SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—CAPTURE OF CETSHWAYO.
Sir Bartle Frere, whose continued popularity spoke somewhat of
colonial approval of the war, had returned to the Cape in June, and
his reception at Cape Town “capped the climax of an uninterrupted
triumph,” according to _The Natal Mercury_. That he thought himself
deserving of the honours due to a conqueror returning home in triumph
we may gather from the fact that he sent no instructions to suppress
any demonstrations of delight at his return, although at that very
time the latest and perhaps the saddest tragedy of all the sad
results of his policy had just been enacted, and Natal, as with one
voice, was lamenting the Prince Imperial’s death.
“So be it,” says _The Natal Witness_ of June 12th, 1879, commenting
upon this text; “Sir Bartle Frere’s reception capped the climax of an
uninterrupted triumph. We are quite ready to believe this, and, as
we have said, we are glad at last to have so decided an intimation
of what Sir Bartle Frere has intended to do. There are triumphs of
various kinds. There is the triumph which surrounds the statesman,
who, by gentle persuasion, by cautious reforms, by a personal
example of uprightness and unselfishness, has reduced threatening
elements of danger, and evolved peace and security out of storm and
terror. There is the triumph which is his who, impressed with a deep
sense of the value of human life, lays his head upon his pillow every
night in the happy confidence that never through his means, either
directly or indirectly, has a human life been needlessly sacrificed.
There is the triumph of the philanthropist, who, feeling deep in
his heart the claims of an aboriginal people to the consideration
of a civilised power, has, in his dealings with that people, been
careful rather to strain doubtful points in their favour, than to
take advantage of their presumed simplicity. There is the triumph
of the Christian legislator, who regards the authority entrusted
to him as entrusted with a solemn injunction to use that authority
in the name of his divine Master, for the purpose of spreading and
confirming the kingdom of peace and good will. There is the triumph
of the diplomatist, who, in respect of his dealings with state
questions, can lay his hand upon his heart, and affirm that he never
misled his superiors, ... never wrote a line which he did not believe
to be true. All these triumphs we doubt not will be yet achieved by
Sir Bartle Frere, if only the fatigue caused by his ‘troubles and
journeying’ does not suggest an early return to Europe.”
Would Sir Bartle Frere be supported by the Home Government? and would
Lord Chelmsford be upheld by his military superiors in England?
Such were the questions perpetually asked in the colony, to which
there seemed no full and sufficient answer. True, both had received
messages of sympathy and confidence; but these were sent palpably on
the spur of the moment, and long before all the facts of the case had
been brought to light; and, on the other hand, Sir Bartle Frere had
received a very severe rebuke in the despatches mentioned in Chapter
XII. Still the tide of events was permitted to flow on, and many
doubted the reality of the condemnation.
From the time of the disaster at Isandhlwana, prophecies were current
that Lord Chelmsford would be recalled, and as misfortune pursued our
arms the prophecies were renewed. Many were the conjectures as to who
would be sent to replace Lord Chelmsford should he be recalled, and a
general idea was prevalent that the sprightly Sir Garnet Wolseley and
his “brilliant staff” would once more grace the shores of Natal. The
despatch announcing his approach reached the colony in the middle of
June, and the telegram to Lord Chelmsford announcing his appointment
ran as follows: “Her Majesty’s Government have determined to send out
Sir Garnet Wolseley as Administrator in that part of South-Eastern
Africa in the neighbourhood of the seat of war, with plenary powers,
both civil and military. Sir Bartle Frere, instructed accordingly by
Colonial Office. The appointment of a senior officer is not intended
as a censure on yourself, but you will, as in ordinary course of
service, submit and subordinate your plans to his control. He leaves
this country by next mail” (sent _viâ_ St. Vincent, 29th May, 1879).
Sir Garnet Wolseley landed at Durban on the 28th June, and proceeded
direct to Pietermaritzburg, where he was the same day sworn in as
Governor of Natal. Certainly Sir Garnet did not let the grass grow
under his feet. On Sunday, the 29th, he telegraphed to Colonel Walker
at Fort Pearson: “Send back Zulu messengers immediately to the king
with following message from me: ‘If the king wants peace he must
send Umnyamana, Umfanawendhela, and Vumandaba to General Crealock’s
column, where I will depute an officer of rank to hear what the king
has to say. I alone have power to make peace. All the other Generals
are under my orders.’ Explain to the messengers who I am. They are to
tell the king, and remind him that I was here as Governor before, and
had many communications with him then.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 149).
The message from Cetshwayo was delivered by two Zulu messengers at
the Lower Tugela, on June 25th, to Mr. Fynney, Administrator and
Border Agent.
“We are sent by the king straight to you. We were ordered not to go
to the troop at the Umlatazi, as other messengers (Sintwangu) will
go there.... The king asks you to speak to the great white Chief
with the Upper Column, and ask to stay the advance of the troops
till he (the king) can hear plainly what he has done, what great sin
he has committed. If he ever killed a white man or white woman, or
ever took cattle from a white man before the war? Did he ever walk
over the words spoken at the Umlambongwenya Kraal by Somtseu? (Sir
T. Shepstone). The king wished us to say if he is to be destroyed
he could die happy if he knew first really what wrong he had done.
The king begs you will speak to the great white Chief with the Upper
Column to stay a further advance till chosen representatives from
both sides can meet and hear really the cause of the war, and what
wrong he has done. The king does not ask for favour if it is proved
he has been wrong. He wants to hear, and he wishes the troops not to
advance till he can hear; for if they do he cannot help fighting,
as there will be nothing left but to try and push aside a tree if
falling upon him.”
“This is our message from the king to you, and he ordered us to tell
you that it is from himself; even the indunas do not know he has sent
it” (_ibid._ p. 154).
On the same day (29th) Sir Garnet sent the following order to Captain
McLeod: “Make arrangements at once, with Swazis, for massing north
of Pongolo River, with view to invading Zululand. Spread abroad news
that the invasion will take place immediately, but do not let them
cross river without my orders. When they are ready to cross let me
know, and I will send you further instructions. Impress urgently upon
them that women and children must not be murdered, but promise them
all cattle they take. This promise to be made as public as possible.
I am now High Commissioner, with full powers to decide all terms of
peace. All reports must be sent to me, care of General Clifford,
’Maritzburg” (_ibid._ p. 150).
The object of this message was “to establish a standing menace, and
to bring formidable pressure to bear in that quarter upon the Zulus.”
The barbarity of the Swazis in warfare, and the keen delight
with which they would have found themselves let loose upon their
hereditary enemies the Zulus, whose army was either scattered or
destroyed, was a well-known fact, and many wondered that such a
course should be proposed.
Captain McLeod, a hardy soldier and brave man, had been for many
months in about as unenviable a position as can well be imagined—in
an unsettled border district in war time, threatened both by Boers
and Zulus. He had been posted at Derby, to guide and control the
movements of our ally the Swazi king, who, it was imagined, would be
stanch to us or not, according to the fortunes of the Zulu war.
Captain McLeod knew the Swazis well, and how little chance there
would be of keeping them under control if once let loose upon the
helpless Zulu people; he therefore begged that they might be used
only as a last resource.
With the view of still further spreading alarm through the Zulu
country, Sir Garnet sent a message to the Amatongas that he might
“possibly ascend the Maputa River with a force and use their
territory as a base of operations against the Zulus from the north”
(_ibid._ p. 149).
On the 30th, after a long conference with General Clifford and
Commissary-General Strickland, Sir Garnet Wolseley had an interview
with about seventy Natal native chiefs, who had been assembled at
his request, and addressed them, through an interpreter, to the
effect that the great English Queen had sent him to carry on the
war against Cetshwayo, and to thank them for what they had already
done. That the chiefs need have no fear but that the Queen would
send as many armies as are necessary, if the troops sent were not
sufficient. “They may depend upon it, and the past history of our
nation is a guarantee thereof, that when we give a promise we will
perform it. Our war is not against the Zulu people, but against
Ketshwayo, who has broken all his promises. We have no wish to rob
the Zulu people of their property or their land; but tell the chiefs
this, that I say this war is going to be finished by us, and finished
in a satisfactory manner. The Queen is most anxious that the war in
Natal should be finished.” Then (as there was a scarcity of grass for
draught-oxen) Sir Garnet requested the chiefs to furnish a certain
number (2000) of their young men to carry provisions for the troops;
the men to carry their arms whilst so employed, and to be paid and
fed by him.
Once more, then, we hear the words: “_Our war is not against the Zulu
people!_”
These “carriers” were taken from the Tugela Valley, which had lately
suffered from the Zulu raid, and where many of the men had belonged
to the native levies raised for the defence of the border; they
naturally did not appreciate an employment which removed them from
the protection of their families, and which was at variance with
their customs[175] and prejudices.
There was not much work for these “carriers” after all; they were
assembled at the Lower Tugela, and marched up to Fort Chelmsford,
each man with a fifty-pound mealie-bag on his head.[176] Their
commander, Major Schwabe, left the loads there, and took the men on
to Port Durnford, where they were employed as required. Having, after
some time, received their pay, the “carriers” quietly walked off to
their homes.
The Commander-in-Chief remained but two days in Pietermaritzburg,
returning to Durban on the 1st of July. The same evening he embarked
on board H.M.S. _Shah_, intending to land at Port Durnford, and
thus reach the scene of action. For once in his life Sir Garnet’s
good fortune deserted him; the heavy surf on the beach prevented
his landing, and the _Shah_ brought him back to Durban. Here he
received the news of the battle of Ulundi, telegraphed to him by Mr.
Archibald Forbes.
No one quite knew what Lord Chelmsford was about, but everyone
understood that he would try and end the war before he was
superseded; and the general feeling in the colony was certainly one
of hope that “poor Lord Chelmsford” might get a chance, win a battle,
and have his bonfire in the enemy’s city of straw. Some few, indeed,
argued that as Lord Chelmsford could not possibly, in the time left
him, settle the Zulu question by the sword, it might occur to him
at last to pay some attention to the hard-pressed Zulu monarch’s
repeated messages imploring peace, and propose some conditions
possible for Cetshwayo to accept and fulfil. Without further
bloodshed an honourable peace might thus have been concluded before
Sir Garnet Wolseley could step upon the scene.
We left the 1st Division at the Umlalazi River, close to the
landing-place, Port Durnford. There the force remained, General
Crealock occupied in receiving the submission of the neighbouring
Zulus, who were flocking in from every direction.
