CHAPTER XI.

THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PEOPLE.

Although the inquiry may be of no legal importance, it may nevertheless

be one pertinent to the subject, whether it be matter of _history_

even--to say nothing of legal proof--that the _people_ of the country

did really understand or believe that the constitution sanctioned

slavery? Those who make the assertion, are bound to prove it. The

presumption is against them. Where is their contrary history?

They will say that a part of the people were actually slaveholders, and

that it is unreasonable to suppose they would have agreed to the

constitution, if they had understood it to be a free one.

The answer to this argument is, that the actual slaveholders were few in

number compared with the whole people; comprising probably not more than

one-eighth or one-sixth of the voters, and one-fortieth or one-thirtieth

of the whole population. They were so few as to be manifestly incapable

of maintaining any separate political organization; or even of holding

their slave property, except under the sufferance, toleration and

protection of the non-slaveholders. They were compelled, therefore, to

agree to any political organization, which the non-slaveholders should

determine on. This was at that time the case even in the strongest of

the slaveholding states themselves. In all of them, without exception,

the slaveholders were either obliged to live, or from choice did live,

under free constitutions. They, of course, held their slave property in

defiance of their constitutions. They were enabled to do this through

the corrupting influence of their wealth and union. Controlling a large

proportion of the wealth of their states, their social and political

influence was entirely disproportionate to their numbers. They could act

in concert. They could purchase talent by honors, offices and money.

Being always united, while the non-slaveholders were divided, they could

turn the scale in elections, and fill most of the offices with

slaveholders. Many of the non-slaveholders doubtless were poor,

dependent and subservient, (as large portions of the non-slaveholders

are now in the slaveholding states,) and lent themselves to the support

of slavery almost from necessity. By these, and probably by many other

influences that we cannot now understand, they were enabled to maintain

their hold upon their slave property in defiance of their constitutions.

It is even possible that the slaveholders themselves did not choose to

have the subject of slavery mentioned in their constitutions; that they

were so fully conscious of their power to corrupt and control their

governments, that they did not regard any constitutional provision

necessary for their security; and that out of mere shame at the

criminality of the thing, and its inconsistency with all the principles

the country had been fighting for and proclaiming, they did not wish it

to be named.

But whatever may have been the cause of the fact, the fact itself is

conspicuous, that from some cause or other, either with the consent of

the slaveholders, or in defiance of their power, the constitutions of

every one of the thirteen states were at that time free ones.

Now is it not idle and useless to pretend, when even the strongest

slaveholding states had free constitutions--when not one of the separate

states, acting for itself, would have any but a free constitution--that

the whole thirteen, when acting in unison, should concur in establishing

a slaveholding one? The idea is preposterous. The single fact that all

the state constitutions were at that time free ones, scatters for ever

the pretence that the majority of the people of all the states either

intended to establish, _or could have been induced to establish_, any

other than a free one for the nation. Of course it scatters also the

pretence that they believed or understood that they were establishing

any but a free one.

There very probably may have been a general belief among the people,

that slavery would for a while live on, on sufferance; that the

government, until the nation should have become attached to the

constitution, and cemented and consolidated by the habit of union, would

be too weak, and too easily corrupted by the innumerable and powerful

appliances of slaveholders, to wrestle with and strangle slavery. But to

suppose that the nation at large did not look upon the constitution as

designed to destroy slavery, whenever its principles should be carried

into full effect, is obviously to suppose an intellectual impossibility;

for the instrument was plain, and the people had common sense; and those

two facts cannot stand together consistently with the idea that there

was any general, or even any considerable misunderstanding of its

meaning.

The Unconstitutionality of Slavery · 第 12 / 14 章