NGINGINDHLOVU—RELIEF OF ETSHOWE—BORDER RAIDING.
Lord Chelmsford, having moved down to Durban, reports (February
8th) that No. 1 Column is secure at Etshowe; that he is about to
forward troops to the Lower Tugela; and that Durban, Stanger,
Pietermaritzburg, and Greytown are prepared for defence, “with
garrisons which should prevent panic among those living around;” the
frontier quiet, and the road from Greytown quite open.
The first reinforcement for Natal was brought by H.M.S. _Shah_, which
chanced to be at St. Helena (on her voyage home from the Pacific),
when the news of the disaster in Zululand arrived. Captain Bradshaw,
R.N., immediately decided to proceed to Natal with his ship; the
Governor, after consultation with the officer commanding the troops,
Colonel Philips, R.E., arranging to send in her all the available
force that could be spared from the island. Accordingly she sailed on
February 12th, with 3 officers and 52 men of the Royal Artillery, and
2 officers and 109 men of the 88th Regiment.
H.M.S. _Boadicea_ also arrived on the station, bringing Commodore
Richards, who relieved Rear-Admiral Sullivan, C.B.
Communications had been established with Etshowe by means of flashing
signals, which were conducted by Lieutenant Haynes, R.E., who, after
some failure and discouragement at first, persevered until complete
success was attained.
Previous to this there had been no communications with Colonel
Pearson for a considerable time, but on March 11th a cypher message
from him (dated 9th) said that the flashing signals had been
understood, and that as officers and men were generally sickly, it
would be desirable to relieve the whole of the garrison, and that any
relieving force should bring a convoy and be prepared to fight.—(P.
P. [C. 2316] p. 81).
On March 16th the signals from Etshowe were first made out, and
one of the messages received was: “Short rations until 3rd April.
Breadstuffs until 4th April. Plenty of trek oxen. Captain Williams,
‘The Buffs,’ died at Ekowe on 13th March” (_ibid._ p. 83).
Reinforcements arriving from England, Lord Chelmsford determined to
effect the relief of Etshowe, and assembled a strong force on the
Lower Tugela for that purpose. The column to be in two divisions: the
first, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Law, R.A., composed of the
Naval Brigade of _Shah_ and _Tenedos_, 57th Regiment, 2 companies
“Buffs,” 5 companies 99th Regiment, mounted infantry, volunteers,
and natives, and 5th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery—2
9-pounders, 2 24-pounder rocket-tubes, and 1 Gatling gun; also 150
of John Dunn’s people as scouts. The second division—Lieut.-Colonel
Pemberton, 60th Rifles, commanding—Naval Brigade of H.M.S.
_Boadicea_, Royal Marines of _Shah_ and _Boadicea_, 60th Rifles, 91st
Highlanders, and 4th Battalion Natal Native Contingent; artillery, 2
24-pounder rocket-tubes and 1 Gatling gun; making a total fighting
strength of 3390 white troops and 2280 natives. The Lieut.-General
decided to take command of the column himself, and directed that it
should advance by the coast road, so as to avoid the bush country; to
advance without tents, and with only a blanket and waterproof-sheet
for each man. The convoy, taking one month’s provisions for the
garrison and ten days’ supplies for the column, consisted of about
100 waggons and 44 carts.—(P. P. [C. 2318] pp. 74, 75).
The assembling of this column and preparation for an advance
occupied some weeks, and on the 23rd March Lord Chelmsford assumed
the personal command, the force being assembled on the left bank of
the Tugela and organised in two brigades, as already detailed, by
the 28th. Next day, at 6 A.M., the column marched from the Tugela
and encamped at Inyone, reaching next day the Amatakulu River.
_Now_, profiting by bitter experience, every precaution was taken,
and an entrenched waggon-laager formed before nightfall at each
halting-place.
The crossing of the Amatakulu River took nine hours, and the column
encamped a mile and a half beyond it. Nothing had been seen of the
enemy until the 31st, when the scouts noticed small bodies of Zulus
near the Amatakulu bush. Captain Barrow, with a mounted force,
reconnoitred towards the Engoya Forest, and burnt the kraal of one of
the king’s brothers.
On April 1st, the column marched to Ngingindhlovu, and about a mile
from the Inyezane River a laager was formed in a favourable position.
From this point to Etshowe, the track, after crossing swampy ground,
winds through a bushy and difficult country for about fifteen miles,
the country covered with high grass, and thus affording easy cover.
Etshowe could be plainly seen from the laager, and flash signalling
was at once established.
