THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EGYPT.
(January-April 1916.)
The Position in Egypt at the close of 1915—The Western
Frontier—Trouble with the Senussi—General Wallace’s attack
on Christmas Day—The Arrival of the South African Brigade at
Alexandria—The Battle of Halazin—The Battle of Agagia—The March
upon Sollum—The exploit of the Armoured Cars—The Brigade leaves
for Europe.
At the close of 1915 the main British force in Egypt was concerned with
the defence of the Suez Canal against a threatened attack by the Turks
from their Syrian bases. The Canal, as Moltke had long before told his
countrymen, was for Britain a vital artery, and Egypt was the key of all
her activities in the Near and Middle East. Suddenly, as is the fashion
in the Orient, a new trouble blew up like a sandstorm in the desert. The
Western frontier, some 700 miles long, adjoined the Italian possessions
in Tripoli; but, though the Treaty of Lausanne had given Italy the
suzerainty of that province, her writ ran feebly in the interior and
her occupation had never been effective beyond the coast-line. When she
declared war on Austria, she was compelled to leave the inland tribes to
their own devices, and, stirred up by German and Turkish agents, they
prepared for mischief. The chief of the Turkish agents was Nuri Bey, a
half-brother of Enver, and about April 1915 a certain Gaafer arrived from
Constantinople with large supplies of money and arms. His instructions
were to mobilize the Arab and Berber tribes of the Libyan plateau for a
dash upon Egypt from the west.
The hope of the Turks in that region lay in the support of the great
Senussi brotherhood. The Senussi form one of those strange religious
fraternities familiar to the student of Northern Africa. Their founder
had been a friend of Britain and had refused to cast in his lot with the
Mahdi. He had preached a spiritual creed which orthodox Islam repudiated,
and his followers had stood outside the main currents of Moslem life,
holding apart from all secular politics, and declining any share in
the propaganda of Pan-Islamism. Their headquarters were the oases of
the Northern Libyan desert, and they looked without disfavour upon the
rule of Britain in Egypt. Their Grand Sheikh, Sidi Ahmed, had at the
outbreak of the war given assurance of friendliness to the Anglo-Egyptian
authorities, and his official representatives dwelt on the banks of the
Nile in good relations with the Government of Cairo.
[Illustration: OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER OF EGYPT.]
But the overtures of Nuri and Gaafer proved too much for the loosely
organized tribesmen of the Senussi, and ultimately for the Grand Senussi
himself. The Egyptian littoral as far as the Tripoli frontier was
sparsely populated, consisting only of a few coastguard stations and the
strip of flat land between the Libyan plateau and the sea. The Khedival
highway, a rough unmacadamized road cut as a relief work during famine,
ran to Sollum on the border, and a railway ran west from Alexandria to
Dabaa. It was only at the north end that the frontier had to be guarded,
where were many little oases linked up by caravan-tracks, for to the
south lay the impassable wastes of the Libyan desert. The possibility
of trouble was suspected in May 1915, but it was not till August that
the first hostile incident took place, when two British submarines,
sheltering from bad weather on the Tripoli coast, were treacherously
fired upon by Arabs, under a white officer. In the first week of November
the crews of the _Tara_ and the _Moorina_, torpedoed by enemy submarines,
landed in Cyrenaica, and were taken captive by the Senussi. On the 6th
of that month, the little port of Sollum was shelled by U-boats, and an
Egyptian coastguard cruiser sunk. After that Sollum and Sidi Barrani were
subjected to repeated attacks by land, and it became necessary to admit a
state of war.
