diplomatist at Seville may be estimated from the
following note, written by Mr. Stuart to Mr. Frere, upon the subject
of permitting British troops to enter Cadiz.
“When the junta refused to admit general Mackenzie’s detachment, you
tell me it was merely from alarm respecting the disposition of the
inhabitants of Seville and Cadiz. I am not aware of the feelings
which prevail in Seville, but with respect to this town, whatever
the navy or the English travellers, may assert to the contrary, I am
perfectly convinced that there exists only a wish to receive them,
and general regret and surprise at their continuance on board.”
Nor was the mischief confined to Spain. Mr. Frere, apparently tired
of the presence of a man whose energy and talent were a continued
reflection upon his own imbecile diplomacy, ordered Mr. Stuart,
either to join Cuesta’s army or to go by Trieste to Vienna; he chose
the latter, because there was not even a subordinate political agent
there, although this was the critical period, which preceded the
Austrian declaration of war against France in 1809. He was without
formal powers as an envoy, but his knowledge of the affairs of Spain,
and his intimate personal acquaintance with many of the leading
statesmen at Vienna, enabled him at once to send home the most exact
information of the proceedings, the wants, the wishes, and intentions
of the Austrian government, in respect to the impending war.
That great diversion for Spain, which with infinite pains had been
brought to maturity by count Stadion, was on the point of being
abandoned because of Mr. Canning’s conduct. He had sent no minister
to Vienna, and while he was lavishing millions upon the Spaniards,
without conditions, refused in the most haughty and repulsive
terms, the prayers of Austria for a subsidy or even a loan, without
which, she could not pass her own frontier. And when Mr. Stuart
suggested the resource of borrowing some of the twenty-five millions
of dollars which were then accumulated at Cadiz, it was rejected
because Mr. Frere said it would alarm the Spaniards. Thus, the aid
of a great empire with four hundred thousand good troops, was in a
manner rejected in favour of a few miserable self-elected juntas in
the peninsula, while one-half the succours which they received and
misused, would have sent the whole Austrian nation headlong upon
France; for all their landwehr was in arms, and where the emperor had
only calculated upon one hundred and fifty battalions three hundred
had come forward, voluntarily, besides the Hungarian insurrection.
In this way Mr. Canning proved his narrow capacity for business,
and how little he knew either the strength of France, the value of
Austria, the weakness of Spain, or the true interests of England at
the moment; although he had not scrupled by his petulant answers to
the proposals of Erfurth to confirm a war which he was so incapable
of conducting. Instead of improving the great occasion thus offered,
he angrily recalled Mr. Stuart, for having proceeded to Vienna
without his permission. In his eyes the breach of form was of much
higher importance than the success of the object. Yet it is capable
of proof, that had Mr. Stuart remained, the Austrians would have been
slower to negotiate after the battle of Wagram; and the Walcheren
expedition would have been turned towards Germany, where a great
northern confederation was then ready to take arms against France.
The Prussian cabinet in defiance of the king, or rather of the queen,
whose fears influenced the king’s resolutions, only waited for these
troops, to declare war; and there was every reason to believe that
Russia would then also have adopted that side. The misfortunes of
Moore’s campaign, the folly and arrogance of the Spaniards, the loss
of the great British army which perished in Walcheren, the exhausting
of England both of troops and specie, when she most needed both;
finally the throwing of Austria entirely into the hands of France,
may thus be distinctly traced to Mr. Canning’s incapacity as a
statesman.
But through the whole of the Napoleonic wars this man was the evil
genius of the Peninsula; for passing over the misplaced military
powers which he gave to Mr. Villiers’ legation in Portugal, while he
neglected the political affairs in that country, it was he who sent
lord Strangford to Rio Janeiro whence all manner of mischief flowed.
And when Mr. Stuart succeeded Mr. Villiers at Lisbon, Mr. Canning
insisted upon having the enormous mass of intelligence, received from
different parts of the Peninsula, translated before it was sent home;
an act of undisguised indolence, which retarded the real business of
the embassy, prevented important information from being transmitted
rapidly, and exposed the secrets of the hour to the activity of the
enemy’s emissaries at Lisbon. In after times when by a notorious
abuse of government he was himself sent ambassador to Lisbon, he
complained that there were no archives of the former embassies, and
he obliged Mr. Stuart, then minister at the Hague, to employ several
hundred soldiers, as clerks, to copy all his papers relating to the
previous war; these, at a great public expense, were sent to Lisbon;
and there they were to be seen unexamined and unpacked in the year
1826! And while this folly was passing, the interests of Europe
in general were neglected, and the particular welfare of Portugal
seriously injured by another display of official importance still
more culpable.
It had been arranged that a Portuguese auxiliary force was to have
joined the duke of Wellington’s army, previous to the battle of
Waterloo; and to have this agreement executed, was the only business
of real importance which Mr. Canning had to transact during his
embassy. Marshal Beresford well acquainted with the characters,
of the members of the Portuguese regency, had assembled fifteen
thousand men, the flower of the old troops, perfectly equipped,
with artillery, baggage, and all things needful to take the field;
the ships were ready, the men willing to embark, and the marshal
informed the English ambassador, that he had only to give the order,
and in a few hours the whole would be on board, warning him at the
same time, that in no other way could the thing be effected. But as
this summary proceeding did not give Mr. Canning an opportunity to
record his own talents for negotiation, he replied that it must be
done by diplomacy; the Souza faction eagerly seized the opportunity
of displaying their talents in the same line, and being more expert,
beat Mr. Canning at his own weapons, and as Beresford had foreseen
no troops were embarked at all. Lord Wellington was thus deprived
of important reinforcements; the Portuguese were deprived of the
advantage of supporting their army, for several years, on the
resources of France, and of their share of the contributions from
that country; last and worst, those veterans of the Peninsular war,
the strength of the country, were sent to the Brazils, where they
all perished by disease or by the sword in the obscure wars of Don
Pedro! If such errors may be redeemed by an eloquence, always used in
defence of public corruption, and a wit, that made human sufferings
its sport, Mr. Canning was an English statesman, and wisdom has
little to do with the affairs of nations.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Section 2.]
