ULUNDI.
Before entering on the history of the advance of the main column on
Ulundi, we will glance at the doings of No. 1 Division, which was to
operate against Ulundi from the eastward.
During May entrenched posts had been established—Fort Crealock,
on the left bank of the Amatikulu River and close to John Dunn’s
Road, about fourteen miles from Fort Pearson, on the Tugela; Fort
Chelmsford, on the right bank of the Inyezane, also on John Dunn’s
Road, and eight miles from Fort Crealock; and, in June, Fort
Napoleon, on the left bank of the Umlalazi River, between Fort
Chelmsford and Port Durnford, where a landing-place was established—a
brief account of which may be interesting. The spot is described as
a straight sandy coast near the mouth of the Umlalazi River, always
having a boiling surf rolling in on the beach. The landing operations
were carried out by means of large decked surf-boats of about forty
tons burden each.
The mode of working them was as follows: One end of a long hawser
was made fast to an anchor dropped some distance outside the surf,
and the other end taken on shore by a small line, hauled taut, and
secured to shore moorings.
By means of this “warp” the surf-boat travels to and from the beach.
Having picked up the warp by the buoy-rope, it is placed in grooves
in the bow and stern of the boat, and there retained by pins. The
roll of the surf takes the boat in, large rope-stoppers being used to
check her should she be going too fast.
In this way some 3000 tons of stores were landed, at a very great
saving of expense over land transport. The landing operations were
at all times difficult, sometimes impossible; they were conducted
by Commander Caffin, R.N., and to him and the Naval Brigade there
stationed is due the entire credit of the excellent work done.
Forwarding supplies and bridging the Tugela was the work of the
1st Division through May and well into June; everything military,
except convoy duty, appeared at a standstill. There was a great
deal of sickness amongst the troops, but General Crealock did much
in providing proper hospital accommodation and improving sanitary
arrangements.
Fort Pearson was converted into an extensive hospital, where there
were as many as 400 patients at times, and whose garrison, after
the advance of the division, was composed of the convalescents. At
this hospital some wily patients managed to appropriate £5000 of the
public moneys; but this fortunately was all recovered, except about
£33.
Telegraphic communication was established by the Royal Engineers
between Fort Chelmsford and the Lower Tugela; and Colonel Walker,
C.B., Scots Guards, was appointed to the command of this portion of
the base, and stationed at Fort Pearson.
On the 18th June the long-expected move was made by No. 1 Division,
and General Crealock, with the advanced portion of the force, left
Fort Pearson and the Lower Tugela. Moving by Fort Chelmsford, he
reached the Umlalazi River on the 22nd. The river was bridged by the
train under Captain Blood, R.E., and a work commenced on the left
bank called “Fort Napoleon.”
The General was engaged reconnoitring on the 23rd and following days,
capturing a few cattle, one of which appeared to resent its capture,
charging the General, and severely injuring his horse. On the 28th
the force encamped near Port Durnford.
But little interest attaches to this division, which had great
opportunities before it. An earlier advance and a little dash
would have given the laurels of the second campaign to the 1st
Division, which at the beginning of May consisted of upwards of 9000
men—6500 being Europeans—a sufficient force to have accomplished the
destruction of Ulundi with ease; but it was not to be.
Many absurd stories are told as to causes of delays, one being the
want of so many rations of _pepper_; and the whole ending in the
well-known telegram, “Where is Crealock?”
We may here devote a few remarks to the Naval Brigade, which rendered
such good service throughout the campaign; and, had opportunity
offered, would have largely added to the laurels it won.
After the relief of Etshowe, the Naval Brigade was divided between
Lower Tugela and Fort Chelmsford, Commander Brackenbury in command at
the latter post, Captain Campbell in chief command. The main force
advanced with General Crealock—545 officers and men of _Active_,
_Boadicea_, and _Shah_, with 3 9-pounder guns, 6 rocket-troughs, and
5 Gatling guns. At Port Durnford they remained disembarking stores
till July 21st, when, after being reviewed by Sir Garnet Wolseley,
the _Active’s_ and _Shah’s_ men embarked, leaving the _Boadicea’s_ to
continue temporarily the duties of the landing station.
Captain Bradshaw of the _Shah_, and Captain Adeane of the _Tenedos_,
rendered good service at Durban and Simon’s Bay respectively.
