THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: DELVILLE WOOD.
(April-July 1916.)
The Brigade reaches Flanders and joins the 9th Division—The
Position of the Campaign in the Spring of 1916—First Experience
in the Trenches—The Move to the Somme—The Purpose of the Battle
of the Somme—Successes of the First Day—The Brigade enters
the Line at Bernafay Wood—The 4th Regiment engaged in Trônes
Wood—Death of Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Jones—The British Attack
of 14th July—Longueval and Delville Wood—The South Africans’
Attack on Delville—The Critical Fourth Day—Colonel Thackeray at
last relieved—The Losses of the Brigade—The Magnitude of the
South African Performance.
[Sidenote: _April 23._]
The transports _Megantic_, _Oriana_, _Scotian_, and _Tintoretto_,
carrying the Brigade, left Alexandria between the 13th and 15th of April,
and reached Marseilles during the night of the 19th, about the same time
as the Russian division dispatched to the aid of France from Vladivostok.
Owing to a case of contagious sickness on board the _Oriana_, the 4th
Regiment and part of the 1st were placed in quarantine, while the
remainder of the troops entrained at once for Flanders. Steenwerck was
reached on the morning of the 23rd, and the 2nd and 3rd Regiments marched
to their billeting area along roads wholly under water. It was the first
sight which the South Africans had of the delectable land in which for
four years the British Army made war. Headquarters were established at
Bailleul, and the Brigade was attached to the 9th (Scottish) Division,
under Major-General W. T. Furse. For three weeks detachments of the
two regiments took their place in the trenches for instruction, and on
11th May the 4th Regiment and the rest of the 1st arrived from their
quarantine at Marseilles. On 14th May the 28th Brigade of the 9th
Division disappeared, being absorbed in other divisions, and the South
African Brigade took its place in the fighting unit to whose glory it was
so worthily to contribute.[9]
The 9th Division belonged to the “First Hundred Thousand” of the
New Army, and at the start was wholly Scottish. The famous Scottish
battalions of the old regulars had drawn their men from every quarter of
Britain; but the 9th Division had few in its ranks who did not hail from
north of the Tweed. It had already made a name for itself at Loos, where,
under Major-General George Thesiger, who fell in the battle, it had
captured the Hohenzollern Redoubt and the ill-omened Fosse 8, and held
the latter till it was utterly outflanked. It had fought in the toughest
part of the whole line, and all the troops, Highland and Lowland, had
borne themselves like veterans. The division had spent the winter in the
Ypres salient as part of Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army, and during
the spring had occupied the front around Armentières. It was a proof of
the respect in which the South African Brigade was held by the British
Command that it should be made part of so notable a division; and it was
not less fortunate for the 9th Division that it received a brigade so
competent to sustain its record.
The April of 1916 was a critical month in the Western campaign. On the
9th the first and deadliest stage of the German assault on Verdun had
closed with the failure of the attackers. Pétain’s thin lines had held
their ground; the little city was still inviolate; and, though France
had lost terribly, she had wrecked the plans of her enemy, inflicted
upon him irreparable loss, and by her heroism won that quiet confidence
which is the surest guarantee of victory. When the Imperial Crown Prince
opened the battle, one part of his purpose had been to induce a British
counter-offensive. That counter-offensive did not come, for General
Joffre did not desire it. He preferred to wait until Germany had spent
her strength, and to use the armies of France and Britain in a great
movement against a weakened foe. Our task, therefore, during the first
months of 1916 had been to wait. The duty had been costly, for on our
front the average daily toll of loss in trench fighting was not far
from 1,000. It was a difficult time, for there was no great objective
to quicken the spirit, and those indeterminate months imposed a heavy
strain upon the _moral_ of our troops. Yet the apparent stagnation was
not without its advantage, for it gave the new British Commander-in-Chief
time to complete his field army and perfect its education. When Sir
Douglas Haig took over the supreme command he set himself to the work
which Sir John Moore had undertaken more than a century before. He
had to train his men for a new kind of warfare, and the whole British
front became one vast seminary. To quote from his dispatch at this
date: “During the periods of relief all formations, and especially the
newly-created ones, are instructed and practised in all classes of the
present and other phases of warfare. A large number of schools also exist
for the instruction of individuals, especially in the use and theory of
the less familiar weapons, such as bombs and grenades. There are schools
for young staff officers, and regimental officers, for candidates for
commissions, etc. In short, every effort is made to take advantage of the
closer contact with actual warfare, and to put the finishing touches,
often after actual experience in the trenches, to the training received
at home.”
Moreover, during these months of waiting our strength in munitionment
had grown beyond belief. The Allied offensives of 1915 had failed
largely because there was no sufficient weight of shells and guns behind
them. But by June of 1916 Britain was manufacturing and issuing to the
Western front weekly as much as her whole pre-war stock of land service
munitions. In heavy guns the output in the year had increased six-fold.
The weekly production of machine guns had increased fourteen-fold, and
of rifles three-fold—wholly from home sources. In small-arm ammunition
the output was three times as great, and large reserve stocks had been
accumulated. The production of high explosives was sixty-six times what
it had been in the beginning of 1915, and the supply of bombs for trench
warfare had been multiplied by thirty-three. At last we were providing a
machine which would put our infantry on equal terms with the enemy.
[Illustration: “NANCY,” THE 4TH REGIMENT MASCOT, ON THE SOMME BATTLEFIELD.
(_By permission of the Imperial War Museum._)
The springbok “Nancy” was presented to the Regiment in August 1915 by Mr.
D. M’Laren Kennedy of Driefontein, Orange Free State. She accompanied the
4th to Egypt, and thence to France, where she was with the Brigade in all
its battles. She was wounded in 1917. She died at Hermeton, in Belgium,
on 28th November 1918.]
[Sidenote: _June 14._]
The South African Brigade was inspected on 29th April by Sir Douglas
Haig, and on 4th May by Sir Herbert Plumer. The next two months were
devoted to its initiation in the methods of trench warfare, which were
wholly new to it. During May it held a portion of the front line, and
on 4th June the whole Brigade and the Field Ambulance moved into the
Steenbecque and Morbecque training area. Battalion training was followed
by skeleton Brigade training until 14th June, when orders were received
for the division to move to the Somme. The Brigade was quartered in the
neighbourhood of Ailly-sur-Somme, whence parties of officers and N.C.O.’s
visited the front line in the Maricourt region. Meantime the 2nd and 3rd
Regiments were attached to the 30th Division, to assist in the work of
preparation for the coming attack.
Few men who were then in Picardy will ever forget that strange month
before the great battle opened—the pleasant summer weather, the quiet
of the front, the endless activity of the British hinterland, where
every road was thronged with guns and transport, the curious breathless
sense of expectation. On 23rd June the Brigade moved to Corbie and
Sailly-le-Sec, where it was within a few miles of the line. Next morning,
Saturday, the 24th, in grey, cloudy weather with flying showers of rain,
the main bombardment opened.
The South Africans, as they moved east from Corbie along the Picardy
downs, beheld a landscape which, in the heat and dust of midsummer, must
have recalled their own country. The Somme, with its acres of swamp and
broad lagoons, was not unlike some river of the bushveld. The “tawny
ground,” which Shakespeare’s Henry V. had summoned his men to colour
with their blood, had something of the air of the high-veld—yellow-green
ridges and slopes falling away to an infinite distance. As they topped
the hill behind Méaulte and faced the long lift of land towards Bapaume,
they had the kind of spectacle which is common enough beyond the Vaal.