[Sidenote: _Dec. 25, 1915._]
The frontier posts were drawn in to Mersa Matruh, which, with a railway
eighty miles distant and the sea at its door, was well-equipped as a
base to defend the marches. On 11th December Major-General Wallace, in
command of the hastily-collected Western Frontier Force, moved out from
Mersa Matruh and drove the enemy from the Wadi Senaab. On the 13th his
column dispersed with considerable losses some 1,200 Arabs near Beit
Hussein. Towards the end of the month an enemy force of some 5,000, under
Gaafer, concentrated eight miles south-west of Matruh, and on Christmas
Day General Wallace marched against it with two columns, one composed of
English Yeomanry and Australian Light Horse, and the other of the 15th
Sikhs, a battalion of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, and a territorial
battalion of the Middlesex. The action was of the familiar type—a frontal
attack by the infantry, and a wide circling movement by the horse, and it
resulted in a substantial check to the enemy. He lost nearly 500 killed
and prisoners, and most of his transport and supplies, and the Grand
Senussi and his staff retired to Unjeila and Bir Tunis.
But the enemy was checked and not routed, and early in January 1916 he
reappeared in force some twenty-five miles south-west of Matruh. It was
clear that to safeguard the frontier he must be driven westward out of
Egyptian soil and south into the desert, and General Wallace had not at
his command the troops for such an operation. It was at this time that
the South African Brigade arrived in Alexandria.
The contingent had had a fair voyage after the first few days at sea.
Submarines were active in the Mediterranean, and stringent precautions
had to be taken in the way of guards and boat drills, which, combined
with the congestion of the ship, made life on board a Spartan business.
At Malta the Governor, Lord Methuen, was prevented by illness from
greeting his old friends, but he wrote to General Lukin: “South Africa
has been a second home to me. Fourteen years of my life have been spent
there, and you know the love we bear for each other. I look back as the
proudest and happiest time of my life on the helping hand I gave to
General Botha and General Smuts in the formation of your great citizen
army, that true bond of union between Englishmen and Dutchmen. We
little thought how soon and how splendidly you would be called upon to
show its value.” On 10th January the _Saxonia_ reached Alexandria, and
the _Corsican_, bringing the 4th South African Regiment and the Field
Ambulance, arrived three days later. The Brigade encamped under canvas
at Mex Camp, six miles west of the city, where they spent some days in
training and in perfecting the local defences. On 18th January they were
inspected by the G.O.C. of the Forces in Egypt, Lieutenant-General Sir
John Maxwell, who years before had been Military Governor of Pretoria.
“The South African Brigade,” he wrote, “is evidently fit to take its
place alongside the best troops in the army,” and he expressed the hope
that it might soon have the chance of meeting the enemy. His hope was
speedily realized, for next day came orders for part of the Brigade to
move towards the western marches.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 21, 1916._]
An infantry battalion was required at once to reinforce General Wallace
for his attack upon the enemy concentration south-west of Matruh. The
2nd South African Regiment was chosen, and two companies, under Major
Christian, embarked on the afternoon of the 19th on their sixteen-hours
voyage.[6] Next day the remainder of the regiment followed, and by the
evening of the 21st, after a weary time in bucketing little coasters,
the 2nd South Africans, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tanner, were at Matruh
awaiting orders. The whole force moved out next afternoon to Bir Shola,
eighteen miles distant, and the South Africans, still fagged from their
journey, found their first day in the field a high test of endurance.
They bivouacked for the night at Bir Shola, and at six o’clock on the
morning of the 23rd, General Wallace began his preparations for attack.
