THE LOWER TUGELA—INYEZANE—ETSHOWE.
The first step taken towards preparing for the campaign and advance
of a column on Ulundi by the coast road was the landing of a “Naval
Brigade” from H.M.S. _Active_, in November, 1878, under the command
of Commander Campbell, R.N. The “Actives” at once marched up to
Lower Tugela Drift, and commenced preparations for the crossing of
the river. A “pont” was established, and boats collected preparatory
to the passage of the troops. Fifty men from the _Tenedos_, under
Lieutenant Kingscote, R.N., joined the Naval Brigade on January 7th,
1879, but remained at Fort Pearson and took charge of the pont, etc.,
when the “Actives” moved up with No. 1 Column.
The passage of the Tugela was a difficult and rather hazardous
undertaking, the river being nearly 300 yards wide, with a strong
current flowing. The preparations, including taking across a wire
hawser for the working of the pont, were conducted in a very
business-like and satisfactory manner by Commander Campbell and the
Naval Brigade.
The Navy had received early notice of impending hostilities, and,
as early as April, 1878, Sir Bartle Frere had requested Commodore
Sullivan, C.B. (the naval chief), to remain in Natal, “in order
to render such assistance by sea and land as may be practicable,”
“as it appeared almost certain that serious complications must
shortly arise with the Zulu tribe ... which will necessitate active
operations.”—(P. P. 2144, p. 32).
The coast was explored by the Commodore as far as St. Lucia Bay,
and every possible assistance willingly rendered by him and the
force under his command before and throughout the campaign. Valuable
assistance was also given by Captain Baynton, commodore of the Union
Steamship Company’s fleet. The force detailed for Colonel Pearson’s
command—styled No. 1 Column—concentrated on Fort Pearson, on the
Lower Tugela; its detail has been previously given.
It was directed that this column should cross the river and encamp
on the Zulu bank, under the guns of the fort, there to await further
orders; but, from the flooded state of the river and other causes,
the passage was not effected till the 12th January, when the
principal part of the force crossed and encamped in Zululand.
The 2nd (Captain Wynne’s) Company Royal Engineers arrived at Fort
Pearson on the 12th, and crossed on the 13th. It immediately set
about the construction of Fort Tenedos on the left bank, about 600
yards from the river, to cover the crossing, protect stores, etc.
The Naval Brigade were constantly at work, day and night, working the
boats and pontoon across the river, with the exception of the night
of the 14th, when a heavy flood swept away the wharves. Twice the
pontoon was upset, and one of the _Active’s_ men was drowned.
Reconnaissances were made in the Zulu country, and a few prisoners
taken, but there were no signs of any large body of the enemy. One
of John Dunn’s men reported on the 17th that “the whole of his
neighbourhood” was “now deserted and the cattle driven into the
interior.”
Everything being carefully prepared, the advance was made on the
18th, a strong advanced guard and the Natal Native Pioneers[166]
preceding the column. Every precaution was taken to prevent a
surprise, extra vigilance being necessary on account of the long
waggon-train carrying tents, rations for fifteen days, and a large
quantity of food and ammunition destined for an advanced depôt to be
formed at or near Etshowe.
We may here say a few words on the extreme difficulties of South
African transport—difficulties so serious and full of danger that
they should have been eliminated from the plan of the campaign.
The waggons used were, as a rule, the ordinary South African
ox-waggons, clumsy and heavy to move, each drawn by a team of
fourteen to eighteen oxen. The Zulu oxen are much superior to the
up-country oxen, as they stand more work, and will swim rivers; they
even swam the Tugela, whilst the remainder had to be ferried over.
The pace of the ox-waggon is about a mile and a half an hour, and
drifts and hills cause frequent delays. Take for instance the train
of No. 1 Column: it accomplished the march to Etshowe, a distance
of thirty-seven miles, in between five and six days—from daylight
on the 18th to 10 A.M. 23rd—having only been detained by the enemy
at Inyezane for about two hours: the train was necessarily some six
miles in length, an element of the utmost danger had the swift-footed
Zulus been a little more enterprising. Two or three thousand Zulus
might easily have prevented Colonel Pearson reaching Etshowe _with_
his train, in spite of all the precautions he might and did take.
The commanding officers of the various columns had no option in
the matter of waggon-train, and as far as they were concerned the
transport under their control worked well.
The difficulty of moving with a long train of waggons during the
summer, or rainy season, can scarcely be exaggerated. Double spanning
over drifts and soft places, making bad places good with brushwood,
oxen getting tired owing to the length of time they were yoked,
rather than from the distance travelled, all gave endless trouble
and anxiety, and entirely upset all calculations as to distances to
be traversed. The transport duties of No. 1 Column were admirably
carried out by Captain Pelly Clarke and Assistant-Commissary Kevill
Davis.[167]
The force advanced from the Tugela in two columns—the first crossed
the Inyoni and encamped—weather very wet and trying. The second
column started on the following day (19th) and joined its leader
at Umsundusi. At this camp the troops remained during the 20th. The
reconnoitring parties had reported the Amatikulu impassable, and
Colonel Pearson pushed forward engineers (native pioneers), with a
strong working-party and guard, to render the drift practicable,
which, after a day’s hard work, was done. On the 21st the column
again advanced, and, crossing the Amatikulu, encamped in the
evening at Kwasamabela, four miles from Inyezane; during the day a
reconnoitring party burnt a military kraal near Ngingindhlovu. Up to
this time only a few of the enemy’s scouts had been seen, and nothing
had occurred beyond an occasional nocturnal alarm.
