NO. 4 COLUMN—INTOMBI—INDHLOBANE—KAMBULA—KING’S MESSENGERS.
On January 6th, No. 4 Column, under Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B.—strength
previously detailed—crossed the Blood River (the Zulu boundary
according to the award of the Commission) and advanced to Bemba’s Kop.
On the 11th, Colonel Wood met the General halfway to Rorke’s Drift,
and received instructions “to occupy himself with the tribes on his
front and left flank, notably Seketwayo,” until No. 3 Column was
ready to advance to Isipezi Hill, when he was to proceed to Ingwe,
both columns to establish advanced depôts, bring up supplies, and
then move forward. Colonel Wood induced the Zulu chief Bemba to give
up his arms and come in, which he did on the 10th, bringing with him
about eighty of his people and 1000 head of cattle, sheep, and goats;
they were sent to Utrecht.
On the 11th, Colonel Wood, who had advanced with a portion of the
force from Bemba’s Kop towards Rorke’s Drift to meet the General on
his return march, seized about 2000 head of cattle, the owners of
which were quietly tending them as usual (these were supposed to
be Sihayo’s), and next day attacked a petty chief, who was said to
have “given considerable trouble to the Transvaal farmers”, with
the result of seven Zulus killed and upwards of 500 head of cattle
captured.
Some 2000 to 3000 head of cattle were also taken from the Sondolosi
tribe,[161] a slight resistance being offered by the Zulus, of whom
one was killed. Colonel Wood _thus_ endeavoured to induce Seketwayo’s
people to be pacified, and was “therefore most anxious to refrain
from taking any steps which might discourage these men from coming
in!”
The General, on entering Zululand, finding the difficulties greater
than he had anticipated, instructed Colonel Wood “to act altogether
independently, about the head waters of the White Umveloosi River”
(16th January, 1879), and when Seketwayo had either surrendered
or been defeated, to “take up a position covering Utrecht and the
adjacent Transvaal border, wherever he considers his force can be
most usefully employed,” and not to “attempt to advance towards the
Inhlazatye Mountain until an advance by the other three columns
across the Umhlatoozi River has become possible.” (P. P. [C. 2252]
p. 63.) Colonel Wood, from Bemba’s Kop, communicated with Uhamo—a
brother of Cetshwayo—who had asked for a way to be pointed out by
which he might escape.
No. 4 Column now moved towards Intemgeni River, and encamped there on
18th January, Colonel Wood reporting “many of the natives are giving
themselves up to me; I have captured about 4000 head of cattle.”
On the previous day a party of Wood’s “irregulars” attacked some
Zulus, killing 9, wounding about 20, and taking 5 prisoners and 100
sheep; with a loss to themselves of 2 wounded (_ibid._ p. 66). On the
19th and 20th there were skirmishes with some of Tinta’s people, of
whom about 12 were killed. A prisoner was brought in by the Native
Contingent on the 19th, whom they gravely asked permission to kill
in the evening, “thinking they had done their whole duty in obeying
orders and bringing the man in.”
The column encamped at Tinta’s kraal, on the left bank of the
Umvolosi River, and a stone fort was commenced. A reconnaissance
across the Umvolosi to Zinguni Mountain met the Zulus in force,
and was compelled to retire with a loss of two wounded, the enemy
not being checked until the river was recrossed. January 22nd, the
Zinguni Mountain was patrolled by a strong force, the enemy retiring
hastily, and leaving about 600 head of cattle. In the distance a
large force, estimated at 4000, was seen, and it apparently ascended
the Indhlobane Mountain. The column had a smart engagement with the
enemy on the 24th, and drove them off with a loss of about fifty
killed; but on receiving intelligence of the disaster to No. 3
Column, retired to Fort Tinta.
At Luneburg a laager was formed by the Dutch farmers, under
Commandant Schermbrucker, and Colonel Wood moved his force to Kambula
Hill, to cover Utrecht and the neighbouring border, and there
firmly entrenched himself. The situation chosen was a commanding
and central position between the Umvolosi and Pevana rivers on the
Jagt-pad (Hunter’s path), covering the country northward to Luneburg,
eastward to the Amaqulusi, southward to the Umvolosi, and westward to
Balte’s Spruit and Utrecht.