As this laager was destined to be the scene of an important
engagement, we will describe the disposition of the troops: Front
face (north), 60th Rifles; right flank, 57th Regiment; left flank,
99th Regiment and “Buffs;” rear face, 91st Regiment; the angles
manned by blue-jackets and marines, and armed with the guns,
Gatlings, and rocket-tubes. The night passed without alarm, and
the troops stood to arms at 4 A.M., the mounted men being sent out
scouting as usual at earliest dawn. From scouts and piquets came
reports, at 5.45 A.M., that the enemy was advancing, and at six
the attack commenced on the north front. The Zulus advanced with
great rapidity and courage, taking advantage of every bit of cover;
they even pushed forward to within twenty or thirty yards of the
entrenchments, but were checked by the steady fire of the 60th and
the Gatling gun. Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 3-60th Rifles, received a
dangerous wound, but cheered on his men to the end of the engagement.
The attack, checked here, rolled round to the left face; and, whilst
this was being developed, a fresh force came up against the rear,
probably anticipating that all the faces of the laager could not be
defended at the same time. Here they obstinately held their ground,
finding cover in the long grass and undulations.
The mounted troops were now sent out, the mounted infantry and
volunteers to clear the front face, and Captain Barrow to attack
the enemy’s right flank. On their appearance the Zulus commenced
to retreat. It was now 7.30 A.M.; and the Natal Native Contingent,
clearing the ditch of the rear face, dashed out in pursuit, which,
led by Captain Barrow’s horsemen, was carried on for several miles.
The loss of the enemy in this engagement is estimated at 1000: 671
bodies were actually counted. The attacking force is said to have
numbered about 11,000 men.
Colonel Pearson, who had watched the fight through a glass,
telegraphed his congratulations to the General.
The loss of the column was 2 officers and 9 men killed (including
Lieut.-Colonel Northey, 60th Rifles), 5 officers and 57 men wounded.
On the 3rd April, leaving a garrison in the laager, Lord Chelmsford
pushed on to Etshowe with a convoy of fifty-eight carts with stores.
The advance was unopposed, but the difficulties of the country were
such that it was nearly midnight before the rear guard had traversed
the fifteen miles and entered Etshowe.
The garrison had suffered severely from sickness during the preceding
month, losing by disease 4 officers and 20 non-commissioned officers
and men; and when relieved there were sick in hospital, 8 officers
and 44 non-commissioned officers and men, and attending hospital,
1 officer and 78 non-commissioned officers and men—out of a total
force of 53 officers, 1289 non-commissioned officers and men, and 121
natives.
The constant wet weather and close quarters in the fort, with little
or no shelter, the want of medicines, and insufficient food, might
well have caused even heavier loss.
The General determined to evacuate Etshowe, as he found it so
difficult of approach: future operations being planned to be carried
on by the coast road. On the 4th Colonel Pearson evacuated the fort
he had so tenaciously held, taking with him his waggons and all his
stores that were of any use; unserviceable tools and metal-work were
buried, but the fort was not destroyed.
Colonel Pearson’s march to the Tugela was performed without any
interruption from the enemy.
On the 4th a kraal of Dabulamanzi’s on the Entumeni Hill was
destroyed by a patrol from Etshowe, and on the 5th the relieving
column left, and bivouacked near the Infuchini mission station. Early
next morning an unfortunate alarm occurred, causing the death of
three men. A sentry fired at what he thought was a body of the enemy,
and the piquet on the opposite side of the entrenchment retired into
shelter, together with native scouts who were out in front. Although
it was a bright moonlight night, and no mistakes should have been
made, fire was opened from the entrenchment, and five of the 60th
were wounded and nine natives bayoneted as they attempted to gain the
shelter of the laager.
On reaching Ngingindhlovu a new laager was formed, about a mile from
the old one; this was garrisoned on the 7th, the column moving on to
the Tugela.
The small mounted force under Captain Barrow, 19th Hussars, rendered
excellent service, both during the engagement at Ngingindhlovu, and
by the manner in which the scouting duties were carried out.
A party of Mr. John Dunn’s people (natives), 150 in number, were also
of the greatest utility in scouting and outpost duties. Mr. Dunn
himself accompanied the General; his knowledge of the country and
sound advice being of much use (_ibid._ p. 122).
John Dunn was an Englishman, resident in Zululand, where he had
lived for many years and adopted many Zulu customs. He amassed a
considerable property, and had an extensive following. He invariably
received the greatest kindness and consideration from the Zulu king,
and was frequently employed by him in various communications with the
English Government. When the danger of war between English and Zulus
appeared imminent, John Dunn appealed to the English for protection
for himself, his property, and people, who were ready, he said, to
fight on the English side. At the same time Cetshwayo sent him a
message to the effect that he saw the English were going to attack
him, and therefore Dunn had better leave his country, with his people
and cattle, and go to a place of safety. This John Dunn did, crossing
the Tugela about the 3rd of January, and settling near Fort Pearson.
