THE BATTLE OF ARRAS.
(January-July 1917.)
The Allied Plan for 1917—Sir Douglas Haig’s Scheme—The Object
of the Arras Battle—The Nature of the German Defences—The
Training of the Brigade—The Attack of Easter Monday—Success
of the 9th Division—The Work of the South African Field
Ambulance—The Attack of 12th April—The Losses of the
Brigade—Transferred to Trescault Section.
In November 1916 a conference of representatives of all the Allied Powers
was held at French General Headquarters, and a plan made for the campaign
of the following year. In 1917 Sir Douglas Haig desired to undertake
a great offensive in Flanders, with a view to clearing the Belgian
coast, for in that area he believed that success would give the highest
strategic reward. But before this movement began it was desirable to
reap the fruits of the Battle of the Somme. In November the enemy was
penned in an awkward salient between the valleys of the Ancre and the
Scarpe. The British Commander-in-Chief proposed early in the spring to
attack this salient simultaneously on two sides—the Fifth Army moving on
the Ancre front, and the Third Army attacking from the north-west about
Arras. At the same time the First Army was to carry the Vimy Ridge,
the possession of which was necessary to secure the left flank of our
operations farther south. So soon as this was completed, the Flanders
campaign would begin with an assault on the Messines Ridge, to be
followed by an attack eastward from the Ypres salient.
The reasons for Sir Douglas Haig’s plan are clear. He was fully aware of
the new great German position which had been preparing during the winter,
and which was known as the Hindenburg or Siegfried Line, and he did not
think it good policy to make a frontal assault upon it. He knew that the
Battle of the Somme had seriously weakened the enemy, and he believed—it
was, indeed, a mathematical certainty—that the tactics of the Somme, if
persisted in during 1917, and supported by a reasonable pressure from the
Russian front, would give the Allies victory before the close of that
year. He wished, therefore, to stage a second battle of the Somme type—to
stage it in an area where its strategic results would be most fruitful;
and to begin it sufficiently early in the season to allow a decision to
be reached before the close of the good weather.
This plan had to be wholly recast. The British and French Governments
decided that Haig must take over a longer front, and before the end of
February 1917 the British right was as far south as a point opposite
the town of Roye. Again, the retreat of the Germans during February and
March 1917 destroyed the salient which Haig had purposed to attack. There
now remained nothing of the preliminary movement as originally planned,
except the carrying of the Vimy Ridge. But a fresh scheme had been
proposed by the French and accepted by the British Government. Under
the new French Commander-in-Chief, Nivelle, an ambitious operation was
conceived on the heights of the Aisne, which, it was trusted, would open
the way to Laon. In this action the old method of limited objectives was
to be relinquished; and Nivelle hoped, by means of his new tactics and by
an unexampled concentration of troops, to break through the enemy lines
on a broad front and restore the war of movement. This attack was fixed
for the middle of April. It would operate against the southern pivot of
the Siegfried zone, and it was arranged that Haig should use his forces
against the northern pillar east of Arras, and should strike a week
before.
The position was, therefore, that the Arras battle, which Haig had
regarded as only a preparation for the main campaign of the season in
Flanders, became the principal task of the British Army during the first
half of 1917. This battle in turn was conceived as an action subsidiary
to the greater effort of the French in the south. It was admittedly an
attack in a region where, except for an unexampled piece of fortune,
great strategic results could scarcely be obtained. The British success
depended upon what the French could do on the Aisne. If Nivelle failed,
then they, too, must fail in the larger strategic sense, however valuable
might be certain of their local gains. If, however, Nivelle succeeded,
the pressure from Arras in the north would beyond doubt greatly
contribute to the enemy’s discomfiture. The danger of the whole plan was
that the issue might be indeterminate and the fighting at Arras so long
protracted, without any decisive success, that the chances of the more
vital Flanders offensive later in the summer would be imperilled. This,
as we shall see, was precisely what happened.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 14, 1917._]
In December 1916 the 9th Division relieved the 35th Division, which was
then holding the trenches in front of Arras. The front held by the South
African Brigade extended now for 1,800 yards northward from the River
Scarpe.[19] For three months they remained in this section, during the
severest winter known in France for many years. For most of December it
rained, and in January and February there came heavy snow and bitter
frost. On 14th January the 9th Division passed from the VI. Corps to
the XVII. Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson,
and this involved an alteration in the divisional boundaries. The 26th
Brigade, which was holding a line of trenches south of the Scarpe, now
relieved certain Canadian units; and the whole of the new corps front,
since several of its divisions had not yet arrived, was held by the 9th
Division, with all three brigades in line. Early in February the 51st
(Highland Territorial) Division took over the ground held by the 26th
Brigade, and the 34th Division relieved the 27th Brigade, so that the 9th
Division’s front from St. Pancras Trench to the Scarpe was held by the
South Africans.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 3._]
These months were filled with preparations for the great spring attack.