He disposed his troops in two columns. One on the right, consisting
mainly of infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. R. Gordon, included
the 2nd South Africans, the 15th Sikhs, the 1st Battalion New Zealand
Rifle Brigade, and a squadron of the Duke of Lancaster’s Yeomanry;
the second, echeloned on its left front and moving parallel with it,
consisted of squadrons of the Dorset and Herts Yeomanry, the Royal Bucks
Hussars, and the Australian Light Horse, under Brigadier-General Tyndale
Biscoe.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 23._]
About 8.30, when the infantry were some seven miles from Bir Shola,
the mounted column became engaged with the enemy, who was occupying as
his advanced position a half-moon of ridge, on which he had prepared
trenches not easy to locate. The ground, except for the undulations, was
utterly featureless and treeless, and a morning mirage increased its
difficulty. The mounted column found itself checked, and the infantry
were ordered to attack the enemy centre and left, while the cavalry
covered its left flank and worked round the enemy right. There followed
a stubborn battle, the ground traversed being often no better than a
swamp, owing to the abnormal rains. The 15th Sikhs led, with the 2nd
South Africans in support, and the attack, spread over a mile and a
half of ground destitute of any cover, gave a fine target to the enemy
artillery and machine guns. There were many casualties, and, since the
hostile positions were in the shape of a semicircle, it was impossible
to avoid flanking fire. But the infantry steadily pressed on, and after
the first three-quarters of a mile had been covered, the South Africans,
hitherto in support of the Sikhs, were ordered to extend the attack to
the right. The Senussi were forced back from their forward lines, and
retreated slowly and with much skill the three miles to their main camp
at Halazin, resisting all our efforts to get to close quarters. About
two in the afternoon the Sikhs in the centre, the South Africans on the
right, and the New Zealanders on the left, were close on the main enemy
position, but their flanks were in jeopardy, for the Senussi still kept
their semicircular formation, and their horns threatened envelopment.
Tanner was obliged to leave a company to protect his right flank, and the
reserve battalion of the column, the 1/6th Royal Scots, had to be put in
to avert danger from the same quarter.
[Illustration: SCENE OF EARLIER OPERATIONS NEAR MERSA MATRUH.]
By 2.30 our infantry had broken into the main position, but the mounted
troops on their left were less happily fated. They had been compelled to
give ground, and were now nearly a thousand yards behind, so that Colonel
Gordon had to detach two companies of the New Zealanders to assist the
cavalry and protect his left rear. This proved sufficient, and by 4.30
the Senussi were in retreat, and their camp given to the flames. But the
sun was now low in the west, our horses were too exhausted to pursue,
and the baggage camels of the enemy were allowed to retire unmolested.
Our troops were compelled to bivouac on the ground won—a comfortless
bivouac, for it rained in sheets, and they had no supplies or blankets,
seeing that the transport was bogged in the mud three miles west of Bir
Shola. Mud, indeed, had been the trouble of the day. It had hindered the
cavalry from giving due support to the infantry, and it had deprived the
latter of the Royal Naval Armoured Car Division, which had been detailed
to defend their right flank. The following morning the troops struggled
through the quagmires to Bir Shola, and on the 25th, in better weather,
returned to Matruh.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 25._]
The South Africans had come well out of their baptism of fire. They
had lost in killed, one officer (Captain J. D. Walsh) and seven other
ranks; one officer (Lieutenant W. G. Strannock) and two other ranks died
of wounds; four officers and 102 other ranks were wounded. It must be
remembered that no time to rest had been given them after a fatiguing
voyage, and that they were already weary before the battle began. Yet
all observers bore testimony to the “invincible dash and resolution of
their attack.”[7] In that desert fighting we relied much upon the work of
our airmen, and it is interesting to note that among the most brilliant
members of the Royal Flying Corps attached to the Western Frontier Force
was a South African, Lieutenant van Ryneveld.
* * * * *
The Western Frontier Force was now completely reconstituted. General
Wallace’s health did not permit him to continue in the command, and his
place was taken by Major-General W. E. Peyton, who had commanded the
2nd Mounted Division at Suvla Bay. The 2nd Mounted Brigade replaced the
composite Yeomanry Brigade, and the place of the Sikhs and New Zealanders
was filled by the South African Brigade, which by the middle of February
had arrived in its entirety at Matruh. Sufficient camel transport had
now been provided to make the columns really mobile, and to enable them
to follow up any success.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 20._]
Early in February it became clear that the main Senussi forces were near
Barrani, with a smaller body at Sollum, and that to pacify the country
these forces must be beaten and dispersed. It was difficult to land
troops at Sollum, for the place was commanded by encircling ridges, and,
since it would be necessary to sweep the mines at the entrance to the
harbour, a surprise was impossible. General Peyton accordingly resolved
to attack by land. His object was to occupy Barrani and Sollum, after
which supplies would be available by sea. The problem before him was
largely one of physical difficulties, for the land was almost devoid
of water. An advance depot was established at Unjeila on the 16th of
February, and on 20th February a column under General Lukin moved out
from Matruh with orders to occupy Barrani, as the first stage on the road
to Sollum.