The Royal Marines of the squadron served with the Naval Brigade.
Lieutenant Dowding, R.M.L.I., was at first the senior officer, and
advanced with Colonel Pearson’s column to Etshowe, remaining there
until its relief. Captain Phillips, R.M.L.I., and Captain Burrowes,
R.M.A., were landed from H.M.S. _Shah_, the former senior officer,
and in command of the Marines at the battle of Ngingindhlovu.
We must now return to the 2nd Division and Flying Column, which
at last began to move in the right direction. Zululand had been
carefully reconnoitred to the Babanango Mountain by Colonel Buller,
and the advance of the 2nd Division, with the head-quarters, in this
direction was covered by the Flying Column, which was always within
striking distance.
The troops now were carefully protected at night by laagers; the
ordinary form being a rectangle in three compartments, with a
shelter trench two yards outside the waggons, so that there might be
a second line of fire from the top of the waggons, without risk to
the defenders of the shelter trench.
The Flying Column bore the brunt of work in the advances, scouting
the country in every direction, the most reliable “eyes and ears”
of the force the “Natal Native Horse,” then commanded by Captain
Cochrane. These men (Edendale men and Basutu) in small numbers
crowned the summit of every hill right and left of the route, and
miles in front they were pushed to feel the way. On the 4th June the
scouts reported a considerable number of the enemy, these, after the
exchange of a few shots, Colonel Buller tried to draw towards the
camp, but in vain, and the patrol, not being strong enough to risk an
engagement, returned to camp. There three messengers from Cetshwayo
were being received by Lord Chelmsford.
They were sent back on June 6th with the following message: “He must
at once give proof of being earnest in desiring peace, proof to
be—1st. Two 7-pounder guns, and the oxen now with him taken from us
to be sent in with the ambassadors. 2nd. A promise from Ketchwayo
that all the arms taken during war, etc., when collected shall be
given up. 3rd. One regiment to come to my camp and lay down its arms
as a sign of submission. Pending Cetywayo’s answer, there will be no
military operations on our part; when he has complied with them, I
will order cessation of hostilities pending discussion of final terms
of peace.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 107).
On the previous day (5th June), Colonel Buller took a force of about
300 men to reconnoitre the proposed route. The Zulus seen the day
before came out from their kraals, and formed as if for an attack.
The ground in their rear was broken and covered with thorny bush,
the kraals large, apparently belonging to a chief; and beside one of
them were four waggons, evidently taken from Isandhlwana. Colonel
Buller determined to burn the kraals, but as he approached the enemy
broke and retired into the cover, opening a heavy fire. A portion
of the force engaged the Zulus from the edge of the bush whilst the
remainder set fire to the kraals, which was accomplished with the
loss of two men wounded.
Major-General Marshall came up with a portion of the Cavalry Brigade,
and, with a view to ensuring the safety of Colonel Buller’s retreat,
advanced three troops of the 17th Lancers under Colonel Drury-Lowe to
hold the enemy in check.
The enemy was found to be very strongly posted in the thorns, and
the ground being impracticable for cavalry, the Lancers were ordered
to retire. Their Adjutant, Lieutenant Frith, was in this fruitless
skirmish shot through the heart.
During this affair an incident occurred (told by an officer present
at the time), showing the individual bravery of the Zulus: A single
warrior, chased by several Lancers, found himself run down and escape
impossible. He turned and faced his enemies; spreading his arms
abroad he presented his bare breast unflinchingly to the steel, and
fell, face to the foe, as a brave soldier should.
On the 6th a post called Fort Newdigate was established, and on this
evening the warmth of the double line of fire from the laager of the
2nd Division was unpleasantly experienced by the 5th Company Royal
Engineers. This company had marched up that afternoon in advance
of the Flying Column (which was going down-country for supplies),
and had camped close to one of the unfinished redoubts outside the
laager; an alarm was given in the laager, and a heavy fire opened
therefrom. The Engineers coolly lay down flat on the ground, and
waited till the excitement was over. It was due entirely to their
own steadiness that the casualties were not greater; as it was, one
sergeant was wounded and two horses killed.
On the 7th, the division advanced, clearing the country of Zulus and
burning their kraals, and encamped at the Upoko River; remaining
there till the arrival of Brigadier-General Wood’s Column with a
large convoy of supplies for which it had been sent. The time was
usefully employed in reconnoitring, examining the road in advance,
making drifts practicable, etc.