But whilst Lord Chelmsford, on his approach to Ulundi, was inquiring,
“Where is Crealock?” Crealock was quietly established near the coast,
his military activity being displayed in the burning of Empangeni
and other kraals north of the Umlatuzi River. As the Zulus all round
were coming in, and no “impi” was even heard of, the object of this
exhibition of force seems a little doubtful. As was remarked by
_The Cape Times_: “Why the British soldier was ordered to destroy
the shelter, and, with the shelter, the store of grain food of some
thousands of poor women and children whose husbands and fathers
were making their submission, we can no more understand than we can
comprehend the strategy by which a large British force was held back
for months at the edge of the enemy’s country, while commissariat
supplies were accumulating sufficient to support a long campaign,
the whole work before them being to march a hundred miles, and with
one fight close up the war. If they were beaten they could fall back
on the base; but with caution and generalship defeat was out of the
question.” However, Major-General Crealock must have the credit of
quieting the eastern portion of Zululand before the termination of
the war. From his despatches of the 5th July we gather that the
“district people are all wanting to come in,” that he was “sending
back the people to their districts; difficulty of feeding them would
be great.” His division paraded under arms to receive the “official
submission” of “Mabilwana, Manyingo, and other chiefs,” who, with
some 250 men, double that number of women and children, and their
cattle, etc., had come in—these people belonging to the coast
district, but were not strictly speaking warriors, or necessarily
belonging to the Zulu army; nor could their submission be looked upon
as any desertion of their king by the fighting-men of the nation.
They were told that the General accepted their submission, and should
look to them in future to keep peace in that district. If any Zulus
were found in arms, their chief or headman would suffer; but, if they
behaved themselves well, he would give them back their cattle and
his protection. The men then received passes (or tickets) and were
permitted to return to their districts.[177]
Sir Garnet Wolseley crossed the Tugela with his staff and escort on
July 6th, and proceeded to the head-quarters of the 1st Division,
near Port Durnford, which he reached on the 7th. He at once set
to work “to reduce the excessive rate of expenditure which has so
far been maintained in connection with this war,” and “arranged
with the Commodore to embark the Naval Brigade at the earliest
opportunity,” and also “dispensed with the services of some of the
colonial troops.” Reinforcements of all kinds were stopped, including
a fine battalion of Marine Infantry and strong detachment of Marine
Artillery, just arrived at the Cape in H.M.S. _Jumna_.
On July 10th, Sir Garnet also put on one side “the plan of a Swazi
invasion.” (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 163.) All the chiefs up to St. Lucia
Bay tendered their submission, and sent in their arms.
Sir Garnet Wolseley and Lord Chelmsford met at St. Paul’s on the
15th July, the latter arriving with Brigadier-General Wood’s Flying
Column. This Sir Garnet inspected on the following day, taking the
opportunity of decorating Major Chard, R.E., with the Victoria Cross,
awarded him for his gallantry at Rorke’s Drift.
Lord Chelmsford left St. Paul’s on the 17th, on his way home. His
“brilliant victory” had turned the tide of popular favour somewhat in
his direction, and he found that (as he said) “nothing succeeds like
success.”
In Durban he was accorded a reception which must have been highly
gratifying to his feelings. One of his last remarks in Natal,
in reply to a speech made as he was about to embark, was to the
following effect: “I think I may say confidently that we have now
seen the beginning of the end of this campaign, and any success which
has attended my efforts, I feel, is due to the prayers of the people,
and the kindly ordinations of Divine Providence; for I am one of
those who believe firmly and implicitly in the efficacy of prayer and
in the intervention of Providence.”
In this comfortable frame of mind Lord Chelmsford passes from the
scene.
Sir Garnet Wolseley completed the chain of forts across Zululand,
commencing with St. Paul’s, an English mission station on the coast
road a little north of where it crosses the Umlatusi. Fifteen miles
west of this is Kwamagwasa. Twenty miles a little south of west lies
Fort Evelyn, on the road from Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi. Fort Marshall
about twenty miles west-south-west of Fort Evelyn, Fort Newdigate,
twelve miles north-west of Fort Evelyn, and a fort on Itelezi Hill
completes the chain to the Blood River. Some of these forts were
constructed on the upward march of the 2nd Division and Flying
Column, to keep open their communications. In addition to these,
Fort Cambridge was built near where the road from Conference Hill
crosses the White Umvolosi; and a little later an entrenched post
(Fort George) was thrown up near Enhlongana mission station, thus
thoroughly, by these detached posts, commanding the country.
Patrols were pushed out in various directions, by one of which
the two guns lost at Isandhlwana were found between Ulundi and
Maizekanye. They had not been spiked, but the Zulus had screwed
rifle-nipples into the vents, and had also apparently tried to load
the guns by ramming home shells, but without cartridges.
The Cavalry Brigade was broken up, and a fresh disposition of the
troops made. Sir Garnet visited various posts, interviewing the Zulu
chiefs who had surrendered themselves. Some of the most important,
however, of those who came in, and were supposed to have submitted
and deserted their king, had, in point of fact, no such intention,
appearing merely to make their often and vainly repeated attempt at
procuring “terms” for Cetshwayo and themselves. It had always been
prophesied that the Zulu nation would desert their king. Before the
war began, some of those who professed to understand the people best,
declared that they would be thankful to throw off the yoke of one
whom, it was alleged, they regarded with fear and hatred, and would
side with the English as soon as the latter crossed their border.
The fallacy of this idea was discovered to our cost.
It was then asserted that the Zulu army had given a temporary
strength to the authority of their king, which would last until we
had beaten his troops and proved our superiority, and this assertion
was used by those who insisted that no peace must be made, however
earnestly desired by the Zulus, until we had beaten them and shown
them that we were their masters.
After Ulundi, it was argued that the people would be glad to procure
peace by giving up their king, whose unconditional submission, or
capture, was announced by us to be the only possible conclusion to
the war.
The Zulus had ceased to struggle with their powerful conquerors, and
it now only remained to find Cetshwayo, who was said to be north
of the Black Umvolosi River, with a very small following. A flying
column, under Lieut.-Colonel Baker Russell, was sent out from Fort
Newdigate early in August, but his patrols were not successful.
On August 14th, a cavalry force under Major Barrow, with Lord
Gifford, started from Ulundi to try and find Cetshwayo, who had
hitherto eluded all attempts to capture him. Day after day it was
reported that the pursuers were close upon the fugitive: they had
come to a kraal where he had slept the previous night, they reached
another where he had been that very morning, and then they lost “the
scent,” and for some time could trace him no farther. They tried in
vain to persuade his people to betray him, but this “hated tyrant,”
although beaten and powerless, flying through the land now in the
possession of his conquerors, had still such a hold over the loyalty
and affection of his people, that they were true to him in his
adversity, and refused to give him up or to set his enemies on his
track.
Severe measures were taken to procure by force the information which
could not otherwise be obtained. Orders were given to one party of
the pursuers that at each kraal they reached, if the inhabitants
refused to speak, so many huts should be burnt, so many principal men
and women taken prisoners, and all cattle confiscated. Many kraals
were thus treated, and so many prisoners collected in this manner,
that the number to be taken at each kraal had to be reduced from
eight to four, then to two, and at last to one of each sex; thus
proving how steadfast were the people generally in their loyalty to
their king. On approaching some of these kraals, the headmen came out
and offered the passes or papers promising protection, given them
on surrendering their arms; but the unhappy people received another
lesson on the text, “When we give a promise we will perform it,”
and were told that their papers were worthless now; they must tell
where the king was, or suffer like the rest. One of the officers
concerned in carrying out these orders, exclaimed at the time with
natural indignation: “I don’t care what may be said of the necessity
of catching Cetshwayo; necessary or not, we are committing a crime in
what we are doing now!”
These measures proving useless, five prisoners were flogged to make
them speak—yet they held their peace. An interpreter, who accompanied
Major Barrow’s party, writes: “I had been a long time in Zululand. I
knew the people and their habits, and although I believed they would
be true to their king, I never expected such devotion. Nothing would
move them. Neither the loss of their cattle, the fear of death, or
the offering of large bribes, would make them false to their king.”
For many days this work of trying to persuade or force the people
to betray their king was continued, and, at last a woman was
frightened into giving a clue, which resulted in taking prisoners
three brothers, at whose kraal the king had slept the night before.
“They were questioned,” says the interpreter, “but denied in the most
solemn way that they knew anything about the king. We threatened to
shoot them, but they said: ‘If you kill us we shall die innocently.’
This was about nine o’clock at night, a beautiful moonlight night,
and the picture was rather an effective one. There were all our men
sitting round at their fireplaces, our select tribunal facing the
three men, who were calm and collected, whilst we, as a sort of
inquisition, were trying to force them to divulge their secret. As
a last resource we took one man and led him away blindfolded behind
a bush, and then a rifle was fired off to make believe that he was
shot. We then separated and blindfolded the remaining two, and said
to one of them: ‘You saw your brother blindfolded and led away;
we have shot him. Now we shall shoot you. You had better tell the
truth.’ After a good deal of coaxing (?) one told us where the king
had slept the night before, and which was about fifteen miles away,
and also where he had seen him that very morning ... it was now
eleven o’clock. Lord Gifford gave orders for our party to saddle up,
which was smartly done, and we started off with the two brothers as
guides. We left the one brother behind so as to keep on the screw, to
make the two believe he had been shot. They took us over as ugly a
piece of country as ever horse crossed, and at daybreak we surrounded
the kraal. But disappointment was again in store for us, for our bird
had flown about twelve hours previously.”
The direction he had taken being pointed out, the party followed
until they got within four or five miles of a kraal, where the king
had halted for the day. Lord Gifford sent off a note addressed to
Captain Maurice, saying he was on the track and hoped for speedy
capture; and, finding the kraal could not be approached without his
being seen, seems to have made up his mind to wait till nightfall. It
is perhaps fortunate that this arrangement was not carried out, as,
in the darkness and hurry of a night attack, it is possible that we
might have had the additional wrong laid upon us of having shot the
Zulu king.
Amongst other patrols sent out to look for Cetshwayo was one under
Major Marter, King’s Dragoon Guards, consisting of one squadron
Dragoons, ten men Mounted Infantry and Lonsdale’s Horse, and one
company Natal Native Contingent, their orders being to get on the
king’s track and capture him, if possible, and to reconnoitre the
Ngome Forest, and report if it could be traversed.
This force started on the 27th August, Major Marter sending two
natives on in the direction of the Ngome to impress upon the people
that until the king was captured they could not have rest, as troops
would be constantly on the move amongst them, and require supplies,
etc., and to suggest it would be to their advantage to give him some
hint or sign about the king. He had found the natives friendly,
but they said frankly that if they knew the king to be close by
they would not tell him; he, therefore, remembering the language of
symbols was pleasant to the native mind, endeavoured, by indirect
means, to obtain the information he sought. Having got over about
twenty-four miles of rough country, the little column halted on
the summit of the Inenge Mountain, and, starting at daylight next
morning, had crossed the Ibuluwane River about ten o’clock, when
a Zulu came from the hill in front, sent by a headman to whom
the scouts had been, and began to talk on indifferent subjects,
not appearing to wish to speak about the king. After some time
he casually remarked: “I have heard the wind blow from this side
to-day,” pointing to the Ngome Forest, “but you should take that road
until you come to Nisaka’s kraal,” showing a track leading upwards
and along the side of the range.
