the plunder which he took from the enemy, nor yet the thefts, which he
committed or the bribes which he received from the allied states could
satiate him; and he was even suspected of having been too late for the
first battle of the war because he delayed his march to amass wealth for
himself. Others blame Cæcina, because in his haste to win a victory
before Valens came up, he, besides other blunders of less consequence,
began a battle so unseasonably and conducted it so remissly that he very
nearly brought the cause of Vitellius to ruin.
VII. After Cæcina's repulse at Placentia he proceeded to Cremona,
another large and flourishing city. Meanwhile Annius Gallus, who was on
his way to Placentia to reinforce Spurinna, hearing while on the march
that the troops at Placentia had been victorious, but that Cremona was
in danger, changed the direction of his march towards that place, and
encamped close to the enemy. Here Cæcina concealed many foot-soldiers in
rough and wooded ground ordering his cavalry to ride forward and, if
they fell in with the enemy, to retire little by little so as to draw
them into the ambuscade. This plan was betrayed to Celsus by deserters.
Celsus attacked them with the best of his cavalry, pursued them with
caution, taking care to avoid the ambuscade, and then surrounded the
troops in ambush, and threw them into confusion. He now sent for his
infantry from the camp: and it was thought that if they had come up
promptly after the cavalry, the whole army of Cæcina might have been
destroyed; but as it was, Paullinus brought them up slowly and too late,
and tarnished his glory as a general by overcaution. The mass of the
soldiers charged him with treason, and tried to exasperate Otho against
him by boasting that they had won the victory, but that their success
was not followed up owing to the cowardice of their generals. Otho,
though he did not believe their accusations, yet feared to be thought to
disbelieve them. He accordingly sent his brother Titianus to the army,
and with him Julius Proculus[642], the prefect of the prætorians, who
virtually had the supreme command, though Titianus was the nominal
chief, while Celsus and Paullinus were given the titles of counsellors
and friends, but were not allowed the least real power or authority.
The enemy also showed want of discipline, especially in the army of
Valens. These men, when they heard of the ambuscade and the defeat to
which it had led, were greatly enraged at not having been there in time
to prevent so great a slaughter of their friends. Valens[643] was forced
to beg for his life; for the soldiers were preparing to stone him. He
pacified them with difficulty, and led them to join the forces of
Cæcina.
VIII. When Otho arrived at the camp at Bedriacum,[644] which is a
village near Cremona, he held a council of war. Proculus and Titianus
were of opinion that, as the troops were full of confidence and flushed
with victory, it would be best to fight a decisive battle at once, and
not blunt their spirit by delay, which would also bring Vitellius down
upon them from Gaul. On the other hand Paullinus argued that the enemy
had already collected their entire available force, whereas Otho might
expect another army as large as his present one to join him from Moesia
and Pannonia, if he would only wait until it suited him to fight, and
not play into the hands of the enemy by engaging prematurely. The
troops, he said, after being so largely reinforced, would be no less
confident than at present, when they are but few; indeed, they would
fight with a great superiority of numbers. Besides this, delay would be
all in their favour, as they had abundance of supplies, while the
opponents, who were in an enemy's country, would soon be reduced to
great straits by the want of provisions. Marius Celsus agreed with the
views of Paullinus. Annius Gallus was not present at the council, having
been disabled by a fall from his horse: but when Otho wrote a letter to
him, asking his opinion, he advised the emperor not to be hasty, but to
await the arrival of the legions which were already on their way from
Moesia. However Otho was not convinced by these arguments, but agreed
with those who urged him to fight at once.
IX. Many other reasons for this decision are given by various writers,
and it is evident that the prætorians, or bodyguard of the emperor, who
now for the first time had experience of actual warfare, were eager to
return to their old haunts at Rome, and the unwarlike pleasures of the
theatre and the circus, and that their eagerness for battle could not be
restrained, as they imagined that they would overthrow their antagonists
at the first onset. It seems, too, that Otho himself could no longer
endure the uncertainty of his position, for his ignorance of war and his
life of enervating luxury had unfitted him for a calm calculation of his
chances of success, and, worn out as he was with anxiety, he longed to
let the matter be settled whichever way chance might determine, like a
man who covers his face through dizziness at looking over a precipice.