A line of telegraph was laid by the half Telegraph Troop (C) Royal
Engineers, from Quagga’s kraal (on the road between Newcastle
and Ladysmith), where it joined the colonial line to Doornberg
_viâ_ Dundee and Landtmann’s Drift, thus placing head-quarters in
communication with Pietermaritzburg, etc.; flag-signalling being
employed to communicate with Doornberg.
On the 16th June the correspondent of _The Times_ wrote: “We are
wandering towards Ulundi much as the Children of Israel wandered
towards Canaan, without plans, or even definite notions for
the future. It would seem not impossible to form some plan of
campaign—something, at any rate, more definite than the hand-to-mouth
manner in which we are now proceeding. Deep science and tactical
skill are not necessary to contend with savages; a simple method
and plain common-sense suffice, if backed by energy, decision, and
determination.”
The intelligence now telegraphed that Sir Garnet Wolseley was on
his way to Natal to unravel the various tangled skeins of civil and
military policy, doubtless acted as the “spur in the head” which
expedited Lord Chelmsford’s movements.
On the 17th, Brigadier-General Wood arrived with the supplies, and
next day the force advanced to the Upoko River, where the road from
Rorke’s Drift to Ulundi crosses it. Here there was a halt for a day,
and a depôt formed, called Fort Marshall. Colonel Collingwood was
left in charge of the two posts, Forts Newdigate and Marshall; and
the whole line of communication in the enemy’s country, and such
of the garrison as were left in frontier-posts for the purpose of
patrolling, were placed under the command of Major-General Marshall.
Fort Marshall was about twenty-five miles from Rorke’s Drift, and
sixteen from Fort Newdigate; from this post to Koppie Allein (on the
Blood River) the distance was twenty-one miles.
Having struck down into this road, which runs into Zululand in an
easterly direction, a glance at the map will show how needless
was the waste of time and money spent in concentrating stores at
Conference Hill—so far removed from the line of communications with
Pietermaritzburg.
The combined column reached the Umhlatusi River on the 21st, having
traversed difficult and mountainous ground, where in many places the
train was obliged to pass by single waggons.
The Zulus took no advantage of the many opportunities for attack
that presented themselves, and the march to Ulundi was practically
unopposed. At this halting-place Fort Evelyn was built; and on the
24th the march was resumed.
Cetshwayo’s messengers, ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane, came up from
Pietermaritzburg on the 24th, and next morning were sent to the king
with Lord Chelmsford’s reply to his message.
A very awkward drift on the Uvulu River was passed by the column,
after crossing which a day’s halt was made, when a cavalry patrol was
sent out to destroy some military kraals. Two more indunas came in to
ask for peace, and were sent back to Ulundi in the evening. On the
27th the force arrived at Entonjaneni, where the arrangements for the
final advance on Ulundi were made, tents and all unnecessary baggage
left behind, and a strong post formed with the aid of waggons. Four
hundred waggons, 6000 oxen, and 800 mules were left entrenched here;
the remaining 200 waggons, with ten days’ provisions, accompanying
the advancing force. This evening two more messengers came in from
the king with elephant tusks, some hundred head of oxen, and two
trunks, the property of Lord Chelmsford. The messengers were sent
back next day.
_The Natal Colonist_ of June 28th says: “Again we hear that Ketshwayo
has sent to Government, asking why Lord Chelmsford continues to
advance. He (the king) hopes the General will not persist in
advancing, as in that case he will be forced to fight, and what he
wants is peace. This, we believe, makes the eleventh message he has
sent in to the same effect. The General affects to doubt his _bonâ
fides_. How is this to be established? Can his lordship think of
no better guarantee than one which the most vigorous supporters of
the war cannot term anything but childish?” This latter question is
explained in another issue of the same paper, in which the editor
remarks: “It is argued that the Zulus or the Zulu king cannot be
sincere in desiring peace, because when the chance offers our troops
are fired upon. If people would but consider for a moment, that until
there is a truce or armistice agreed on we are living in a state of
war; that our troops are in the Zulu country, making war upon its
inhabitants, missing no opportunity of inflicting damage and injury
upon them, burning their kraals, destroying their grain, ravaging
their gardens, and firing on the natives themselves at every chance,
what right, they would ask themselves, have we to expect that the
Zulus should refrain from retaliation, however desirous they may be
of seeing peace restored, and an end put to all the devastation and
horror of prolonged warfare? _We_ do not profess to be otherwise than
desirous of peace—peace with honour and security for the future—and
yet are we not invading their country, and almost vaunting that we
shall dictate its terms only when our invading columns have met at
Ulundi, and planted the English flag there?”