In the hollows around the water-courses was the light green of crops;
then a great stretch of unfenced country patched with woods, which were
curiously clean-cut like the coppices in the park of a country house. It
was such a view as a man may see from Haenertsberg, looking north towards
the Woodbush. The weather, too, was the soft, shimmering mist which one
meets on the edge of the Berg. Our bombardment had only just begun, and
the countryside was not yet devastated. Fricourt was still a pleasant
woodland village, Bernafay and Trônes were as yet little forests, and the
spire of Mametz church was more than a tooth of masonry.
* * * * *
The story of the Battle of the Somme belongs to history written on a
larger scale than this, for here we are concerned with only a part of
it. But to understand that part it is necessary to grasp the purpose
of the whole action. The enemy was suffering from a lack of immediate
reserves, and the depression of _moral_ due to his failure at Verdun and
the recent successes of Brussilov in Galicia. He had boasted so loudly
of his “war map,” and the amount of conquered territory which he held,
that he dared not resort to the expedient of shortening his long line.
He trusted to the great natural and artificial strength of his positions
in the West to repel the Allies, whatever weight of men and guns might be
brought against him. In no part of the Western front were these positions
stronger than between Arras and the Somme, where he held in the main the
higher ground, and had in the rear many fortified woods and villages
which could be linked together into reserve lines.
The Allies had learned the lesson of the futile offensives of 1915, and
of the long-drawn contest at Verdun. They no longer dreamed of breaking
the enemy’s front by a sudden bound, for they realized the depth of his
fortified zone. They had accepted the principle that an attack should
proceed by stages, with, as a preliminary to each, an elaborate artillery
“preparation;” and they realized, too, that, since the struggle must be
protracted, fresh troops must be used for each stage. Their new plan
was simply attrition on a colossal scale. It was like the mighty head
of water which hydraulic engineers apply to a mountain in order to wash
it away. The governing idea was not a breach in the front, though that
might come incidentally, but such a steady, unrelenting pressure as would
first cripple and then destroy the enemy’s machine. Their method was
that of “limited objectives,” with new troops and a new bombardment for
each phase, and they had certain tactical devices in reserve which they
hoped to apply with good effect at the right moment. To quote what I
have written elsewhere, the scheme might be suggested by the metaphor of
a sea-dyke of stone in a flat country where all stone must be imported.
“The waters crumble the wall in one section, and the free reserves of
stone are used to strengthen that part. But the crumbling goes on, and
to fill the breach stones are brought from other sections of the dyke.
Some day there must come an hour when the sea will wash through the
old breach, and a great length of the weakened dyke will follow in the
cataclysm.” This method of attrition presupposed the continuance of the
war on two fronts. When Russia fell out of line the situation was utterly
changed, and the plan became futile against an enemy with a large new
reservoir of recruitment. But at the time of its inception, uninspired
and expensive as it was, it was a sound plan, and _ceteris paribus_ would
have given the Allies victory before the end of 1917. Even as things
turned out, in spite of the unlooked-for _débâcle_ in the East, the
Battle of the Somme struck a blow at the heart of Germany’s strength from
which she never wholly recovered.
A strategy of active attrition demands a battle, and a battle requires
certain definite objectives. Our aim was to crumble the enemy’s defences
on the Bapaume Ridge so completely that he could not find an alternate
position of equal strength, and would be slowly forced into open warfare.
The British front of attack was from Gommecourt in the north to Maricourt
in the south, whence the French carried the battle across the Somme to a
point opposite the village of Fay. It was Sir Douglas Haig’s intention
to make his main attack between the Ancre and Maricourt, and it is clear
from his dispatch that he regarded the movement of his left wing as a
subsidiary operation. The final campaign of 1918 proved that in this he
judged wrongly, and that the Bapaume Ridge was most vulnerable to a
flanking attack from the north. The effort of the British left on the
first day failed, and thereafter the battle became a stubborn frontal
attack up the slopes from the west. The enemy’s fortress was assaulted on
its most formidable side, and when after six months he admitted defeat
and fell back, he yielded not to any strategical brilliance in our plan,
but to the incomparable valour and tenacity of the Allied troops.
[Sidenote: _July 1._]
On 30th June, the day before the battle began, the South African Brigade,
comprising the four infantry battalions, the 64th Field Company R.E.,
the 28th Brigade M.G. Company, and the South African Brigade Trench
Mortar Battery, moved to Grove Town, a large dump on the outskirts of
Bray, the 9th Division being in general reserve to Sir Walter Congreve’s
XIII. Corps. That night the weather suddenly cleared to a blue midsummer
evening. Next morning, Saturday, 1st July, at half-past seven, under a
cloudless and windless sky, the Allied infantry went over the parapets,
and the battle began.
The result of that day was that the German first line was carried almost
everywhere from the Ancre southward. In no part of the field was the
success more notable than in the area of Congreve’s XIII. Corps, which
took Montauban, and came to the edge of Bernafay Wood. For the next few
days, while our centre was struggling for Ovillers and Contalmaison,
Congreve, on the British right wing, working in co-operation with the
French, was endeavouring to clear the woods of Trônes and Bernafay, which
intervened between the first and second German positions. Bernafay soon
fell; but Trônes Wood, being commanded from the south by the Maltzhorn
Ridge and from the north by the German position at Longueval, was a
hard nut to crack, and though we took most of it, we could not hold it.
The place became a Tom Tiddler’s ground, which neither side could fully
claim, since it was at the mercy of both the British and German artillery
fire. That was the position by the 13th of July, when the capture of
Contalmaison allowed Sir Douglas Haig to begin the second stage of the
action.
[Sidenote: _July 5._]
Meantime the South Africans had entered the fringes of the battle. On the
night of 2nd July the Brigade moved forward to Billon Valley to relieve
the 27th Brigade, which was advancing into the line. On 4th July General
Furse ordered Lukin to relieve the 21st Brigade in divisional reserve,
and the 89th Brigade in the Glatz sector of the front.[10] This relief
was completed by 3.15 a.m. on the morning of 5th July. The position now
was that the 1st and 4th South Africans held the line from the junction
with the French to Briqueterie Trench east of Montauban, the 2nd South
Africans were in divisional reserve at Talus Boise, and the 3rd South
Africans were in support in the old British and German front-line
trenches immediately to the north-west of Maricourt.
The first experience of the South Africans in the battle was the
difficult task of holding a piece of captured front in the face of
heavy enemy shelling. The 27th Brigade had cleared Bernafay Wood on the
night of the 4th, and during the following days the French (General
Nourrisson’s 39th Division of the famous XX. Corps[11]) were assiduously
attacking towards Maltzhorn Farm, while the British right division, the
30th, was labouring to secure the wood of Trônes. The South Africans were
stationary except for the contingent which, as we shall see, assisted the
30th Division in Trônes Wood. Their position was uncomfortable, for they
were close to the angle of our front, where it bent southward, and were
thus exposed to sniping and gun-fire from both front and flank. On the
5th General Lukin began those faithful pilgrimages along the front-line
trenches which from the first marked him out among brigade commanders.