This is the account which is given by the orator Secundus, who acted as
private secretary to Otho. Other[645] authorities relate that many
efforts were made by the soldiers of both armies to combine, and agree
to elect an emperor from among their own officers: or, if this proved
impossible, to place the election in the hands of the senate. It seems
indeed rightly probable, considering the ill-repute of both claimants of
the throne, that the more sedate and thoughtful of the soldiers should
have reflected that it would be a horrible and shameful thing that the
Romans should be made to suffer for a second time all the miseries which
they had once endured in the civil wars of Sulla and of Marius and of
Cæsar and Pompeius, merely in order to provide an empire to bear the
charges of the gluttony and drunkenness of Vitellius, or of the luxury
and profligacy of Otho. It is suspected that Marius Celsus, knowing that
this feeling was gaining ground, endeavoured to gain time, hoping that
the whole matter might be decided without fighting; and that Otho,
fearing this, hurried on an engagement.
X. After the council Otho again retired to Brixellum. This was a
mistake, not only because the army would have fought with greater zeal
and discipline when under the eye of the emperor, but because by taking
away the best and most loyal troops, both of cavalry and infantry, to
act as his bodyguard, he made his army like a spear which has lost its
steel point. At this time a battle took place on the bank of the Padus,
across which Cæcina endeavoured to throw a bridge, while the Othonians
tried to prevent him from doing so. As they did not succeed in this,
they threw lighted sulphur and pitch into the boats which formed the
bridge, and a wind suddenly springing up carried the fire across the
stream towards the enemy. At first volumes of smoke, and then a mass of
flames burst out, so that the enemy were thrown into confusion and
forced to leap from the bridge into the river, upsetting the boats and
exposing themselves to the missiles and the ridicule of the enemy.
However, the Germans were victorious in a fight with Otho's corps of
gladiators for the possession of an island in the river, and slew many
of them.
XI. As, after this, the soldiers in Otho's camp at Bedriacum were
frantically eager for battle, Proculus led them forward about six miles
from that place and encamped in such an ignorant and ridiculous fashion
that the men suffered from want of water, although it was spring time,
and all the surrounding country was full of springs and perennial
streams. On the next day he wished to lead them at least twelve miles
nearer the enemy, but Suetonius Paullinus would not allow him to do so,
thinking that the soldiers ought to have some rest, and not first be
fatigued with a long march, and then while they were confusedly mixed up
with baggage animals and camp-followers, be brought to fight against an
enemy who could quietly and deliberately place themselves in order of
battle. While the generals were at variance, one of the horsemen called
Numidians rode up bearing a letter from Otho, in which he ordered them
not to waste any time, but to march against the enemy at once. On
receiving this they started. Cæcina, hearing of their march, was much
disquieted, abandoned his operations by the river, and proceeded to the
camp. Here after Valens had got the men under arms, and had given them
the watchword, he sent forward the best of the cavalry while the legions
were taking up their respective positions in the line of battle.
XII. For some reason or other the men of Otho's vanguard conceived an
idea that the generals of Vitellius intended to desert to their side:
and so, when they came near to one another, they saluted the Vitellians
and addressed them as friends and comrades. As the Vitellians made an
angry and fierce response, the Othonians were discouraged, while their
opponents imagined that they intended to desert. This incident at the
first onset caused some confusion among the troops of Otho: and, besides
this, everything was in disorder, for the baggage train was entangled
among the ranks, and the line was broken in many places by the ditches
and trenches with which the ground was intersected, so that the
soldiers, in trying to avoid these obstacles, were forced to attack in
detail, and in disorganised crowds. Two[646] legions alone, that named
"Rapax" on the side of Vitellius, and "Adjutrix" on that of Otho, were
able to find a level plain, upon which they deployed into a regular line
of battle and fought front to front for a long time. Otho's soldiers
were active and brave, but had never been in action before, while those
of Vitellius had fought many battles, but were somewhat elderly and past
their prime. At the first charge the Othonians drove them back, and
captured their eagle, killing almost every man in the front rank; but
the Vitellians, filled with shame and rage, charged in their turn, slew
Orfidius, the legate in command of the legion, and took many standards.
