THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT.
(July-December 1916.)
The Brigade attached to the First Army—In the Trenches at
Vimy—The Difficulties of the Later Stages of the Battle of
the Somme—The Country around The Butte de Warlencourt—The
Brigade enters the Line at Eaucourt l’Abbaye—The Attack of
12th October—The Capture of the Pimple—The Attack of 18th
October—The Fighting of the 18th and 19th—The Brigade withdrawn
to the Arras Area—General Lukin takes Command of the 9th
Division.
[Sidenote: _July 27._]
After the fight at Longueval and Delville Wood the 9th Division left the
Somme and was transferred from the XIII. Corps in the Fourth Army to the
IV. Corps, under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson, in Sir Charles
Monro’s First Army. The South African Brigade marched to Maricourt on
23rd July, where it entrained for Hengest, and on the 27th arrived in the
Frévillers area, north of the main road between Arras and St. Pol.
[Sidenote: _Aug. 11._]
[Sidenote: _Aug. 23._]
Here its first task was reorganization. Drafts to the number of 40
officers and 2,826 other ranks had been sent from Bordon during July,
and their training had to be completed before they could be absorbed
into the different regiments.[13] On 5th August, the Army Commander,
Sir Charles Monro, inspected the Brigade, which at the moment showed
a parade strength of 62 officers and 2,523 men. On the 11th the King
visited Frévillers and walked down the village street, which was lined
by the 1st Regiment in fatigue dress. By the third week in the month the
Brigade was sufficiently rested and reconstituted to take its place once
again in the front line, and on 23rd August it took over from the 26th
Brigade the Berthonval and Carency sections of the Vimy area. At that
date the Germans held the crown of the celebrated ridge, and the British
front ran along its western slopes. Different battalions of the Brigade
held the first-line trenches until 23rd September, and thereby enlarged
their experience of modern war, for they were enabled to realize for the
first time the discomfort of trench fighting amid perpetual rain. For
the greater part of the time the weather was abominable, the men were
standing in two feet of water, and the last few days it rained so heavily
that the parapets crumbled, and every available man had to be employed on
their repair. It was a foretaste of what awaited them in October.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 13._]
Vimy was a quiet area, for the great battle on the Somme continued; and
this stage was for the Brigade almost barren of incident. The exception
was a raid into the enemy’s trenches on the night of the 13th September,
carried out by parties from “B” and “D” Companies of the 2nd Regiment,
under the command of Lieutenants Lilburn and Walsh. There was a bright
moon occasionally obscured by passing clouds; but the raiding parties
managed to reach the enemy’s side of our wire without being observed. Our
artillery put down a barrage, and under its cover the men doubled across
No Man’s Land and jumped into the German trenches, the barrage lifting
as they arrived there. Prisoners were secured, dug-outs were bombed, and
at a prearranged signal the raiders returned to their lines before the
German barrage began. Their casualties were only two, though one was so
severely wounded that he could not be moved from the German lines. Sir
Charles Monro sent a message to General Lukin to express his admiration
for the way in which the raid had been conducted—the meticulous care
in its preparation, and the gallantry and enterprise displayed in its
execution.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 23._]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 8-9._]
On 23rd September the Brigade was relieved, and on the 25th it moved
to a new training area, that of the Third Army. On 5th October the 9th
Division was restored to the Fourth Army, and on the 7th the South
Africans marched southward to the Somme. Next day, in heavy rain, they
relieved the 141st Brigade of the 47th (London Territorial) Division in
Mametz Wood, now a bleak desolation, and on the 9th moved to High Wood,
where they took over from the 142nd Brigade. The 9th Division was now
side by side with another famous Scottish division, the 15th, and part of
General Pulteney’s III. Corps.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 3._]
Since the 20th of July much had happened on the Somme. The advance of
1st July had carried the first enemy position on a broad front; but
the failure of the attack north of the Ancre had made the breach eight
miles less than the original plan. The advance of 14th July gave us the
second enemy position on a still narrower front—from Bazentin-le-Petit
to Longueval. The danger now was that any further movement might result
in the formation of a sharp and precarious salient; so Haig broadened
the breach by striking out to left and right, taking first Pozières and
the high ground at Mouquet Farm, and then on the other flank Guillemont
and Ginchy. This made the gap in the second enemy line seven miles wide,
and brought us in most places to the highest ground, from which direct
observation could be had over the slopes and pockets to the east. On 3rd
September the Allies everywhere between Thiepval and Estrées were facing
the German third line. At the outset of the battle this third position
had been only in embryo, but before the assault of 14th July it had been
for the most part completed, and by the beginning of September it had
been elaborately fortified, and a fourth position prepared behind it.