New trenches had to be made and old trenches diverted; headquarters had
to be found for battalions and brigades, and emplacements constructed
for artillery and trench mortars. In addition to this, patrols and
wiring parties were busy every night. On January 3, 1917, a party from
the 3rd South African Regiment, commanded by Lieutenants B. W. Goodwin
and W. F. G. Thomas, made a successful raid on the German trenches. The
men were picked volunteers, who, for the week before, had been thoroughly
trained in the work, so that each knew exactly the task before him.
All had blackened faces, and used only the Zulu language. After our
barrage had drenched the enemy front line the raiders entered the German
trenches, which were found to be very deep and magnificently constructed,
though badly damaged by our gun-fire. Only one prisoner was brought in,
but a number of dug-outs and concrete machine-gun emplacements were
destroyed, and the enemy suffered many casualties.
[Sidenote: _March 4._]
On 4th March the South Africans were relieved by the 26th Brigade, and
marched from Arras to the neighbourhood of Ostreville, where they began
their intensive training for the coming offensive. Their casualties
during the previous three months in the line had been 2 officers and
49 other ranks killed, and 5 officers and 166 other ranks wounded. The
health of the men, considering the severity of the weather, had been
extraordinarily good, and only twenty-eight cases of trench feet were
reported. As was dryly observed, the doubt as to whether they could
stand a northern winter was settled by keeping them continuously in
the trenches. On 5th March Sir Douglas Haig inspected the 1st and 4th
Regiments, and complimented them highly on their smartness; and on 11th
March the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Regiments were inspected by the Colonial
Secretary, Mr. Walter Long.
While the South Africans were beginning their intensive training, the
Germans were completing their retirement from the Bapaume Ridge to
the Siegfried Line. At the hamlet of Tilloy-lès-Mofflaines, on the
Arras-Cambrai road, this line branched off from the old front. Beaurains
was now ours, and Arras was therefore free from its former encirclement
in the south. The German position from the northern pivot of the new
Siegfried Line to Lens was very strong, consisting of three main systems,
each constructed on the familiar pattern of four parallel lines of
trenches studded with redoubts, and linked up by numerous switches. A
special and very powerful switch line ran for 5½ miles from the village
of Feuchy northward across the Scarpe to beyond Thélus, and constituted
what was virtually a fourth line of defence. The whole defensive belt was
from two to five miles deep, but the German High Command were not content
with it. They had designed an independent line running from Drocourt,
south-east of Lens, to the Siegfried Line at Quéant as an alternative
in case of an assault on the Arras salient. Towards the close of March
this position, which was to become famous as the Drocourt-Quéant Switch,
was not complete. It was intended as a protection to Douai and Cambrai,
the loss of which would have made the whole Siegfried system untenable.
But it was designed only as an extra precaution, for there was every
confidence in the mighty ramified defences between Lens and Tilloy and
in the resisting power of the northern Siegfried section. The country
through which the German positions ran was peculiarly suited to their
purpose. It represented the breakdown of the Picardy wolds into the flats
of the Scheldt, the last foothills of the uplands of northern France.
Long, low spurs reach out to the eastward separating the valleys of the
Scarpe, the Cojeul, and the Sensée, and their sides are scored with
smaller valleys—an ideal terrain for a defensive battle.
It will be seen that Sir Douglas Haig had a formidable problem before
him. The immediate key of the area was Vimy Ridge, the capture of
which was necessary to protect the flank of any advance farther south.