About half an hour afterwards a native brought a note addressed to
Captain Maurice. As this officer was out in another direction on
the same service, Major Marter opened and read it. It was from Lord
Gifford, who said he was on the track again and hoped for a speedy
capture of the king, but gave no information as to where either the
king or Lord Gifford were. Sending the man on in Captain Maurice’s
direction, Major Marter proceeded to Nisaka’s kraal, some distance
up the mountain. After some talk a suggestion of guides was made to
Nisaka, who said they had better go to his brother’s kraal on top of
the mountain, and called two men to go as guides. On reaching this
kraal the guides made signs for the party to halt where trees hid
them from being seen from below, and then took Major Marter on to the
edge of the precipice, crawling along on hands and knees; they then
stopped, and told him to go to a bush a little farther on and look
down. He did so, and saw a kraal in an open space about 2000 feet
below, in a basin, three sides of which were precipitous and covered
with dense forest. He considered it would be useless to approach the
kraal from the open side, as one minute’s warning would enable the
king to escape to the nearest point of the forest; and therefore
decided to venture down the side of the mountain under cover of the
forest, feeling that the importance of the capture would warrant the
risk.
Having rejoined his men, Major Marter ordered the natives to take off
their uniform, and, with their arms and ammunition only, pass down
the precipitous mountain to the lower edge of the forest nearest to
the kraal, and remain concealed till the cavalry were seen coming
from the forest on the other side; they were then to rush out towards
the open side of the kraal and surround it. The cavalry left led
horses, pack-animals, and every article which could make a noise
or impede their progress, and followed Major Marter, leading their
horses down the descent in single file. They left the upper part
of the mountain at 1.45 P.M., and, after a scramble over rocks and
watercourses, floundering in bogs, and hampered everywhere by trees
and gigantic creepers, reached the foot about three o’clock, having
lost two horses killed in the descent, and one man having his arm
badly hurt. In a little dell they mounted, and at a gallop dashed
out—one troop to the right, one to the left, the irregulars straight
to the front—over boulders, through high grass and every impediment,
up to the kraal; the natives reaching it at the same moment.
Seeing that the men in the kraal were armed with guns as well as
assegais, Major Marter desired his interpreter to call out that if
any resistance were offered he would shoot down every one and burn
the kraal; and then dismounting, with a few of his men, he entered
the enclosure, which was strongly stockaded. A chief—Umkosana—met
him, and was asked where the king was; after some delay, seeing it
was a hopeless case, he pointed out a hut on the farther side of
the enclosure. Major Marter called on the king to come out, but he
insisted the officer should go in to him. A threat of setting fire to
the hut was then made, when the king asked the rank of the officer,
and, after some further parley, came out and stood erect and quite
the king, looking at Major Marter, saying: “You would not have taken
me, but I never thought troops could come down the mountain through
the forest.”
Besides the Chief Umkosana, there were with Cetshwayo seven men and a
lad, five women and a girl, of his personal attendants.
There were twenty guns in the kraal, four of them rifles that had
belonged to the 24th Regiment, much ammunition, some belts of the
24th, and many assegais, one of which—the king’s—was sent by Sir
Garnet Wolseley to the Queen.
Taking the most open line of country, the party set out for Ulundi,
Major Marter taking personal charge of the king, who was in good
health, and showing no signs of over-fatigue.
On the evening of the second day three men and a woman sprang
suddenly into the thick bush through which they were passing and
tried to escape; but two of the men were shot. They had been
repeatedly warned that anyone trying to escape would be shot.
On the morning of the 31st August, Major Marter safely reached the
camp at Ulundi with Cetshwayo; who is described by his captor as “a
noble specimen of a man, without any bad expression, and the king all
over in appearance and manner.”
Sir Garnet Wolseley did not receive the fallen king himself, or
accord him any of the signs of respect to which he was entitled, and
which at least generosity demanded. That this was deeply felt is
apparent from the words of an eye-witness, the interpreter attached
to Major Barrow’s force. “Cetywayo,” he says, “who appreciates nicely
the courtesies due to rank—as those who knew him tell me—felt this
keenly. Sir Garnet Wolseley did not see him at all, and Mr. John
Shepstone only had an interview with him to tell him that he would
leave under the charge of Major Poole, R.A., for—no one knew where.
The instructions to the Major were, on leaving Ulundi, to proceed to
Pietermaritzburg _viâ_ Rorke’s Drift, but the camp had not been left
many miles behind before a messenger to the Major from the General
gave Port Durnford as the port of embarkation.
“Cetshwayo spent less than three hours amidst the ruins of Ulundi,
and when he left them he was not aware of his destination. His hope
was that he was going to Pietermaritzburg.... This he believed was
where he was going until he came to Kwamagwasa, and he said, ‘This
is not the way to the Tugela.’ He grew moody after this, and used to
moan, ‘It was better to be killed than sent over the sea.’”
The party reached Port Durnford on the 4th September, and was
immediately embarked for Cape Town. There the king met with a fitting
reception, and was conveyed to the castle, where he remained under
strict surveillance in the custody of Colonel Hassard, C.B., R.E.,
Commandant at Cape Town.
One peculiarity regarding the treatment of Cetshwayo may be
illustrated by the following personal anecdote:
A son and daughter of the Bishop of Natal, on their way to England,
called at Cape Town on board a steamer at the time of the king’s
arrival. They asked permission to see him, feeling that if anything
could be a solace to the captive it would be an interview with
members of a family which he knew had kindly feelings towards
him.[178] This request was refused by Sir Bertie Frere, who regretted
that he could not “at present give anyone permission to visit
Cetewayo,” and said that “all intercourse with him must be regulated
by the orders of the General Commanding H. M. Forces in the Field,
to whom all applications to communicate with the prisoner should be
referred.” After this communication, it was rather surprising to find
that several of the passengers on board the mail-steamer, leaving
the Cape the next day, had not only seen the king, but had found no
difficulty in so doing.[179]
CONCLUSION.
The fall of Ulundi was looked upon by some as the finishing touch
to the Zulu power and the end of the war, while others considered
peace ensured only and completely by the capture of the king. Much,
however, remained to be done before Natal could be thought of as at
peace with her neighbours and herself, and what has been commonly
called the “Settlement of Zululand,” was a task which required the
gravest consideration and the most careful handling.
Sir Garnet Wolseley’s first act in this direction was to call
together as many of the principal Zulu chiefs and officials as could
be found, and to address them upon the situation. This meeting took
place at Ulundi on the 1st of September, the day after the captive
king’s departure for Port Durnford. About 200 Zulus, including two of
Cetshwayo’s brothers, and his prime minister Mnyamana, had responded
to the summons; and seating themselves in rows four deep, with the
principal chiefs in front, a few paces from the flagstaff at Sir G.
Wolseley’s tent, waited in perfect silence. When Sir Garnet, with his
staff, at last appeared, he addressed the assembled chiefs through
Mr. John Shepstone, who accompanied him as interpreter. He informed
them that it was six years that very day since Cetshwayo was crowned
king of the Zulus, and that he was now carried away never to return.
This, he told them, was in consequence of his having broken his
coronation promises, and having failed to make and keep such laws
amongst his people as the Queen of England could approve, therefore
his kingdom was taken from him; and would now be divided amongst a
number of chiefs, who would be expected to rule with justice. In
future no life was to be taken without trial, and trivial offences
were to be punished by fines; no standing army would be allowed, nor
the possession of guns and ammunition by any Zulu; nor would any
stores be permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under
the guise of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country.
The young men would be allowed to marry when and whom they pleased,
provided they had sufficient for the support of a wife, and could
obtain the consent of the girl’s parents, and “smelling out” for
witchcraft was to be put down. Nevertheless, the Queen had no wish to
force our laws and customs upon them. By their own rules of war and
conquest, Zululand now belonged to her; but she had already enough
land in Africa, and had therefore no intention of depriving the Zulus
of theirs. Finally, the missionaries were not to be forced upon them,
and the Zulus were even forbidden to encourage their settling amongst
them.
To secure the fulfilment of all these commands, Sir G. Wolseley told
the chiefs that he intended to leave an English officer as resident,
to be the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, and
to see the laws observed and that the chiefs ruled with justice and
equity. With what machinery the officer in question was to perform
so wide a task does not appear. Whether his position is to be a real
one, requiring several British regiments to support it, or whether it
is to be a mere farce, a fine-sounding pretence, remains yet to be
proved.
At the conclusion of the General’s discourse he produced a document,
the purport of which, he said, he had now told them, and which was to
be signed by all the chiefs whom he had chosen as rulers of the land,
to each of whom a duplicate copy would be given, while he retained a
similar one himself.
The first to sign his name was Mr. John Dunn, whose chieftainship
was by far the largest; and after him the Zulu chiefs touched the
pen while Mr. Shepstone made their crosses for them, in place of the
signature which they could not form.
For once in the history of Natal, all classes, from whatever widely
differing motives, were united in condemning the arrangement.
“The so-called settlement of Zululand,” says _The Cape Times_, on
September 16th, “is regarded with anything but satisfaction in Natal,
if we may accept the press of that colony as representative of public
opinion. Sir Garnet Wolseley was probably acting under instructions
in making peace on a barbarian basis; such a peace, however, has no
guarantee for continuance, but on the contrary an inherent weakness,
forbidding any hope of permanence. A savage nation is now divided
into a number of savage nations, each leaning to the other with all
the force of common blood and common traditions, while to check
the impulses of that force there is absolutely nothing beyond the
influence of two or three British residents, unsupported by any armed
retinue, and clothed with no more than a shadow of authority. And
as the embodiment of British civilisation, and as Her Majesty the
Queen’s own representative in Zululand, is placed Mr. John Dunn....
But whatever John Dunn’s merits may be, his appointment as Chief
Resident in Zululand is a shock to civilisation. His ways are Zulu
ways; his associations, Zulu associations; his very habits of thought
imbued with the Zulu character. A white man who for twenty years or
more has lived the Zulu life, wedded Zulu wives, and chosen their
society in preference to that of such women as a white man should
love and honour, is not the man to represent the Queen of England
in a nation of savages. The settlement of Zululand means simply
the appointment of a dozen Cetywayos, with a white man to look
after them, who is a Cetywayo in all but colour. And now Sir Garnet
Wolseley skips off in his light and airy fashion to the Transvaal,
flattering himself that he has made things pleasant in Zululand. It
is a miserable delusion....”
The “engagements” into which the Zulu chiefs entered are:
“1. I will observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned
to my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the
division in which my territory is situated.
“2. I will not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or
the existence of any military system of organisation whatever, in my
territory, and I will proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall
be allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according
to the good ancient customs of my people, known and followed in the
days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the system known as the
military system; and I will allow and encourage all men living within
my territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work
in Natal and the Transvaal and elsewhere for themselves or for hire.