When the issue of the Walcheren expedition caused a change of
ministry, lord Wellesley obtained the foreign office. Mr. Henry
Wellesley then replaced Mr. Frere at Cadiz, and he and Mr. Stuart
received orders to make conditions and to demand guarantees for the
due application of the British succours; those succours were more
sparingly granted, and the envoys were directed to interfere with
advice and remonstrances, in all the proceedings of the respective
governments to which they were accredited: Mr. Stuart was even
desired to meddle with the internal administration of the Portuguese
nation,—the exertions and sacrifices of Great Britain, far from
being kept out of sight, were magnified, and the system adopted was
in every thing a contrast to that of Mr. Canning.
But there was in England a powerful, and as recent events have
proved, a most unprincipled parliamentary opposition, and there were
two parties in the cabinet. The one headed by lord Wellesley, who
was anxious to push the war vigorously in the Peninsula, without
much regard to the ultimate pressure upon the people of his own
country; the other, headed by Mr. Perceval, who sought only to
maintain himself in power. Narrow, harsh, factious, and illiberal,
in every thing relating to public matters, this man’s career was
one of unmixed evil. His bigotry taught him to oppress Ireland, but
his religion did not deter him from passing a law to prevent the
introduction of medicines into France during a pestilence. He lived
by faction; he had neither the wisdom to support, nor the manliness
to put an end to, the war in the Peninsula, and his crooked,
contemptible policy was shown, by withholding what was necessary to
sustain the contest, and throwing on the general the responsibility
of failure.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV.]
With all the fears of little minds, he and his coadjutors awaited
the result of lord Wellington’s operations in 1810. They affected to
dread his rashness, yet could give no reasonable ground for their
alarm; and their private letters were at variance with their public
instructions, that they might be prepared for either event. They
deprived him, without notice, of his command over the troops, at
Cadiz; they gave Graham power to furnish pecuniary succours to the
Spaniards at that place, which threw another difficulty in the way
of obtaining money for Portugal; and when Wellington complained of
the attention paid to the unfounded apprehension of some superior
officers more immediately about him, he was plainly told that those
officers were better generals than himself. At the same time he was,
from a pitiful economy, ordered to dismiss the transports on which
the safety of the army depended in the event of failure.
Between these factions there was a constant struggle, and lord
Wellington’s successes in the field, only furthered the views of
Mr. Perceval, because they furnished ground for asserting that due
support had been given to him. Indeed such a result is to be always
apprehended by English commanders. The slightest movement in war
requires a great effort, and is attended with many vexations, which
the general feels acutely and unceasingly; but the politician,
believing in no difficulties because he feels none, neglects the
supplies, charges disaster on the general, and covers his misdeeds
with words. The inefficient state of the cabinet under both Mr.
Canning and Mr. Perceval may however be judged of by the following
extracts, the writers of which as it is easy to perceive were in
official situations.
[Sidenote: A. April. 1810.]
“I hope by next mail will be sent, something more satisfactory and
useful than we have yet done in the way of instructions. But I am
afraid the late O. P. riots have occupied all the thoughts of our
great men here, so as to make them, or at least some of them, forget
more distant but not less interesting concerns.”
[Sidenote: A. April. 1811.]
“With respect to the evils you allude to as arising from the
inefficiency of the Portuguese government, the people here are by no
means so satisfied of their existence (to a great degree) as you who
are on the spot. Here we judge only of the results, the details we
read over, but being unable to remedy forget them the next day; and
in the mean time be the tools you have to work with good or bad, so
it is that you have produced results so far beyond the most sanguine
expectations entertained here by all who have not been in Portugal
within the last eight months, that none inquire the causes which
prevented more being done in a shorter time; of which indeed there
seems to have been a great probability, if the government could have
stepped forward at an earlier period with one hand in their pockets,
and in the other strong energetic declarations of the indispensable
necessity of a change of measures, and principles, in the government.”
[Sidenote: B. Sept. 1811.]
“I have done every thing in my power to get people here to attend to
their real interests in Portugal, and I have clamoured for money!
money! money! in every office to which I have had access. To all
my clamour and all my arguments I have invariably received the
same answer, ‘_that the thing is impossible_.’ The prince himself
certainly appears to be _à la hauteur des circonstances_, and has
expressed his determination to make every exertion to promote
the good cause in the Peninsula. Lord Wellesley has a perfect
comprehension of the subject in its fullest extent, and is fully
aware of the several measures which Great Britain ought and could
adopt. But such is the state of parties and such the condition of the
present government, that I really despair of witnessing any decided
and adequate effect, on our part, to save the Peninsula. The present
feeling appears to be that we have done mighty things, and all
that is in our power, that the rest must be left to all-bounteous
Providence, and that if we do not succeed we must console ourselves
by the reflection that Providence has not been so propitious to us
as we deserved. This feeling you must allow is wonderfully moral and
christian-like, but still nothing will be done until we have a more
vigorous military system and a ministry capable of directing the
resources of the nation to something nobler than a war of descents
and embarkations.”
A more perfect picture of an imbecile administration could scarcely
be exhibited, and it was not wonderful, that lord Wellington,
oppressed with the folly of the peninsular governments, should have
often resolved to relinquish a contest that was one of constant
risks, difficulties, and cares, when he had no better support from
England. In the next chapter shall be shewn the ultimate effects of
Canning’s policy in the Spanish and Portuguese affairs.