On the 30th the descent into the valley of the White Umvolosi was
commenced, through a country covered with scattered bush and aloes.
Two indunas were escorted in during the day, one bearing a letter
from Cetshwayo to Lord Chelmsford,[173] and the other the sword of
the Prince Imperial, which the king sent in immediately on learning
the value attached to it.[174]
Sir Garnet Wolseley—having been ordered out to Natal as Governor of
Natal and the Transvaal, and Her Majesty’s High Commissioner for the
eastern portion of South Africa—landed at Durban on the 28th June. On
the 30th Lord Chelmsford sent him the following message: “Five miles
from Entonganini; ten miles from Umvolosi River. King’s messengers
have just left with message from me. I must advance to position on
left bank of river. This I do to-morrow, but will stop hostilities,
pending negotiations, if communicated demands are complied with by
3rd July, noon. There are indunas come with cattle and guns. I have
consented to receive 1000 captured rifles instead of a regiment
laying down its arms. As my supplies will only permit of my remaining
here until the 10th July, it is desirable I should be informed by
you of the conditions of peace to be demanded. White man with king
states he has 20,000 men. King anxious to fight; Princes not so.
Where is Crealock’s column? Signal.”
On the 1st July the Flying Column and General Newdigate’s division
reached, without opposition, the southern bank of the White Umvolosi,
within five or six miles of the royal kraals of Ulundi. Defensible
laagers were at once formed, and the position made secure before
night. Large bodies of Zulus were seen in motion at Ulundi. Next day
the 2nd Division closed up their laager to that of the Flying Column,
and a stone redoubt was erected on knoll in rear; so that a small
garrison might hold the post, leaving the main force unencumbered to
operate as desired. The Zulu army was not seen, and no messengers
arrived from the king; but a large herd of white (royal) cattle was
observed being driven from the king’s kraal towards the camp, and
shortly afterwards driven back again.
On the 3rd, as the Zulus were firing on watering-parties at the
river, and no message had come in, a reconnaissance on the farther
side was ordered. At noon, the cattle, sent in with the last
messengers from the king, were driven back across the river, and
about the same time Colonel Buller crossed lower down with the
mounted men of the Flying Column to reconnoitre towards Ulundi.
Detaching parties to cover his flank, he advanced rapidly to within
about 200 yards of the Ulundi river, and about three-quarters of a
mile from Ulundi, when he came upon about 5000 Zulus concealed in the
river-bed, who at once opened fire, while large bodies of the enemy,
moving down on each flank, endeavoured to cut off his retreat.
Colonel Buller, having effected the purpose for which he had gone
forward—feeling the enemy and reconnoitring the ground—retired
with a loss of three men killed and four wounded. Many officers
distinguished themselves in endeavouring to save the men who were
lost, as well as in bringing in dismounted men: Commandant D’Arcy,
Lieut.-Colonel Buller, Captain Prior, Lord William Beresford,
Lieutenant Hayward, and also Sergeant Kerr are mentioned.
On the 4th, at 6.45 A.M., the force crossed the river, leaving the
camp garrisoned by the 1-24th Regiment, a company of Engineers, and
casualties (about 900 Europeans, 250 natives, with one Gatling gun).
Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with the light cavalry of the Flying Column,
crossed in advance, and occupied the high ground in front without
opposition; the main body following, marched up the broken ground
out of the valley, and formed a hollow square, the ammunition-carts,
etc., in the centre, and the guns in position ready to come into
action without delay. The Flying Column formed the front half, and
the 2nd Division the rear half of the square; front, flanks, and
rear covered by the cavalry. In this formation the troops advanced
to the spot selected by Colonel Buller, which was about 700 yards
beyond the Nodwengo kraal, and about the same distance from a stream
that crossed the road halfway to Ulundi; high ground, commanding the
adjacent country, and with little cover beyond long grass, near it.
The guns were posted in the angles and in the centre of each face of
the square, and each face had a company of infantry in reserve.