The third line was based on a string of fortified villages which lay on
the reverse slopes of the main ridge—Courcelette, Martinpuich, Flers,
Lesbœufs, and Morval. Behind it was an intermediate line, with Le Sars,
Eaucourt l’Abbaye, and Gueudecourt as strong points in it. Further back
lay the newly-made fourth line, just west of the Bapaume-Péronne road,
covering the villages of Sailly-Saillisel and Le Transloy. This was the
line protecting Bapaume, and at the moment the final German prepared
position.
The fighting during July and August had greatly weakened the enemy
forces. All the most famous German units had appeared—the pick of the
Bavarians, the 5th Brandenburgers, and every division of the Guard and
Guard Reserve Corps. The time was ripe early in September for a new
attack which should accelerate the enemy’s decline, and give the British
front a new orientation. Haig’s immediate aim was to break through the
German third line; but his ultimate objective was a thrust north-eastward
across the Upper Ancre, so as to get behind the great slab of unbroken
enemy positions from Thiepval northward. The moment was propitious for a
new blow. The French on the British right had won conspicuous successes;
Brussilov was still pinning down the Austro-German forces on the Eastern
front; Sarrail had just launched an offensive in the Balkans; Rumania
had entered the war, and was pouring troops into Transylvania; and the
recent changes in the German High Command had for the time being slightly
dislocated the machine.
[Sidenote: _Sept. 15._]
[Sidenote: _Sept. 25-26._]
On Friday, 15th September, Haig struck from a point south-east of
Thiepval to Ginchy, with a force the larger part of which, such as the
Guards, the Canadians, and the New Zealanders, was fresh to the Somme
area. He used for the first time the new British tanks, and in one day
advanced to an average depth of a mile on a front of more than six,
taking Courcelette, Martinpuich, and Flers. Only on his right, where
the Guards were faced with an impossible task, was there any serious
check. On 25th September he struck again between Combles and Martinpuich,
and for the second time advanced one mile on a front of six, and took
Morval, Lesbœufs, and Gueudecourt, while on the 26th the right wing of
Sir Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army carried Thiepval and the whole of that
crest. That evening the Allied fortunes in the West had never looked
brighter. The enemy was now back in his fourth line, and had lost all the
advantages of the higher ground. His _moral_ was seriously shaken, and
it appeared as if his great machine was getting out of gear. If heaven
granted a fine autumn there was good hope that a further advance might
drive him from the Bapaume ridge and crumble his whole front between
Arras and Péronne.
That hope was destined to fail. The guns were scarcely silent after
the attack of the 26th when the weather broke, and October was one
succession of tempestuous gales and drenching rains. Now appeared the
supreme difficulty of trench warfare. For three months the Allies had
been slowly advancing, blasting their way forward with their guns before
each infantry attack, and the result was that the fifty square miles of
old battle-ground which lay behind their front lines had been tortured
out of recognition. The little country roads had been wholly destroyed,
and, since they never had much of a bottom, the road-menders had nothing
to build upon. New roads were hard to make, for the chalky soil had been
so churned up by shelling that it had lost all cohesion. In all the area
there were but two good highways, and by the third month of the battle
even these showed signs of wear. The consequence was that there were now
two No Man’s Lands—one between the front lines, and one between the old
enemy front and the front we had won. The second was the bigger problem,
for across it must be brought the supplies of a great army. It was a
war of motor transport, and we were doing what the early Victorians had
pronounced impossible—running the equivalent of steam engines not on
prepared tracks but on high-roads, running them day and night in endless
relays. The problem was difficult enough in fine weather, but when the
rain came it turned the whole land into a morass. Every road became a
watercourse, and in the hollows the mud was as deep as a man’s thighs.