At the time the General determined to move to the relief of Etshowe
he “sent secret instructions to the different commanders along the
border, from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula Hill, requesting them
to make strong demonstrations all along the line, and, if possible,
to raid into Zululand in order to make a diversion in favour of the
relieving column,” thinking he “might possibly have to meet the full
strength of the Zulu army.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56).
On the 2nd of April a small force of Native Contingent crossed the
Tugela and burnt two large kraals, no resistance being made. On
the next day a force crossed again and burnt an unoccupied kraal,
exchanging a few shots with Zulus, of whom a considerable number
were seen at a distance. On the following day the natives refused
to cross, and the Border Agent, Mr. Fannin, remarks: “I think it
is fortunate it was not attempted, as the Zulus had assembled a
considerable body of men to resist.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 104).
The reserve native force had co-operated in these movements by being
assembled and placed in position along the Tugela, but the colonial
commander declined to proceed over the border, or send any of his
force into Zululand, without the sanction of the Lieut.-Governor.
The Government of Natal had placed at Lord Chelmsford’s disposal a
number of natives (over 8000) for service in the Zulu country. Some
of these were intended for fighting purposes, and formed what we
have already described as the Natal Native Contingent. The rest were
supplied for transport, pioneer, and hospital-corps services, and all
were expected to cross the border.
But besides these men, native levies were called out, when the war
began, for service _in the colony_—that is to say, for the defence
of the border under colonial district commanders. These levies were
to be used solely as a border-guard, and were not intended to cross
into Zululand at all. Sir Henry Bulwer, in permitting them to be
raised, had been careful to protect as far as possible the interests
of both the white and the native population of Natal, and had made
very proper stipulations as to the services for which he placed these
levies at the disposal of the General. The latter, indeed, expressed
it as his opinion that every available fighting native in the colony
should be called out; but Sir Henry, with a greater comprehension
of consequences, demurred to this rash proposal, and a personal
interview between the two resulted in the above-mentioned arrangement.
Consequently the Lieut.-Governor was not a little surprised to
learn on the 8th April that the native levies had been ordered, in
conjunction with the other troops, to make raids across the border
into Zululand. To this he objected, writing to the High Commissioner
on April 9th in the following terms: “I venture to suggest for your
Excellency’s consideration the question of the policy of raids of
this kind. The burning of empty kraals will neither inflict much
damage upon the Zulus, nor be attended with much advantage to
us; whilst acts of this nature are, so it seems to me, not only
calculated to invite retaliation, but to alienate from us the whole
of the Zulu nation, men, women, and children, including those who are
well disposed to us. We started on this war on the ground that it was
a war against the king and the Zulu Government, and not against the
nation....”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 103).
A correspondence ensued between the Lieut.-Governor and the
Lieut.-General, in which the two differed in a very decided
manner. Lord Chelmsford complained that the action taken by the
Lieut.-Governor, “in refusing to allow the orders issued by” him to
the native forces to be carried out, appeared to him “fraught with
such dangerous consequences” that he considered it necessary to refer
the question to the Home Government. (P. P. [C. 2318] p. 56.) He
implied that this interference had (in conjunction with the state of
the Tugela River) prevented a general raid being made, which might
have proved an important diversion in favour of the column relieving
Etshowe, and he declared, in behalf of the raiding system, that
“it would be madness to refrain from inflicting as much damage as
possible upon our enemy” (_ibid._ p. 56).
It was a well-known fact that the fighting-men of the Zulu nation
were with their army, and that the only occupants of the kraals
to be raided were the women, children, and the infirm and other
non-combatants; therefore the General’s following remark, “I am
satisfied that the more the Zulu nation at large feels the strain
brought upon them by the war, the more anxious will they be to see it
brought to an end,” was of a highly Christian, wise, and soldierly
nature, hardly to be matched by anything attributed to the Zulu
monarch himself.