The column consisted of the 3rd South African Regiment, the Dorset
Yeomanry, the Notts Battery, R.H.A., one squadron of the Royal Bucks
Hussars, the 1/6th Royal Scots, and two field ambulances. Its course
lay north of the Khedival highway, practically along the line of an old
Roman road. The scanty wells were as often as not the ruins of Roman
cisterns, so that the new defenders of civilization followed in the steps
of the greatest empire of the past. The weather had changed since the
January fighting at Halazin. Scorching winds and a glaring sun made the
march arduous, but since the route ran close to the sea the men could
refresh themselves with sea-bathing at the different halting places. Bir
Abdih was reached on the afternoon of the 21st, and Unjeila, 32 miles
from Matruh, on the 22nd. Here the 1st South Africans, who had gone on
ahead on the 16th, joined the column, and the greater part of the Royal
Scots remained as garrison. On the 24th Lukin was at Maktil, where his
column rested for a day. The Senussi had been located at Agagia, 14 miles
south-east of Barrani, and it was ascertained from captured Bedouin that
both Nuri and Gaafer were with them.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 25._]
During the 25th, while the troops rested in camp, the enemy was observed
in considerable numbers about three miles to the south, and a good deal
of sniping followed. Lukin had decided to make a night attack, moving off
at 7 p.m.; but Gaafer anticipated him, for about half-past five he opened
on our camp with two field guns and at least one machine gun. Lukin
at once moved forward the Royal Scots on his right, and the 1st South
Africans on his left, with the 3rd South Africans in reserve. The enemy
guns had been located, and were quickly silenced by our artillery, and in
half an hour, with the loss of one man killed and one man wounded, the
threatened assault was frustrated. The incident compelled Lukin to cancel
the orders for the night march, and he resolved to advance against the
enemy at daybreak.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 26._]
A Yeomanry reconnaissance sent out at dawn on the 26th, reported that
Gaafer had evacuated his position of the previous night; and presently we
learned from our aircraft that he was back on his old ground near Agagia.
At 9.30 Lukin moved out his whole force, leaving 300 Royal Scots to guard
his camp. He had now with him six armoured cars, under Major the Duke
of Westminster, which had just arrived. Three-quarters of an hour later
the Yeomanry seized a little hill rather more than two miles north of the
enemy’s position. This enabled us to reconnoitre the field, and at eleven
it was possible to join battle. In the centre the 3rd South Africans,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Thackeray, advanced on a front of about 1,700
yards, with Yeomanry and armoured cars on either flank. The 1st South
Africans formed the general reserve. The guns were brought up to a point
about 4,500 yards from the enemy, but were outranged, and played little
part in the beginning of the action. Presently Lukin moved them to 3,500
yards range, where their shrapnel was more effective.
[Illustration: THE ADVANCE TO AGAGIA AND BARRANI.]
The battle which followed was a model of a successful desert action.
Lukin had his main strength in mounted troops on his right, and it was
his plan that these, when the infantry had broken the enemy, should swing
round his flank and rear, prevent him breaking west, and round up his
retreat. As the 3rd South Africans advanced with admirable steadiness the
enemy opened a heavy fire upon them with rifle and machine gun and more
than one field piece. Then, following his old practice, Gaafer attempted
an encircling movement against our left. Lukin ordered Lieutenant-Colonel
Dawson to send a company of the 1st South Africans to that flank, and so
checked the enemy manœuvre. As soon as this danger was past he withdrew
the squadron of Yeomanry on his left to augment the mounted troops on his
right. The firing line was now within 300 yards of Gaafer’s posts. In
order to gain fire superiority at once, Lukin brought the greater part
of his reserves into the fight, and sent a message to Colonel Souter,
commanding the Yeomanry on his right, that now was the time to push
forward. In a few minutes the company of the 1st South Africans on the
left flank broke into the enemy position, the 3rd South Africans followed
immediately, and presently the whole enemy lines were in our hands.