The Zulus abandoned the open, and remained in the mountains and
broken country, where rocks and caves afforded them secure positions.
On February 1st, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 140 irregular cavalry,
made a dash at the Amaqulisini (or Amaqulusi) kraal, thirty miles
distant. This was a military stronghold, deemed by the Boers to be
impregnable. It was situated in a basin at a distance of nearly
two miles from the summit of the rugged heights by which it was
surrounded, and almost hidden from view, although about 300 yards in
diameter and containing at least 250 huts.
Leaving thirty men as a covering party, Colonel Buller moved with the
remainder down the almost precipitous slopes, the horsemen frequently
obliged to dismount and lead their horses. However, the kraal was
not occupied in force, and, after a few shots, the inmates fled. Six
Zulus were killed, 270 head of cattle taken, and the kraal burnt, the
force returning from this daring exploit without casualty, after a
hard day’s work of twenty hours.
A small fort was finished and armed on February 3rd, and, on the
10th, Lieut.-Colonel Buller, with 400 irregular cavalry, reconnoitred
the Indhlobane Mountain, and, after a slight skirmish, captured 490
head of cattle.
A new fort was commenced at Kambula, about two miles higher up the
spur, and the camp moved to this spot on the 13th, the fort being
garrisoned by two companies of infantry and two guns.
It was reported that Manyonyoba (an independent native chief) had
been killing and plundering in the Intombi Valley, so Colonel Buller
was sent with a force to the spot. The Swazi chief Umbilini was also
reported by Commandant Schermbrucker to have raided, in combination
with Manyonyoba, and done much mischief to life and property;
however, a force sent from Luneburg had a successful skirmish with
them.
The king’s brother, Uhamo, came in to Captain McLeod from the Swazi
border with 300 of his people and 1000 cattle, and reached Derby on
February 4th, his following increased to about 600, and was moved
down to Luneburg, where he arrived on March 7th.
A sad disaster occurred on the Intombi River to a detachment of the
80th Regiment on the 12th March. Captain Moriarty, with 104 men of
the 80th, was escorting a convoy from Derby to Luneburg. On reaching
the Intombi Drift (about four miles from Luneburg) the river was
found to be rising, and by the time the advanced guard (thirty-five
men, under Lieutenant Harward) had crossed, it was impossible to take
the waggons over. They were therefore laagered on the river-bank in
the shape of a triangle; and there they remained next day. About
4 A.M. on the 12th a shot was fired, and the troops turned out,
remaining under arms for half an hour, when, all being quiet, they
returned to their tents (it transpired afterwards that the outlying
sentries had been surprised and killed by the enemy). Suddenly the
fog lifted, and a large body of Zulus without any warning rushed on
and took the laager, driving the troops into the river. The party
under Lieutenant Harward, which was encamped on the opposite bank,
opened a brisk fire, but were soon broken, and obliged to fly towards
Luneburg; Lieutenant Harward, galloping in, gave the alarm. Only
forty-four men of this detachment survived.
Major Tucker sallied out from Luneburg, when the enemy slowly
retreated. The waggons were saved, and the bodies of Captain Moriarty
and his unfortunate men buried.
The comparatively quiet time at Kambula was passed thus: Colonel
Wood was up with the first in the early morning, and often out with
the patrols who daily scouted the country round for miles; his force
securely entrenched; himself a very strict but kind commander, who
had the full confidence and good-will of his troops. Sports were
got up for the amusement and occupation of the men. A band played
in the evening, and the singing and laughter in camp showed that
all were in excellent spirits. The daily business was cutting wood
from the mountain-side some three miles distant, escorts, patrols,
and piquet-duty. One of the night piquets (eight men) posted at
some distance from camp was termed “the forlorn hope;” its special
duty was to give early warning of an enemy’s approach. But the most
unpleasant feature in this camp-life was the absence of comfort at
night. The troops necessarily “turned in” dressed, armed, and ready
for instant work, with the _personal_ discomfort illustrated by this
soldier’s joke—that it was “Cetshwayo outside and Catch-away-o!
inside.”
