PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC THOUGHT
A large number of references have already been made to
psycho-sociologic thought. In origin it may be traced to the primitive
days of the race. The folkways reveal keen psycho-sociologic
observations. Undoubtedly, many phases of the psychic nature of group
activities were known to the leaders of ancient civilizations. Plato
wrote on the importance of custom and custom imitation as a societal
force. Aristotle understood the socio-psychic nature of man when he
observed that property which is owned in common is least taken care
of, and when he declared that a fundamental test of good government
may be found in the attitude of a people toward public service. In his
theory of social attitudes Aristotle made a distinct contribution to
psycho-sociologic thought.
Thomas More analyzed the causes of human actions. He was a worthy
social psychologist when he protested against heaping punishment upon
human beings, without attempting to understand the causes of criminal
conduct and without seeking to remove the societal causes of such
conduct. Bodin postulated a theory of interests in his explanation of
social evolution. He made the common economic, religious, and other
interests of man the basis of social organization. These interests,
according to Bodin, led primitive families to form a commonality of
organization or government.
It was Hobbes who believed that man originally was a being of entirely
selfish interests. Man’s interest in others was based on their ability
to cater to his own good. This theory still has strong support; there
are large numbers of individuals who today apparently are living
according to this rule. Nations oftentimes still seem to be motivated
by no higher principle. On the basis of an introspective psychology,
Hobbes made the scientific observation that “he that is going to be a
whole man must read in himself--mankind.” Such a person must not simply
find in himself this or that man’s interests, but the interests of all
mankind.
George Berkeley (1685–1753), bishop of Cloyne and eminent philosopher,
in his _Principles of Moral Attraction_ attempted to point out the
analogies between the physical and social universe. His work was
stimulated by the discoveries of Isaac Newton. He tried to apply the
Newtonian formulas to society. While his “physical analogies” are of
little value, they represent a stage in the rise of psycho-sociologic
thought. He made the social instinct, or the gregarious instinct, in
society the analogue of the force of gravitation. The centrifugal force
in society is selfishness; and the centripetal, sociability. As the
attractive force of one mass for another varies directly in relation
to the distance between them, so the attraction of individuals for
one another varies directly in proportion to their resemblances. The
physical analogies, however, could not be carried far without being
lost in the realm of absurdity.
The Scotch philosopher, David Hume, has been called the father of
social psychology because of his splendid analysis of sympathy as a
social force. “Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to
serve and obey one man, ... he will still be miserable, till you give
him some one person at least with whom he may share his happiness,
and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy.”[XXII-1] “Whatever
other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice,
curiosity, revenge or lust,--the soul or animating principle of them is
sympathy.”[XXII-2]
But sympathy is not always limited in its operation to the present
moment. Through sympathy we may put ourselves in the future situation
of any person whose present condition arouses our interest in him.
Moreover, if we see a stranger in danger, we will run to his assistance.
Vice was defined by Hume as everything which gives uneasiness in
human actions. By sympathy, we become uneasy when we become aware
of injustice anywhere. “Self-interest is the original motive to the
establishment of justice; but a sympathy with public interest is the
source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue.”[XXII-3]
There is a continual conflict between self-interest and sympathy, both
in the individual and between individuals in society. Although at
times this self-interest seems to predominate, “it does not entirely
abolish the more generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good
offices.”[XXII-4]
Sympathy causes people to be interested in the good of mankind.[XXII-5]
But whatever human factor is contiguous either in space or time has a
proportional effect on the will, passions, and imagination.[XXII-6] It
commonly operates with greater force than any human factor that lies in
a distant and more obscure light. This principle explains why people
often act in contradiction to their interests, and “why they prefer
any trivial advantage that is present to the maintenance of order in
society.”
In accordance with the analysis of sympathy by Hume, Adam Smith made
sympathy a leading concept in his theory of political economy. Smith
also carried the concept of self-interest, with the resultant conflict
between self-interest and social interest, into nearly all his economic
theories.