Large numbers of Zulus were now seen coming from the hills on the
left and left front, and other masses on the right, partly concealed
by the mist from the river, passed the Nodwengo kraal to surround the
square.
The cavalry on the right and left became engaged at 8.45 A.M., and,
slowly retiring as the enemy advanced, passed into the square, which
immediately opened fire.
The Zulu advance was made with great determination, but their
movements appeared to be without order. Some individuals managed to
reach within thirty or forty yards of the rear face, where there
was some cover, but the main advance on all sides was checked at
some distance by the heavy artillery fire and steady volleys of the
infantry. These were so effective that within half an hour the enemy
wavered and gave way, when the cavalry dashed out to complete their
discomfiture. Passing out by the rear face of the square, Colonel
Drury-Lowe (who had been already wounded) led the 17th Lancers in the
direction of the Nodwengo kraal, dispersing the enemy and killing
those that could not reach the shelter of the kraal or the bush
below; then wheeling to the right, he charged through the enemy, who
were endeavouring to reach the mountains beyond.
In this manner the whole of the level ground was cleared.
Lieut.-Colonel Buller’s command also took up the pursuit, doing much
execution until the enemy mounted the slopes of the hills and were
beyond their reach. But even then a place of safety was not gained,
for some guns were moved out from the square, and got the range of
the enemy retreating over the hills. The brunt of this day’s work
fell on the cavalry. Even in the pursuit the greater part of the
Zulus turned and fought for their lives. Overtaken by a Lancer, a
Zulu would stop just before the fatal thrust was delivered, and,
dodging like lightning, evade the lance, sometimes seizing it and
holding on till the Lancer was relieved by a comrade.
The Irregular Horse, Mounted Infantry, and Native Horse (Captain
T. Shepstone’s Basutu and the Natal Native Horse under Captain
Cochrane), thoroughly searched the ground, disposing of the enemy who
had taken refuge in dongas, bush, and long grass. 600 Zulus are said
to have fallen before the cavalry alone—150 of them being credited to
the Lancers.
Thus was fought the battle of Ulundi.
It was impossible for the ill-armed enemy to pass the belt of fire
that encircled the square, even had they not been shaken by the
accurate artillery fire whilst yet at a distance.
The ease with which the attack was repelled may be gathered from the
fact that the average number of rounds fired by the infantry actually
in the ranks was less than six-and-a-half rounds per man (6·4 rounds).
The troops certainly were very steady, and the firing—generally
volley-firing by sections—was as a rule under perfect command.
We have heard of an officer calmly smoking his pipe whilst in command
of his company during the engagement.
As soon as the wounded had been attended to, the force advanced to
the banks of the stream near Ulundi, whilst the cavalry swept the
country beyond. Ulundi was fired at 11.40 A.M., and the adjacent
kraals shortly afterwards. At 2 P.M., the return march to the camp
commenced. Every military kraal in the valley that had not previously
been destroyed was in flames; and not a sign of the Zulu army was to
be perceived.
The British force engaged consisted of 4062 Europeans and 1103
natives, with 12 guns and 2 Gatlings. The loss: killed, 2 officers
(Captain Wyatt-Edgell, 17th Lancers, and the Hon. W. Drummond, in
charge of the Intelligence Department), 13 non-commissioned officers
and men, and 3 natives; wounded, 19 officers, 59 non-commissioned
officers and men, and 7 natives.
The Zulu force is estimated variously; some put it at 12,000, some at
20,000. Being scattered over a large extent of country, and some of
the regiments engaged having already suffered heavily, it is not easy
to arrive at a reliable conclusion. It is probable that the correct
number lay between 15,000 and 20,000.
As regards the Zulu loss, Lord Chelmsford says: “It is impossible to
estimate with any correctness the loss of the enemy, owing to the
extent of country over which they attacked and retreated; but it
could not have been less, I consider, than 1000 killed.”—(Despatch,
4th July).
Using the same reasoning on the 6th, Lord Chelmsford says: “But
judging by the reports of those engaged, it cannot be placed at a
less number than 1500 killed.”