Lieut.-Colonel Buller, having returned to Kambula, patrolled Uhamo’s
district, and in the direction of the Indhlobane range; and on the
16th brought into camp 958 of Uhamo’s people.
On March 28th, a reconnaissance by the whole cavalry force was made
towards Indhlobane. The Zulus were in possession of the mountain,
which was ascended in skirmishing order as rapidly as possible,
the enemy keeping up a heavy fire from caves and from behind huge
rocks. The summit was reached with the loss of one officer—Lieutenant
Williams—and serious fighting was kept up for some time in the
endeavour to dislodge the Zulus from their secure positions. Captain
the Hon. R. Campbell was killed, also Lieutenant von Sticenstron, and
Colonel Wood himself had a very narrow escape.
Whilst engaged in this struggle a Zulu army was moving up to seize
the approaches to the mountain, and cut off the force from the camp.
Immediately on this being observed a retreat was made in rapid but
good order, until a very steep and stony krantz was reached, where
the men could only move in single file; here the enemy got in amongst
the troopers, causing utter confusion. The officers did their best to
steady their men, but it became a case of _sauve qui peut_.
Captain Barton’s troop was sent down the mountain to recover the
body of Lieutenant Williams, and returned, having been joined by Mr.
Uys. On the flats they came up with Colonel Weatherley’s troop, and
found the enemy in front and on the right and left. Retreating a
short distance they were surrounded, so, opening out, they charged
through the enemy and over the neck, which was lined with Zulus. But
few were enabled to win their way through this perilous pass, and of
those who did many were overtaken and killed on the plain. Of Captain
Barton’s troop but eight men returned to camp that night.
The broken force fought its way to the camp, followed by the enemy
for several miles. Many a man’s life was saved by a comrade halting
and taking him up on his own horse, a personal instance of which
Captain D’Arcy gives. His horse had been killed under him in the
descent of the mountain, and he ran for his life for some 300 yards,
when a man named Francis caught a horse for him, which, however,
he shortly relinquished to a wounded comrade, running on himself
on foot. Colonel Buller picked him up when nearly exhausted, but
when he recovered his breath he dismounted; he was a second time
in difficulties, and assisted by Lieutenant Blaine, and again, a
third time, by Major Tremlett, R.A. Indeed, most of the men got into
camp with comrades mounted behind them. The loss was 12 officers
and 84 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and also Colonel
Wood’s staff-officer, Captain the Hon. R. Campbell; Captain Barton,
Coldstream Guards; and Mr. Lloyd, Political Assistant. Colonel Wood’s
horse was shot under him.
Mr. Piet Uys, the leader of the Burgher force, was likewise amongst
those killed in action this day.
Small patrols were sent out next morning to endeavour to find any men
who might have escaped.
Warning of an intended attack on Kambula was brought in by a
native—one of Uhamo’s men—and, about 11 A.M., dense masses of the
enemy were seen in the distance, when all the force was assembled
and the cattle driven into their laager. At 1.30 P.M. the action
commenced by mounted troops, under Colonels Buller and Russell,
engaging the enemy on the north of the camp. They were speedily
forced to return into the laager, followed by the Zulus until they
were within 300 yards, when a heavy fire from the 90th Regiment
checked their advance, and they opened out round the camp.
At 2.15 the right front and rear of the camp were attacked by heavy
masses of the enemy, who, apparently well supplied with Martini-Henry
rifles, occupied a hill commanding the laager, enfilading it so that
the company of the 13th posted at the right rear of the enclosure had
to be withdrawn. The front of the cattle-laager was, however, stoutly
held by a company of the 13th; but the Zulus coming boldly on, Major
Hackett, with two companies of the 90th, was directed to clear the
slope. They sallied out into the open, driving the Zulus back in a
gallant manner under a heavy fire, until ordered to retire by Colonel
Wood.
While bringing his men in, Major Hackett was dangerously wounded.
The two guns in the redoubt were admirably worked by Lieutenant
Nicholson, R.A., until he was mortally wounded; when Major Vaughan,
R.A., replaced him.