The army must be fed, troops must be relieved, guns must be supplied, so
there could be no slackening of the traffic. Off the roads the ground was
one vast bog, dug-outs crumbled in, and communication trenches ceased
to be. Behind the British front lay six miles of sponge, varied by mud
torrents. It was into such miserable warfare, under persistent rain in a
decomposing land, that the South African Brigade was now flung.
The line of the Fourth Army from a point north-east of Courcelette ran
southward for the most part along the foot of the slopes which culminated
in High Wood, and which were known to us as the Thiepval-Morval ridge.
But a special topographical feature must be noted, for on it depended the
fighting in October. From that ridge a series of spurs descended eastward
into the hollow, one of which specially concerns us—the hammer-headed
spur immediately west of Flers, at the end of which stood the odd tumulus
called the Butte de Warlencourt. Below the eastern edge of this spur lay
the German fourth position. It was a position on reverse slopes, and thus
screened from direct observation, though our command of the high ground
to the west gave us a view of its hinterland. Our own possession of the
heights, great though the advantages were, had this drawback, that our
communications had to descend the reverse slopes, and were thus partly
exposed to the enemy’s observation and long-range fire. The task of Sir
Henry Rawlinson’s Fourth Army in this sector was, therefore, to carry
the spurs, and so get within assaulting distance of the German fourth
line. The spurs were not part of the German main front, but were held
as intermediate positions, every advantage being taken of sunken roads,
of ruins, and of the undulations of the country. They represented for
the fourth German line what Contalmaison had represented for the second;
till they were carried no general assault on the main front could be
undertaken. Further, their capture would relieve our difficulties by
giving us certain cover for our advanced gun positions, and shelter for
the bringing up of supplies.
At first things went well. From Flers north-westward, in front of
Eaucourt l’Abbaye and Le Sars, ran a very strong trench system which we
called the Flers line, and which was virtually a switch connecting the
old German third line, now in our hands, with the intermediate positions
on the spurs. The capture of Flers gave us the south-eastern part of this
line, and during the last days of September and the beginning of October
we won the rest of it. On the 1st of October the 50th and 47th Divisions
carried the Flers line north of Destremont Farm, and the ruined abbey
of Eaucourt, though in the latter remnants of the 6th Bavarian Division
made for some days a stout resistance. On 7th October the 23rd Division
took the village of Le Sars, on the Albert-Bapaume road; but the 47th
Division, on their right, failed to reach the Butte de Warlencourt. These
two divisions were now relieved, and the 15th and the 9th took their
places, with orders to carry the Butte and the German intermediate line.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: _Oct. 9._]
During the day of 9th October the 2nd South African Regiment, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Christian, to the strength of 20 officers and 578
other ranks, took over the portion of the front line to be held by the
Brigade. The relief, with the exception of two posts, was complete by
1.25 a.m. on the 10th, and shortly before daybreak the missing posts
were discovered. During that night a number of wounded, belonging to the
outgoing 141st Brigade, were brought in by the South Africans.
The attention of the reader is now requested to the map opposite page 92.
The boundary of the 9th Division on the left was the road from the Butte
de Warlencourt to Martinpuich, where it ran along the depression of the
ground west of Eaucourt. The South African Brigade was on the left of
the division, and its brigade boundary ran through the ruins of Eaucourt
l’Abbaye, beyond which the 26th Brigade held the front. The 27th Brigade
was in divisional reserve. “B” and “C” Companies of the 2nd Regiment
held the front line, as shown in the map, together with two strong
posts, Nos. 58 and 77, on their left and right fronts respectively. “A”
and “D” Companies were in the support trenches of the old Flers line
running along the south-west, side of Eaucourt l’Abbaye. The German,
front trenches, known to us as Snag and Tail, lay about 1,000 yards
from our front line, and conformed roughly to its shape. Beyond them,
running through the Butte de Warlencourt, was the enemy main intermediate
position, cutting the Albert-Bapaume road beyond Le Sars. The confused
fighting of the past weeks and the constant rains had made the whole
front on both sides indeterminate. Odd lengths of fantastically-named
trenches abounded, and at any one moment it was doubtful which were held
by the Germans and which could be claimed by the British. Sir Henry
Rawlinson’s first task was to clear the ground up to the Butte, which
would bring him directly in front of the German fourth position, running
through Le Transloy and Ligny-Thilloy.