It was clear that no strategic result could be obtained unless the
Drocourt-Quéant Switch were breached, and that meant an advance of well
over six miles. But this position was still in the making; and if the
fates were kind, and the first three German systems could be carried at
a rush, there was good hope that the Drocourt-Quéant line would never be
manned, and that the drive of the British, assisted by the great French
attack on the Aisne, might bring them to Douai and Cambrai. It was a
hope, but no more. A result so far-reaching demanded a combination of
fortunate chances, which as yet had not been vouchsafed to us in any
battle of the campaign.
The city of Arras, situated less than a mile inside the British lines,
was, like Ypres, the neck of a bottle, and through it and its environs
went most of the transport for the new battle front. For two years it
had been a place of comparative peace. It had been badly shelled, but
mainly in the autumn and winter of 1914. The cathedral, a poor rococo
edifice, had been destroyed, and looked far nobler in its ruin than it
had ever done in its integrity. The beautiful old Hôtel de Ville had
been wrecked, and much damage had been done among the exquisite Spanish
houses of the Grande Place. Few buildings had altogether escaped, but
the place was still a habitable though a desolated city. Entering it by
the Baudimont Gate on a summer’s day the stranger saw the long white
street running intact towards the railway station, and it was not till he
looked closer that he noted shell marks and broken windows and the other
signs of war. There were many hundreds of civilians still living there,
and children could be seen playing on the pavement. Visitors came often,
for it was the easiest place in all France from which to enter the first
lines. Across the railway, a short walk in communication trenches, or
even on the open road, and you were in the actual battle front west of
Blangy or in the faubourg of St. Sauveur. An inn, the Hôtel de Commerce,
was still open, and men could dine there in comfort before proceeding to
their posts in the line. But up to April 1917 the place had the air of a
tomb. It was like a city stricken with the plague: whole, yet untenanted.
Especially eerie did it seem in the winter twilight, when in the long
echoing streets the only sign of life was an occasional kilted Scot
or South African, or a hurrying peasant woman, and the rumble of the
guns beyond Vimy alone broke the heavy silence. The gaunt ruins of the
cathedral rose like a splendid headstone in a graveyard.
Towards the close of March 1917 Arras awoke to an amazing change. Its
streets and lanes were once more full of life, and the Roman arch of
the Baudimont Gate saw an endless procession of troops and transport.
A city makes a difficult base for a great attack. It must be the route
of advancing infantry and their billeting area, and it is a mark which
the enemy guns can scarcely miss. To minimise this danger the British
generals had recourse to a bold plan. They resolved in this section to
assemble their armies underground. After the fashion of old French towns,
Arras had huge ancient sewers, like those of Paris which may be read
of in _Les Misérables_. A map of them was found, and the underground
labyrinth was explored and enlarged. Moreover, the town had grown over
the quarries from which the older part of it had been built, and these
also were discovered. The result was that a second city was created below
the first, where three divisions could be assembled in perfect security.
The caverns were lit by electricity, plans and sign-posts were put up as
if it had been a Tube railway, and a dressing station with 700 beds was
constructed. Here it was arranged that the greater part of the VI. Corps
should assemble for the attack due east of the city. As a matter of fact
the thing was not needed. The Germans shelled the town intermittently,
but there was no real bombardment, and before Arras could be methodically
destroyed the enemy had been pushed many miles eastward.
[Sidenote: _April 5._]
The South African Brigade, like the other troops of assault, were trained
for the battle with scientific precision. Models in clay of the German
trenches were constructed on the training ground, which was laid out as
near as possible to correspond to the enemy front in depth and breadth.
Here the attack was practised until each man was made familiar with his
proper task. During these days the British artillery was very busy. So
great was the concentration of guns that they could have been placed
wheel to wheel from end to end of the battle front. Various “Chinese”
attacks were organized, as rehearsals and to mislead the enemy. In the
third week of March a systematic cutting of the German wire began, and
our heavy artillery shelled their back areas and communications. On
Thursday, the 5th of April, a steady bombardment opened against all the
main German positions, more especially the great fortress of the Vimy
Ridge. Wonderful counter-battery work was done, and battery after battery
of the enemy was put out of action, located partly by direct observation
from the air, and partly by our new device for sound-identification.
These were for the most part days of clear, cold, spring weather, with
the wind in the north-east; and from dawn to dark our airplanes fought on
their own account a mighty battle. The history of that week must rank as
an epoch in the campaign in the air. It was a time of heavy losses, for
at all costs the foe must be blinded, and the British airmen kept up one
continuous offensive. Forty-eight of our own planes failed to return, and
forty-six of the enemy’s were destroyed or driven down out of control.