Major Tremlett, R.A., with four guns, remained in the open during the
engagement.
The attack began to slacken about 5.30 P.M., enabling Colonel Wood
to assume the offensive; the Zulus were driven from the cattle kraal
into which they penetrated, and from the immediate vicinity of the
camp, the infantry doing great execution among the retreating masses.
The pursuit was taken up by the mounted men under Colonel Buller, and
continued for seven miles, “killing great numbers, the enemy being
too exhausted to fire in their own defence” (_vide_ Colonel Wood’s
despatch of March 30th). All agreed in admiring the pluck of the
Zulus, who, “under tremendous fire, never wavered, but came straight
at us.”
The loss of No. 4 Column was 2 officers killed, 5 wounded, and 80
men killed and wounded. The strength of the enemy was thought to be
about 20,000, of whom 1000 are supposed to have been killed. Colonel
Wood’s operations at Indhlobane were for the purpose of “making
demonstrations against the enemy,” as directed by the General, who
had reason to believe at that time, that he should find the whole
Zulu army between his force and Etshowe. (P. P. [C. 2367] p. 35.) One
trooper, a Frenchman named Grandier, had a very remarkable escape
from Indhlobane, of which the following is his account: On coming
down the mountain we were met by a large Zulu force, and fell back
across the neck assailed on all sides. I was about the last, having
put a comrade on my horse whilst I ran alongside, when a Kafir caught
me by the legs, and I was made prisoner. I was taken to Umbilini’s
kraal and questioned; after which, I passed the night tied to a
tree. Next day I was taken into the middle of a large “impi,” where
I was threatened with death, but the leader said he would send me to
Cetywayo. Next day I started for Ulundi, in charge of four men, who
were riding, but I had all my clothes taken from me, and had to walk,
carrying their food. On the evening of the fourth day we reached
Ulundi, and I was kept tied in the open till about noon next day,
when Cetywayo sent for me, and questioned me about what the English
wanted, where Shepstone was, etc. A Dutchman acted as interpreter,
and I saw a Portuguese, and an English-speaking Zulu, who could
read.[162] Cetywayo had a personal guard of about one hundred men,
but I did not see any large numbers of men at his kraal, but there
were two small cannons there. During my stay I was fed on mealies,
and frequently beaten. At last messengers arrived reporting the death
of Umbilini, and Cetywayo said he would send me to his Kafirs to
kill. On 13th April I started in charge of two Kafirs, one armed with
a gun and both with assegais. About midday we were lying down, the
Kafirs being sleepy, when I seized an assegai and killed the man with
the gun, the other running away. I walked all night guided by the
stars; next day I saw an impi driving cattle towards Ulundi, so had
to lie still. After this I saw no Kafirs, and walked on at night. On
the morning of the 16th I met some of our own people and was brought
into camp. Trooper Grandier, when brought in, was dressed in an old
corduroy coat, cut with assegai stabs, and a pair of regimental
trousers cut off at the knee; these he had picked up on the Veldt. He
had strips of cloth round his feet.
The independent chief Umbilini, who was such a thorn in the side of
the Transvaal, was killed early in April. Small parties had raided
into the Pongolo Valley from Indhlobane, opposite Luneburg, until
they were said to number some hundreds, when they came upon two
companies of the 2-24th on the march; these at once laagered, and the
enemy moved on; Umbilini, Assegai’s son, and four horsemen, going
back with twenty horses. They were pursued by Captain Prior, 80th
Regiment, with seven mounted men (80th), and another European, when
Assegai’s son was killed, and Umbilini mortally wounded.
The raiders were attacked by some parties of natives, but went off to
the Assegai River with several beasts and sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2374] p.
51).
Meanwhile, many attempts were made by the Zulu king to arrest the
tide of invasion, and to bring about a more peaceable solution of the
difficulties between him and the English Government.
When Lord Chelmsford first crossed into Zululand, messengers were
sent by the king to the column on the Lower Tugela asking for an
explanation of the invasion, suggesting that hostilities should be
suspended, that the British troops should re-cross the Tugela, and
that talking should commence.[163] These men did not return to the
king, but remained at the Lower Tugela, Sir Bartle Frere says by
their own desire, since they dared not return with an unsatisfactory
answer.