On the left of the South African front, and under their control, stood
the ruins of a mill. The first instructions of the 2nd Regiment were to
link up the posts 58 and 77 with the mill; but owing to the slowness of
the relief this could not be done till the second night, when some 600
yards of trench were dug. During the whole of the 10th and the 11th the
2nd Regiment was heavily shelled; but their casualties were not large. On
the 11th General Furse issued orders for an attack during daylight on the
12th in conjunction with the 26th Brigade on their right, and the 44th
Brigade of the 15th Division on their left. The enemy’s trenches were
accordingly reconnoitred, and a certain number of machine guns located.
So far as could be judged, there was no wire in the immediate vicinity.
Orders were issued to push out a post to the point marked 93, and to link
it up with the mill, but this instruction was presently cancelled. A new
communication trench was dug between Flers trench and the front line.
[Illustration: THE FIGHTING BEFORE THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT, BATTLE OF
THE SOMME.]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 12._]
The attack on the 12th was fixed for 2.5 in the afternoon. The assault
was to be carried out on a one-battalion front by the 2nd and 4th
Regiments, the 2nd Regiment leading, with the 3rd and 1st in reserve.
There were two objectives; the first the enemy trenches called Snag and
Tail, and the second the main intermediate line through the Butte de
Warlencourt. The cloudy morning dissolved after midday in a drizzle of
rain. At 2.5, after a well-arranged barrage, the 2nd Regiment crossed the
parapets, closely followed by the 4th, under Major Hunt. One minute after
zero an enemy barrage of exceptional violence began, with the result that
in a quarter of an hour the telephone wires to the front line were cut,
and no reports were received for some time. In the misty weather it was
impossible to see any distance, and the difficulty was increased owing
to a smoke barrage, which we had laid down around the Butte, drifting in
our direction. Presently it appeared that the enemy was following a new
practice. The ground over which we were attacking was a gentle slope,
perfectly suited to machine-gun fire. He had his machine guns placed well
back in prepared positions, and caught our attack at long range. Under
this blast no troops could live, and presently the impetus of the assault
died away, long before the first objective had been obtained.
At 4 p.m. General Lukin received a message from Captain Ross of the 4th
Regiment that he, with some details of the 2nd, was holding a line of
shell-holes and a shallow trench half-way between our old front line and
the first objective, and that in front of him, near the first objective,
was a company of the 4th, while a part of the 2nd seemed to be farther
forward. Lukin had already sent forward a company of the 3rd Regiment
to hold the old front line, and he now ordered two officers’ patrols
from this company to clear up the situation. They reported during the
evening that the Brigade had nowhere reached its first objective. As the
attacking battalions had suffered heavily, and were now more or less
disorganized, Lukin ordered the 3rd Regiment to relieve them, while the
1st was moved up in support. The relief was no light task, owing to the
congested state of the communication trenches, and the difficulty of
obtaining reliable guides; and it was not till after dawn on the 13th
that the 2nd and 4th Regiments were brought back to High Wood.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 13._]
Early on the 13th it was discovered that Lieutenants Pearse and
Donaldson, with about sixty men, had dug themselves in at a very exposed
point near the enemy’s line, and due south of the post at point 93.
Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, commanding the 3rd Regiment, instructed
Captain Montgomery, who commanded “C” Company in it, to open up visual
communication with Lieutenant Pearse, and tell him that he could not be
relieved till after dark. This was found to be impossible; but Lieutenant
Cruddas succeeded in reaching the place and ascertaining the exact
position of the party, with the result that they were brought back safely
during the evening. Meantime much work had been done in digging trenches
and establishing what ground had been won. A new trench, afterwards known
as Pearse’s Trench, was dug from our old line to the point which he had
held, and made a jumping-off ground for future operations.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 14._]
Orders were received from the division at 6.15 p.m. to reconnoitre
the deserted strong-point 93, with the object of occupying it. A
patrol, under Lieutenant Mallett, reached it with little opposition,
and found there many signs of German occupation, including a field
and two machine-gun emplacements and a deep dug-out. This place was
soon to become only too familiar to us under the name of the Pimple, a
little mound some 60 feet long, 12 feet wide, and from 12 to 15 feet
high.[14] The patrol did not return till daybreak, so it was impossible
to occupy the Pimple that night; but the 3rd Regiment were instructed
that the following evening, as soon as the dark fell, they must enter
into possession of the place, so that it might be linked up with the
rest of the line. Accordingly, early on the night of the 14th, “B”
Company of the 3rd Regiment, under Captain Sprenger, was detailed for
the work. Lieutenant Mallett led the advance for 400 yards and reached
the mound, which was thereafter garrisoned by a party under Lieutenant
Medlicott. Lieutenant Mallett then entered the trench running from
the Pimple towards the enemy position in Snag and Tail trenches, and
bombed the enemy out of a portion of this till he was driven back by
machine-gun fire and severely wounded. Another party, however, under
Lieutenants Harris and Estill, continued the work, and succeeded in
taking and holding a considerable part of this section of the old German
communications. That night the place was heavily bombed by Germans
moving along the trenches, and soon after dawn on the 15th a working
party was seen approaching. As they were in close order, a Lewis gun was
turned on them, and the squad was dispersed with many casualties. The
garrison of “B” Company continued to hold the Pimple and the captured
trenches until relieved by “A” Company of the 3rd on the night of
the 15th. The casualties during the operation amounted to 3 officers
(Lieutenant Medlicott killed, Captain Sprenger and Lieutenant Mallett
wounded, the latter subsequently dying of his wounds) and 35 other ranks.
It was one of the most gallant exploits during this stage of the battle.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 16-17._]
On the night of the 16th the 3rd Regiment retired to the support line,
and their place in the front trenches was taken by the 1st, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson. Meantime, large working parties had been
employed in widening and deepening the communication trench between
the Pimple and our front line and back to Flers Switch. During the
17th Dawson took his company commanders round the whole trench system,
pointing out the limits of each company’s front and the points to be
attacked, for on that day orders had come from the division for an
assault in the early morning of the 18th against the same objectives
which had been attacked without success on the 12th. Such coaching was
a most needful preliminary, for every hour, under the shelling and the
weather, the landscape was growing more featureless. To the eye it was
only a waste of wrinkled grey mud.
[Illustration: SCENE OF SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE’S ADVANCE AGAINST THE BUTTE
DE WARLENCOURT POSITION.]
All that evening and for most of the night heavy rain fell, so that
the trenches and parapets were mere undulations in a quagmire. The
front-line trench being deep and narrow with few fire-steps, it was
difficult for the men to leave it, and realizing this, the company
commanders began getting their troops out more than an hour before the
time fixed for the attack. Zero hour was at 3.40 a.m., and when it came
the three assaulting companies of the 1st Regiment were already for the
most part formed up in No Man’s Land.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 18._]
Keeping as close as they dared to their barrage, the South Africans
advanced, with “C” Company on their left, “B” Company in the centre, and
“A” on the right. They disappeared into the rain, and for several hours
were unheard of. When news came it was news of failure. “C” Company,
under Captain Jenkins, passed the communication trench leading south from
the Pimple, and came to that junction of Tail and Snag trenches which we
called the Nose of the Switch. Here they were held up by wire at the foot
of a steep bank in front of the German line, and were also heavily bombed
from the trenches themselves. The leading platoon was almost entirely
shot down, and though an officer and six men of the following platoon
managed to get into the German trench, they, too, immediately fell. The
only officer left was Captain Jenkins, who was himself wounded; and,
seeing that the enemy line was so strongly held, and that there was no
hope of success for what remained of his company, he ordered the company
sergeant-major to withdraw the survivors to their original line. The
casualties of “C” Company were 69 out of the 100 who crossed the parapet.