He was on his feet that day for no less than fifteen hours. Next day,
the 6th, there was a great shelling, and the two South African regiments
suffered some twenty casualties, among the killed being Lieutenant
Oughterson at Glatz Redoubt, and Lieutenant W. N. Brown in Chimney
Trench. On the 7th the shelling continued, and that afternoon, in pouring
rain, the relief began of the 1st South Africans by the 18th Manchesters
of the 21st Brigade. That evening came the preliminary orders from
General Headquarters for the second stage of the battle, which for the
9th Division was an attack upon the German line at Longueval.
At dawn on the 8th the only South Africans in the line were the 4th
Regiment, holding the Briqueterie Trench and the section from Dublin
Trench to Dublin Redoubt. The 2nd Regiment, which had been in reserve
at Talus Boise, was ordered to relieve the 12th Royal Scots and the 6th
K.O.S.B. of the 27th Brigade, which were holding a portion of Bernafay
Wood. “A” and “C” Companies were detailed for the task, and the following
day they were joined by “D” Company. During the 10th these companies of
the 2nd South Africans were replaced by two companies of the 4th. The 2nd
during its short time in the line was most severely shelled, and incurred
some 200 casualties, including Captain H. E. Clifford and Lieutenants C.
L. H. Mulcahy, L. Greene, and B. N. Macfarlane, the first two dying of
their wounds.
[Sidenote: _July 10._]
The 4th Regiment, now the only part of the Brigade in the line, was about
to be drawn into the fight for Trônes Wood, where the 30th Division had
made a lodgment on Saturday, the 8th. There were heavy counter-attacks
all through the Sunday, and on Monday, the 10th, an attack was ordered to
clear the place. At 11 p.m., on the 9th, “A” Company of the 4th was sent
to support the 90th Brigade, a platoon was dispatched to the garrison of
the Briqueterie, and the 3rd Regiment was held in reserve at the disposal
of the 30th Division. At dawn on the 10th came the attack, and troops of
the 30th Division, together with “A” Company of the 4th South Africans,
advanced through the southern half of the wood, and reported it clear of
the enemy. But it could not be held. The half-moon of German artillery
positions around it made communication with our rear too perilous, and
the denseness of the covert, cut only by the railway clearings and the
German communication trenches, rendered organized movement impossible
within it. In the afternoon a German counter-attack lost us most of our
gains, and the company of the 4th, when it returned to its trenches,
was subjected to a desperate shelling, in which its commander, Captain
Russell, was mortally wounded.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL F. A. JONES, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding
4th Regiment, South African Infantry. Killed at Bernafay Wood, 11th July
1916.]
[Sidenote: _July 11._]
On the 11th the fighting in Trônes continued, and the 4th South Africans,
whose “A” and “C” Companies were in the neighbourhood of Glatz Redoubt,
and whose headquarters and “B” and “D” Companies were in Bernafay Wood,
came under the barrage with which the enemy prepared his counter-attacks.
That day the Brigade suffered a grievous loss in the death from a
shell-splinter of Lieutenant-Colonel F. A. Jones, the commanding officer
of the 4th Regiment. He had served in the old South African War with
the Welsh Regiment, and won the D.S.O., and in German South-West Africa
had been Brigade major to Colonel Beves, commanding the 1st Infantry
Brigade. “Fatty” Jones was beloved throughout the contingent for his gay
and imperturbable temper, his ready humour, and his complete coolness and
gallantry. It was a tragic fate which cut him off on the eve of a battle
for which his whole life had been a preparation. The command of the 4th
Regiment now passed to Major D. M. MacLeod.
On the 13th orders were issued for the attack on the German second line,
and the 4th Regiment was relieved by the 2nd Royal West Surreys and the
7th Middlesex of the 55th Brigade in the 18th Division. That evening
the whole South African Brigade was concentrated at Talus Boise as the
reserve brigade of the 9th Division. Its week in the front line had been
costly. In the 1st Regiment there were 50 casualties, in the 2nd 205, in
the 3rd 91, and in the 4th 191, and these included 7 officers killed and
9 wounded. Almost all the losses were from shell-fire, and the severity
of the German bombardment may be gathered from the fact that the 3rd
Regiment, which was in the support trenches, had 91 losses, mainly among
its working and carrying parties.
[Sidenote: _July 14._]
In the cloudy dawn of Friday, the 14th of July, Haig launched his attack
against a section of the German second position—the four miles of front
from a point south-east of Pozières to Longueval and Delville Wood. It
was the business of Congreve’s XIII. Corps to take Bazentin-le-Grand,
Longueval, and Delville Wood, and to clear Trônes Wood and form a
defensive flank. The result of the day was that we carried all our
objectives from Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval, a front of over three
miles, and at one moment had all but penetrated the enemy third position
at High Wood. Here we are concerned only with the British right flank,
the attack of the 9th Division against Longueval, and of the 18th
Division, under Major-General Ivor Maxse, on its right at Trônes Wood.
[Illustration: LONGUEVAL AND DELVILLE WOOD.]
This section was beyond doubt the most difficult in the battle-front.
To begin with, we were fighting in a salient, and our attack was under
fire from three sides. This enabled the enemy to embarrass seriously our
communications during the action. In the second place, the actual ground
of attack presented an intricate problem. The land sloped upwards from
Bernafay and Trônes Wood to Longueval village, which was shaped like an
inverted fan, broad at the south end, where the houses clustered about
the junction of two roads, and straggling out to the north-east along the
highway to Flers. Scattered among the dwellings were many little enclosed
gardens and orchards. To the east and north-east of the hamlet stretched
the wood of Delville, in the shape of a blunt equilateral triangle, with
an apex pointing northward. The place, like most French woods, had been
seamed with grassy rides, partly obscured by scrub, and the Germans had
dug lines of trenches along and athwart them. It had been for some days a
target for our guns, and was now a mass of splintered tree-trunks, matted
undergrowth, and shell-holes. The main German positions were to the
north, north-east, and south-east, at a distance of from 50 to 200 yards
from its perimeter, where they had strong entrenchments manned by machine
guns. It was Sir Douglas Haig’s aim to carry Longueval, and make it the
flanking buttress of his new line, from which a defensive flank could be
formed running south-east to the junction with the French. But it was
obvious that the whole of Longueval could not be held unless Delville
were also taken, for the northern part, where the road climbed towards
Flers, was commanded by the wood. Nothing short of the whole village
would make an adequate pivot; and, with the wood still in German hands,
there would be no good leaping-off ground from which to press outward in
the direction of Ginchy and Guillemont.
The attack on Longueval on the morning of the 14th was entrusted to
the 26th Brigade of the 9th Division—the 8th Black Watch and the 10th
Argyll and Sutherlands leading, the 9th Seaforths in support, and the 5th
Camerons in reserve. The 27th Brigade moved behind them to “clean up,”
and the intention of General Congreve was that day to make good Longueval
and also Delville Wood, if the latter should prove practicable—a heavy
task for two brigades. Shortly after dawn Lukin received orders to put a
battalion at the disposal of the 27th Brigade to assist in clearing the
Longueval streets, and the 1st Regiment was sent forward for the purpose.
The 3rd Regiment was also allotted to the 26th Brigade, but this order
was subsequently cancelled.