The attackers, as was natural, paid the heavier price.
The British front of attack was slightly over twelve miles long, from
Givenchy-en-Gohelle in the north to a point just short of Croisilles in
the south. On the left was the right Corps of Sir Henry Horne’s First
Army—the Canadian Corps under Sir Julian Byng, with one British brigade,
directed against the Vimy Ridge. On their right lay Sir Edmund Allenby’s
Third Army. Its northern Corps, next to the Canadians, was the XVII.,
under Sir Charles Fergusson, with three divisions in line—from left to
right the 51st (Highland Territorial), the 34th, and the 9th; and one,
the 4th, in support. The central Corps was Aylmer Haldane’s VI., with,
in line, the 15th, 12th, and the 3rd Divisions, and the 37th in support.
On the right of the battle was Sir Thomas Snow’s VII. Corps, with the
14th, 56th, and 30th Divisions in line, and the 21st forming a pivot on
the right. It is interesting to note that in its constituents the army of
assault was largely Scottish. Thirty-eight Scots battalions were destined
to go over the parapet—a larger number than the British at Waterloo, and
many times the force that Bruce commanded at Bannockburn.
[Sidenote: _April 6._]
On 13th March the 9th Division had received the plan of attack, and from
5th April onward its divisional guns—269 pieces in all—were busy with
the preliminary bombardment. On Friday, 6th April, the South African
Brigade—with the exception of the 1st Regiment, which was in line—was
inspected by Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts, but lately returned from
his East African campaign. He was deeply impressed by the fine condition
of the men. They had passed through one of the worst winters on record
without losing any of their ardour of spirit or vigour of body. So far
their experience in battle had been bitterly hard—the long-drawn-out
torture of Delville Wood, and the misery of the hopeless struggle at the
Butte de Warlencourt. Now for the first time they were about to engage
in a great forward movement, long and patiently prepared, and amply
supported by artillery. Every man among them was strung to that pitch of
expectation and confidence which is the mood of all successful offensives.
[Sidenote: _April 7._]
A proof of their spirit was given the following day. It was necessary
to identify more carefully the German troops against them, and the
1st Regiment was ordered to carry out a daylight raid. The attempt was
originally timed for eleven in the morning, but it was subsequently
postponed to three in the afternoon. At that hour, under cover of our
barrage, a party of 5 officers and 50 other ranks, under Captain T.
Roffe, crossed our parapets, and reached the German trenches without a
casualty. A large dug-out was found, out of which three Germans of the
8th Bavarian Regiment were taken prisoner. Their object having been
accomplished the party retired, and reached their own lines with the loss
of one killed and three wounded. On their way back, however, a private
with a broken thigh was seen by Lieutenant Scheepers to be lying in front
of the German parapet. He and Captain Roffe went back to help him; but,
coming under heavy fire, were compelled to take cover in a shell-hole in
No Man’s Land, where they remained until, under the cloak of darkness,
they were able to bring in their wounded man.
[Sidenote: _April 8._]
That night the Brigade, less the 1st Regiment, marched from its training
area to Arras, and took up its quarters in the northern outskirts. The
artillery preparation continued to be intense till the next day, Sunday,
8th April, the day originally fixed for the attack. That Sunday the
weather was clear and calm, with a foretaste of spring. A lull seemed to
fall upon the British front, and the ear-splitting din of the past week
died away into sporadic bombardments. It is possible that this sudden
quiet outwitted the enemy. He was perfectly aware of the coming attack,
and he knew its area and objectives. He had expected it each day, and
each day had been disappointed. On the Sunday he began to reply, and
rained shells at intervals into the streets of Arras, but he did little
harm. The troops of attack there were waiting comfortably in cellars and
underground assembly stations. In the late evening the weather changed,
the wind shifted to the west, and blew up to rain and squalls of snow.
During the night there were long spells of quiet, broken by feverish
outbreaks of enemy fire from Vimy to Croisilles. Our own batteries were
for the most part silent.