The fate of “A” and “B” Companies was still harder, and to understand
it the reader must again turn to the map. The two companies advanced
rapidly behind our barrage and entered Snag Trench, Captain Whiting,
who commanded “B” Company, being mortally wounded half-way across. They
failed, however, to realize that they had reached their objective, and
continued beyond it. The whole place was so battered by shell-fire that
the trench outlines had become obscure. They saw about 600 yards on
their right some of the Highlanders of the 26th Brigade, but they had
now wholly lost touch with their flanks, and the enemy was filtering
in between them and their old front. Lieutenant Stapleton with a few
stragglers succeeded in returning, after killing some twelve Germans and
taking nineteen prisoners; two officers and sixteen other ranks were
captured; but with these exceptions all the men of “A” and “B” Companies
were killed.[15]
At daybreak a gallant attempt was made by Major Ormiston, commanding the
troops on the Pimple, to bomb along the trench leading to the junction
of the Tail and Snag trenches, but it broke down under machine-gun fire
from the German strong-point at the Nose. A block was established about
50 yards up the trench from the Pimple, but no further progress could be
made, since the trench dipped into a hollow, and was wholly commanded by
the Germans at the Nose.
Such was the position on the morning of the 18th. During the night a
company of the 3rd Regiment, under Captain Langdale, had been moved
forward to the front line and put at Dawson’s disposal, and a company of
the 4th Regiment was sent to replace it in the support line. Presently
Langdale took up his position in Pearse’s Trench, and on Dawson’s
instructions sent out a patrol to look for “A” and “B” Companies. The
patrol returned at two in the afternoon, having obtained no information.
The situation, therefore, was that “C” Company had failed in the attack
with heavy losses, and that “A” and “B” Companies had disappeared. The
key of the enemy position was clearly the Nose, and until this could be
thoroughly bombarded progress was impossible. Communications, however,
were so difficult that all day Dawson was asking for the bombardment of
the Nose, and all day our guns were firing on the wrong point.
That afternoon Dawson was ordered to renew the attack at 5.45 p.m. He
decided that “D” Company of his own 1st Regiment should attack from
the Pimple, while Captain Langdale’s Company of the 3rd should advance
from Pearse’s Trench. If the Nose was to be taken it must be attacked
along Snag Trench from the east. Owing to the appalling condition of the
trenches, which were now all but impassable, Captain Langdale advanced
with only one platoon and two Lewis gun teams. He entered Snag Trench
without opposition, and moved along it to the right for some 200 yards,
where he made a block and left a Lewis gun. He then moved westward to
a point about 25 yards from the Nose, where he came upon three German
machine guns in action. He did not feel strong enough to attack them
himself, and after remaining there about an hour withdrew his men to the
original front line. The bombing attack from the Pimple had also failed.
Dawson ordered Captain Langdale to return at once and reoccupy Snag
Trench, and this was done between twelve and one on the morning of the
19th.
[Sidenote: _Oct. 19._]
Meanwhile Lukin had sent forward a company of the 4th Regiment, under
Captain Ross, with instructions to carry out a fresh attack at the
junction of Snag and Tail trenches. Captain Ross reached the front
line about 4 a.m. on the morning of the 19th. At about five o’clock
the enemy launched an assault with bombs and _flammenwerfer_ against
Captain Langdale’s and Captain Ross’s men in Snag Trench, and drove them
out, with heavy casualties to Captain Ross’s company. The leader was
wounded, and Lieutenant Young, V.C., killed. The position now was that
Snag and Tail trenches were held in force by the enemy, and that we were
everywhere back in our old line except on the extreme right, where some
details of the 3rd and 4th Regiments seemed to be on the left flank of
the 26th Brigade.
On the morning of the 19th it was decided to make another attempt to
clear Snag Trench, and for the purpose a company was dispatched from the
3rd Regiment, under Lieutenant Elliott. All that morning the two machine
guns at the Pimple, under Major Ormiston, had enfiladed the trench. It
often happened that small bodies of Germans, unable to stand the strain,
would leave cover and bolt across the open towards the Butte, making
an excellent target for our snipers and machine gunners.[16] By the
afternoon few of the enemy were left in Snag Trench; but the machine
guns were still at the Nose, and our artillery seemed unable to touch
them.