It was now the turn of the Yeomanry. When Colonel Souter received Lukin’s
message about one o’clock, he resolved to let the enemy retreat get clear
of the sandhills, and then attack it in the open. His pursuit, therefore,
took a line parallel to the enemy’s retirement, and about a thousand
yards to the west of it. The rest is best told in Colonel Souter’s own
words: “About 2 p.m. I saw for the first time the whole retreating force
extend for about a mile, with a depth of 300 to 400 yards. In front
were the camels and baggage, escorted by irregulars, with their proper
fighting force (Mahafizia) and maxims forming their rear and flank
guard. I decided to attack mounted. About 3 p.m. I dismounted for the
last time to give my horses a breather and to make a careful examination
of the ground over which I was about to move. By this time the Dorset
Regiment was complete, and, as the squadron of the Bucks Yeomanry had
gone ahead and could not be found, I attacked with Dorsets alone. The
attack was made in two lines, the horses galloping steadily and well in
hand. Three maxims were brought into action against us, but the men were
splendidly led by their squadron and troop leaders, and their behaviour
was admirable. About 50 yards from the position I gave the order to
charge, and with one yell the Dorsets hurled themselves upon the enemy,
who immediately broke. In the middle of the enemy’s lines my horse was
killed under me, and, by a curious chance, his dying strides brought me
to the ground within a few yards of the Senussi General, Gaafer Pasha.”
This very complete success, due to the perfect co-ordination of infantry
and yeomanry, and General Lukin’s power of prompt decision after the
action had begun, was not gained without severe losses. These were
chiefly among the mounted troops, for when their officers were killed
the men were apt to carry on too far. The infantry casualties—almost all
incurred by the 3rd South Africans—were 1 officer (Lieutenant Bliss)
and 13 other ranks killed, and 5 officers and 98 other ranks wounded.
The capture of Gaafer and his staff deprived the enemy of his principal
general, and two days later Barrani was occupied by us without a blow.
“It was the Battle of Agagia,” General Peyton subsequently wrote, “which
sealed the fate of the combined Turks and Senussi who had contemplated
an attack on Egypt.” The possession of Barrani enabled us to bring to
that port supplies by sea and to make of it a new advanced base. After
the action at Halazin the 2nd South African Regiment had been employed in
furnishing escorts for convoys between Matruh and Unjeila. This task was
now accomplished, and by 8th March the 2nd and 4th Regiments had joined
Lukin at Barrani, together with the rest of the 2nd Mounted Brigade and
two sections of the Hong-Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery. After
their defeat the Senussi had retreated westward towards Sollum, and the
Egyptian Bedouin, notably the Aulad Ali tribes, began to desert in
large numbers and sue for pardon. The time had not yet come, however,
for negotiations. The enemy had occupied his old camp near Sollum, which
had been the Grand Senussi’s headquarters before the campaign began, and
there was the danger that he might receive reinforcements from Tripoli.
It therefore behoved General Peyton to strike again without delay, and to
clear Egyptian soil up to the frontier.
* * * * *
To Sollum there were two routes: one by the Khedival road along the
coast, the other inland by the high ground of the plateau. For military
purposes the latter was to be preferred, for the ridges rise steeply
behind Sollum, and to attack the enemy’s camp from the coast would have
been no light undertaking. It was better to move inland and come upon the
Senussi from the south and south-east. The main problem, as in all desert
warfare, was that of the water supply; but General Peyton’s intelligence
led him to believe that there were sufficient wells by the inland route
to supply his force if it moved in two parts and made careful use of its
reserve water park.
[Illustration: BARRANI TO SOLLUM.]