And Bishop Schreuder narrates on March 3rd that—“Two Zulus arrived
here yesterday with a message from the king.... The king says: ‘Look
here, I have taken care of the deserted mission stations, and not
allowed them to be destroyed, thinking that the missionaries in
time would return to them, such as Mr. Robertson’s at Kwamagwaza,
and Oftibro’s at Ekhowe, but we now see what use the missionaries
make of the station-houses; Robertson has come with an impi (army)
to the Ekhowe mission station, and there has made a fort of it, the
houses being turned to advantage for our enemies. Seeing this, my
people have of their own accord destroyed the other mission stations;
and although I have not ordered this destruction, still I cannot
complain of it, seeing that the houses on the stations will serve as
a shelter for our present invading enemy. I am in a fix what to do
with your station Entumeni, for it is reported ... that the column at
Miltongambill is to ... march to Entumeni, turn the station into a
fort, like Robertson has had the Ekhowe turned into a fort. In that
case I will, much against my wish, be obliged to destroy the house
at Entumeni, as a matter of self-protection, the last thing I ever
thought of doing, as I have no grudge against you or your station.’
This is the substance of the king’s message to me with respect to
my station, Entumeni; it, therefore, now will entirely depend on
the decision of the General Lord Chelmsford, whether the Entumeni
station-houses are to be destroyed or _not_.” Bishop Schreuder says:
“The messengers also report that the king has sent, through a certain
Ikolwa Klass (not known to me), that copy of Sir T. Shepstone’s
report which I, on behalf of the Natal Government, handed over to him
from Her Majesty Queen Victoria, August, 1875.
“Already Umavumendaba had requested the king to send that book with
the deputation that met at Tugela, 11th December, 1878, in order
that there might be proved from that book wherein the king had
sinned, since the English had put forth such warlike demonstrations;
but Umavumendaba’s request was not then acceded to. The king now
sends this book that from the contents of it may be proved wherein he
has broken the compact made at his installation, 1st September, 1875”
[1873].—(P.P. [C. 2318] pp. 35-37).
Bishop Schreuder requested Mr. Fannin, the border agent, “to receive
the message from the messenger’s own lips, and communicate it to
His Excellency.” He reported that Cetshwayo wished to explain to
the Government that he had never desired war. He had not, he said,
refused the terms proposed at the Lower Tugela; he had collected 1000
head of cattle to pay the demand made on him, and would even have
delivered up Sihayo’s sons to the General, but “any Zulu that showed
himself was immediately fired upon.” The attack upon Sandhlwana,
he protested, was not made by his orders, and his induna was in
disgrace for having made it. As regards Inyezane, the king contended
that Colonel Pearson provoked the attack made on him by burning
kraals, and committing other acts of hostility. He asked that both
sides should put aside their arms, and resume negotiations with a
view to a permanent settlement of all questions between himself and
the Government. He would, he said, have sent in a message some time
since, but was afraid, because the last time, when he sent eight
messengers to the Lower Tugela, they were detained, whom he now
begged might be sent back to him (_ibid._ pp. 40, 41).
Mr. Fannin, on the 22nd March, reports the arrival of the messengers
with the book, and says: “Cetywayo sends by the messengers the book
containing the laws promulgated at the time of his coronation, and
presented to him by Her Majesty the Queen.
“It will be remembered that this book was handed to the Zulu king by
Bishop Schreuder at the request of the Natal Government some time
after the coronation took place. The king now returns it, and asks
him to cast his eye over its contents, and say in what way he has
transgressed its provisions” (_ibid._ p. 47).
On March 28th Mr. Fannin reports that “three messengers have arrived
with a message from Cetywayo. Their names are Johannes (a native
of Entumeni), ’Nkisimana, and Umfunzi. On approaching the ferry
they were fired on by the Native Contingent.... The message is
very short; it is simply to say, Cetywayo sees no reason for the
war which is being waged against him, and he asks the Government
to appoint a place at which a conference could be held with a view
to the conclusion of peace.” They further brought a message from
Dabulamanzi, that “a few days ago he sent a white flag with two
messengers to Ekhowe, to ask for a suspension of hostilities, until
the result of this mission was known, but the men have not returned.