At noon Lieutenant Elliott reported to Dawson, and was instructed to
enter Snag Trench, to get in touch with the 26th Brigade on his right,
and then to work his way towards the Nose and drive out the enemy there.
At five minutes to three Lieutenant Elliott entered Snag Trench without
difficulty, but failed—apparently owing to insufficient bombs—to advance
towards the Nose, beyond which Major Ormiston was waiting to attack as
soon as there was a supporting movement from the east. The thing had
now become hopeless. Dawson had not a single officer or man, with the
exception of his adjutant, fit to make another journey to the front line.
The mud was so thick that rifles, machine guns, and Lewis guns were
constantly jamming, and among the little party on the Pimple there was
not one rifle which could be fired. In many of the trenches the mud was
three feet deep, and the wounded had to be dug out at once before they
suffocated. Every man was utterly exhausted.[17]
[Sidenote: _Oct. 20._]
That night the remnant under Dawson was relieved by the 6th K.O.S.B. from
the 27th Brigade, and early on the morning of the 20th all were back in
High Wood.
So ended the tale of the South Africans’ share in the most dismal of all
the chapters of the Somme, a chapter which, nevertheless, deserves to
rank high in the record of British hardihood. The enemy held his ground
with admirable skill and resolution. The fighting had not the swift pace
and the obvious successes of the earlier battles. We were striving for
minor objectives, and such a task lacks the impetus and exhilaration of
a great combined assault. Often the action resolved itself into isolated
struggles, a handful of men in a mud-hole holding out till their post
was linked up with our main front. Rain, cold, slow reliefs, the absence
of hot food, and often of any food at all, made those episodes a severe
test of endurance and devotion. So awful was the mud that each stretcher
required eight bearers, and at the end battalion runners, though carrying
no arms or equipment, took from four to six hours to cover the thousand
odd yards between the front line and battalion headquarters. To show
the utter exhaustion of the troops, at High Wood after the relief many
men were found lying fast asleep without overcoats or blankets, and
stiff with frost. To add to their discomfort, there was a perpetual and
inevitable confusion of mind. The front was never at any one moment
clearly defined, and officers led and men followed in a cruel fog of
uncertainty. Such fighting could not be other than costly. In the ten
days from the 9th to the 19th October the South African casualties were
approximately 1,150, including 45 officers, 16 of whom were killed.[18]
On 21st October the Brigade, with the exception of the 3rd Regiment,
which was in High Wood in reserve to the 27th Brigade, moved to Mametz
Wood. On the 23rd orders were received that the Brigade would be in
reserve in the attack to be carried out by the 9th Division on the 25th.
Presently these orders were cancelled, and the entire division was taken
out of the line. At the end of the month it moved north to an area south
of the Doullens-Arras road, and became part of Major-General Aylmer
Haldane’s VI. Corps in Sir Edmund Allenby’s Third Army.
[Illustration: BRIG.-GEN. FRED. STEWART DAWSON, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.,
Commanding 1st South African Regiment, and later South African Brigade.]
During November the 1st South African Regiment was in huts at Duisans,
the 2nd at Lattre St. Quentin, the 3rd at Wanquetin, and the 4th billeted
in Arras, where it was engaged in improving the defences of that city.
The other regiments were occupied in training, in the construction of new
roads and cable trenches, and in the other preliminary work necessary
in the area of a coming battle. For it had already been decided by Sir
Douglas Haig that the great thrust of the spring would be from Arras
eastward.
[Sidenote: _Dec. 2._]
November of that year was not the sodden downpour of October. There
were seasons of high wind and sharp frost, which were a grateful relief
after the monotony of the Butte de Warlencourt fighting. On 2nd December
General Lukin was promoted to the command of the 9th Division, with the
rank of Major-General, on General Furse’s appointment as Master-General
of the Ordnance. All South Africans felt their Brigadier’s advancement
to be a personal tribute to the Brigade which he had so gallantly led.
He was succeeded in its command by Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson of the 1st
Regiment, who was succeeded in turn by Major F. H. Heal.