On the 22nd the column marched at 5 A.M., crossed the Inyezane River,
and halted for breakfast, and to outspan the oxen for a couple of
hours, in a fairly open spot, though the country round was a good
deal covered with bush. The halt here was unavoidable, as there
was no water for some distance beyond, but the country had been
previously carefully scouted by the mounted troops under Major Barrow.
At eight o’clock piquets were being placed, and the waggons parked,
when a company of the Native Contingent—who were scouting in front,
under the direction of Captain Hart, staff-officer attached to the
regiment—discovered the enemy advancing rapidly over the ridges, and
making for the adjacent clumps of bush. The Zulus now opened a heavy
fire upon this company, and almost immediately inflicted a loss upon
it of 1 officer, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 3 men killed.
The Naval Brigade (with rockets), under Captain Campbell, the guns
of the Royal Artillery, two companies of “The Buffs,” and the Native
Pioneers were at once posted on a knoll close by the road, from
whence the whole of the Zulu advance was commanded. From this knoll
the bush near was well searched with shell, rockets, and musketry.
The waggons continuing to close up and park, two companies of
“The Buffs,” who moved up with them, were ordered to clear
the enemy out of the bush, guided by Captain Macgregor,
Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General. This they did in excellent
style, driving the Zulus into the open, which again exposed them to a
heavy fire from the knoll.
The engineers and mounted troops were now enabled to move up from
the drift, and, supported by a half company of “Buffs” and a half
company of the 99th, sent on by Lieut.-Colonel Welman (99th) from the
rear of the column, cleared the Zulus out of the bush on the right
flank, where they were seriously threatening the convoy. The Gatling
gun also moved up from the rear, and came into action on the knoll.
The enemy now endeavoured to outflank the left, and got possession
of a kraal about 400 yards from the knoll, which assisted their
turning movement. This kraal was carried by Captain Campbell with his
Naval Brigade, supported by a party of officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Native Contingent under Captain Hart, who were posted
on high ground on the left of the road. Lieut.-Colonel Parnell with a
company of “Buffs,” and Captain Campbell with the Naval Brigade, now
attacked some heights beyond the kraal, upon which a considerable
body of the enemy was still posted. This action was completely
successful, and the Zulus fled in all directions. About half-past
nine the last shot was fired, and the column was re-formed, and
resumed its march at noon.
The loss sustained in this action was 2 privates (“The Buffs”)
killed, 2 officers, 4 non-commissioned officers, and 4 natives
killed, and 1 officer and 15 men wounded. Colonels Pearson and
Parnell had their horses shot under them.
The enemy’s force was estimated at 4000—the Umxapu, Udhlambedhlu, and
Ingulubi Regiments, and some 650 men of the district—and their loss
upwards of 300 killed. The wounded appear to have been either carried
away or hidden.
Four miles beyond the scene of this engagement the column bivouacked
for the night; and, moving off at 5 A.M. next day, reached Etshowe at
10 A.M.; the rear guard not getting in till the afternoon.
Etshowe was a mission station, abandoned some months before, but
now selected for an entrenched post, in preference to more open and
commanding ground to the north, in consequence of the necessity
of utilising the buildings for the storage of supplies. The
station consisted of a dwelling-house, school, and workshop, with
store-rooms—three buildings of sun-dried brick, thatched; there
was also a small church, made of the same materials, but with a
corrugated iron roof; and a stream of good water ran close by the
station. Here the column encamped, and preparations for clearing the
ground and establishing a fortified post for a garrison of 400 men
were made.
Two companies of “Buffs,” two companies Native Contingent, and some
mounted men, were sent back to reinforce Lieut.-Colonel Ely, 99th
Regiment, who, with three companies of his regiment, was on the march
to Etshowe with a convoy of sixty waggons.
On the 25th, Major Coates was sent down to the Tugela with a strong
escort and forty-eight empty waggons, for a further supply of stores;
and next day a “runner” arrived with news that a disaster had
occurred on the 22nd. On the 28th a telegram was received from Lord
Chelmsford, hinting at disaster—that he had been compelled to retire
to the frontier—that former instructions were cancelled, and Colonel
Pearson was to hold Etshowe or withdraw to the Tugela, also that he
must be prepared to bear the brunt of an attack from the whole Zulu
army.
Colonel Pearson at once assembled his staff and commanding officers,
when it was finally decided to hold the post, sending back to the
Tugela the mounted troops and Native Contingent. These marched,
unencumbered with baggage, and reached the Tugela in ten hours—a
contrast with the upward march! The various buildings were loopholed,
and the church prepared for use as a hospital, all tents struck, and
the entrenchments supplemented by an inner line of waggons. In the
evening Colonel Ely’s convoy arrived safely.