According to Adam Smith there are four classes of people in modern
life. (1) There are those who live by taking rent. They have social
interests but are not socially productive; they grow listless and
careless. (2) There is the class which takes wages. This group is
large, productive, and socially interested, but their widespread lack
of education makes them subject to the passions of the day, and hence
socially useless or even harmful. (3) Those who take profit have
interests at direct variance with the welfare of society. Their selfish
interests become unduly developed; their public attitudes are usually
dangerous to all except themselves. (4) The fourth group is composed
of all who derive a living from serving one or more of the three
afore-mentioned classes. The interests of the three first-mentioned
groups often clash, leading to destructive social conflicts. Despite
this conclusion, Adam Smith was an advocate of _laissez faire_. He
urged that natural laws be allowed to express themselves normally.
In 1859, Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal began to contribute
to social thought in the _Zeitschrift für Völker-Psychologie und
Sprachwissenschaft_. They applied psychological methods to the study
of primitive society. In this journal they made notable contributions
concerning the social customs and mental traits of early mankind.
It is in this field, which was discussed in Chapter XVIII, that the
original work of such men as Franz Boas, W. G. Sumner, W. I. Thomas,
and L. T. Hobhouse belongs. Fundamental pioneering in psycho-sociologic
thought was done by Lester F. Ward (see Chapter XVII). Ward opposed
the prevailing belief of his time, and particularly of Herbert
Spencer, that society must continue as it now is going on, namely, an
exhibition of a blind struggle of competitive forces. He not only
perceived the rise of mind out of the obscure processes of social
evolution, but more important still, he noted the part that mind may
play in modifying the course of social forces. Although he considered
the human desires to be the dynamic social elements, he gave to mind,
through its power of prevision, the prerogative of directing the
desires of mankind. Moreover, he pointed out the direction in which
mind could best guide the desires. He urged a sociocracy in which the
desires of the individual are so controlled that they operate only when
in harmony with the welfare of other individuals. For establishing
these fundamental considerations, Ward ranks high in the history of
psycho-sociologic thought.
The chief founder of social psychology was Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904).
He wrote the first important treatise in the field of the psychology of
society. The _Lois de l’imitation_ established Tarde’s reputation as a
social psychologist, and at the same time aroused the world of thought
to the existence of a new phase of social science. Tarde was a jurist
who inquired into the causes of anti-social conduct. He was greatly
impressed by the observation that criminal acts are committed in
waves. Upon examination of this fact he found imitation to be a potent
factor, and began to analyze the laws of imitation. This study soon
showed that not all is imitation but that much human conduct arises
out of opposition. His analysis of the laws of opposition led him to
the conclusion that imitation and opposition are the bases of a third
social factor, invention. The social process, as he observed it, is
characterized (1) by an ever-widening imitation of inventions, (2) by
the opposition of conflicting circles of imitation, and (3) by the rise
of new inventions (out of these oppositions), which in turn become the
centers of new imitations. Thus, the social process goes on, endlessly
and unconsciously or consciously. To understand society, Tarde believed
that one must understand how minds act and interact.
Tarde’s work, first presented is _Les Lois de l’imitation_, was
formally developed in his _Logique sociale_, and summarized in his
_Lois sociale_ (English translation, _Social Laws_). Together, these
books constitute a unique social theory. Although Tarde’s approach to
the psychology of society was objective and sociological, and although
he did not give serious attention to the purely psychological nature of
the mind nor to the instinctive bases of conduct, he nevertheless made
a contribution to social thought which is valid and enlightening.
Society, according to Tarde, is a group of people “who
display many resemblances, produced either by imitation or by
counter-imitation.”[XXII-7] Again, he says that society is “a group of
distinct individuals who render one another mutual services.”[XXII-8]
Societies are groups of people who are organized because of agreement
or disagreement of beliefs.[XXII-9] “Society is imitation.”[XXII-10]
The outstanding element in social life is a psychological process in
which inventions are followed by imitations, which when coming into
inevitable oppositions produce new inventions.