The assault of the Highlanders was a most gallant performance. They
rushed the trenches outside the village, and entered the streets, where
desperate hand-to-hand fighting took place among the houses, for the
enemy made a resolute defence. Before noon all the west and south-west
part of Longueval was in our hands; but it had become clear that the
place in its entirety could not be held, even if won, until Delville
Wood was cleared. At 1 p.m. General Furse informed Lukin that, as soon
as the other two brigades had taken Longueval, the South Africans should
capture and consolidate the outer edge of Delville Wood. For this purpose
the whole of the Brigade was available with the exception of the 1st
Regiment. Lukin thereupon drew up his orders for the operation. The first
hour suggested for the attack was 5 p.m. that afternoon; the time was
later changed to 7 p.m., and then to 7.30 p.m.; but owing to the fact
that the village was not entirely captured these orders were suspended.
A staff officer of the Brigade, Lieutenant Roseby, was sent forward to
ascertain the position in Longueval; and from his report it was apparent
that the northern part was not in our hands, and that, consequently, it
would be impossible to form up on a line west of Longueval and advance
to the attack from that direction. At a conference with General Furse at
Montauban that evening it was arranged that the attack should take place
at 5 a.m. on the following morning. The orders were that the wood was to
be taken at all costs, and that the advance was to proceed, even if the
26th and 27th Brigades failed to capture the northern part of the village.
[Illustration: LONGUEVAL VILLAGE AFTER THE BATTLE.
(_By permission of the Imperial War Museum._)]
Lukin called together his battalion commanders and gave them
instructions. These were that if, on arrival at Longueval, they found
the northern part still held by the enemy, they should attack Delville
from the south-west corner, moving forward on a one-battalion front.
To the 2nd and 3rd Regiments, the latter leading, was entrusted the
assault, with the 4th Regiment in support. Meantime during that day the
1st Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson, had been heavily engaged
in Longueval. At 2 p.m. it had deployed along the line held by the two
Scottish brigades, having been brought through a severe artillery fire in
eight lines of sections in file without a single casualty. Its business
was to attack the remainder of the village, and its leading companies,
“A” and “B,” reached their first objectives about four o’clock, but were
unable to advance owing to the machine-gun fire from front and flank.
During the night three parties—under Lieutenants Burgess, Henry, and
Bate—were sent out to capture the enemy posts which were checking the
advance, and found that the whole village in its northern part was a
nest of machine guns. On the morning of the 15th, after the other three
regiments had started for Delville Wood, the 1st returned to Lukin’s
command.
[Sidenote: _July 15._]
Two hours before dawn the three other regiments of the Brigade had moved
forward from Montauban. It was a cloudy morning, but as the sun rose
the sky lightened above the Bapaume Ridge, and men noticed amid the
punctual shelling how small birds still sang in the ruined coverts, and
larks rose from the battered ridges. Before them on their right front
lay the shadow which was Delville Wood, and the jumbled masonry, now
spouting like a volcano, which had been the hamlet of Longueval. On the
way orders came from the division to put two companies at the disposal
of the 26th Brigade in Longueval, and accordingly “B” and “C” Companies
of the supporting battalion, the 4th, were instructed to report to the
officer commanding the 5th Camerons there. The rest of the Brigade, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, who was in charge of the attack, moved over
the broken ground under heavy fire till they were close on the southern
edge of the village.
[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. E. C. TANNER, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanding 2nd South African Regiment, and later South African Brigade.]
It was Tanner’s first business to find out the situation. His patrols
reported that the Germans still held the northern part of Longueval
and all the wood adjoining the streets, but that the position in the
rest of the wood was obscure. Some of the 5th Camerons were holding a
trench running into Delville from the south-west corner, and in rear of
this trench the 2nd and 3rd Regiments assembled about six o’clock. In
such a posture of affairs, Lukin’s instructions had been to attack the
wood from the south-west. As the coming action was fought in a narrow
area where the smallest landmark had its importance, it is necessary
to understand the nature of the place. From the road junction in
Longueval there ran nearly due east a long ride which our men called
Princes Street. Subsidiary rides branched off it to the north and south
extending to the perimeter; these were in order from west to east, on
the north side the Strand, Regent Street, and Bond Street; and on the
south side Buchanan Street, Campbell Street, and King Street—an odd
mixture of the nomenclature of London and Glasgow. Another ride, parallel
to Princes Street and about half-way between it and the southern edge,
ran from Buchanan Street to the eastern perimeter, and was named Rotten
Row. Tanner decided to occupy the wood by first clearing the southern
part—that is, the area south of Princes Street—and then pushing north
from Princes Street, and occupying the Strand and the perimeter from its
northern end round to the south-west corner. This would give him the
whole of Delville except the north-west corner, which abutted on the
uncaptured part of Longueval village.
At first the attack moved swiftly. By seven o’clock the 3rd South
Africans, supported by one company of the 2nd, held everything south of
Princes Street. Thereupon Tanner sent the remaining three companies of
the 2nd to occupy the Strand and the northern perimeter. This proved to
be a heavy undertaking. The three weak companies reached their objective,
and found themselves compelled to hold a front of some 1,300 yards on
which it was almost impossible to maintain connection. They were well
supplied with shovels, and did their best to dig themselves in and wire
the ground they had won; but as soon as they reached the edge the whole
wood was violently shelled by the enemy, while machine-gun and rifle fire
broke out from the strong German lines around the perimeter. Meantime,
in the southern and eastern parts, two patrols of the 3rd Regiment, under
the command of Captains Medlicott and Tomlinson, had managed to get to
close quarters with the enemy, and had captured three officers, 135 other
ranks, and a machine gun.
At 2.40 p.m. Tanner reported to Lukin that he had won the whole wood with
the exception of strong points in the north-west abutting on Longueval
and the northern orchards. He had succeeded brilliantly in the first
part of his task, but the problem of Delville was far less to carry the
wood than to hold it. Lukin’s plan had been to thin out the troops in
the wood as soon as the perimeter was reached, leaving it to be held by
small infantry detachments with machine guns. But now came the enemy’s
counter-attack which made this plan impossible, for every available man
was needed to resist the German pressure. About three o’clock elements of
the 6th Bavarian Regiment of the 10th Bavarian Division attacked in force
from the east, but were driven back by rifle-fire. At 4.40 p.m. Tanner
reported that the enemy was also massing for an attack at the northern
end, and at 6.30 he again reported an enemy concentration to the north
and north-east. He informed Lukin that his casualties had been heavy, one
company of the 2nd South Africans having virtually been destroyed, and he
asked for reinforcements. He had already received a company of the 4th
South Africans, and another company of that regiment was sent forward to
reinforce the 3rd South Africans. The 1st Regiment had now returned to
Lukin’s command, and one of its companies was dispatched to reinforce the
2nd. At 7 p.m. Lukin sent a staff officer to obtain full details of the
position in the wood. The officers commanding the 2nd and 3rd Regiments
were urged to see that their battalions, in spite of their fatigue, dug
themselves in, since heavy shell-fire might be expected on the morrow.
This had already been done, for unless the men had been well dug in they
could not have lived where they were. The officer commanding the 1st
Regiment was ordered to detail special carrying platoons to keep up the
supply of ammunition, and to put up a Vickers and a Lewis gun at the
south-west corner of the wood to command the southern edge.