That night the South Africans began to assemble in the front and support
lines preparatory to their attack. The 9th Division was holding some
1,800 yards of front from the river Scarpe to a point just north of the
Bailleul road. It had the 26th Brigade on its right next the river, the
South Africans in the centre, and the 27th Brigade on its left. Three
objectives had been given to the division, known as the Black, the Blue,
and the Brown lines. The Black Line, from the river Scarpe to Chantecler,
including the village of Laurent-Blangy, represented the last line of
the enemy’s front system, and was approximately 800 yards away from our
own front trenches. To reach this line two, and in places three, trench
lines had to be taken and passed. The Blue Line was 900 yards east of
the first objective, and represented the enemy’s second trench system
on the Arras-Lens railway. The Brown Line, from 800 to 1,000 yards
farther east, was the German third system, running from the village of
Athies to the Point du Jour. To reach the Brown Line a distance of some
2,700 yards had to be traversed. If the Brown Line were taken, General
Lambton’s 4th Division was to pass through the 9th, and capture the Green
Line, including the village of Fampoux—the last German system before the
Drocourt-Quéant Switch.
[Sidenote: _April 9._]
The arrangements for the South African Brigade were that they should
attack on a two-battalion front of 600 yards, with the 4th Regiment
on the left and the 3rd on the right, each battalion attacking on a
two-company front, supported by its two remaining companies, while each
company in turn would be on a two-platoon front. The 2nd Regiment was
in support on the left, and the 1st on the right. When the first two
objectives were taken the two battalions in support were to become the
attacking battalions for the third objective—the Brown Line—while the
two original assaulting battalions remained in support. The 1st Regiment
was under Lieutenant-Colonel Heal, the 2nd under Lieutenant-Colonel
Tanner, the 3rd under Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, and the 4th under
Lieutenant-Colonel Christian. Pontoons were thrown across the Scarpe
during the night to facilitate the march of the men to the assembly area;
and the Royal Engineers attached to the Brigade blew twenty-six craters
in No Man’s Land to accommodate the leading waves of the attack. By 2
a.m. on the morning of Easter Monday, 9th April, all four battalions of
the Brigade were in position.
Zero hour was at 5.30 in the morning. At 4 a.m. a drizzle began which
changed presently to drifts of thin snow. It was intensely cold, and it
was scarcely half-light, so the troops waiting for the signal saw before
them only a dark mist flecked with snowflakes. But at the appointed
moment the British guns broke into such a fire as had not yet been
seen on any battle-ground on earth. It was the first hour of the Somme
repeated, but tenfold more awful. As our men went over the parapets they
felt as if they were under the protection of some supernatural power,
for the heaven above them was one canopy of shrieking steel. There were
now no enemy front trenches; there were no second-line trenches; only a
hummocky waste of craters and broken wire, over which our barrage crept
relentlessly.
The great deeds of that day are known to all: how the Canadians at a
bound reached the crest of Vimy; how the 15th Division carried the
Railway Triangle and Feuchy; how the fortress of the Harp fell to the 3rd
Division; how Telegraph Hill fell to the 14th and Observation Hill to the
12th, and Neuville-Vitasse to the 56th. We are here concerned with only
one part of the battle—the doings of the 9th Division, and especially of
the South African Brigade.
At zero hour our barrage opened fifty yards in front of the first German
trenches, and under its cover the 3rd and 4th South African regiments
advanced to the attack. On the left “C” Company (Lieutenant Smith) and
“D” Company (Captain Reid) of the 4th led, followed by “A” Company
(Captain Grady) and “B” Company (Lieutenant Morrison). On the right
“A” Company (Captain Vivian) and “D” Company (Lieutenant Money) of the
3rd led, followed by “B” Company (Lieutenant Elliott) and “C” Company
(Lieutenant Ellis). Close on their heels came the supporting companies
of the 1st and 2nd Regiments, and occupied some trenches just beyond the
German front line, as the supporting point to the attack on the first
objective. The 3rd Regiment, as it crossed the parapet and moved over
No Man’s Land, met with heavy machine-gun fire on its right flank, and
suffered many casualties, including Lieutenant Burrows killed, and
Lieutenants Elliott, Money, Hyde, Gray, Thomas, Van Ryneveld, and Lee
wounded. Our barrage, however, was perfect, and the skilful use of smoke
shells blinded the enemy’s vision. In thirty-four minutes the Black
Line was reached. The 4th Regiment on the left had fewer losses, though
its leading companies had some casualties from approaching too close to
our own barrage. The “mopping-up” detachments, consisting of fifty men
from the 4th Regiment, two platoons from the 1st, and two platoons from
the 2nd, reached the trenches with the first wave, and cleared out the
dug-outs, taking many prisoners, and meeting with little resistance.