“3. I will not import or allow to be imported into my territory by
any person, upon any pretext or for any object whatever, any arms
or ammunition from any part whatsoever, or any goods or merchandise
by the sea-coast of Zululand, without the express sanction of the
Resident of the division in which my territory is situated; and I
will not encourage or promote, or take part in, or countenance in any
way whatever, the importation in any other part of Zululand of arms
or ammunition from any part whatever, or goods or merchandise by the
sea-coast of Zululand, without such sanction, and I will confiscate
and hand over to the Natal Government all arms and ammunition, and
goods and merchandise, so imported into my territory, and I will
punish by fine or by other sufficient punishment any person guilty
of or concerned in any such unsanctioned importation, and any person
found possessing arms or ammunition, or goods or merchandise,
knowingly obtained thereby.
“4. I will not allow the life of any of my people to be taken for
any cause, except after sentence passed in a council of the chief men
of my territory, and after fair and impartial trial in my presence
and after the hearing of witnesses; and I will not tolerate the
employment of witch-doctors, or the practice known as smelling-out,
or any practices of witchcraft.
“5. The surrender of persons fugitive in my territory from justice,
when demanded by the government of any British colony, territory, or
province, in the interests of justice, shall be readily and promptly
made to such government; and the escape into my territory of persons
accused or convicted of offences against British laws shall be
prevented by all possible means, and every exertion shall be made to
seize and deliver up such persons to British authority.
“6. I will not make war upon any chief or chiefs, or people, without
the sanction of the British Government, through the Resident of the
division in which my territory is situated.
“7. The succession to the chieftainship of my territory shall be
according to the ancient laws and customs of my people, and the
nomination of each successor shall be subject to the approval of the
British Government.
“8. I will not sell, or in any way alienate, or permit, or
countenance any sale or alienation of any part of the land in my
territory.
“9. I will permit all people residing in my territory to there
remain, upon the condition that they recognise my authority as chief,
and any persons not wishing to recognise my authority and desiring
to quit my territory I will permit to quit and to pass unmolested
elsewhere.
“10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are involved
I will appeal to and abide by the decision of the British Resident
of the division in which my territory is situated. In all cases when
accusations of offence or crime committed in my territory are brought
against British subjects, or against my people in relation to British
subjects, I will hold no trial and pass no sentence except with the
approval of such British Resident.
“11. In all matters not included within these terms, conditions, and
limitations, and in all cases provided for herein, and in all cases
when there may be doubt or uncertainty as to the laws, rules, or
stipulations applicable to matters to be dealt with, I will govern,
order, or decide in accordance with the ancient laws and usage of my
people.”
The following letter, addressed to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone,
and published in _The Guardian_ of December 10th, 1879, by the Dean
of ’Maritzburg, contains such valuable and important matter that we
quote it verbatim:
THE DEANERY, ’MARITZBURG, NATAL,
_September 27th, 1879_.
SIR,—Though I have not the honour of being known to you, yet,
as the affairs of South Africa must necessarily engage the
attention of Parliament when it next meets, I venture to hope
you will not consider it an intrusion if I lay before you
some of the conclusions I have arrived at after thirty years’
residence as a clergyman in Natal. I do so as I know from
experience how extremely difficult it is for those who have
passed their lives in the midst of a highly organised society,
to realise the conditions of a colony, and especially of one
which is brought into contact with the undeveloped races of South
Africa. The first question that presents itself is, What is
the meaning of the apparent antagonism of the native races, at
the present time, to the white man? I attribute it immediately
to the natives suddenly and unexpectedly finding themselves in
the possession of firearms. When the Diamond Fields were first
opened out, no restrictions were placed on the gun-trade by the
Cape Government, and so soon as this became known the natives
flocked there in thousands from all parts of South Africa,
hiring themselves out to work, and stipulating to be paid in
rifles. Young men everywhere will arm themselves if they can,
and especially in a country in which there is abundant room for
hunting, and still more so when the young men are savages, and
know of no distinction except that which comes from exhibiting
prowess in war. I do not myself think they were influenced by
any feelings of hatred to the white man, or that there existed
any deep-seated conspiracy amongst the chiefs or old men. But
the young men suddenly discovered they could obtain firearms, so
got them; and having got them, they then desired to use them.
Everywhere they were armed, and so everywhere they began to
talk of fighting; the leaven had been put in and the whole lump
worked. The war which arose is now over, and the Cape Government
is engaged in steadily disarming the natives under its rule;
its loyal subjects, the Fingoes and the Basutos, as well as the
recently conquered tribes. Sir Garnet Wolseley told the Zulus
also to bring in their guns; but they have treated his order with
contempt, and he has made no attempt to enforce it; the Zulus
themselves, I am afraid, will soon adduce this as evidence that
they were not beaten. I may say, also, the Natal Governor always
placed restrictions on the natives possessing firearms, and, so
far as he could, enforced those restrictions on his own natives
returning from the Diamond Fields, and they have proved perfectly
loyal. Whilst at the time I deprecated the reckless trade allowed
by the Cape Government, still it seems to me rather hard, after
having allowed the natives to purchase guns, to set to work to
disarm them. The wisest course I consider would be to impose a
tax on the possession of firearms generally, granting privileges
to members of volunteer corps, etc. In that way, without drawing
invidious distinctions between white and coloured, our own young
men would be exempted from paying by serving as volunteers; and
if the tax were a heavy one the natives would be deterred from
keeping guns, and, further, the Government would know exactly to
what extent they were armed.
To leave, however, the native races in general, and to confine
ourselves to the Zulus. They never went to war with us, but
we with them; they have always been excellent neighbours; for
thirty years they have never been accused of stealing a sheep,
or an ox, or a horse from the Natal side. Natal had no quarrel
with them nor Cetywayo with us; it has been our misfortune that
it has been found convenient to carry on the war from Natal;
but Sir H. Bulwer, our Governor, has been true to the colony
in insisting that it was no war of ours. If there was any
justification of the war, it must be sought in the interests of
Transvaal, and then it can only be accepted as a judgment. The
Crown had not a shadow of right to annex the Transvaal. True,
they were not governing themselves very well in that State;
neither, perhaps, is Germany, but we do not annex Germany. We
did take over the Transvaal, however, in direct violation of
engagements which had been entered into with the Dutch Boers.
Shepstone, in his proclamation, was obliged to say that we must
read between the lines of that engagement—_i.e._ the promises
of the British Government were worth nothing. The simple fact
was that the Cape and Transvaal merchants had been overtrading
in that republic; it was bankrupt, so many of them were on the
brink of insolvency. I cannot say more without mentioning names,
but there was no difficulty in seeing what influences were
brought to bear on Lord Carnarvon. The Republic was annexed;
farms were accepted at a nominal price in payment of debts, and
resold again in London, say at sixpence per acre, which amply
repaid the merchant, who thus saved himself, whilst the Boers
were left without their independence, and poorer than ever. Had
we stayed our hand, finding themselves hopelessly bankrupt, in
a few months they might probably have sought our assistance,
and then we could have annexed them without their having a
grievance; as it is they cannot forget it. I am sorry for them,
for they are a simple people. Shepstone went up as Governor, and
Cetywayo at once asked to have his old disputes with the Boers
arranged—in former days both he and his father, whenever they had
had any difference with the Transvaal, always sent messengers
in to the Natal Government to advise with it—and Shepstone,
the Secretary for Natal Affairs, according to his wont, always
temporised, admitting in a half-and-half way that they were
right, but advising patience. When, however, he found himself
at the Transvaal he suddenly sided with the Dutch, and Cetywayo
became greatly incensed and declared himself betrayed. I believe
he would at once have invaded the Transvaal, but from fear of us
in Natal. He hesitated, however, and according to the old maxim,
he who hesitates does not fight; but before he had quieted down
Sir B. Frere interfered with his _ultimatum_, and Cetywayo stood
grandly on the defensive. He is a savage, and his ambition was
to be a great savage; I do not mean a cruel one, but a powerful,
influential savage. He was ambitious, but disliked progress,
and such men must fail; so he has fallen, but with dignity. He
has never attacked a neighbour, white or black; he has defended
his country bravely, and has been guilty of no excesses. It has
been our war, not his. Sir B. Frere says most truly that almost
everyone he spoke to encouraged him to go to war; but I am afraid
he avoided those who, he was told, were against war—and when
will not Englishmen advise war? No argument was used, except
the one that Cetywayo might overrun Natal at any moment; but he
had never shown a disposition to do so, and we were stronger
than men would allow. Men who do not trust in the arm of God do
not see the defences which surround them. The Tugela, the river
which separates Natal from Zululand, was a great protection,
as in summer-time, even if fordable, the Zulus would not cross
it, lest it should rise in their rear; and in the winter, our
dry season, they cannot keep the field, as their naked bodies
are quite unable to bear exposure to the cold nights. Moreover,
though our own army will never acknowledge it, Cetywayo’s force
did not exceed 30,000 naked savages. Of course we are told they
were 60,000 or 80,000 strong; but if you casually inquire of any
officer who has been in Zululand whether the kraals were thickly
dotted over the country, he will tell you artlessly, “No, quite
the contrary.” I have again and again inquired of traders as to
the density of the population relative to Natal. I have inquired
of those who have lived at Ulundi, and have seen Cetywayo’s
regiments mustered, and I am confident that 30,000 is the very
outside at which the Zulu force could be put. I may return to
this. I mention it now to show why I do not agree with Sir Bartle
in his view of our position; and certainly I cannot admit,
because a neighbour is powerful, that therefore we are justified
in going to war with him.
But, now that we have been at war, on what terms is peace to
be arranged? In the Cape Colony the natives—as the Basutos,
the Fingoes, and others—live in districts to themselves, not
intermingled with the white man. The young men leave their homes,
and go into the colony, and work for a time in the towns or on
the farms; but their home is in Basutoland, Fingoland, etc. The
same holds good in the Transvaal. The natives there are on the
border; but Natal is the one exception to this rule; in this
colony we live intermingled; and a few years ago we were regarded
as living in the crater of a volcano. It was thought that the
Natal natives, who outnumber the European settlers eighteenfold,
might at any moment overwhelm us, so that Cape politicians and
others refused to be connected with this colony. In 1876,
however, before the rising of the natives on the frontier, I was
bold enough to point out to my fellow-colonists that our supposed
weakness was in reality our strength. And so it has proved.
During the last two years Natal has been the oasis of South
Africa; everywhere else the natives have either been in arms,
or shown themselves disaffected, if we except the Fingoes; but
the position in which they stand to the Kafir tribes around them
compels them to be loyal, so they are scarcely to be taken into
account.