As the sun went down the activity of the enemy’s guns increased, and the
darkness of night was turned by shells and liquid fire into a feverish
and blazing noon. The German rate of fire was often as high as 400 shells
a minute. The position that evening was as follows:—The north-west corner
of the wood was in the enemy’s hands. The north-east corner was held from
left to right by one and a half companies of the 2nd Regiment, with one
company of the 1st in support, and by one company of the 3rd Regiment,
with one company of the 4th in support. The south-east corner was held by
two companies of the 3rd Regiment. The southern face from left to right
was held by one company of the 2nd Regiment and by one company of the
3rd, with one company of the 4th in support. A half company of the 2nd
Regiment held the western third of Princes Street, with two companies
of the 1st forming a defensive flank on the side of the village. The
headquarters of the 2nd and 3rd Regiments were at the junction of
Buchanan Street and Princes Street. Machine guns were in position round
the perimeter—four at the northern apex, four at the eastern end of the
north-eastern face, and two in the eastern half of the southern face. It
will be seen that twelve companies of infantry, now gravely weakened,
were holding a wood little less than a mile square with a long, rambling
perimeter—a wood on which every German battery was accurately ranged, and
which was commanded at close quarters by a semicircle of German trenches.
Moreover, since the enemy held the north-west corner, he had a covered
way of approach into the place. The only reserves of the South African
Brigade were one company of the 1st Regiment and the two companies of the
4th which had been lent to the 26th Brigade, and were due to return the
following morning.
To complete the story of the day, we must record the doings of these
two companies. On the 14th the 18th Division had cleared Trônes Wood,
and established their line up to Maltzhorn Farm. They joined hands with
the 9th Division just west of Waterlot Farm, where, in the ruined sugar
factory, the enemy had a position of great strength. On the morning
of the 15th the 5th Camerons were attacking this point, and the two
companies of the South African Scottish were to be used as troops to
follow and consolidate. Major Hunt, who was in charge of the companies,
sent a platoon from each to occupy the trenches close to the farm, which
they did under heavy fire from the concealed posts to the south and east.
The farm was not taken till the following day, and the work of the South
Africans was therefore less that of consolidation than of protecting the
skirts of the Cameron attack under a heavy German barrage. About six in
the evening an enemy force was detected coming from Guillemont, but this
was checked by our artillery barrage. An hour later the two companies
were ordered to fall back and construct a strong point, and at 2.30 on
the morning of the 16th they were relieved by the Camerons and withdrawn
to the sunken road behind Longueval.
All through the furious night of the 15th the troops in Delville Wood
were working for dear life at entrenchments. At the time it was rumoured
that the South Africans were a little negligent in digging, trusting
rather to their courage and their marksmanship than to trenches. The
criticism was unjust. No soldiers ever worked harder with the spade,
but their task was nearly impossible. In that hard soil, coagulated by
incessant shell-fire, and cumbered with a twisted mass of roots, wire,
and tree trunks, the spade could make little way. Nevertheless, when the
Sunday morning dawned, a good deal of cover had been provided.
[Sidenote: _July 16._]
At 2.35 a.m. Lukin received orders from the division that at all costs
the northern entrance into Longueval must be blocked, and that for this
purpose his Brigade must complete the capture of the northern perimeter
of the wood, and advance westward till they joined hands with the 27th
Brigade. There was a lane called North Street, which was a continuation
of the main street of Longueval from the point where the Flers Road
branched off to the north-east. Between these roads lay an orchard, the
tactical importance of which will be obvious from the map. The plan was
for the 27th Brigade to push north through the village and capture that
orchard and the other enclosures east of North Street, and to join hands
with the South Africans on the Flers Road. This was to be the work of the
11th Royal Scots; while two companies of the 1st South Africans (those
which, as has been already explained, had formed a defensive flank at the
south-west corner of the wood) were to push north from the Princes Street
line. The situation did not allow of a previous artillery bombardment;
but it was arranged that a “preparation” by trench mortars should precede
the infantry attack.
The advance was made at ten on the Sunday morning and failed completely,
since the Royal Scots were held up in their area by a strongly-wired
stone redoubt, and the South Africans by machine-gun fire from the
ominous orchard between the two roads. It was then that Private W. F.
Faulds of the 1st Regiment won the first Victoria Cross which fell to
the lot of the Brigade. Lieutenant Craig had attempted to reach a German
trench with a bombing section, and had fallen severely wounded half-way
between the lines. He was rescued by Private Faulds, who, along with
Privates Baker and Estment, crossed the parapet in broad daylight under a
drenching machine-gun and rifle fire.
After this failure the attacking troops fell back to the trenches
midway in the wood, and for the rest of the day had to endure a steady
concentrated fire to which they had no means of effective reply. It was
hot, dusty weather, and the enemy’s curtain of shells made it almost
impossible to bring up food and water or to remove the many casualties.
That afternoon Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson, commanding the 1st Regiment,
met Lukin in Longueval, and reported that his men were greatly exhausted.
He asked for an early relief; but Lukin could only repeat his divisional
commander’s instructions that at all costs the wood must be held. At the
same time he was so impressed with the signs of strain and fatigue on
the faces of the men that he submitted the matter to General Furse. The
situation, indeed, was becoming desperate. Longueval and Delville had
proved to be far too strongly held to be overrun at the first attack by
one division. At the same time, until they were taken, the objectives of
the battle of the 14th had not been achieved, and the stability of the
whole right wing of our new front was endangered. Fresh troops could not
yet be spared for the work, and the thing must be attempted again by the
same weary and depleted battalions. It was a vicious circle. Longueval
could not be won and held without Delville; Delville could not be won and
held without Longueval; so what strength remained to the 9th Division had
perforce to be divided between two simultaneous objectives.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT W. F. FAULDS, V.C., 1st Regiment, South African
Infantry.]
That Sunday evening it was decided to make another effort against the
north-west corner next morning. At 10.30 p.m. orders were received to
withdraw all the infantry in Longueval village to a line south of Princes
Street, and all infantry in the wood to the area east of the Strand,
in order that the north-west corner of Delville and the north end of
Longueval might be bombarded. The bombardment was to cease at 2 a.m. on
the morning of Monday, the 17th, when the 27th Brigade and two companies
of the 1st South Africans were to repeat their attack of the Sunday.
Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, commanding in the wood, was instructed to
order the men of the 2nd Regiment, who were now holding the Strand,
to move slowly forward so as to narrow the front of the 1st Regiment
attacking from Princes Street.
[Sidenote: _July 17._]
The attack was made shortly before dawn, and did not succeed. Once again
machine-gun fire from the fatal enclosures blocked any advance from west
or south. The enemy, too, was in force just inside the angle of the wood.
The 2nd South Africans, moving west from the Strand according to plan,
met with a stubborn resistance, and were forced to fall back to their
original position.
That morning Lukin visited Delville and discussed the position with his
commanding officers. He had now no troops which had not been in action
for at least forty-eight hours. It was the most wearing kind of battle,
for there was rarely a chance of getting to close quarters with the
enemy. Now and then the brilliant marksmanship of the South Africans
was given its opportunity; but for the most part they had to wait under
a continuous machine-gun and artillery fire, contending with a distant
and impalpable foe. Their general was gravely concerned both at the
fatigue of the men and the impossibility of making the wood anything but
a death-trap. On his return to Brigade Headquarters he discussed the
situation on the telephone with General Furse, but could get no hope of
relief or reinforcements. General Congreve’s instructions stood that
Delville must be held at any cost.