[Illustration: SOUTH AFRICAN BRIGADE AT BATTLE OF ARRAS. FIRST STAGE OF
ADVANCE.]
At 7.30 the advance was continued towards the Blue Line, supported not
only by the artillery, but by a creeping barrage of twenty machine guns.
At first sight this was a far more formidable objective, for it included
the cutting of the Arras-Lens railway, and the attackers had to descend a
slope where were a number of wire entanglements not fully destroyed. It
was at this point that most of the casualties occurred, for the passes
through the wire were commanded by snipers on the edge of the railway
cutting. Once down the slope some protection was given by the bank beside
the railway. Mounting this, our men looked down into the cutting, where
the enemy were sheltering from our guns in their dug-outs. Here there
were many machine-gun posts, which, being visible to us, were engaged by
our Lewis guns. There was one awkward incident. The South African attack
had pushed slightly in advance of the 26th Brigade on its right, thus
causing a gap; and the Germans were able to open machine-gun and rifle
fire along the railway. Captain Vivian, however, of the 3rd Regiment,
pushed forward some details of the 26th Brigade who had joined him, and
cleared out the German machine gunners and snipers. The Blue Line, which
lay on the eastern side of the cutting, was then consolidated. Part of it
was a veritable fortress, and in the cutting itself concrete machine-gun
posts had been built. By the time the whole Brigade had reached the
second objective it was just on 10 o’clock.
The attack on the final objective, the Brown Line, was timed to start
at 12.45. The 1st and 2nd Regiments took the place of the 3rd and 4th,
who became the supporting battalions. The 1st Regiment was on the right,
with a strength of 20 officers and 488 other ranks; on the left was
the 2nd, with a strength of 20 officers and 480 other ranks. Punctual
to time the final advance began under the same methodical barrage. The
German wire in the valley just west of the Brown Line was found to be
very strong and untraversable, except through a passage cut by the enemy
and a communication trench. Had there been serious resistance the attack
might have been long delayed at this point, but already there were signs
that the enemy was breaking. Few prisoners were found in the trenches,
but groups were seen to advance from the Green Line and surrender. About
2 o’clock the Brown Line was occupied, where the trenches were found in
almost perfect order, having suffered little from our bombardment.
The work of the South Africans was now accomplished. General Lambton’s
4th Division, about 3 o’clock, moved up and passed through the 9th
Division to the assault of the final Green Line—an operation now tried
for the first time on the British front. Thanks to the admirable
training of both divisions, the experiment was a brilliant success.
Before dark the Green Line had fallen, the strong-post of the Hyderabad
Redoubt was rushed, and Lambton was in Fampoux. This was the apex reached
on the first day of the battle. The right of the XVII. Corps and the left
of the VI. Corps formed a salient on both sides of the Scarpe, the point
of which was facing no prepared position nearer than the Drocourt-Quéant
line.
The record of the 9th Division that day was not excelled by any other
unit in the battle. All three brigades had performed to the full the
tasks allotted to them. They had taken the strength of a brigade in
prisoners—51 officers and 2,088 other ranks; they had taken 7 howitzers,
10 field guns, and 84 machine guns. As regards the South Africans, whose
advance was literally unbroken, the casualties were far less than the
number of prisoners. The enemy was demoralized by our barrage, and then
surprised and routed by the steady infantry pressure behind it. Seven
officers fell—Major H. C. Symmes and Lieutenant Hardwich of the 2nd
Regiment; Lieutenants Godfrey, Burrows, and Lee of the 3rd Regiment; and
Lieutenants Hunt and Dorward of the 4th Regiment. The total casualties
were: in the 1st Regiment, 15 killed and 69 wounded or missing; in the
2nd Regiment, 20 killed and 68 wounded or missing; in the 3rd Regiment,
53 killed and 226 wounded or missing; in the 4th Regiment, 57 killed and
186 wounded or missing. From dawn to dusk the troops were in the highest
spirits. In the words of General Dawson: “The men are on their toes, and
the wounded do not want to leave the fighting line.”