From the statements of prisoners it would seem that the attacking
force was about 15,000 strong, 5000 being in reserve. At a meeting
of the Zulu Council on the 2nd July, it appears that it was resolved
by the King to send in the royal coronation white cattle as a
peace-offering; but as they were being driven towards the English
camp on the 2nd, they were turned back at Nodwengo by the Umcityu
Regiment, who refused to let them pass, saying, as they could not
fulfil all the demands, it was useless to give up the cattle, and
therefore they would fight. The king was then at Ulundi; he said that
“as the Inkandampemvu (Umcityu) Regiment would not let the cattle go
in as a peace-offering, and as we wished to fight, the white army
being now at his home, we could fight, but we were to fight the white
men in the open, and attack before the Nodwengo and Ulundi kraals,
where we were on the day of the fight.... The army is now thoroughly
beaten, and as it was beaten in the open, it will not reassemble and
fight again. No force is watching the lower column, and none has been
sent there. How could there be, when all were ordered to be here
to-day? We mustered here by the king’s orders at the beginning of
this moon, about ten days ago. We have not been called out before.”
The natives belonging to the British force were exceedingly struck at
the idea of their being brought into the square, whilst the soldiers
formed “a laager” of their bodies round them.
The special correspondent of _The Daily News_, Mr. Archibald Forbes,
performed a very gallant act after the battle of Ulundi. Finding
that no despatch was being sent off by the General to announce the
victory, he determined to take the news himself, and, “taking his
life in his hand,” set out alone to ride right through the Zulu
country. This he did, riding the whole night, having frequently to
dismount and actually _feel_ his way—the tracks of the waggons on the
upward route.
Next day, after a ride of nearly a hundred miles, he reached
Landtmann’s Drift (in fifteen hours), and was enabled to telegraph to
Sir Garnet Wolseley the news of the victory of the 4th.
A few brief remarks on the return march are all that are necessary.
The day after the battle of Ulundi (5th July) the whole force retired
to Entonjaneni, and remained there till the 9th, when the Flying
Column moved on the road towards the coast to Kwamagwasa, _en route_
to meet Sir Garnet Wolseley.
On the 10th the 2nd Division marched from Entonjaneni, and arrived at
the Upoko River on the 15th.
Lord Chelmsford accompanied the Flying Column. We cannot leave
Brigadier-General Wood’s command without a word of notice. From
the beginning to the end of the campaign its work was done in
a thoroughly soldierlike manner, leaving little or nothing to
be desired. There was a thorough reciprocal confidence between
commander and men, and a total absence of those “scares” which were
occasionally heard of during the campaign.
Where all did well, it may seem a little invidious to single
one out for mention, but we will quote the concluding words
of Brigadier-General Wood’s despatch of 5th July, referring to
Lieut.-Colonel Redvers Buller, not only on account of this officer’s
merit, but “to point the moral” as to where was the neglect which led
primarily to the disaster to the Head-quarter Column in January:
“He has never failed to cover the column with his mounted men, for
from ten to twelve miles in front, and on the flanks.
“Constitutionally fearless, he is prudent in counsel, and though
resolute, is very careful of the lives of his troops in action. He
possesses, in my opinion, all the attributes of a perfect leader of
light cavalry.”
It is stated (_Standard_, August 22nd, 1879) that, on reaching
the White Umvolosi, despatches arrived from Sir Garnet Wolseley,
requesting Lord Chelmsford to fall back and meet him at Kwamagwasa—a
mission station, where it had at one time been proposed that the 1st
and 2nd Divisions should effect a junction.
On the 4th, Lord Chelmsford sent a despatch to Sir Garnet Wolseley,
in which he said: “As I have fully accomplished the object for which
I advanced, I consider I shall now be best carrying out Sir Garnet
Wolseley’s instructions by moving at once to Entonjanini, and thence
to Kwamagwaza.”
Why the blow struck at Ulundi was not followed up it is difficult to
say. If Lord Chelmsford’s instructions permitted him to advance and
engage the enemy, they would be sufficiently elastic to enable him
to follow up the victory. The king was known to have a new kraal in
a strong position at the junction of the White and Black Umvolosi
Rivers, within a day’s march of Ulundi; the Zulu army was thoroughly
beaten and dispersed, and there was absolutely nothing to prevent an
advance for the destruction of this stronghold, the moral effect of
which on the native mind would have been very great. There was an
ample force, willing hearts, and no lack of supplies. The solution of
the problem must be sought in Lord Chelmsford’s words: “I have fully
accomplished the object for which I advanced.” He withdrew at once
from the scene of his victory, and—resigned his command.