To the degree that a person is social he is imitative. In the way
that vital, or biological, resemblances are due to heredity, so human
resemblances are caused by imitation. The closer the human resemblances
between individuals, even though they be occupational competitors,
the larger will be the proportion of imitations and the closer the
social relationships. The father will always be the son’s first
model.[XXII-11] A beloved ruler will so fascinate his people that they
will imitate blindly, yea, even be thrown into a state of catalepsy by
him. In such a case imitation becomes a kind of somnambulism.[XXII-12]
Imitations are characterized by inclines, plateaus, and
declines.[XXII-13] The incline refers to the period of time which an
imitation requires for adoption. The plateau is the length of time
during which an imitation is in force. The decline, of course, has to
do with the passing away of an imitation. Each of these phases are
of varying lengths--dependent upon the operation of almost countless
socio-psychical factors. It is this career through which all imitations
must pass that is the important phase of history.[XXII-14]
There are two causal factors determining the nature of imitation:
logical, and non-logical.[XXII-15] Logical causes operate when the
imitator adopts an innovation that is in line with the principles
that have already found a place in his own mind. Extra-logical,
or non-logical, imitations are those which are determined by the
adventitious factors of place, date, or birth of the individual.
The fundamental law of imitation, stated in simplest terms, is that
the superior are imitated by the inferior, for example: the patrician
by the plebeian; the nobleman by the commoner; the beloved by the
lover.[XXII-16] A more accurate statement of the law of imitation is
that “the thing that is most imitated is the most superior one of those
that are nearest.” The term “superior” in all these cases must be
used in the subjective sense, that is to say, that which seems to the
specific individual to be superior, not necessarily that which actually
is the superior, is imitated.
A country or period of time is democratic if the distance between the
highest and lowest classes is lessened enough so that the highest may
be imitated freely by the lowest.[XXII-17] Democracy will keep the
distance between classes reduced to that minimum where imitation may
operate.
An important phase of sociology involves the knowledge and control of
imitations.[XXII-18] Sociological statistics should determine (1) “the
imitative power which inheres in every invention at any given time and
place;” and (2) “the beneficial or harmful effects which result from
the imitation of given inventions.”
Imitation is divided into sets of complementary tendencies; custom
imitation and fashion imitation; sympathy imitation and obedience
imitation; naïve imitation and deliberate imitation.[XXII-19]
Everywhere custom imitation and fashion imitation are embodied in
two parties, divisions, or organizations--the conservative and the
liberal.[XXII-20]
Through custom imitation, usages acquire autocratic power. They control
habit, regulate private conduct, and define morals and manners with
imperial authority. Usages are frequently extra-logical imitations.
Usages are commonly accepted first by the upper classes. They usually
are related primarily to objects of luxury; they stick tenaciously to
the leisure-time phases of life. Their most favorable _milieu_ is a
social and individual status of ignorance.
Fashion imitation rules by epochs, for example: Athens under Solon,
Rome under the Scipios, Florence in the fifteenth century.[XXII-21]
These epochs of fashion produce great individualities--illustrious
legislators, and founders of empire. Whenever the currents of fashions
are set free, the inventive imagination is excited and ambitions are
stimulated.
Fashion imitation has a democratizing influence. A prolonged process
of fashion imitation ends “by putting pupil-peoples upon the same
level, both in their armaments and in their arts and sciences, with
their master people.”[XXII-22] In fact, the very desire to be like the
superior is a latent democratizing force.
The counterpart of imitation is opposition. Opposition, however, may be
a very special kind of repetition. There are two types of opposition:
interference-combinations and interference-conflicts.[XXII-23]
The first type refers to the coming together of two psychological
quantities of desire and belief with the result that combination
takes place and a total gain is made. The second type refers to
the opposition resulting from incompatible forces. In this case an
individual or social loss is registered.
From another standpoint, opposition appears in one of three forms,
namely, war, competition, and discussion.[XXII-24] Conflicts often
pass through these three forms, which are obedient to the same law of
development, but in order are characterized by ever-widening areas of
pacification, alternating however with renewals of discord. As war is
the lowest, most brutal form of conflict, discussion is the highest,
most rational form.
Opposition in human life is society’s logical duel.[XXII-25] This
duel sometimes ends abruptly when one of the adversaries is summarily
suppressed by force. Sometimes a resort to arms brings a military
victory. Sometimes a new invention or discovery expels one of the
adversaries from the social scene.