Throughout the day the work of the Field Ambulance was admirably
performed. The advance was so rapid that the task of the
stretcher-bearers was a heavy one, for the distance from the farthest
objective to the nearest collecting post was more than 3,000 yards. Had
the weather been fine, the difficulties would have been great enough,
but the drizzle and sleet showers soon converted the battle area into a
sea of mud. Nevertheless, by working without rest, under the brilliant
direction of Captain Lawrie, before 6 o’clock that evening all the
wounded of the Brigade had been collected and evacuated by the South
African Field Ambulance, who had also dealt with casualties from the
other two brigades of the 9th Division, and from the 34th and 4th
Divisions.
The result of the first day of Arras was that all the enemy’s front
positions had gone, and his final position, short of the Drocourt-Quéant
line, had been breached on a front of 2½ miles. Unfortunately the weather
became his ally. It changed to intense cold and wet, and with the sodden
ground it took long to bring up our guns. He held us up with machine guns
in pockets of the ground, which prevented the use of our cavalry, and
there was no chance of a dramatic _coup de grâce_. The infantry could
only push forward slowly and methodically, and complete the capture of
the remains of his position. We had made a breach, a genuine breach, on
a broad front in his line, but we could not exploit our success owing
to the nature of the ground and the weather. Our remarkable gains,
won at small cost the first day, could only be increased by small
daily additions, for the elaborate preliminaries of Arras could not be
improvised, and the infantry must wait on the advance of the guns.
[Sidenote: _April 10._]
[Sidenote: _April 11._]
Tuesday, 10th April, was spent by the South African Brigade in the Blue
and Black lines, in cleaning rifles and equipment and replenishing
ammunition. The Brigade was then placed at the disposal of the 4th
Division, and early on Wednesday, the 11th, orders were received for it
to relieve the 10th Brigade, which was then holding the Brown Line. That
day Lambton was attacking at noon, and the 1st and 2nd South African
Regiments moved up to a forward post under cover of a ridge 500 yards
behind the Green Line to act in support. The attack of the 4th Division
gained some ground, but failed in its main purpose; and after dark the
1st, 2nd, and 4th South African Regiments took up a position running
north-west from Fampoux, with the 3rd Regiment in reserve. At that moment
the enemy held a line running from south to north from Rœux through the
Chemical Works and the railway station along the Gavrelle road. Behind it
to the east lay the slopes of Greenland Hill.
An attack was ordered for the following day against this position.
The 9th Division was to advance against the line between Rœux and the
roadside inn which lay a thousand yards east of the Hyderabad Redoubt,
with the 15th Division holding the front south of the Scarpe, and the
4th Division to protect the northern flank of the attack. There were two
objectives—the first being the road from the inn to the station; and the
second, the Chemical Works and buildings south of the railway, the wood
called Mount Pleasant, and the village of Rœux. The South African Brigade
on the right and the 27th Brigade on their left were to capture the
first objective, after which the 26th Brigade would advance south of the
railway.
[Sidenote: _April 12._]
At 3 p.m. on the 12th the 1st, 2nd, and 4th South African Regiments
assembled in Fampoux. The enemy was evidently prepared, for though this
movement was carried out in file, with intervals between companies, it
was subjected to a heavy and steady bombardment, which cost us many
casualties.
The prospects of success were not bright. All three brigades of the 9th
Division were very tired, having been hard at work under shell-fire for
three days, and having had no sleep for four nights, three of which
they had spent lying in the snow without blankets and many without
greatcoats. There was no chance of an adequate bombardment, and there
was no time to reconnoitre the ground. The country between Fampoux and
Rœux station was perfectly open, and was commanded in the south by a high
railway embankment and three woods, all of them held by the enemy; while
in the north it sloped gradually to the inn around which the Germans
had organized strong-points. It was impossible, therefore, to prevent
the movement of troops being observed by the enemy. The South African
dispositions were the 1st Regiment on the left and the 2nd on the right,
with two companies of the 4th in support of each. The 3rd Regiment was
held in brigade reserve. As the different companies began to deploy from
the shelter of the houses in the east end of Fampoux they were met with
heavy machine-gun and rifle fire.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF ARRAS. FINAL STAGE OF ADVANCE.]