There was no change in the situation during the Monday afternoon.
Lieutenant Roseby, the Brigade Intelligence Officer, was sent forward to
get information, and was mortally wounded. During the evening Tanner
was hit, and Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, commanding the 3rd Regiment,
succeeded him in charge of the troops in the wood. That afternoon the
news came that the 9th Division was drawing in its left flank, and that
the 3rd Division, under Major-General Aylmer Haldane, was to attack
Longueval that night from the west. About half-past seven Lukin received
orders to take before the next dawn the enemy trench parallel to and 200
yards distant from the south-east edge of the wood. The perimeter facing
this trench was held by two companies of the 3rd South Africans, and
their commanding officer reported that the enemy trench before them was
very strongly manned, and contained several machine guns. He added that
he could not furnish more than 200 men for the attack without endangering
the whole position. On receiving this news General Furse cancelled the
operation. At half-past ten that night the Corps informed Lukin that
as soon as the 3rd Division completed the occupation of the village
they would establish machine guns on the north-west edge of the wood to
protect his men. The attack was to take place at 3.45 a.m. on the 18th,
and was to advance as far east as the Strand.
[Sidenote: _July 18._]
During the night all available reinforcements were pushed up to the
perimeter, where they had to face a strong enemy attack. In the southern
area the Germans advanced as far as Buchanan Street and Princes Street,
and drove the South Africans out of some of their new trenches. A
counter-attack cleared the ground, but only at the cost of heavy
casualties. At a quarter to four the 76th Brigade of the 3rd Division
succeeded in obtaining a footing in the orchard between Flers Road and
North Street. At eight in the morning Thackeray was ordered to send up
patrols to get in touch with this brigade, and directed the company of
the 1st Regiment, then occupying the Strand and the western part of
Princes Street, to move forward for the purpose. They were not seriously
opposed, and presently they joined hands with the 1st Gordons just west
of the orchard.
* * * * *
On that morning, the fourth of the battle, came the crisis for the
defenders of Delville. The arrival of the company of the 1st Regiment
at the outskirts of the wood was the signal for the enemy to open a
bombardment of unprecedented fury. Every part of the area was searched
and smothered by shells, but the fire was most intense around the
perimeter and down the Strand. Major Burges, the officer in command of
the company, was wounded, and shortly afterwards killed. At the same
time the 76th Brigade was driven in, and the Germans began to enter the
wood on the exposed left flank of the South Africans. About nine o’clock
an officer and fifty other ranks were dispatched as reinforcements. All
through the morning the wearied handful, now rapidly thinning, held out
as best they could. Their one relief was when the enemy came on to reap
the fruits of his shelling, for then their admirable rifle-fire took
heavy toll of him.
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL E. F. THACKERAY, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commanding 3rd South African Regiment.]
About half-past two in the afternoon the position had become desperate.
Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson was ordered to take forward as reliefs all the
men available under his command—a total of 150 from the 1st Regiment.
These men had just been withdrawn after having been continuously in
action for four days; they had had no rest; but their one thought when
they were ordered forward was to get to grips with the enemy. On arriving
at Longueval Dawson placed his men in a trench at the south-east corner
of the village, and went into the wood to find Thackeray. At the same
time the men of the Trench Mortar Battery, numbering three officers and
some eighty other ranks, under Lieutenant Phillips, were brought up from
Montauban and placed at Dawson’s disposal. Dawson found Thackeray in
serious straits. In many parts of the wood the garrisons had been utterly
destroyed, and everywhere north of Princes Street the few survivors had
been forced back. Thackeray was now holding only the south-west corner,
defined by Buchanan Street and the western part of Princes Street. The
wounded filled the trenches, for it was impossible to remove them, since
all the stretcher-bearers of the 3rd Regiment were casualties, and no
men could be spared to take their places. Dawson, acting under Lukin’s
instructions, did his best to cope with the situation. He sent Lieutenant
Phillips and the Trench Mortar Battery men to reinforce Thackeray, and
through the division procured additional stretcher-bearers from the
cavalry, in addition to those from the 1st Regiment.
At 6.5 p.m. that evening came the welcome intelligence that that night
the South Africans would be relieved by the 26th Brigade. But a relief
under such conditions was a slow and intricate business. By midnight the
work had been partially carried out, and portions of the two companies of
the 1st Regiment and the two companies of the 4th were withdrawn.
[Sidenote: _July 20._]
But, as at Flodden, when
“they left the darkening heath
More desperate grew the strife of death.”
The enemy had brought up a new division—the 8th of the 4th (Magdeburg)
Corps—and made repeated attacks against the Buchanan Street line. For
two days and two nights the little remnant under Thackeray clung to
the south-west corner of the wood against impossible odds, and did not
break. The German method of assault was to push forward bombers and
snipers, and then to advance in massed formation simultaneously from the
north, north-east, and north-west. The three attacks on the night of
the 18th were repelled with heavy losses to the enemy; but in the last
of them the South Africans were assaulted on three sides. Thackeray’s
adjutant, Captain M’Donald, had been wounded, and he was left with only
two officers—Lieutenant Garnet Green of the 2nd and Lieutenant Phillips
of the 3rd—to assist him, who, though wounded themselves, were able to
keep on their feet. All through the 19th the gallant handful suffered
incessant shelling and sniping, the latter now from very close quarters.
It was the same on the 20th, but still relief tarried. At last, at six
o’clock that evening, troops of the 76th Brigade in the 3rd Division
were able to take over what was left to us of Longueval and the little
segment of Delville Wood. Thackeray marched out with two officers, both
of whom were wounded, and 140 other ranks, made up of details from all
the regiments of the Brigade. He spent the night at Talus Boise, and next
day joined the rest at Happy Valley.
It is not easy to reproduce the circumstances of a battle so that
a true impression may be made upon the minds of those who have not
for themselves seen the reality of modern war. The six days and five
nights during which the South African Brigade held the most difficult
post on the British front—a corner of death on which the enemy fire
was concentrated at all hours from three sides, and into which fresh
German troops, vastly superior in numbers to the defence, made periodic
incursions only to be broken and driven back—constitute an epoch of
terror and glory scarcely equalled in the campaign. There were positions
as difficult, but they were not held so long; there were cases of as
protracted a defence, but the assault was not so violent and continuous.
The closest parallel is to be found, perhaps, in some of the incidents
at Verdun, and in the resistance of units of the old British regulars at
the point of the Ypres salient in 1914; but even there we shall scarcely
find an equal feat of tenacity, and certainly none superior. Delville
Wood was not finally taken till the 25th of August, a month later, when
the 14th Light Division cleared it for good. The high value set upon it
by the enemy is proved by the fact that he used his best troops against
it—successively the 10th Bavarian Division, the 8th Division of the 4th
Corps, and the 5th of the 3rd Corps. The South Africans measured their
strength against the flower of the German army, and did not draw back
from the challenge. As a feat of human daring and fortitude the fight
is worthy of eternal remembrance by South Africa and Britain, but no
historian’s pen can give that memory the sharp outline and the glowing
colour which it deserves. Only the sight of the place in the midst
of the battle—that corner of splinters and churned earth and tortured
humanity—could reveal the full epic of Delville Wood.