[Sidenote: _Mar. 9._]
On 9th March a column, under Lukin, left Barrani to secure the plateau
by way of the pass called the Nagb Medean. The troops were the whole
South African Brigade, a squadron of the Dorset Yeomanry, the Hong-Kong
and Singapore Mountain Battery, and a Camel Supply column and train, and
it was arranged that they should be joined later by the Armoured Car
Battery and a company of the Australian Camel Corps. Sollum lay 50 miles
off along the coast, and to turn its encircling escarpment the plan
was to march to Bagbag, and then strike south-west for Bir-el-Augerin,
after which an attempt would be made to seize the passes which led from
the south-east to the Sollum tableland, notably the Nagb Medean and the
Erajib. These passes could not be used by the armoured cars, so it was
arranged that they should go further south by a practicable route, and
join the column when the Medean pass had been taken by the infantry.
General Peyton had planned that the second column, consisting of mounted
troops and camel transport, should leave Barrani two days later than
Lukin, and reach Augerin after the Medean pass had been secured. This
would have concentrated the whole force at Augerin, with its outposts on
the south-eastern scarp of the Sollum plateau, ready to make its final
attack on the enemy’s camp.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 12._]
The water difficulty became serious for Lukin as soon as he left Barrani.
The first night a Roman cistern was found, which gave a fair supply. On
the night of the 10th the column bivouacked on the seashore, where the
Roman wells were found to be silted up with sand, and had to be opened up
by the engineers. On the 11th Bagbag was reached, but the water proved
scanty and infamous, much of it being too sulphurous to be drunk by men
or beasts. The best that could be done was to dig new wells in the sand.
On the morning of the 12th Lukin was at Augerin, and that afternoon the
1st and 4th South Africans made good the Medean pass without opposition,
and were presently joined by the armoured cars.
Now appeared an unexpected difficulty. The Roman cistern at the top of
the Medean pass, which it had been hoped would provide water for the
whole column, proved to be dry, as were the wells at Siwiat further along
the ridge. This compelled General Peyton to revise his plan. Clearly, he
could not send the second column by the same route as the first; indeed,
the water supply made it impossible for the first column in its entirety
to continue on its original line. He therefore made a new disposition of
his forces. Lukin was ordered to push along the top of the escarpment
with the 1st and 4th South Africans, the armoured cars, the Hong-Kong
and Singapore Battery, and a company of the Australian Camel Corps. The
rest of the infantry and the mounted troops were directed to proceed from
Augerin along the coast to the foot of the Halfaia pass. Lukin’s force
carried their water in “fantasies” on camels, and their total supply,
which had to last for forty-eight hours, was limited to eight pints per
man.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 15._]
The movement began on the 13th. At midnight Lukin was four miles from
the Halfaia, the rest of the infantry at Alim Tejdid, and the cavalry
at Bagbag. At daybreak on the 14th the armoured cars moved forward to
the Halfaia pass, which they occupied without opposition. At 9 a.m. we
learned that the enemy had evacuated Sollum the previous evening and was
retiring to the south-west. There was now no obstacle in front of the two
columns, and the mounted troops joined Lukin on the high ground. Next
day, 15th March, General Peyton entered Sollum.
As soon as the news of the enemy’s evacuation reached Lukin, he
dispatched the Duke of Westminster with the armoured cars in pursuit.