The logical result of opposition is invention or adaptation.
“Invention is a question followed by an answer.”[XXII-26] Invention,
or adaptation, at its best is “the felicitous interference of two
imitations, occurring first in one single mind.”[XXII-27] Inventions
grow in two ways: (1) in extension--by imitative diffusion; and (2)
in comprehension--by a series of logical combinations, such as the
combination of the wheel and the horse in the inventions of the
horse-cart.[XXII-28]
Inventions partially determine the nature of new inventions and new
discoveries. A new invention makes possible other inventions, and so
on. Each invention is the possible parent of a thousand offspring
inventions.
To be inventive, one must be wide-awake, inquiring, incredulous, not
docile and dreamy, or living in a social sleep. The inventor is one who
escapes, for the time being, from his social surroundings.[XXII-29]
Inventing develops from wanting. A man experiences some want, and in
order to satisfy this want he invents. Inventiveness is contrary in
nature to sheepishness.
Since an invention is the answer to a problem, inventions are
the real objective factors which mark the stage of progress. But
invention, according to Tarde, becomes increasingly difficult.
Problems naturally grow increasingly complex as the simpler ones
are mastered. Unfortunately, the mind of man is not capable of
indefinite development, and therefore will reach a limit in solving
problems.[XXII-30] At this point, Tarde is on doubtful ground. His
argument can neither be proved nor disproved. Apparently, man’s
ability to solve problems increases with his training and experience in
that connection. Moreover, man appears to be at the very dawn of his
possibilities in the field of invention. He is only beginning to gather
together systematically the materials for inventing, and to understand
slightly the principles of inventing.
Inventors are imitative.[XXII-31] This statement is but another way
of saying that inventions are cumulative, that they come in droves,
that they are gregarious. A new discovery will arouse the ambition
of many wide-awake persons to make similar discoveries. “There
is in every period a current of inventions which is in a certain
general sense religious or architectural or sculptural or musical or
philosophical.”[XXII-32]
Invention and imitation represent the chief forces in society.[XXII-33]
Invention is “intermittent, rare, and eruptive only at certain
infrequent intervals.” It explains “the source of privileges,
monopolies, and aristocratic inequalities.” Imitation, on the other
hand, is democratic, leveling, and “incessant like the stream
deposition of the Nile or Euphrates.” At times the eruptions of
invention take place faster than they can be imitated. At other times
imitations flow in a monotonous circular current.
The contributions of Tarde to social thought have stimulated numerous
investigators to enter the field of social psychology. While Tarde’s
thinking has been severely criticised by the psychologists and
modified by the sociologists, it has opened mines of valuable social
ores. Not the least important consideration was the impetus which the
Tardian thought gave to American writers, such as E. A. Ross.[XXII-34]
Tarde’s name, however, will be long revered for the penetrating way
in which he developed the concept of imitation. Although Walter
Bagehot, an English publicist, in an epoch-stirring book, _Physics and
Politics_, published an important chapter on “Imitation” as early as
1872, it was Tarde’s _Lois de l’imitation_ in 1890 which at once became
the authority on the subject. In the United States, Michael M. Davis,
Jr., has written an excellent summary of Tarde’s socio-psychologic
thought.[XXII-35] As a critical digest of Tardian thought, Dr. Davis’
_Psychological Interpretations of Society_ is unsurpassed.
In 1892, Profesor H. Schmidkunz published an elaborate work on the
_Psychologie der Suggestion_. This book is an important pioneer
work. In the English language, the writings of Boris Sidis on the
psychology of suggestion are well-known. Professor E. A. Ross has given
an intensive treatment of the theme in his _Social Psychology_. In
these various discussions, however, the fact is not made clear that
suggestion and imitation are correlative phases of the same phenomenon.
The point, also, is not developed that suggestion-imitation phenomena
are natural products of social situations in which like stimuli
normally produce like responses.
In 1895, the first book by Gustave Le Bon on crowd psychology was
published. Le Bon has also written on the psychology of revolutions,
of war, and of peoples. He gave a limited definition to the term,
crowds, and then applied the term to nearly all types of group life.