The mounted men were sent back from Etshowe, because a large
proportion of the horse forage consisted of mealies, which it was
thought might be required for the use of the garrison, as eventually
was the case.
To replace the mounted men, a small vedette corps was formed under
Lieutenant Rowden, 99th Regiment, and Captain Sherrington, of the
Native Contingent, and did excellent service.
These vedettes were constantly under fire. One was killed at his
post. Another was attacked by some dozen Zulus, who crept upon him
through the long grass; he lost two fingers of his right hand, had
a bullet through each leg and one in his right arm; his horse was
assegaied; yet he managed to get back to the fort, retaining his
rifle.
The vedettes being much annoyed in the early morning by the fire
of some Zulus from a high hill, Captain Sherrington and six of the
men went out one night and lay in wait for them, behind some rocks
near the top of the hill, wounding three and putting an end to the
annoyance.
Colonel Pearson felt it to be necessary to reduce the bread and
grocery rations of the troops, but was enabled to increase the meat
ration by a quarter of a pound, as a large number of cattle had been
brought up with Colonel Ely’s convoy. The waggons of the troops
sent back to the Tugela were officially searched, and a quantity of
food, medicines, and medical comforts thus added to the stock, the
two latter subsequently proving of the utmost value. All articles of
luxury were eventually sold by auction, and fetched almost fabulous
prices: matches were sold for 4s. a box, bottles of pickles 15s.
each, and tobacco 30s. a pound!
The water supply was excellent, both in quality and quantity; and in
the lower part of the stream bathing-places for both officers and
men were constructed; and all sanitary arrangements most carefully
attended to.
A waggon-laager was formed for the cattle, and every effort made to
provide for the security of the fort, as we may now call it—deepening
ditches, strengthening parapets, erecting stockades—all most
energetically carried on under the direction of Captain Wynne, R.E.
So things went on, till, on February 9th, Zulus were observed to be
collecting; but nothing occurred beyond an occasional alarm.
On the 11th two “runners” arrived from the Lower Tugela with a
despatch[168] from the General, almost requiring Colonel Pearson to
retire with half his force to the Tugela, leaving the remainder to
garrison the fort. This, after a council of war, was decided not to
be practicable, the country being occupied by the Zulus in force. A
flying column, however, was organised, in case it became necessary to
carry out what the General seemed to desire.
Having questioned the messengers, and ascertained that they were
willing to return on the following Saturday, Colonel Pearson sent a
despatch, asking for further instructions, and saying he would be
prepared to start on Sunday night at twelve o’clock if necessary.
This message was twice repeated on different days, but no reply
received.
Alterations and improvements in the defences, to enable the fort
to be held by a smaller garrison, went steadily on in spite of bad
weather; ranges from 600 to 700 yards were marked round the fort, and
_trous-de-loups_ and wire entanglements formed on the north, south,
and east faces.
On March 1st an expedition was led out by Colonel Pearson to attack a
military kraal (Dabulamanzi’s) six miles distant; this was done and
the kraal burnt, a smart skirmish being kept up with the Zulus during
the homeward march.
On the 2nd it was noticed that heliograph signals were being flashed
from the Lower Tugela, but no message was made out.
Next day further signalling, though vague, was taken to mean
that a convoy was to be expected on the 13th instant with 1000
men, and that on its approach Colonel Pearson was to sally out
and meet it. A heliograph was improvised by Captain Macgregor,
Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General, by means of a small
looking-glass, and efforts made to flash back signals, but bad
weather ensued, preventing further communication till the 10th.
A new road to Inyezane, shortening the distance by about three
miles, and avoiding much of the bush, was commenced, and reported
fit for use on the 13th, though the work had been hindered by very
bad weather, and by the working-parties being constantly under fire.
Fortunately no one was hit, except Lieutenant Lewis, of “The Buffs.”
On March 23rd two Zulus came up with a white flag, and were brought
in to the fort each with a mealie-bag over his head; they are said
to have come with a message from the king to the effect that if our
force would return to Natal he would order the officers commanding
his large armies not to touch it. These men were detained as
prisoners in irons, and interviewed by Lord Chelmsford on his arrival
at Etshowe; but of their subsequent disposal nothing appears known.
At first the health of the troops was extremely good, but before
the end of February the percentage of sick had largely increased,
there being 9 officers and upwards of 100 men on the sick-list when
it was relieved. The principal disorders were diarrhœa, dysentery,
and fevers, aggravated by the want of proper medicines and medical
comforts, which had been soon exhausted. The church was used as the
hospital, and both officers and men lived under the waggons, over
which the waggon-sails were spread, propped up with tent-poles; thus
the troops actually lived at their alarm-posts.
The relief took place none too soon, there being then but six days’
further supply of reduced rations available for the garrison.
“From first to last, the men showed an excellent spirit, the highest
discipline was maintained, and the reduction of the food was never
grumbled at or regarded in any other light than a necessity and
a privation to be borne, and which they were determined to bear
cheerfully.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 39).