He asks that the men may be released.” Mr. Fannin says: “Four other
Entumeni men have arrived with these messengers,” and he suggests,
“that the Entumeni men should not be allowed to return to Zululand”
(_ibid._ pp. 44, 45).
“Owing,” says Sir B. Frere, on June 17th, “to some misunderstanding
between the various civil and military authorities, these messengers
also were detained for several weeks, and have only lately been sent
back.”
“I do not for a moment suppose,” he continues, “that either the civil
or military authorities were aware of this, or could have prevented
it by bringing their detention to notice at an earlier period, but
it shows the difficulties of intercourse on such subjects with the
Zulus, where such things could occur without the slightest ground for
suspicion of bad faith on the part of either the civil or military
authorities.”[164]
It is not easy to discover what unusual and mysterious difficulties
the civil and military authorities can have found in communicating
with the Zulu messengers (men who had been employed for many years
in carrying the “words” of Government and the Zulu king to each
other), and it is still more inexplicable to whose notice the said
authorities could have brought their detention. The whole matter
is about as comprehensible as the statement which appeared at the
time in the Natal papers, that when these same messengers—a small
party—approached our camp, bearing a white flag, “_we fired upon it_
(_i.e._ the flag) _to test its sincerity_.”
The detention of these messengers as prisoners at Kranz Kop came
to the knowledge of the Bishop of Natal about the middle of April,
and he at once brought the fact to the notice of the civil and
military authorities. On the 20th April he saw Lord Chelmsford
in Pietermaritzburg, and spoke to him on the subject. The General
informed him that he had already ordered them to go back to
Cetshwayo, and to say that he must send indunas to meet him (Lord
Chelmsford) at General Wood’s camp, to which he was then bound.
Nevertheless the General’s message, which would take but two days on
the road, had not reached Kranz Kop on the 29th, nor were the men
actually released until the 9th of May. When finally set at liberty
they carried with them a message calculated to discourage any further
attempts on the Zulu king’s part at bringing about a peaceful issue
to the war, being merely that if “Cetywayo sends any more messengers
he must send them to the Upper Column (Dundee).”
Nevertheless on the 12th of June the same two old men appeared again,
brought down, bearing a white flag, to ’Maritzburg by policemen from
Mr. Fynn, resident magistrate at the Umsinga. Apparently they had
been afraid to cross at Kranz Kop, where the “sincerity” of their
white flag had been “tested” before, and were sent, not to the
military authorities, but to the civil magistrate, who sent them
down to Sir Henry Bulwer. He would have nothing to say to them, and
transferred them to General Clifford, who examined them on the 13th,
and sent them off on the following day to Lord Chelmsford. They had
already walked one hundred and fifty miles from Ulundi to ’Maritzburg
with their message of peace, and had then still further to go in
order to reach the General, before they could get any kind of answer.
Meanwhile the campaign was prosecuted without a pause.
General Clifford’s account of this is as follows:
“I began by informing them that I was only going to ask them such
questions as would enable me to judge whether I should be justified
in sending them on to my Chief, Lord Chelmsford, now in Zululand
carrying on the war. The headman, Umfundi, then made the following
statement: ‘We are Umfundi and Umkismana, Zulu messengers from
Cetywayo. I am sent here by Cetywayo to ask for time to arrange a
meeting of Chiefs with a view to arranging peace. We did not go to
the head white Chief, because Fynn at Rorke’s Drift, whom I knew,
told me the Great White Chief was in Zululand, and we had better see
Shepstone and the second White Chief, who were at Pietermaritzburg,
so we came on here advised by Fynn. I have been here about twice a
year for the last six years as King’s messenger, but not as Chief.
I am nothing but a messenger, and I have no authority from the King
to treat for peace, or to do anything besides delivering my message,
asking if time will be given to assemble a meeting of Chiefs. I know
Mr. Shepstone, Mr. Gallway, and Bishop Colenso, and I have seen
Bishop Colenso in this town, and also at his place in the country,
but I do not wish to see him now, and I have not asked to see him.’