Let us measure it by the stern register of losses. At midnight on 14th
July, when Lukin received his orders, the Brigade numbered 121 officers
and 3,032 men. When Thackeray marched out on the 20th he had a remnant of
143, and the total ultimately assembled in Happy Valley was about 750.
The casualties were—for the 1st Regiment, 558; for the 2nd, 482; for
the 3rd, 771; and for the 4th, 509. These figures included 23 officers
who were killed, 7 who died of wounds, 47 who were wounded, and 15 who
were prisoners or missing. All the commissioned ranks of the 2nd and 3rd
Regiments who were in the wood became casualties, as did all the officers
of the Machine-Gun Company attached to the Brigade.[12] It is such a
record as that of the 1st Coldstream or the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers at
First Ypres. But the price was not paid in vain. The Brigade did what it
was ordered to do, and did not yield until it was withdrawn.
I take two quotations from personal narratives which, better than any
words of mine, reflect the grimness of the battle. One is from Private
J. A. Lawson of the 3rd Regiment. He is describing the fight of Tuesday,
the 18th—the great German attack when the garrison was forced back to the
south-west corner. That morning Thackeray was holding the wood with nine
and a half companies, a strength of about 1,500 men; two days later he
had 140; so we may judge the fury of the conflict.
“Our little party had to wait in their cramped position of
tortured suspense till nearly 3 p.m. for the only relief we now
looked for—the relief afforded by the excitement of desperate
fighting against great odds. The enemy now launched an attack
in overwhelming numbers, amid the continued roar of artillery.
Once more they found us ready—a small party of utterly worn-out
men, shaking off their sleep to stand up in the shallow trench.
As the Huns came on they were mowed down—every shot must have
told. Our rifles smoked and became unbearably hot; but though
the end seemed near, it was not yet. When the Huns wavered
and broke, they were reinforced and came on again. We again
prevailed, and drove them back. Only one Hun crossed our
trench, to fall shot in the heart a few yards behind it. The
lip of our trench told more plainly than words can how near
they were to not failing. Beyond, in No Man’s Land, we could do
something to estimate the cost of their failure.... Exhaustion
now did what shell-fire and counter-attacks had failed to do,
and we collapsed in our trench, spent in body and at last worn
out in spirit. The task we had been set was too great for us.
What happened during the next two hours or so I do not know.
Numbed in all my senses, I gazed vacantly into space, feeling
as if the whole thing had been a ghastly nightmare, out of
which I was now only awaiting complete deliverance. From this
state of coma I was awakened by a shell which exploded just
over me, and instantaneously I passed into unconsciousness.
When I regained consciousness a few minutes after, my first
sensation was that of having been thoroughly refreshed by
sleep. But on moving I found that the fight for me was over....
I tried to rouse my friend, who had fallen face downward beside
me. Getting no response, I lifted his head, calling upon him
by name, but I could not arouse him. I then began with pain
and difficulty to walk down the line. I found that the last
two hours of shelling had done their work—only six remained
alive in the trench. I aroused one sleeper, and told him I had
been badly hit, and was going to try and walk out. He faced me
for a second, and asked me what he was to do. I said there was
nothing to do but carry on, as the orders of Saturday morning
had not been countermanded. His brave ‘Right-o!’ were the last
words I heard there—surely fitting words as the curtain fell
for me.”
The second quotation is from the late Captain Welsh, M.C., D.C.M., who
was then a staff sergeant with the stretcher-bearers. The work of the
Field Ambulance and of the regimental medical officers during these
days deserved the highest praise, and it was due to their gallantry
and resource that the sufferings of the men in the wood were not more
horrible. The weather was now hot sun, now drenching rain, and the task
of getting out the casualties was one long nightmare.
“The road from Longueval to Bernafay Wood was in an
indescribable condition. It was impossible to carry from the
front of the Regimental Aid Posts in Longueval, owing to the
sniping, which was at times very severe and accurate. The
rear was a mass of ruins, wire entanglements, garden fences,
fallen and falling trees, together with every description of
_débris_ and shattered building material. It is one thing to
clear a path along which reinforcements may be brought, but
quite another to make a track on which four men may carry
a stretcher with a modicum of comfort to the patient....
Besides this road there was a narrow sunken lane, which at
first afforded some safety, but later became so pitted with
shell-holes that the bearers were compelled to take to the
open. In addition to these difficulties, it must be remembered
that these roads were shelled heavily day and night. At times
the enemy would put up a barrage with heavy stuff, which meant
that no stretcher-bearing could be done until the fire was
over. Parties who were unfortunate enough to be caught in one
of these barrages spent moments of nerve-racking suspense,
crouching in shell-holes or under banks, or wherever cover
was available. One of the worst experiences of this kind was
when it was decided to shell Longueval once more. Very short
notice was given to clear all the Regimental Aid Posts, and
only two men per stretcher could be spared. Padres, doctors,
and odd men were pressed into service to enable all patients
to be removed. As the party left, the bombardment began on
both sides. Scrambling, pushing, and slipping amid a tornado of
shell-fire, they headed for Bernafay Wood. It was impossible
to keep together, and in the darkness squads easily became
detached and lost touch. The noise of bursting shells was
incessant and deafening, while the continuous sing of the
rifle and machine-gun bullets overhead tried the nerves of the
hardiest. To crown all, it was raining, and the roads were
almost impassable for stretcher work. In fact, had it not been
for the light of the German star shells, the thing could not
have been worked at all. As the night wore on squad after squad
of tired, soaked, and mud-covered men stumbled into Bernafay
Wood. Here came a medical officer covered with grime and mud
from top to toe, carrying a stretcher with a kilted Scot. Then
a tall parson, unrecognizable under a coating of mud, with a
stretcher-bearer as partner, whose orders he obeyed implicitly.
When word was passed round in the morning that all had returned
alive, some were so incredulous that they started an inquiry of
their own.”
I quote, too, from the records of the Field Ambulance a bare summary of a
very gallant deed:—
“On the 18th it was again decided to shell Longueval, in which
Captain Lawrie had established a Regimental Aid Post. It was
found to be quite impossible to move all the stretcher cases,
so he decided to remain behind in his station. The Aid Post was
in a building, and as the Germans were counter-attacking and
our troops going out, the windows and doors were barricaded
with mattresses, furniture, and anything that might stop a
bullet. The bombardment was opened by both British and German
guns, and for about nine hours a hurricane of shells was poured
into the village. By nothing short of a miracle the Regimental
Aid Post was practically the only place that did not get a
direct hit. During the night, dressing the wounded was carried
out under great difficulty, as only a small electric torch or
candle could be used. Captain the Rev. E. Hill, who had also
remained to help, managed to keep up a constant supply of
tea and coffee, apparently from supernatural sources. On the
morning of the 19th a counter-attack was driven well home, and
Captain Lawrie’s party was thus saved from capture.”