The corps of gladiators, who were supposed to possess both courage and
practice in close combat, were attacked by Alphenus Varus with the
Batavians, who inhabit an island formed by the river Rhine, and who are
the best horsemen in Germany. Few of the gladiators stood to receive
their charge, but most of them fled towards the river, where they fell
in with other bodies of the enemy, by whom they were entirely cut to
pieces. The worst fight of all was made by the Prætorians, who did not
even wait until the enemy reached them, but by their panic flight
struck terror even into the unbroken troops through whose ranks they
fled. Yet many of Otho's troops, after having conquered their immediate
opponents, forced their way back through their victorious enemies to
their own camp.
XIII. Of the generals, neither Proculus nor Paullinus dared to return
with their men, but went off another way, fearing the soldiers, who
already began to throw the blame of their defeat upon the generals.
Annius Gallus assumed the command of the soldiers as they assembled in
the town of Bedriacum, and encouraged them by assurances that the battle
had been a drawn one, and that in many cases they had beaten the enemy.
Marius Celsus called a meeting of the generals, and bade them take
measures for the common good. He said that after so great a disaster and
so much slaughter of their countrymen not even Otho himself, if he were
a right-thinking man, would wish to make any further trial of fortune;
since even Cato and Scipio, although they fought in defence of the
liberty of Rome, were blamed for having wasted the lives of many brave
men in Africa, by not yielding to Cæsar immediately after the battle of
Pharsalia. All men, he urged, are equally liable to the caprices of
fortune; but they have the advantage, even when defeated, of being able
to form wise resolutions. By this reasoning Celsus convinced the
generals: and when, on trying the temper of the soldiers, they found
them desirous of peace, and Titianus himself bade them begin
negotiations for agreement, Celsus and Gallus determined to go and
discuss the matter with Cæcina and Valens. On their way they were met by
some centurions, who informed them that Vitellius's army was already
advancing, and that they had been sent on before by their generals to
arrange terms of peace. Celsus spoke with approval of their mission, and
bade them return and conduct him to Cæcina. It happened that when they
drew near the army, Celsus was like to have lost his life: for the
cavalry who formed the advance guard were the same who had been defeated
in the ambuscade, and when they saw Celsus approaching, they set up a
shout of rage and rode towards him. However the centurions stood before
Celsus and kept them back; and as the other officers called to them to
spare him Cæcina perceived that some disturbance was taking place and
rode up. He quickly repressed the disorderly movement of the cavalry,
greeted Celsus affectionately, and proceeded with him to Bedriacum.
Meanwhile Titianus had repented of having sent the embassy. He manned
the walls of the camp with those soldiers who had recovered their
spirits, and was encouraging the rest to fight. However, when Cæcina
rode up and held out his hand no one resisted him, but some of the
soldiers greeted his troops from the walls, and others opened the gates,
came out and mingled with the new-comers. No violence was done to any
one, but they all fraternised and shook each other by the hand, swore
fealty to Vitellius and joined his army.
XIV. The above is the account which most eye-witnesses give of the
battle, though they themselves admit that they do not know all the
details of it because of the confusion which prevailed and the
irregularity of the ground. Some time afterwards when I was journeying
across the battlefield, Mestrius Florus, a man of consular rank, who had
fought under Otho not from choice but from necessity, showed me an
ancient temple, and related that after the battle he came there and saw
so huge a pile of corpses, that those on the top were level with the
pinnacles of the roof. He said that he could not discover himself or
learn from any one else the cause of this heap; for though a greater
slaughter of the vanquished is made in civil wars than in any others,
because no quarter is given, as no use can be made of prisoners, yet it
was hard to imagine how such a mass of carcasses came to be piled
together on that spot.