Whilst, then, throughout South Africa the natives have been a
source of uneasiness, the overwhelming native population of
Natal (360,000, against 22,000 whites) has been perfectly true
to the Government, and the grounds of their loyalty are now, I
think, recognised in Natal. They are these: 1. The natives are
not, like Englishmen, self-reliant, but naturally dependent;
consequently, they use the machinery of Government much more
than we do. An Englishman dislikes appealing to a magistrate, as
it implies a want of power to take care of himself or to govern
his dependents. Not so the native; he habitually leans upon the
magistrate. Thirty years ago in Natal the native leant upon his
chief; now he has become familiar with the magistrate, who has
become a necessity to him. I argue, therefore, that a people will
not plot or even desire to throw off an authority which enters
into their daily life. 2. Natives who have resided amongst white
men feel the need of their presence. The native races cannot
develop themselves—nor, when in some degree developed, can they
stand by themselves—as their wills are weak, and intellectually
they are lawyers, fond of argument, but without imagination; so
they can neither plan nor construct. In their independent state
they have no criminal law, no commercial code, no municipal one,
no law of tenure of landed property; they possess only a few
customs regulating marriage and the division of their cattle
amongst the family; but, scattered amongst white men, they are
able to expand. The effect is seen in many ways—amongst others,
in the increase of their families. 3. They are naturally fond of
trading. In many ways they may be compared to the Celtic race, as
they cannot rise above the tribal organisation; but, unlike the
Celt, they are not intellectual; and, unlike him, their natural
bent is towards trading. They are good soldiers, but they prefer
trading to everything; consequently, on this account, they are
unwilling to separate from the white man. 4. The natives never
go to war unless they can first send their cattle to the rear;
but this they cannot do when distributed amongst the Europeans,
and this operates alone as a great check. During the thirty years
I have been in Natal we have only had three chiefs give the
slightest trouble, and these three have all been on the borders,
and so have been able to send their cattle away. I am convinced,
therefore, that, if the Government wishes to maintain peace and
to develop the native races, it should intermingle them with the
Europeans. The Aborigines Society at home will probably object.
It is easy to say the white man seeks only to dispossess the
native, but whatever the individual motive, the white man is the
benefactor by his presence. He may have hunted down the North
American Indian and the Aborigines of Australia, but not so in
South Africa. Here not only does the magistrate protect him,
but the Kafir is a worker, which the North American Indian and
the native of Australia is not. The white man wants the Kafir’s
labour, and to secure it has to be just and kind. A farm-servant
in England is by no means so independent as a Kafir out here. Mix
up the races therefore, and to some extent at least the problem
of governing and improving the native race is solved. After the
defeat at Isandhlwana, new-comers like the military thought our
natives might rise; but their wives, children, waggons, cattle,
etc., were in the colony, so they made common cause with us, and
showed themselves zealously loyal. I consider it, therefore,
to be most foolish to try and keep the races apart; we must
intermingle them. It was Alexander’s principle and the Roman
rule; the present European families have been founded on this
method—so we must go on mingling, not separating.
I send you a copy of Sir Garnet Wolseley’s conditions of peace,
as published in _The Natal Witness_. They are universally
condemned here. 1. The chiefs are to be under British Residents,
and they must be supported by a force. But who is to pay? It
is said the Zulus are not to be taxed, as that would amount to
annexation; or, rather, it would test Sir Garnet’s arrangements.
If he is afraid to tax the Zulus the Residents will be afraid
to control them. The test of defeat with Kafirs is the loss of
cattle—they do not estimate the loss of life; but we have not
taken cattle. Indeed, the balance is on their side: they have
carried off more than we have.[180] The test of submission is
obedience, and they have with one accord disobeyed the order to
give up their guns. The test of the Queen’s authority in South
Africa is the payment of taxes. Even Cetywayo offered to pay a
hut-tax; and if Sir Garnet does not impose one, all the young men
in Zululand, before a year is over, will point to their cattle,
their guns, and their immunity from taxes, and boast that they
were not beaten. If the Zulus are to be controlled by British
Residents they should pay a hut-tax. Our natives pay a hut-tax
of 14s. per hut. I have understood that the Cape Government wish
it to be uniform throughout South Africa, and to be fixed at £1.
We estimate the population at three-and-a-half persons to a hut,
and at 14s. it amounts to 4s. per head. Besides that the natives
on farms pay rent to the farmer, and the more they adopt our
habits the more do they pay through the Customs. The Zulus could
readily pay £1 per hut, or, say £36,000 per annum. Cetywayo’s
Government was an expensive one. His commissariat alone was a
heavy drain upon the resources of the people. Savages, as well
as civilised persons, understand that they must support their
Government; the Zulus, therefore, would recognise the justice
of being taxed; and not to tax them is, I consider, to abandon
one of the duties of Government. Moreover, it is said we are to
be taxed to pay our quota of the recent expenditure. But our
natives will hardly understand first fighting the Zulus, and then
having to pay for it. It will seem to them as if they were the
offending party, if they, and not the Zulus, are taxed. 2. The
conditions discourage trade. It ought to be encouraged to the
utmost. Instead of forbidding importation by sea, a Custom-house
should be established at the one port or landing-place, 3. The
alienation of land is forbidden, in order to keep out the white
man; but he should be encouraged to enter, and so long as the
land is held in common by the whole tribe there will be no
improvement in agriculture. Or, to take the conditions in order—2
is impossible; the young men will be quarrelling with one another
at weddings and other gatherings, tribal fights will ensue, and
the chiefs must have a force at their command. 3 I have touched
upon. 4 is nugatory; if a chief wishes to put to death he can
give a man a mock trial and have done with it. 6 overlooks that
wars often do not begin with the chiefs; the young men bring
them about. 8 I have touched upon. The whole implies the active
and constant superintendence of the Resident, and that will be
resisted: some kraal or kraals will be disobedient to orders,
the chief will be unable or unwilling to enforce obedience, and
the Resident must call in other assistance at great expense; and
at whose? There is nothing enduring, nothing practical in this
settlement, if it deserves to be called such. It is not likely
to last, and everyone expects, after a short interval, more
bloodshed and more reckless expenditure. The burden cannot be
thrown on the Colony, as the Government has not been consulted on
the terms of peace. The whole thing is a cruelty to the Zulus,
to the colonists, and to the suffering home population, for
there will be another £3,000,000 or more to be voted yet; but
during the whole time meat was 8d. and bread 4d. per pound. 1s.
6d. per diem was consequently ample allowance for the keep of a
soldier; of course I am aware there were numerous other sources
of expenditure, but it is extreme folly to send an army out to
a distant place, with power to draw upon the Treasury at will;
it is too great a trial for human nature. As a blind, all sorts
of things are said about the colonists; a great deal or even all
may be true, but it does not explain half. That, however, is by
the way; but I must mention, before concluding, that one of the
newly-appointed chiefs is a white man named John Dunn. He left
home when about fifteen or sixteen, and has since lived with the
Zulus, taking to himself a number of wives. This appointment is
looked upon as an outrage to public morals and as an insult to
the colonists. I say nothing about the missionaries, as I do
not wish that they should lean upon the civil power; the Church
must do her proper work in her proper way. I simply write as an
Englishman, to one who largely guides the counsels of the nation,
to lift up my voice against what has been done, and is being
done, in this part of the empire. Trusting you will excuse my
thus trespassing upon your time, believe me to remain yours most
respectfully,
JAMES GREEN,
_Dean of ’Maritzburg_.
But at all events we had gained one definite result by all the blood
and money spent in the Zulu war. The most important and earnestly
insisted on immediate cause of our attack upon Zululand was the
invasion of our soil, and the violation of our sanctuary, committed
by Mehlokazulu and his brother, sons of Sihayo, when they seized and
carried off two women who had taken refuge in Natal. We “requested”
the Zulu king to deliver up the young men to us for judgment and for
punishment, and he begged us to accept a fine in lieu of the persons
of the offenders. We declined this proposal and repeated our request,
which suddenly became a “demand” when it appeared in the ultimatum,
and as such remained.
It was said at the time that, had the young men been given up even
after the troops had crossed the border, hostilities would have been
suspended until the rest of the demands could be complied with. But
they were not, so we went to war.
And now, at last, the war was over, one of Sihayo’s sons had fallen
in battle, and Mehlokazulu, the other, was in our hands. Here was
what we had fought for, and obtained! What would be done with him?
By the military authorities he could only be treated like any
other prisoner of war, and released unharmed amongst the other
Zulus. He was therefore handed over to the civil authorities at
Pietermaritzburg to be tried by them, although he was denied the
same advantages of counsel which are accorded by law to other civil
prisoners.
This denial was commented upon unfavourably by those who desired
justice to be done, but, apparently, Mehlokazulu required no counsel,
for he was not tried. He had committed no offence on British soil
punishable in a Zulu subject by British law. His own king could have
punished him by our request, but we had deposed and transported
that king, and there was no law by which we could have inflicted
anything beyond a trifling fine for trespass upon the man whom we had
compassed heaven and earth, and shed so much of England’s noblest
blood, to seize. The magistrate declined to commit him for trial,
and Mehlokazulu was permitted to return to his home. “Doubtless,”
remarks _The Natal Colonist_ of October 27th, “the legal adviser of
the Crown was concerned in the case, and framed the charge which
there was the best chance of being substantiated. And this is the
result—‘there was no evidence to maintain the charge.’... It is a
miserable conclusion to a most miserable affair.... The charge which,
as we have seen, is almost made the chief occasion of the war which
has desolated so many homes, and cost millions of money, completely
breaks down when brought to the test of legal trial, and the prisoner
is, of necessity, set at liberty. We never believed much in the
other pretexts for the war put forward by Sir Bartle Frere, but we
confess that we always thought the outrage by Sihayo’s sons was one
to be visited with condign punishment, whether it was one which would
justify war or not; and even though we knew it was only a pretext,
seeing that it only took place long after war had been determined on,
and preparations for it had been begun to be made.”
“But the ultimatum and its demands are things of the past. Rivers of
blood have flowed to enforce these demands, and now they are put on
one side as utterly valueless, both by the settlement of Zululand and
the release of Sirayo’s son.”[181]
With this humiliating fact we must close our record of the Zulu War.
In doing so, we feel that too many of the circumstances which we have
thus recorded reflect no credit on the name of England—that name
which as English men and women we most desire should be honoured by
the world at large; and we realise with pain that, so far as our work
may be perused by dwellers upon other shores, so far have we lessened
the glory of our motherland in their eyes. But, however much we may
regret the necessity, we do not therefore think it a less imperative
duty to bring to the light as much as possible whatever wrong and
injustice has been committed and concealed by those to whom England
has entrusted her power and her fame. That the light of publicity
should be thrown upon them is the first step towards their cure,
or at least towards the prevention of any further wrong, and it is
with the truest loyalty to our Sovereign, and the deepest love and
reverence for our country, that we have undertaken the task now
completed.
THE END.
CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] “Few things struck me more than the evident haste and temporary
character of the defensive measures undertaken by the English part of
the population”—in the border districts of Natal. (See letter from
Sir Bartle Frere to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, dated March 28th, 1879.
P. P. [C. 2318] p. 32.)
[2] Spelt thus to give the nearest proper pronunciation of “Cetywayo.”
[3] Residence of the Bishop of Natal.
[4] These people had refused to leave their homes, or desert their
Bishop, as long as he and his family remained at Bishopstowe,
although both black and white, for miles around, had sought shelter
elsewhere.