The battery consisted of nine cars and one open Ford car mounting a
machine gun, and the total _personnel_ was only thirty-two. They made for
the enemy’s camp at Bir Warr, where a straggler was captured, who was
afterwards to prove a most valuable prize. Dashing along the Tabruk road,
which runs westward into the Libyan desert, they came presently upon the
_débris_ of the retreat. After 23 miles had been covered, the leading
cars, as they turned a bend in the road, came suddenly in view of the
enemy’s camp at the Bir Asisa well a few hundred yards to the south. The
camels were standing loaded, one ten-pounder and two machine guns were in
position, and the enemy masses were just beginning to move. The battery
swung into line and charged. Their machine guns silenced the Turkish
guns, and the shells from the ten-pounder burst far behind them. The
Senussi were surprised and wholly demoralized. Most of them flung down
their rifles and fled. To prevent the escape of the supply train some 50
camels already on the move were shot—in several cases with extraordinary
results, for the unhappy beasts were laden with petrol and bombs, and
blew up under our fire with terrific explosions. At least 50 of the enemy
were killed, 40 prisoners were taken, including 3 Turkish officers, and
all the Senussi guns and much of the supplies were captured. The British
loss in this brilliant affair was one officer slightly wounded.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 17._]
The final exploit in the campaign fell also to the credit of the armoured
cars, and the war has shown few more romantic incidents. It will be
remembered that the previous November the survivors from the _Tara_ and
_Moorina_ had been taken prisoner by Arabs and moved into the interior.
By a coincidence which would scarcely be credited in a work of fiction,
the man captured at Bir Warr proved to have been employed as one of the
guards of the prisoners, and disclosed their whereabouts. The place was
75 miles west of Sollum, and with General Peyton’s consent, the Duke
of Westminster set out on the morning of the 17th to their rescue. He
had with him, besides his cars, a number of motor ambulances. The guide
proved faithful, and after a journey of 120 miles over featureless desert
the prisoners’ camp was found at a place called the Hidden Spring. The
men were naked skeletons, and no language can describe their amazement
and joy at this miraculous rescue. By the morning of the 18th the cars
with the released captives were safely back at Sollum, having travelled
in 24 hours some 300 miles. It was an enterprise which in normal times
would have been considered to belong rather to the realms of wild
romance than to the sober chances of war, and it did signal credit to
the intrepidity and resource of its originator. In the words of Sir John
Maxwell’s dispatch, “to lead his cars through perfectly unknown country
against an enemy of unknown strength was a feat which demanded great
resolution, and which should not be forgotten even in this war, where
deeds of rare daring are of daily occurrence.”[8]
* * * * *
So ended the first invasion of Egypt from the west since the Fatimite
attempt of the tenth century. The occupation of Sollum and the
achievement of the armoured cars put an end to the menace from the
Senussi. In less than a month General Peyton had driven the enemy back
150 miles, had scattered his forces beyond the frontier, had captured
his commander and taken all his guns. If Germany hoped to make of the
Arabs and Bedouin of the Tripoli hinterland a fanatical horde which would
sweep to the gates of Cairo, she had wholly misjudged their temper. To
build up armies from such material was like an attempt to make ropes of
desert sand. Thereafter hostilities degenerated into frontier brigandage
and police patrols. A year later the Grand Senussi, who had been living
in the Siwa oasis, made an attempt to shift his quarters. Major-General
Watson, who then commanded the Western Frontier Force, sent a column
of armoured cars, which on February 3, 1917, broke up his camp, drove
him into the outer deserts, and destroyed for good any little military
prestige that remained to him. The main problem left to the British
Government was that of feeding the starving tribes, for the futile war
had prevented the raising of the usual barley crop. After our humane
fashion we beat the enemy and fed his belongings.
[Sidenote: _April 11._]
On the afternoon of 16th March a parade of all arms was held in Sollum,
and General Peyton thanked his men for the victory which they had won. On
28th March the South African Brigade began its return journey by sea to
Alexandria, and on its arrival there was joined by a draft of 8 officers
and 400 other ranks, under the command of Captain L. W. Tomlinson. On
10th April it was inspected by Sir Archibald Murray, the G.O.C. of
the Forces in Egypt, and next day it received orders to embark for
Marseilles. The three months in North Africa had given it its first field
training in war, and it had emerged with increased physical and moral
strength from the trial. The difficult weather, when hailstorms and great
cold were diversified with long spells of scorching heat, and the weary
and waterless desert marches, had toughened the fibre of every soldier.
It was fortunate that the Brigade had such a preparation, for it was
about to take its place in a classic division on the Western Front, and
to enter one of the most desperate struggles of the campaign.