He conceived of crowds as “feeling phenomena.” They are more or less
pathological. Since the proletariat are subject to crowd psychology,
they are untrustworthy and to be rewarded perpetually with suspicion.
A sounder, more synthetic, and historical position concerning the
psychology of groups and of society is taken by G. L. Duprat in _La
Psychologie sociale_.
Italian contributions in the field of crowd and group psychology are
represented by Paolo Orano’s _Psicologia sociale_, which includes only
a partial treatment of the subject that is indicated by the title;
and by Scipio Sighele’s _La foule criminelle_ and _Psychologie des
sectes_. Permanent groups, according to Sighele (following Tarde),
are either sects, castes, classes, or states.[XXII-36] The sect is a
group of individuals which possesses a common ideal and faith, such as
a religious denomination or a political party. The caste arises from
identity of profession. The class is characterized by a strong unity of
interests. States possess common bonds of language, national values,
and national prestige.
The concept of “consciousness of kind” was developed by Franklin H.
Giddings in his _Principles of Sociology_ (1896). Consciousness of kind
is the original and elementary subjective fact in society.[XXII-37]
Professor Giddings defines this term to mean “a state of consciousness
in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life,
recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself.” In its
widest meaning, consciousness of kind marks the difference between the
animate and the inanimate. Among human beings it distinguishes “social
conduct” from purely economic or purely religious activity. Around
consciousness of kind, as a determining principle, all other human
motives organize themselves.
People group together according to the development of the
consciousness of kind in them. Roughly speaking, there are four
such groupings.[XXII-38] (1) The non-social are persons in whom the
consciousness of kind has not yet developed--in whom it finds imperfect
but not degenerate expression, and from whom the other classes arise.
(2) The anti-social, or criminal, classes include those persons in
whom the consciousness of kind is approaching extinction. They detest
society. (3) The pseudo-social, or pauper, classes are characterized
by a degeneration of the genuine consciousness of kind. (4) The social
classes are noted for a high development of the consciousness of kind;
they constitute the positive and constructive elements in society. At
the head of the list are the pre-eminently social. These people devote
their lives and means to the amelioration of society; they are called
the natural aristocracy of the race, the true social élite.
Consciousness of kind is made possible in part by the operation of
physical factors. Fertility of soil is one of the sources of human
aggregation. Favorable climate makes aggregation possible. Aggregation
of population is either genetic (due to the birth rate) or congregate
(due to immigration). Aggregation leads to association--the proper
_milieu_ for the growth of consciousness of kind.
Aggregation guarantees social intercourse, which is a mode of conflict.
Conflict, according to Professor Giddings, becomes the basis of social
growth.[XXII-39] Primary conflicts are those in which one adversary
is completely outdone, and hence likely to be crushed, by the other.
Secondary conflict refers to the contests between more or less evenly
balanced forces. Primary conflict is conquest; secondary conflict is
growth. Among people secondary conflict leads to the development of
consciousness of kind through the successive steps of communication,
imitation, toleration, co-operation, alliance. The supreme result
is the production of pre-eminently social classes. Of these various
factors, Professor Giddings particularly stresses imitation. “It is
the factor of imitation in the conflict that gradually assimilates and
harmonizes.”[XXII-40]
Association reacts upon individuals and produces self-consciousness,
which in turn creates social self-consciousness, or group awareness
of itself. Social self-consciousness is characterized by rational
discussion. With the rise of discussion, social memory, or traditions,
becomes possible. Moreover, a sense of social values arises. Public
opinion springs from the passing of judgment by the members of the
group upon any matters of general interest.[XXII-41]
Social memory, or traditions, becomes highly differentiated.[XXII-42]
It consists of impressions concerning the tangible world, the
intangible world, and the conceptional world. The traditions in any
field, plus current opinion in that field, form the standards, ideals,
faiths, “isms” of the time. For example, the integration of economic
traditions with current economic opinions is the general standard
of living of the time and place. The integration of the aesthetic
tradition with current criticism is taste, and the modification of a
traditional religious belief by current religious ideas is a faith.