[5] A system not unlike the Inquisition in its evil results.
[6] Who, it may be remarked, have always been well treated in
Zululand.
[7] Portions of this letter are omitted from the Blue-book. It would
be interesting to see the letter as originally received.
[8] One put to death in 1861 was condemned on a charge of high
treason.
[9] As he had previously, in the year 1861, visited Zululand for the
purpose of fixing the succession upon the house of Cetshwayo.
[10] Since by our desire he refrained from protecting it by force of
arms.
[11] He gives as reasons for his objections: first, that such
treaties “involve an admission of equality between the contracting
parties,” and therefore “encourage presumption” on the part of the
inferior, etc.; secondly, that “men who cannot read are apt to forget
or distort the words of a treaty.” A third reason, which does not
seem to have occurred to Mr. Shepstone, lies in the ease with which
a savage may be deceived as to the contents of a written document,
which facility we shall soon largely illustrate in the matter of Boer
treaties with the natives.
[12] See Lecky’s “Rationalism in Europe”:—7000 at Trèves; 600 by a
single Bishop of Bamberg; 800 in _one_ year, in the bishopric of
Wurtzburg; 1000 in the province of Como; 400 at _once_, at Toulouse;
500 in three months, at Geneva; 48 at Constance; 80 at the little
town of Valary in Saxony; 70 in Sweden; and one _Christian_ judge
boasted that he himself had been the means of putting to death, in
sixteen years, 800 witches!
In Scotland, two centuries ago, but after many centuries of
Christianity and civilisation, John Brown, the Ayrshire carrier, was
shot, and, within a fortnight, an aged widow and a young maid were
tied to stakes in the Solway and drowned by the rising tide, for the
crime of neglecting episcopal worship, and going aside into the moor
to spend the Sabbath day in prayer and praise.
[13] P. P. [C. 1401] p. 30.
[14] Natives of Basutoland, resident for many years in Natal.
[15] See Field Force Order, 1873.
[16] In the Zulu language the word _abantwana_ (children) is a
general one, including both women and children.
[17] It is only fair to Major Durnford to state that during the whole
of these proceedings he was away over the mountains, in vain pursuit
of an enemy to be fought.
[18] 1. The following account of the above transaction was given by
one of those concerned, in a letter to _The Natal Times_ of that
date: “Twenty of us volunteered yesterday to go up and into a cave
about eight miles from here. We found only one native, whom we shot,
took a lot of goats (eighty-seven), and any amount of assegais and
other weapons. We also searched about the country and killed a few
niggers, taking fourteen prisoners. One fellow in a cave loaded his
rifle with stones, and slightly wounded Wheelwright and Lieutenant
Clarke, R.A. We, however, got him out, and Moodie shot him through
the brains. Fifteen of ours have just volunteered to go to a cave
supposed to contain niggers. We are gradually wiping out the three
poor fellows who were shot, and all our men are determined to have
some more.”
2. _The Natal Government Gazette_, December 9th, 1873, contains the
following enactment: “All officers and other persons who have acted
under the authority of Sir Benjamin Chillay Campbell Pine, K.C.M.G.,
as Lieut.-Governor of the colony of Natal, or as Supreme Chief over
the native population, or have acted _bonâ fide_ for the purposes
and during the time aforesaid, whether such acts were done in any
district, county, or division of the colony in which martial law was
proclaimed or not, are hereby indemnified in respect of all acts,
matters, and things done, in order to suppress the rebellion and
prevent the spread thereof; and such acts so done are hereby made and
declared to be lawful, and are confirmed.”
[19] It is hard to understand why these people should yet be detained
and their harmless old chief still kept prisoner at Capetown. The
common saying that they are all content and the chief better off than
he ever was before in his life, is an entirely and cruelly false one.
Langalibalele is wearying for his freedom and his own people; the few
women with him are tired of their loneliness, and longing to be with
their children in Natal. The present writer paid the chief a visit in
September of this year (1879), and found him very sad. “I am weary;
when will they let me go?” was his continual question.
[20] Not including those individual acts of cruelty which no one
could defend, although many speak of them as unavoidable.
[21] The Lieut.-Governor of the colony.
[22] Kafir law, under which Langalibalele was tried, because most
of the offences with which he was charged were not recognisable by
English law.
[23] Ordinance No. 3, 1849.
[24] The italics are the Author’s own in this and following charge.
[25] The other rebel chiefs of the Cape Colony here alluded to,
however, were not “banished,” but merely imprisoned in a portion of
their own Supreme Chiefs territory, where, at proper times, they
could be visited by members of their families and tribes; moreover,
they were duly tried and convicted before the ordinary courts of
serious crimes committed by themselves individually, and they had
actually resisted by force their Supreme Chief within his territory;
whereas Langalibalele had made no resistance—he was a runaway, but
no rebel; he had not been tried and condemned for any crime in the
Colonial Court, and banishment for life to Robben Island, away from
all his people, was a fate worse than death in his and their eyes.
[26] The same Magema, the Bishop’s printer, before mentioned.
[27] Although Mawiza’s lies were plainly exposed, he was never
punished, but remains to this day in charge of a large tribe, over
which he has been placed by the Government.
[28] On June 24th, 1874, the Bishop presented this “Appeal on behalf
of Langalibalele” to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal
and the executive committee of the Colony. The appeal was made in
the first instance to Sir B. C. C. Pine, who altogether refused to
listen to it. On this the Bishop forwarded a letter through the
Lieut.-Governor to the Earl of Carnarvon, enclosing a copy of his
correspondence with Sir B. C. C. Pine, and stating his reasons for
acting as he had done in the matter. This letter was dated August
6th, 1874, and on August 16th the Bishop left home _en route_ to
England.
[29] He was a bright intelligent lad, keenly anxious for
self-improvement, and with a great desire, unusual amongst his kind,
to go to England, and see a civilised country.
[30] The Zulus and Zulu-Kafirs bathe their persons frequently, but
they have not our ideas of cleanliness in respect to dress and
habitations, although they are very particular about their food,
utensils, and other matters.
[31] This was done at the expense of Government, which likewise
allowed certain supplies of meal, salt, and a little meat to the
captives.
[32] The boy was one of those who in the meanwhile had learnt at
Bishopstowe to read and write, and who therefore could be of some
use to his father as scribe, although his usefulness in that respect
is much curtailed by the exceeding caution of the Government, which
in its absurd and causeless fear of “treasonable correspondence,”
will not allow written words of any description to reach or leave
the poor old chief without official inspection. This precaution
goes so far that in one instance some mats made by the women for
Miss Colenso, and sent from Uitvlugt (the place of Langalibalele’s
confinement after he was removed from the island), never reached
their destination, owing to the paper attached, signifying for whom
they were intended, being removed, as coming under the head of
prohibited liberties. Another case is that of a lady who visited the
family in September, 1879, and asked them to tell her what trifles
they would like her to send them from Cape Town, but found that she
had no power to send some babies’ socks which the women had chosen,
and a comforter for the old man’s neck, except through an official
individual and by formal permission.
[33] A woman, wife of one of the fugitives, being taken prisoner
during the expedition, found favour, much against her will, in the
eyes of one Adam (a follower of the Secretary for Native Affairs),
who asked to be allowed to take her as his wife. Permission was
granted, but the woman refused, saying that she had a husband
already, to whom she was attached. Her wishes were disregarded, and
she was conveyed home by Adam, from whom she shortly escaped. Adam
applied to the nearest magistrate for an order to take forcible
possession of the fugitive, and the woman was thrown into gaol by
the magistrate, until she should consent to be Adam’s wife. The man
took her home a second time, and she again escaped from him; in fact
her determination was so great that the matter was finally given up
altogether. Eventually she rejoined her own husband, who received her
and her child with the kindness which her constancy deserved.
[34] Reaching home early in October, 1874.
[35] Acts of “defiance” and “resistance,” too vague for any special
instance to be given, probably striking his lordship as being of a
slightly imaginary character.
[36] Implying plainly that strict justice would demand it.
[37] Author’s italics.
[38] No notice was ever taken of the recommendation.
[39] It is reported that Sir B. Pine has felt the injustice to
himself so keenly that he refuses longer to acknowledge his title of
K.C.M.G., and styles himself simply Mr. Pine. There can be little
doubt that in point of fact Mr. Shepstone was mainly responsible for
all that happened; but “the right man to annex the Transvaal” could
not well be spared, and a scapegoat was found for him in Sir Benjamin
Pine.
[40] Three at last.
[41] It would be an injustice to an association, called into
existence and maintained by a true spirit of Christian charity, to
pass over in silence the active, if seemingly ineffectual, efforts
of the Aborigines Protection Society to obtain justice for the
unfortunate people of the Putini tribe.
[42] The annexation of the Transvaal:—so stated by one of his own
staff.
[43] It is neither customary nor convenient to speak publicly of a
parent, and I desire to let facts speak for themselves as much as
possible. I feel, however, bound to remark that of all the mistakes
made by a succession of rulers in Natal, perhaps the most foolish
and unnecessary has been that jealousy of episcopal “or unofficial”
interference, which has blinded them to the fact that the Bishop has
always been ready to give any assistance in his power to the local
Government in carrying out all just and expedient measures towards
the natives, without claiming any credit or taking any apparently
prominent position beyond his own; and, so long as justice is done,
would greatly prefer its being done by those in office. He has never
interfered, except when his duty as a man, and as the servant of a
just and merciful Master, has made it imperatively necessary that he
should do so; nor does he covet any political power or influence. To
a government which intends to carry out a certain line of policy in
defiance of justice and honour, he would ever be an opponent; but
one which honestly aims at the truth would assuredly meet with his
earnest support.
[44] “The recollection of past events”—that is to say, of the
slaughter of many men, women, and children, the destruction of homes,
and the sufferings of the living;—this can hardly with reason be said
to be _kept alive_ by attempts to ameliorate the condition of those
that remained, and to show them some small kindness and pity. How
“a good feeling” was to be restored between the victims and their
conquerors by other means, Sir Garnet does not suggest.
[45] In common only with the rest of the tribe.
[46] Three women and two children only have been allowed to join him.
[47] Which did not prevent their being of the utmost importance
in considering the case of the chief under trial at the time the
statements were made.
[48] Sir B. Pine complains in his despatch, December 31st, 1874, of
the “intolerable injustice” of charges being made against Mr. J.
Shepstone, upon evidence taken by the Bishop _ex parte_, without
the _safety of publicity_ and the opportunity of cross-examination.
Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley refused to allow publicity or searching
cross-examination by experienced advocates.
[49] One of the original four.
[50] Mr. Shepstone says in his second report that a day or two
previous to the meeting with Matshana, he had received information to
the effect that the chief’s intentions were to put him and his people
to death at the expected interview, and all the efforts made by Mr.
Shepstone and his witnesses were to prove, first, the murderous
intentions of Matshana; and, secondly, that _nevertheless_ Mr.