There is no more solemn moment in war than the parade of men after
battle. The few hundred haggard survivors of the Brigade in the bright
sunshine in Happy Valley were too weary and broken to realize how great
a thing they had done. Tributes had come to them from high quarters. Sir
Douglas Haig had sent his congratulations. The commander of the Fourth
Army, Sir Henry Rawlinson, had written that “in the capture of Delville
Wood the gallantry, perseverance, and determination of the South African
Brigade deserves the highest commendation.” They had earned the praise of
their own intrepid commanding officers, who had gone through the worst
side by side with their men. “Each individual,” said Tanner’s report,
“was firm in the knowledge of his confidence in his comrades, and was,
therefore, able to fight with that power which good discipline alone can
produce. A finer record of this spirit could not be found than the line
of silent bodies along the Strand over which the enemy had not dared to
tread.” But the most impressive tribute was that of their Brigadier. When
the remnant of his Brigade paraded before him, Lukin took the salute with
uncovered head and eyes not free from tears.
NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INFANTRY BRIGADE—DELVILLE
WOOD, JULY 1916.
The roll is exclusive of the Machine Gun Company, the Trench Mortar
Battery, the Field Ambulance, and the 64th Field Company Royal Engineers,
all of which took part in the battle.
_Name and Rank._ _Remarks._
Brigadier-General H. T. LUKIN, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Major J. MITCHELL-BAKER, D.S.O.
Captain A. L. PEPPER.
Lieutenant F. R. ROSEBY Died of wounds.
Sec.-Lieutenant F. W. S. BURTON.
1ST REGIMENT.
Lieut.-Col. F. S. DAWSON, C.M.G.
Major F. H. HEAL With transport.
” E. T. BURGES Killed.
Captain G. J. MILLER Killed.
” H. H. JENKINS Wounded.
” P. J. JOWETT Missing (assumed dead).
Lieutenant T. O. PRIDAY (Adjutant) Wounded.
” S. W. E. STYLE Wounded.
” C. B. PARSONS Killed.
” C. F. S. NICHOLSON
” E. A. DAVIES Transport Officer.
” W. S. DENT Wounded.
” J. M. HOLLINGWORTH Missing (assumed dead).
” A. W. CRAIG Wounded.
” L. I. ISSACS
” H. G. CHAPMAN Wounded.
” F. S. ENGLISH
” A. C. HARRISON Wounded.
” W. D. HENRY Wounded and missing
(since prisoner of war).
” W. A. LARMUTH Wounded.
” A. W. LEIFELDT Wounded.
” C. W. REID Wounded.
” W. N. BROWN Killed.
” A. STUCKEY
” E. J. BURGESS Wounded.
Sec.-Lieut. A. C. HAARHOFF Killed.
” A. E. BROWN Killed.
” E. A. L. HAHN Killed.
” W. TEMPANY Wounded.
” P. W. FURMIDGE Wounded.
” C. I. BATE Prisoner.
” R. M. LYNE
Q.M. and Hon. Captain A. C. WEARNER
_Attached._
Chaplain and Captain E. ST. C. HILL
2ND REGIMENT.
Lieut.-Col. W. E. TANNER, C.M.G. Wounded.
Major H. H. GEE Died of wounds.
Captain H. W. M. BAMFORD (Adjt.) Wounded.
” C. R. HEENAN Wounded.
” E. BARLOW Wounded.
” H. E. CLIFFORD Died of wounds.
” W. F. HOPTROFF Killed.
” W. J. GRAY Killed.
Lieutenant H. E. F. CREED Killed.
” L. GREENE Wounded.
” W. J. HILL Killed.
” F. M. DAVIS Wounded.
” C. T. K. LETCHFORD Killed.
” C. L. H. MULCAHY Died of wounds.
” R. BEVERLEY Wounded.
” W. J. PERKINS Wounded.
Sec.-Lieut. T. W. BRU-DE-WOLD Killed.
” E. V. TATHAM Killed.
” A. R. KNIBBS Wounded.
” R. G. MILLER Killed.
” B. N. MACFARLANE Wounded.
” E. C. BRYANT Injured.
” R. P. TATHAM Killed.
” F. G. WALSH Transport officer.
” A. T. WALES Killed.
” G. GREEN Wounded.
” W. H. FLEMMER Died of wounds.
” N. FENIX Wounded.
” J. G. CONNOCK Killed.
Q.M. and Hon. Captain E. A. LEGGE
_Attached._
Chaplain and Captain P. J. WALSHE
3RD REGIMENT.
Lieut.-Col. E. F. THACKERAY, C.M.G. Wounded. (At duty.)
Captain (Acting-Major) J. W. JACKSON Killed.
” R. F. C. MEDLICOTT Prisoner.
” D. R. MACLACHLAN Killed.
” E. V. VIVIAN Wounded.
” L. W. TOMLINSON Wounded.
” A. W. H. M’DONALD (Adjt.) Wounded.
Lieutenant O. H. DE B. THOMAS Wounded and missing
(since prisoner of war).
” J. B. BAKER Wounded.
” A. L. PAXTON Wounded.
” A. M. THOMSON Wounded.
” B. H. L. DOUGHERTY Wounded.
” D. A. PIRIE Prisoner.
” H. M. HIRTZEL Prisoner.
” H. G. ELLIOTT Missing (assumed dead).
” E. J. PHILLIPS Wounded.
Sec.-Lieut. S. B. STOKES Wounded.
” D. JENNER Wounded.
” A. E. BARTON Killed.
” A. E. SHARPE Gassed.
” F. K. ST. M. RITCHIE Prisoner.
” D. M. ABEL Wounded.
” H. W. GOVE Missing (assumed dead).
” C. H. DICK Killed.
” F. H. SOMMERSET Killed.
” A. C. HANKS Died of Wounds.
” S. PEARSON Wounded.
” S. J. GUARD Wounded and prisoner.
” W. SCALLAN Wounded.
” H. N. HEELEY Wounded.
” D. J. W. GOWIE Shell shock.
Q.M. and Hon. Lieut. W. H. CARDING.
_Attached._
Captain S. LIEBSON, S.A.M.C. Wounded.
Chaplain and Captain G. T. COOK Killed.
4TH REGIMENT.
Lieut.-Col. F. A. JONES; C.M.G., D.S.O. Killed.
Major D. M. MACLEOD Wounded.
” D. R. HUNT
Captain E. C. D. GRADY Wounded.
” T. H. ROSS
” C. M. BROWNE (Adjutant) Wounded.
” S. C. RUSSELL Died of wounds.
” W. ANDERSON Shell shock.
” G. E. W. MARSHALL Shell shock.
” F. MCE. MITCHELL Attached 26th Brigade.
Lieutenant A. M. CAMERON Wounded.
” J. L. SHENTON Wounded.
” H. M. NEWSON Prisoner.
” T. FARRELL Gassed.
” C. M. GUEST Staff.
” A. H. BROWN Killed.
” J. WATKINS Wounded.
” R. D. GRIERSON Gassed.
” W. MCLEAN Brigade Staff.
” A. S. TAYLOR Wounded.
” H. G. OUGHTERSON Killed.
” R. B. THORBURN Killed.
” G. SMITH Wounded.
” A. V. CHASE Wounded.
” J. S. FRY Killed.
” A. YOUNG, V.C. Wounded.
Sec.-Lieut. C. S. BELL Killed.
” D. ROSS Killed.
” W. H. KIRBY Wounded.
” C. A. A. MACLEAN Wounded.
” E. F. DALGETY
Q.M. and Hon. Lieut. Z. B. BAYLY.
_Attached._
Major M. B. POWER, S.A.M.C.
Chaplain and Captain S. THOMSON