Inasmuch as consciousness of kind is the psychological basis of social
phenomena, it is natural that the chief social value is the kind
itself, or the type of conscious life that is characteristic of the
society.[XXII-43] The social cohesion is another important social
value. Social cohesion is vital to the unity of any group; therefore
the group is usually willing to make many sacrifices in its own behalf.
The distinctive possessions and properties of the community, such as
territory, sacred or historic places, heroes, ceremonies, constitute
the third class of social values. A fourth group is found in the
general principles which promote the growth of the group; for example,
the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The social values
largely determine the social choices of groups and the nature of social
organizations.
Professor Giddings develops an interesting theory of the dualism in
social structures. Civilization is marked by the contemporaneous
existence of public and private associations. Civilized society
affords four main sets of dualistic associations: political, juristic,
economic, and cultural. In the political field there are private
political parties and the public association, namely, the government,
or the political party in power. Among juristic associations there
are the privately-organized vigilance committees and the public
associations, such as the police, the courts, the prisons. In the realm
of economics there are private individual entrepreneurs, partnerships,
corporations; and on the other hand, there are the governmentally-owned
railroads, postal service, the water systems, the coinage systems.
In regard to cultural associations we may note the privately endowed
universities and state universities, privately organized churches and
state churches, private charities and public charities. This dualism
in social structure is supported by Professor Giddings on the grounds
that private associations are needed for purposes of initiation,
experimentation, and stimulation; and the public associations serve the
useful purposes of regulation and maintenance of balance among various
contending factors.
The highest test of social organization is the development of social
personality. An efficient social organization is one which makes its
members “more rational, more sympathetic, with an ever-broadening
consciousness of kind.”[XXII-44]
In recent works Professor Giddings has developed the concept of
pluralistic behavior. “Any one or any combination of behavior
inciting stimuli may on occasion be reacted to by more than one
individual.”[XXII-45] The character of pluralistic reactions, whether
similar or dissimilar, simultaneous or not, equal or unequal, is
determined by two variables: (1) the strength of the stimulation; (2)
the similarity or dissimilarity of the reacting mechanisms.[XXII-46]
Thus Professor Giddings considers pluralistic behavior the subject
matter of the psychology of society, or sociology.
In 1897, _Social and Ethical Interpretations_, by J. Mark Baldwin, was
printed; it bears the subtitle of “A Study in Social Psychology.” This
was the first time that the term, social psychology, had appeared in
the title of a book in America, though three years earlier, in 1894,
one of the leading parts of Small and Vincent’s _Introduction to the
Study of Society_ was designated “social psychology” and included a
discussion of social consciousness, social intelligence, and social
volition. Baldwin’s _Social and Ethical Interpretations_ and Giddings’
_Principles of Sociology_ appeared almost simultaneously, one by a
psychologist and the other by a sociologist. One was written from the
genetic viewpoint, and the other from the objective viewpoint; one
dealt primarily with social psychology, and the other with a psychology
of society; one was built around the concept of the social self, and
the other around the concept of a consciousness of kind. They both
hastened the development of an organic social psychology.
Professor Baldwin demonstrated that the self is largely a product of
the give-and-take of social life. A child becomes aware of his self by
setting himself off from other selves. It is in group life, that is, in
contact with other selves, that the child develops a self consciousness.
Moreover, the self is bi-polar. One end of the self-pole is
characterized by what one thinks of himself, and the other end by what
he thinks of other persons.[XXII-47] “The ego and the alter are to our
thought one and the same thing.”[XXII-48]
People are so much alike because they are imitative. It is imitation
which keeps people alike. Imitation integrates individuals. Imitation
is either (1) a process whereby one individual consciously or
unconsciously copies another individual, or (2) the copying of a model,
that is, adopting a model which arises in one’s own mind.[XXII-49]
Baldwin found the law of social growth in the particularization by the
individual of society’s store of material, and by the generalization
on the part of society of the individual’s particularizations. The
essence of the first phase of this process is invention and of the
second, imitation. Baldwin considered invention and imitation the two
fundamental processes of social growth.
In this chapter the strength of the psychological approach to an
understanding of societary processes has been demonstrated. In the
chapter which follows the reader will find further materials, showing
the tremendous vitality of psycho-sociologic thought.