Shepstone had no counter-plans for violence, and did not fire upon
the people.
[51] Author’s italics.
[52] Rather by the determination of their rulers to preserve their
land from Boer encroachments.
[53] SAND RIVER TREATY.—“Evidence was adduced that the Transvaal
Boers, who, by the Sand River Convention, and in consideration of
the independence which that convention assured to them, had solemnly
pledged themselves to this country (England) not to reintroduce
slavery into their Republic, had been in the habit of capturing,
buying, selling, and holding in forced servitude, African children,
called by the cant name of ‘black ivory,’ murdering the fathers,
and driving off the mothers; that this slave trade was carried on
with the sanction of the subordinate Transvaal authorities, and that
the President did actually imprison and threaten to ruin by State
prosecution a fellow-countryman who brought it to the notice of
the English authority—an authority which, if it had not the power
to prevent, had at any rate a treaty right to denounce it. This
and more was done, sometimes in a barbarous way, under an assumed
divine authority to exterminate those who resisted them. So much was
established by Dutch and German evidence. But it was supplemented
and carried farther by the evidence of natives as to their own
sufferings, and of English officers as to that general notoriety
which used to be called _publica fama_.”—_From an article by Lord
Blachford in The Nineteenth Century Review, August 1879_, p. 265.
[54] A native chief.
[55] Written in October, 1879.
[56] Lord Blachford says in the article already quoted from: “The
citizens of these Republics have gone out from among us into a
hostile wilderness, because they could not endure a humanitarianism
which not only runs counter to their habits and interest, but
blasphemes that combination of gain with godliness which is part of
their religion. While that humanitarianism forms a leading principle
of our government they will not submit to it. Why should we bribe
or force them to do so? It is no doubt right and wise to remain, if
possible, on good terms with them. It is wise and generous to save
them, if possible, in their day of calamity—as, with our own opposite
policy, we have been able to save them—by a wave of the hand—twice
from the Basutos, and once from the Zulus. (Once for all rather,
through the course of many years, during which we have restrained
the Zulus from asserting their own rights to the disputed territory,
by promises that we would see justice done.—_Author._) But it is
neither wise nor necessary to embroil ourselves in their quarrels
until they call for help, until they have had occasion to feel the
evil effects of their own methods, and the measure of their weakness,
and are ready, not in whispers or innuendos and confidential corners,
but outspokenly in public meetings, or through their constituted
authorities, to accept with gratitude our intervention on our own
terms, until they are, if they ever can be, thus taught by adversity.
I do not myself believe that we could enter into any political union
with them except at the sacrifice of that character for justice to
which, I persist in saying, we owe so much of our power and security
in South Africa. Nor so long as we observe the rules of justice to
them shall we do any good by disguising our substantial differences,
or refraining from indignant remonstrances against proceedings which
are not only repugnant to humanity, but violate their engagements
with us and endanger our security.”
[57] Colonel Durnford, R.E., who paid a flying visit to Pretoria at
the time.
[58] Mr. John Dunn is said to have stated to the Special
Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, and to have since reaffirmed his
statement, that Sir T. Shepstone “sent word to Cetshwayo that he was
being hemmed in, and the king was to hold himself in readiness to
come to his assistance.” This assertion has also been denied by Sir
T. Shepstone’s supporters.
[59] P. P. [C. 1776] p. 88.
[60] It may be interesting to compare the above with the wording of
Sir T. Shepstone’s “Commission”—P. P. [C. 1776] p. 111.
[61] The chief repeatedly refused to sign any paper presented to
him by the Boers, on the grounds that he could not tell what it
might contain, beyond the points explained to him, to which he might
afterwards be said to have agreed; showing plainly to what the
natives were accustomed in their dealings with the Transvaal.
[62] That claimed by the Boers.
[63] P. P. (2079, pp. 51-54).
[64] The conclusion arrived at, after a careful consideration of all
producible evidence, by the Rorke’s Drift Commission, in 1878.
[65] A liability transferred to the Zulu king by Sir Bartle Frere in
his correspondence with the Bishop of Natal.
[66] That is to say, that they may be bribed by substantial benefits
to acquiesce in the loss of their liberties.
[67] Was it by inadvertence that Sir T. Shepstone speaks of “us” and
“we,” thus producing a sentence so strangely and unhappily applicable?
[68] Italics not Sir B. Frere’s.
[69] Author’s italics throughout.
[70] Author’s italics.
[71] “_Ama_-Swazi” for the plural correctly, as also “Ama-Zulu.”
[72] Sir Henry Bulwer, speaking of the disputed territory generally,
writes as follows: “The Zulu king had always, in deference very
much to the wishes and advice of this Government (Natal), forborne
from doing anything in respect of the question that might produce
a collision, trusting to the good offices of this Government to
arrange the difficulty by other means. But no such arrangement had
ever been made; and thus the question had drifted on until the
formal annexation of the disputed territory by the Government of the
Republic last year, and their subsequent attempt to give a practical
effect to their proclamation of annexation by levying taxes upon the
Zulus residing in the territory, provoked a resistance and a feeling
of resentment which threatened to precipitate a general collision at
any moment.”—SIR H. BULWER, _June 29th, 1876_ (C. 1961, p. 1).
[73] Umtonga escaped again, and is now living in the Transvaal. His
brother was still living in Zululand, as head of Umtonga’s kraal, at
the beginning of the war, and no injury appears to have been done to
any of the four.
[74] Thereby pointing the truth of his own remark at a previous
date—March 30th, 1876 (1748, p. 24): “But messages from the Zulu king
are becoming more frequent and urgent, and _the replies he receives
seem to him to be both temporising and evasive_.” (Author’s italics).
[75] Immediately after they had signed the instrument of appointment
the two Zulu messengers were sent in to the Government by Messrs.
Smith and Colenso, and took with them a letter (C. 2000) which
mentioned them as its bearers, and announced what they had done.
[76] ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane were sent down again to ’Maritzburg by
Cetshwayo, at the request of Sir H. Bulwer, and denied the whole
transaction, though it was attested by the signatures of the notary
and two white witnesses. It was afterwards discovered that they had
been frightened into this denial by a Natal Government messenger,
who told them that they had made the Governor very angry with them
and their king by making this appointment; and John Dunn also, after
receiving letters from ’Maritzburg, told them that they had committed
a great fault, and that he saw that they would never _all_ come home
again.
[77] Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s explanatory letter to Sir M.
Hicks-Beach, dated June 9th, 1878, concludes as follows:
“This business, as far as we are concerned, is, therefore, ended. We
had hoped to be instrumental in embodying in a contract a proposal
which we knew was advantageous to both parties. To do so only
required the intervention of European lawyers trusted by Cetewayo.
We knew that he trusted us, and would trust no others. The task of
acting for the king was, therefore, imposed on us as lawyers and as
gentlemen. Of pecuniary reward, or its equivalent, our labours have
brought us nothing. We do not require it. Honour we did not desire,
nor had a savage prince any means of conferring it. The duty thus
undertaken we give up only in despair, and we have nothing to regret.
“Such information, however, as we have gleaned in the course of our
agency you are entitled to hear from us, as we are British subjects.
“The Zulus are hostile to the Boers of the Transvaal, and would
fight with them but for fear of being involved in a quarrel with the
English. But neither Cetewayo himself, who is wise and peaceful, nor
the most hot-blooded of his young warriors have any desire to fight
with England, _i.e._ Natal.
“If they wished to do so there is nothing to prevent them, and never
has been. As they march, they could march from their border to this
city or to Durban in a little more than twenty-four hours. Their only
fear is, that the English will come with an army ‘to make them pay
taxes.’ They say they will rather die than do so. The king says the
same. Almost every man has a gun. Guns and ammunition are cheaper at
any military kraal in Zululand than at Port Natal. These goods are
imported by Tonga men, who come in large gangs from Delagoa Bay, for
white merchants. An Enfield rifle may be had for a sheep of a Tonga
man; many have breech-loaders. The missionaries, whose principal
occupation was trading, deal in ammunition. The missionaries have
recently lost most of their converts, who have gone trading on their
own account. Without these converts the missionaries cannot do
business, and they have left the country, except Bishop Schreuder,
who has gone back, that it may not be said that a white man is not
safe there. Cetewayo says that he has asked the missionaries to stop.
They have certainly not been turned out or threatened. Their going
makes the Zulus think that we are about to invade the country.
“Nothing but gross mismanagement will bring about a quarrel between
England and the Zulus.”—(P. P. [C. 2144] pp. 215, 216).
[78] This is apparently a figure of speech, since Luneburg, near
which the kraal was being built, would seem by the map _not_ to
lie “to the rear”—as seen from Zululand—of Utrecht, where Sir T.
Shepstone was staying.
[79] Compare the account of the delay on the part of the Boer
Government when Mr. Keate proposed to arbitrate. See last chapter, p.
182.
[80] 2144, p. 191.
[81] The Zulus, of course, would not have appreciated the convenience
of a table and chairs; they had no “documents” to lay upon the
former; and their opinion of the comfort of the latter is best
expressed by the well-known Zulu saying that, “_Only Englishmen
and chickens sit upon perches._” The mats provided for them were,
therefore, a proper equivalent to the tables and seats placed for the
other delegates.
[82] Sir Bartle Frere gives a very unfair account of this
matter-of-course fact when he transmits to the Secretary of State
the above despatch, “informing me of the incomplete result, in
consequence of the attitude of Cetshwayo’s representatives at the
Commission of Inquiry.”
[83] The king’s kraal at that time.
[84] The homestead specially spoken of in this case does not appear
to have been destroyed or injured till March, 1879, in the midst of
the war, nor was any human being, white or black, belonging to these
farms, killed by this “savage, unbridled, revengeful nation,” before
the war began.
[85] Apparently by Sir T. Shepstone’s orders, as the following phrase
appears in one of the Boer protests against arbitration, April 25th,
1873: “The majority of the people have, by order of your Excellency,
trekked into laager on December 14th last, and after having remained
in laager for nearly five months, _we are to go and live on our farms
again_.”
[86] The married women work in the mealie-gardens, etc., and the
_little_ girls carry the babies; but the marriageable young women
seem to have an interval of happy freedom from all labour and care.
[87] This was comprehensible during the attempt, which proved so
signal a failure, on the part of Sir T. Shepstone, to impose a
_marriage tax_ upon the natives. The tax was so extremely unpopular
that it was thought advisable to relinquish it, and to make the
desired increase in the revenue of the colony by doubling the hut-tax.
[88] Sir T. Shepstone, when he says (1137, p. 18) “Natal gives up the
_cattle_ of Zulu refugees.... The refugees themselves are not given
up,” plainly includes women amongst the cattle or “property” of the
Zulus.
[89] And later, Nov. 18, 1878 (2222, p. 173), he says: “I do not
hold the King responsible for the commission of the act, because
there is nothing to show that it had his previous concurrence or
even cognizance. But he becomes responsible for the act after its
commission, and for such reparation as we may consider is due for it.”