XV. Otho, as is usual in such cases, first heard only confused rumours
of how the battle went. When however wounded men came from the scene of
action bringing the news of the defeat, not only his friends, as might
be expected, bade him keep up his spirits and not despair, but his
soldiers were wonderfully affected. None of them left him, or deserted
to the enemy, and no one consulted his own safety when his chief
despaired of his. All of them alike repaired to his quarters, and called
him their emperor. When he came out to them, they fell at his feet and
caught hold of his hands with shouts, and prayers, and tears, beseeching
him not to desert them, or betray them to the enemy, but to make use of
them to fight for him, body and soul, until their last breath. While all
besought him thus, one of the common soldiers drew his sword, and
crying, "Cæsar, this is what we are all prepared to do for you," stabbed
himself. Otho, unmoved by any of these entreaties, gazed round upon them
all with a calm and composed countenance, and said: "My comrades, your
noble conduct and your loyal devotion make this a happier day to me than
that on which you elected me your emperor. Yet do not deprive me of the
still greater happiness of dying for so many and such noble friends. If
I am worthy to be an emperor of Rome, I ought not to grudge my life to
my country. I am aware that our enemy's victory is not decisive or
crushing. News has reached me that the Moesian legions have already
reached the Adriatic, and are not many days' march distant. Asia, Syria,
Egypt, and the army engaged with the Jews are all on our side, while we
have in our power both the senate, and the wives and children of our
enemy. But we are not defending Italy from Hannibal, or Pyrrhus, or the
Cimbri, but Romans are fighting against Romans, and our native land will
suffer equally whichever side is victorious, for she must lose what the
conqueror gains. Believe me, I pray you, that it is more to my honour to
die than to reign: for I cannot imagine that if victorious I could do
anything which would benefit the Romans so much as I can by giving my
life to obtain peace and concord, and to save Italy from seeing another
day such as this."
XVI. After speaking thus, he tore himself away from the soldiers, who
tried to hold him back and bade him take courage. He ordered his friends
and such senators as were present to leave his camp: and to those who
were not present he sent similar orders, and also rescripts to the
magistrates of the cities through which they would have to pass, that
they might accomplish their journey[647] with honour and in safety. He
next sent for his nephew Cocceius, who was still a youth, and bade him
be of good cheer and not fear Vitellius, whose mother, children, and
wife he himself had protected as carefully as if they had been members
of his own family. He had wished, he said, to adopt the boy as his heir,
but had put off doing so till the end of the war, meaning to make him
his colleague if he succeeded, but not wishing to involve him in his own
destruction if he failed. "My last charge to you," he continued, "is
that you neither forget altogether nor yet remember too well that you
have had a Cæsar for your uncle." Shortly after this interview Otho
heard a shouting and disturbance outside his quarters; for the senators
were preparing to depart, and the soldiers were threatening to murder
them if they did so, and reproached them with deserting their emperor.
Otho, who feared for their lives, now came out a second time, no longer
in a mild and supplicatory manner, but, frowning savagely, he cast so
terrible a look upon the most turbulent of the rioters that they shrank
away terrified and abashed.
XVII. Towards evening he became thirsty, and drank a little water: after
which he spent a long time in examining the blades of two swords. At
last he rejected one of them, and hid the other in his clothes. He now
called together his servants, and distributed his money amongst them,
not recklessly, as though he were dealing with property not his own, but
giving them each various sums, carefully apportioned according to each
man's deserts. When he sent them away he rested for the remainder of the
night, and those about his bed-chamber noticed how soundly he slept. At
daybreak he called to a freedman who had been entrusted with the
management of the departure of the senators, and ordered him to learn
what had happened to them. When he was told that they had left the camp,
and had received every attention they could wish, he said, "Go now, and
show yourself to the soldiers unless you wish to perish miserably at
their hands; for they will suspect you of having assisted me to die."
When this man was gone, Otho held the sword upright with both his hands
and fell upon it, dying with only one groan, which apprised those
without of his fate. The wailing of his slaves was taken up by the whole
of the camp and city. The soldiers noisily forced their way into his
quarters and lamented over him with bitter grief, reproaching themselves
for not having guarded their emperor, and prevented his dying for them.