(This, according to their custom, merely implied that they had no
message for him.) ‘I want to see the Great Chief, as the King ordered
me to do. I only came here to deliver my message and because Fynn
told me. This is the seventeenth day since I left the King’s kraal.
Am an old man and cannot go so fast as I could when I was young,
and heavy rain detained me three days. The King told me to hurry on
and return quickly. It will take us seven days to get from here to
Ibabamango Mountain if we go by Rorke’s Drift. We only know of two
other messengers sent by the King; one is Sintwango, the name of the
other we do not know. They have been sent to the lower column because
Cetywayo thinks there are two Chiefs of equal power, one with the
upper column and the other with the lower column. They are sent like
us to ask for time to get out by the door. The King does not know
the name of your big Chief, and we do not either. We are the same
messengers the King sent to Fort Buckingham with the same message
we have now. Only then our orders were not to go to your Chief as
now, but to go to Fort Buckingham and wait for the answer there. We
delivered our message to the military Chief there, and he sent the
message on. The Chief was at Etshowe fighting, and the answer did
not come for two months; when it came it was that the great Chief
was surprised we were still there. He thought we had gone back to
the King long ago. The officer at Fort Buckingham advised us to go
to the great white Chief, but we said: “No, those are not the King’s
orders; our orders are to come here, and now we will return and tell
the King;” and it was half of the third month when we got back to
him. We told him what had taken place. He consulted his great Chiefs,
and then sent us with the orders we now have to go and see the great
white Chief, and that is now what we are trying to do. I have no
power given me but to ask for time. The King sends his messengers
first, because it is the custom of the country to do so, and not
to send a great Chief till arrangements have been made where the
Chiefs are to assemble to talk about peace. We have no power to talk
about terms of peace. None but messengers have yet been sent. The
messengers sent to the lower column went before the fighting began;
they were detained and did not return to the King’s kraal till we
did.’ I said I was satisfied they ought to be sent on at once to Lord
Chelmsford.
“I would give a letter, written by me to Lord Chelmsford, to Umfunzi,
to be given by him with his own hand to Lord Chelmsford, and outside
the letter I would say that no one but Lord Chelmsford was to open
it. This appeared to please them much. I said I would write to the
commanding officers along the road they were going to look after
them, and to the officer at Rorke’s Drift to see them safe to
Ibabamango.’ ‘Would a white man be safe going with them?’ ‘Yes,’
they said, ‘quite,’ and they wished one could be sent with them; but
still more, the King would be pleased if a white man was sent to him.
I said I would not send a white man alone into Zululand with them,
because my Chief did not approve, still less could I send one to the
King, because I was only under the big Chief. Anything they wished to
say about peace or anything else they must say to the big Chief when
they saw him.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 111).
At no time during the war, indeed, did we encourage the Zulu king
in his persistent efforts to get peace; but more of this hereafter.
Here we will only add one further instance, namely, that of two
messengers sent to Colonel Pearson at Etshowe, who, although brought
blindfold into the camp, were kept as prisoners in irons until the
garrison was relieved. The pretext for this detention was that they
were _supposed_ to be spies; but officers present were satisfied that
there were no grounds for the supposition, or for the treatment which
they received.
Sir Bartle Frere of course inclines to the opinion that _all_
Cetshwayo’s messengers were spies, his entreaties for peace but
treacherous pretexts to cover his evil intentions. Some of the men
sent were old accredited messengers to the Government, whose names
are frequently mentioned in earlier Blue-books, yet Sir Bartle Frere
says of them: “In no case could they give any satisfactory proof that
they really came from the king.”[165]
But the High Commissioner’s habit of finding evil motives for every
act of the Zulu king, made the case of the latter hopeless from the
first.
Meanwhile the despatches received from Sir Michael Hicks-Beach
contained comments amounting to censure upon the High Commissioner’s
proceedings in forcing on a war with the Zulus. He is plainly told
that he should have waited to consult Her Majesty’s Government upon
the terms that Cetshwayo should be called upon to accept, and that
“they have been unable to find in the documents you have placed
before them that evidence of urgent necessity for immediate action
which alone could justify you in taking, without their full knowledge
and sanction, a course almost certain to result in a war, which, as I
had previously impressed upon you, every effort should have been used
to avoid.”