[90] Since rifled by our troops, and the bones of the old king
brought over to England.
[91] No “demand” was made until it appeared in Sir B. Frere’s
ultimatum.
[92] On perusing the above italicised words, one learns for the first
time that the ultimatum, which Sir Bartle Frere sent to the Zulu king
a few months later, was actually sent for the express purpose of
putting “an end to pacific relations with our neighbours.” This is
hardly the light in which the British public has been taught to look
upon the matter.
[93] Mr. H. Shepstone (Secretary for Native Affairs in the Transvaal)
acknowledges that this fine was paid (2222, p. 99).
[94] Manyonyoba owed allegiance to Cetshwayo (as did Umbilini). He
lived north of the Pongolo, in a part of the country over which
Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Bulwer altogether deny Cetshwayo’s
supremacy, and was claimed as a subject of the Transvaal Government.
[95] Sir H. Bulwer says “they have suspected, quite wrongly, that
we had some design against them in making it” (the new road to the
drift). It is to be questioned how far their suspicion was a wrongful
one, seeing that it was understood from the first that the drift
was intended especially for military purposes, and was undoubtedly
inspected by Mr. Smith for the same.
[96] Quotations from Mr. Deighton’s report to Mr. Wheelwright.
[97] Words applied to him by Mr. Brownlee, late Secretary for Native
Affairs of the Cape Government.
[98] Author’s italics.
[99] On one of these visits a missionary is reported to have said to
the king coarsely in Zulu, “You are a liar!” (unamanga!) upon which
Cetshwayo turned his back to him, and spoke with him no more.
[100] Or rather he was angry with them for the rudeness which they
committed in going _without taking leave_. He said they had never
received anything but kindness from him, and might as well have paid
him the compliment of a farewell salutation.
[101] Author’s italics.
[102] “Our Correspondent” of _The Daily News_ speaks, in to-day’s
issue (November 17th, 1879), of the “tranquillising fear” of
Cetshwayo having been removed from “our own native population.”
[103] A mere assertion, often made, but never supported by the
slightest proof.
[104] And so the Rev. Mr. Glockner, speaking of the late war, says
that they (the missionaries) had often warned the native chiefs of
what would befall them, if they refused to become Christians.—_Vide
The Scotsman, February 5th, 1880._
[105] Story of Maqamsela, from _The Natal Colonist_ of May 4th, 1877:
“Another case referred to in our previous article was that of a man
named Maqamsela, particulars of which, derived from eye-witnesses,
we have received from different sources. On Friday, March 9th, he
attended morning service at Etshowe mission station as usual, went
home to his kraal, and at noon started to go over to the kraal of
Minyegana, but was seized on the road and killed because he was a
Christian!
“For many years he had wished to become a Christian, and this at his
own desire was reported to Gaozi, his immediate chief, who _scolded
him, saying, ‘it would occasion him_ (Gaozi) _trouble_.’ The earnest
and repeated solicitation of Maqamsela was that the missionary
(Mr. Oftebro) would take him to the king to obtain his permission
to profess Christianity. Last winter the missionary consented to
mention it to the king; but, _failing to see Gaozi first, deemed
it imprudent to do so at that time_. Maqamsela was greatly grieved
at this, saying, ‘I am not afraid of death; it will be well if I
am killed for being a Christian.’ When an opportunity occurred of
speaking to Gaozi about Maqamsela’s wish to be baptized, _he would
give no direct answer, but complained of his bad conduct_. Maqamsela,
however, persisted in his entreaties that his case should be reported
to the king. ‘If they kill me because I believe, they may do so; the
Lord will receive me. Has not Christ died for me? Why should I fear?’
A favourable opportunity of naming the matter to the king presented
itself some time after. Cetshwayo appeared very friendly, and
proposed that the Christians should pay a tax, but said that their
service should be building houses for him when called; otherwise
they might remain in peace. Maqamsela was then mentioned as being
desirous to become a Christian. He was an old man, who could not
leave his kraal, and could not come up to serve. He had therefore
been eaten up, and had not now a single head of cattle. On his name
being mentioned, the king replied that _he would say nothing, Gaozi,
Minyegana, and Xubane not being there_. Maqamsela was glad when he
heard what had been done, and said, ‘If they kill me now, it is all
right.’
“A week later his time came. An induna, named Jubane, sent for him,
and on his return from Jubane’s, an impi came to him, saying they
had orders to kill him. He asked for what reason, and being told it
was because he was a Christian and for nothing else, he said again,
‘Well, I rejoice to die for the word of the Lord.’ He begged leave to
kneel down and pray, which he was allowed to do. After praying, he
said, ‘Kill me now.’ They had never seen any man act in this manner
before, when about to be killed, and seemed afraid to touch him.
After a long pause, however, a young lad took a gun and shot him, and
they all ran away.”
[106] This indiscriminate killing is disproved and denied by
Cetshwayo himself and his principal chiefs (_vide_ “A Visit to King
Ketshwayo,” “Macmillan’s Magazine,” March, 1878).
[107] Author’s italics throughout.
[108] Two Zulu prisoners, captured while on a peaceful errand, just
before the commencement of hostilities, and who were permitted to
reside at Bishopstowe when released from gaol, until they could
safely return home, were questioned concerning these regulations,
and said that they applied only to those who voluntarily joined the
regiments, concerning which there was no compulsion at all, beyond
the moral effect produced by the fact that it was looked upon, by
the young people themselves, as rather a poor thing to do to decline
joining. Once joined, however, they were obliged to obey orders
unhesitatingly. These young men said that in the coast, and outlying
districts, there were large numbers of people who had retained
their liberty and married as they pleased, but that strict loyalty
was the _fashion_ nearer the _court_. It was in these very coast
districts that the Zulus surrendered during the late war, the _loyal_
inhabitants proving their loyalty to _the bitter end_.
[109] “We are equal,” said the interpreter; but the expression used
is more correctly translated as above.
[110] The natives of Natal, “peaceful subjects of Her Majesty,” were
living in perfect security on one side of the border, and the Zulus
on the other, the two populations intermarrying and mingling in the
most friendly manner, without the smallest apprehension of injury to
life or property, when Sir B. Frere landed at Durban.
[111] Compare with 9 and 10 the distinct instructions on this point
given by Lord Carnarvon during the previous year (1961, p. 60):
“I request, therefore, that you will cause the missionaries to
understand distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake
to compel the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations
in Zululand.” Yet here the clause is made one of the conditions of an
ultimatum, the alternative of which is war.
[112] Sir T. Shepstone’s incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear
evidence, sifted and proved worthless by the Commissioners.
[113] Sir Bartle Frere declares (Correspondence, p. 57) that
Cetshwayo “could have known nothing of the memorandum,” although
(_ibid._ p. 6) he himself asserts that “it was intended to explain
for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession to him,”
and it was plainly very generally known, and therefore naturally by
the king.
[114] Correspondence, p. 3.
[115] Ibid. p. 6.
[116] Compare with Sir Bartle Frere’s suggestion to Sir Henry Bulwer
that the latter should persuade the Zulu king that the _Active_
and her fellows were mostly merchant vessels, but that the English
war-vessels would be sufficient to _protect his coast_!
[117] Our own troops’ experience showed that this was no idle excuse.
[118] One of Colonel Durnford’s officers writes, January 26th,
“that he (the Colonel) had worked so hard at equipping this Native
Contingent, against much opposition, and took special pride in his
mounted men, three hundred men, that he called ‘The Natal Native
Horse.’”
[119] These words deserve special remark.
[120] After-events proved the fallacy of these “reports.” Even when
the Zulus could have swept Natal with fatal effect, they refrained.
[121] Lord Chelmsford, January 16th, 1879. (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 63.)
[122] Captain N. Newman.
[123] Some Zulus (a chief named Gandama, and others) came into the
camp on the 21st, saw the General, and were allowed to depart.—(P. P.
[C. 2454] p. 182).
[124] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 81.
[125] Major Clery.
[126] “There were no high words,” Lieutenant Cochrane says, of
any kind between the colonels, as some would lead the public to
suppose. The above remarks are taken from Lieutenant Cochrane’s
account of what passed; and he says: “I think no one lives who was
present during the conversation but myself; so that anything said
contradictory to my statement is _invented_.”
[127] Captain Essex, 75th Regiment.
[128] Lieutenant Raw, Natal Native Horse.
[129] Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd Regiment.
[130] Mr. Brickhill.
[131] Having disengaged his men, Captain G. Shepstone said: “I must
go and see where my Chief is,” and rode in again. His devotion cost
him his life.
[132] Captain Gardner.
[133] Captain Essex.
[134] Lieutenant Curling, R.A.
[135] Captain Essex.
[136] Lieutenant Cochrane.
[137] Mr. Brickhill.
[138] Lieutenant Curling.
[139] Three mounted Zulu scouts were seen on the hills on the right
from the rear guard, by an officer, who pointed them out to one of
the staff.
[140] Some remarks made by Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp),
are worthy of notice: “_January 21st._—We then rode up to the high
land to the left of our camp, the ascent very steep, but possible
for horses. On reaching the summit of the highest hill, I counted
fourteen Zulu horsemen watching us at the distance of about four
miles; they ultimately disappeared over a slight rise. Two vedettes
were stationed at the spot from where I saw these horsemen; they
said they had seen these men several times during the day, and had
reported the fact.... We then returned to camp, the General having
determined to send out a patrol in this direction the next day.”—(P.
P. [C. 2454] p. 183).
_January 22nd._—Lieutenant Milne was sent to the top of a hill to see
what was doing in camp, and says: “On reaching the summit I could see
the camp; all the cattle had been driven in close around the tents. I
could see nothing of the enemy on the left” (_ibid._ p. 184).
“We are not quite certain about the time. But it is just possible
that what I took to be the cattle having been driven into camp may
possibly have been the Zulu ‘impi’” (_ibid._ p. 187).
[141] One message only is mentioned by the General or his military
secretary as having been received from the camp. But an officer
(of rank) _who had seen them_, says that five or six messages were
received from the camp during the day by the General or his staff;
and he says distinctly that the messages were in the possession of
Lieut.-Colonel Crealock.
[142] About this hour the tents in camp suddenly disappeared.
[143] No spare ammunition was taken by the force with the General.
[144] The reserve ammunition is said to have been packed in waggons,
which were then filled up with stores.
[145] The _first_ official mention of this appears in a Blue-book of
August, 1879, where Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp), says: “In
the meantime, news came that Colonel Harness had heard the firing,
and was proceeding with his guns and companies of infantry escorting
them to camp. Orders were immediately sent to him to return and
rejoin Colonel Glyn.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 184).
[146] By the General’s directions this statement was to be “of the
facts which came under his cognizance on the day in question.”—(P. P.
[C. 2260] p. 80).
[147] “The panic and confusion were fearful,” says one of themselves.
[148] The number of prisoners thus killed is said to have been about
twenty.