None of Otho's bodyguard deserted him, although the enemy was drawing
near, but after laying out his body, and erecting a funeral pile, they
bore him to it, armed at all points; and happy was the man who could
find a place among the bearers. Of the rest, some kissed his wounds,
some pressed his hands, and some, who could not come near him, knelt as
his body passed by them. Some, who had received no especial favours from
Otho, and had nothing to fear from his successor, slew themselves after
they had applied the torch to his funeral pile. It seems, indeed, that
no king or despot ever was possessed with so frantic a desire to rule,
as these men had to be ruled by Otho and to serve him; for their love
for him did not cease with his life, but remained implanted in their
breasts, causing them to regard Vitellius with the bitterest hatred. Of
what followed from this I shall give an account in its proper place.
XVIII. After the remains of Otho were buried they erected over him a
tomb which could offend no one either by its size or by the pomp of its
inscription. When I was at Brixellum I myself saw a small monument on
which was written in the Latin language "In memory of Marcus Otho."
Otho died in his thirty-seventh year, after a reign of three months.
Many good men, though they blamed his life, yet could not refrain from
admiring his death; for though his life had been no better than that of
Nero, his end was a far nobler one. When he was dead, Pollio, one of the
two prefects, offended the soldiers by requiring them at once to swear
fealty to Vitellius. Some of the senators were still left in Brixellum;
and the soldiers, hearing of this, let them go with the exception of
Virginius Rufus, whom they greatly embarrassed by coming to his house
under arms, and bidding him either take the command of them or at any
rate act as ambassador on their behalf. Virginius, who had refused the
crown when it was offered him by a victorious army, thought that it
would be the act of a madman to accept it from a beaten one. He feared,
also, to go as an ambassador to the Germans, who thought that in time
past he had forced them to do many things against their will.
Accordingly, he escaped from his house by a back door; and the soldiers,
when they discovered that he was gone, took the oaths to the new
emperor. They were pardoned by him, and were sent to serve with the
troops under the command of Cæcina.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] More properly Mandyria. This battle was fought in August B.C. 338,
the same day as that of Chæronea. "Not long before the battle of
Chæronea, the Tarentines found themselves so hard pressed by the
Messapians, that they sent to Sparta, their mother city, to entreat
assistance. The Spartan king, Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, perhaps
ashamed of the nullity of his country since the Sacred War, complied
with their prayer, and sailed at the head of a mercenary force to Italy.
How long his operations there lasted we do not know; but they ended by
his being defeated and killed, near the time of the battle of Chæronea.
B.C. 338."--Grote, 'History of Greece,' part ii. chap. xcvii.
[2] See vol. ii., Life of Lysander, chap. xxx.
[3] See vol. ii., Life of Pyrrhus, chap. xxvi.
[4] See vol. i., Life of Lykurgus, chap. viii.
[5] Cf. note, vol. ii., Life of Lucullus, chap. xxxvi.
[6] Probably the celebrated temple of Poseidon at Tænarus. [Cape
Matapan.]
[7] Borysthenes, also called Olbia, Olbiopolis, and Miletopolis, was a
town situated at the junction of the Borysthenes and Hypania, near the
Euxine sea. It was a colony of Miletus, and was the most important Greek
city north of the Euxine.
[8] In Cyprus. Zeno was the founder of the Stoic school of Philosophy.
[9] The allusion is to a saying of Agis II., that "The Lacedæmonians
never ask how many their enemies are, but where they are."
[10] Called Ladokea by Polybius, ii. chap. 3; and Pausanias viii. 44. 1.
[11] [Greek: mothakes] seem to have been children of Helots brought up
as foster-brothers of young Spartans, and eventually emancipated, yet
without acquiring full civic rights.--Liddell and Scott, s.v.
[12] The ancients always reclined at meals. See the article Triclinium
in Smith's 'Dictionary of Antiquities.'
[13] The western harbour of Corinth.
[14] Who these Leukaspids were I do not know. White was the Argive
colour, and in earlier times men with white shields are always spoken of
as Argives. The celebrated Argyraspids, the silver-shielded regiment of
Alexander, was destroyed by Antigonus I. after their betrayal of
Eumenes; but this may have been a corps raised by Antigonus Doson in
imitation of them.