“The communication which had passed between us,” continues the
Secretary of State, “as to the objects for which the reinforcements
were requested and sent, and as to the nature of the questions in
dispute with the Zulu king, were such as to render it especially
needful that Her Majesty’s Government should understand and approve
any important step, not already suggested to them, before you
were committed to it; and if that step was likely to increase the
probability of war, an opportunity should certainly have been
afforded to them of considering as well the time as the manner of
coming to issue—should it be necessary to come to issue—with the
Zulu king. And though the further correspondence necessary for this
purpose might have involved the loss of a favourable season for
the operations of the British troops, and might have afforded to
Cetywayo the means of further arming and provisioning his forces, the
circumstances rendered it imperative that, even at the risk of this
disadvantage, full explanations should be exchanged.”
The despatch from which the above is quoted was written on the
19th March, and another, dated the following day, expresses the
writer’s “general approval of the principles on which the boundary
award was based,” as intimated in a previous despatch, but gives
a very qualified assent to Sir B. Frere’s emendations by which he
seeks to secure the “private rights” of settlers on the wrongfully
appropriated land, and remarks that he is disposed to think that the
recognition of these said private rights of European settlers in the
district declared to be Zulu territory should have been restricted
as far as possible to those cases in which _bonâ fide_ purchasers
had improved their farms by building, planting, or otherwise, which
restriction would have limited them to a very small number indeed.
Sir M. Hicks-Beach also reminds Sir B. Frere that Her Majesty’s
Government had distinctly said beforehand that “they could not
undertake the obligation of protecting” the missionaries in Zululand.
His comments upon the terms of the ultimatum, he says, are intended
for Sir B. Frere’s guidance when the time for once more proposing
terms should arrive, and he concludes: “It is my wish that, as far
as possible, you should avoid taking any decided step, or committing
yourself to any positive conclusion respecting any of them until you
have received instructions from Her Majesty’s Government.”—(P. P. [C.
2260] pp. 108-111).
Again, upon April 10th, after receiving Sir Bartle Frere’s
explanations, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes as follows:
“Since I addressed to you my despatches of the 19th and 20th March,
I have received your two despatches of February 12th and March 1st,
further explaining the considerations which induced you to decide
that the demands made upon Ketshwayo must be communicated to him
without delay. The definite expression of the views and policy of
Her Majesty’s Government contained in my despatches already referred
to, which will have reached you before you receive this, makes it
unnecessary that I should enter into any examination of the arguments
or opinions expressed in your present despatches. It is sufficient to
say that Her Majesty’s Government do not find in the reasons now put
forward by you any grounds to modify the tenor of the instructions
already addressed to you on the subject of affairs in South Africa,
and it is their desire that you should regulate your future action
according to these instructions.
“But there is one point alluded to in your despatch of March 1st
which I feel it necessary at once to notice, in order to prevent
any misunderstanding. You refer, in the thirty-second paragraph of
that despatch, to ‘much that will remain to be done on the northern
Swazi border and in Sekukuni’s country,’ and to the probability
that ‘the Transvaal, the Diamond Fields, Basutoland, and other
parts now threatened with disturbance, will not settle down without
at least an exhibition of force.’ I entertain much hope that in
each of these cases, including that of Sekukuni, the troubles now
existing or anticipated may disappear, either independently of or
as a consequence of that complete settlement of the Zulu difficulty
which I join with you in trusting to see speedily effected. But, if
this expectation should unfortunately not be fulfilled, you will
be careful to bear in mind that Her Majesty’s Government are not
prepared to sanction any further extension, without their specific
authority, of our responsibilities in South Africa; that their desire
is that the military operations now proceeding should be directed to
the termination, at the earliest moment consistent with the safety
of our colonies and the honour of our arms, of the Zulu question;
and that any wider or larger action of the kind apparently suggested
in your despatch, should be submitted to them for consideration and
approval, before any steps are taken to carry it into effect.”—(P. P.
[C. 2316] p. 36).