The attack was timed for 5 p.m., when our guns opened fire. Unfortunately
our barrage dropped some 500 yards east of the starting-point, and behind
the first enemy line of defence, so that the South Africans had a long
tract of open ground to cover before they could come up with it. Our
artillery, too, seemed to miss the enemy machine-gun posts on the railway
embankment, which, combined with the flanking fire from the woods in the
south and the south-east and from the direction of the inn, played havoc
with both the attacking brigades.
[Sidenote: _April 15._]
The result was a failure. A gallant few of the South Africans succeeded
in reaching the station, a point in their objective, where their bodies
were recovered a month later when the position was captured. For the
rest, only one or two isolated parties reached points as much as 200
yards east of the line held by the 4th Division. But as a proof of the
quality of the troops, it should be recorded that before the attack was
brought to a standstill, the casualties of the 2nd Regiment, who went in
400 strong, amounted to 16 officers and 285 men, while the 1st Regiment
lost 2 officers and 203 men, and the 4th, 6 officers and 200 men.[20]
Among the dead were Captain Grady, who commanded “A” Company of the 4th;
and Lieutenants J. M. Ross, Lees, and Porteous. Since the first part of
the assault had failed, the 26th Brigade, which was waiting to advance
on Rœux, was not called upon. That night it took over the line from
the Scarpe to the Hyderabad Redoubt, where it linked up with the 4th
Division, and the South Africans withdrew to the Green Line. They were
finally relieved on the night of the 15th, having, in the three days
since the 12th, suffered 720 casualties.
In the unsuccessful operations in front of Fampoux the Field Ambulance,
which had a collecting station in that village, had a heavy task. The
stretcher-bearers were under constant shell-fire, and Captain Welsh was
mortally wounded on the 12th—an irreparable loss to the unit. Many of the
stretcher-bearers had been working without rest for three days, but they
continued to do their duty till they dropped from sheer exhaustion. The
work of one man, Private R. W. Nelson, deserves special mention. He had
carried continuously from the morning of the 9th, and was already worn
out when the attack opened on the 12th. He worked on steadily, until he
collapsed late in the evening. Nevertheless, he refused to be relieved,
and after a short rest returned to his post, and carried seven cases
before morning.
The Brigade was to have no further part in the long-drawn-out struggle
lasting till far on in May, which the failure of the French attack on
the Aisne compelled us to continue in the Arras area. It was in the
Monchy-Breton district during the latter part of April. On 5th May a
composite battalion, consisting of a company from each of the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd Regiments, was formed under the command of Major Webber, and
moved to Arras, where it was placed at the disposal of the 27th Brigade.
It took its share in holding the front line till May 14th, when it was
demobilised. On the 13th of that month Sir Edmund Allenby inspected the
Brigade, and congratulated the men on the distinguished part they had
played in the late battle. In June it was in Arras as divisional reserve,
and on 5th June two composite battalions were formed to assist in the
attack on Greenland Hill. That attack, carried out by troops of the XVII.
Corps, was so successful that the supports were not called upon, and
these battalions rejoined their Brigade on the 6th.
Its numbers had now grown sadly thin. It had suffered severe casualties
in April, and there had been the usual wastage from sickness which is
inevitable in any force on active service. It was clear that if the
Brigade was to preserve its identity on the British front it must get
larger reinforcements than it had received in the past. To replace
losses, drafts to the strength of 1,448 had been sent to France between
the end of April and the end of June, but even with these it was gravely
under strength. On 30th June the strength of the different regiments was
as follows: 1st Regiment, 38 officers, 680 other ranks; 2nd Regiment, 37
officers, 601 other ranks; 3rd Regiment, 35 officers, 691 other ranks;
4th Regiment, 39 officers, 818 other ranks.
[Sidenote: _July 28._]
In July the Brigade moved to the Somme area for training, and on the 27th
of that month, along with the rest of the 9th Division, was transferred
to the IV. Corps. On the 28th it relieved the 174th Infantry Brigade in
the Trescault section of the line, north of Havrincourt Wood and along
the Canal du Nord. This was then a quiet region, and beyond a few minor
raids there was no incident to record. During the summer, while the
Brigade was in training, the weather had been all but perfect; but by the
close of July it had broken in a deluge of rain, and August recalled the
October of the past year on the Somme. The great battle had begun in the
north, the fight on which Haig had placed his highest hopes, and with
it had begun that epoch of mists and gales and torrents which were more
fatal to our success than any German tactics.