Sir Henry Bulwer’s replies were temperate but decided. He pointed
out that the statement contained in Lord Chelmsford’s despatch
to the Secretary of State for War, implying that the Governor’s
interference had (or might have) seriously interfered with the relief
of Etshowe, was erroneous; Etshowe having been relieved on the 3rd
of April, five days before Sir Henry even heard of the order for
the Natal natives to make raids. To the General himself he observes
that his interference had been limited to approval of the action of
the district commander, who declined to employ his force in a manner
contrary to the express stipulations under which they were raised,
and concludes: “The views of this Government are very strongly
against the employment, under the present circumstances, of the
native levies or native population along the border in making raids
into the Zulu country, as being, in the opinion of the Government,
calculated to invite retaliation, and also as being demoralising to
the natives engaged in raiding” (_ibid._ p. 55).
The Lieut.-Governor’s views were that these native levies “were
called out expressly and solely for service in the colony, and
for the defence of the colony, and were placed under the colonial
district commanders for that purpose only,” and that no authority had
been given to employ these native levies “on any service in the Zulu
country” (_ibid._ p. 54).
And it seems that raids along the border had been ordered _after_ the
relief of Etshowe was effected.
Sir H. Bulwer writes, 16th April, that he had received, on the 7th,
a copy of a military telegram written after the relief of Etshowe,
showing that the General had “ordered raids to be made across the
border wherever feasible,” and, on the following day, a copy of a
memorandum, written from Etshowe by Colonel Crealock, the Assistant
Military Secretary, and addressed to the officer commanding at the
Lower Tugela, and, among other things, it contained the following
instruction: “Send word up to the frontier to raid across the river
wherever the river permits.” And the same evening he heard of the
native levies having been required to cross (_ibid._ p. 53).
The question of the employment of the native levies in making
raids across the border was referred by the Lieut.-Governor to the
Executive Council of Natal, which, on the 23rd April, expressed
itself as “strongly opposed to the employment, in making raids into
the Zulu country, of the native levies, who ... have been called
out for the _defence_ of the colony only.” But, in view of the
Lieut.-General’s strongly-expressed opinions, the Council felt there
was no alternative but that the General “should have the power of
so employing the native levies on the border. At the same time, the
Council desires ... to record emphatically its objections to the
course proposed, and to such employment of the levies.”—(P. P. [C.
2367] p. 132).
This decision of the Executive Council was communicated to the
General on April 25th by the Lieut.-Governor, with the remark:
“Your Excellency will therefore have the power to employ the native
levies across the border in the way named by you, should you think
it imperatively necessary for military reasons. Your Excellency will
not fail to perceive, however, that such employment of the native
levies is against the decided opinion of this colony as to its
inexpediency” (_ibid._ p. 133).
On the 20th May raids were again made into Zululand from three
different points, under Major Twentyman’s command. One party crossed
at the Elibomvu Drift, and burnt fifteen kraals and large quantities
of grain; another burnt three kraals and captured a large herd of
cattle; and the third burnt two kraals, and then, seeing the Zulus
assembling in force, beat a hurried retreat across the Tugela.—(P. P.
[C. 2374] p. 91).
Sir Henry Bulwer, on the 24th May, writes to the High Commissioner:
“Major-General the Hon. H. H. Clifford, commanding the base of
operations ... was wholly unaware that any such raid was being
organised by Major Twentyman, who, I believe, acted under general
instructions received from head-quarters.... The views of the
Government of Natal on the subject of these raids, your Excellency is
already acquainted with. The material advantage to be gained by the
work of destruction or of plunder of Zulu property can be at the best
but trifling and insignificant, and on every other account I fear
our action will prove positively injurious to us, to our interests,
and to our cause. We are absolutely provoking retaliation. Already,
I am informed, since the raid reported in these papers took place,
some native huts on the Natal side of the Tugela have been burned by
Zulus; and to what extent this work of revenge and retaliation may be
carried, with what losses of property, and even of life, inflicted
on our border natives, it is impossible to say.... What result we
have gained to justify even the risk of such retaliation against us,
and of such a sacrifice to our own native population, I know not”
(_ibid._ pp. 89, 90).
The fears of the Lieutenant-Governor were in some measure realised
on the 25th June, when he writes: “A raid was made by two bodies
of Zulus, numbering, it is estimated, about 1000, into the Tugela
Valley, below the Krans Kop in this colony. The Zulus destroyed
several kraals, and carried off a number of cattle. I regret to say
also that several of our Natal natives, including women, were killed,
and some women and children carried off.”
“There can be little doubt that this raid has been made in
retaliation for the one that was made into the Zulu country opposite
the Krans Kop by a force under Major Twentyman, of Her Majesty’s
4th Regiment, on the 20th May, and which was reported to you in my
despatch of the 31st of that month.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 150).
Thus the opinions expressed in Sir H. Bulwer’s despatch of 24th May
were to some extent justified, with the probability of a blood-feud
being set up between the two border populations, and widening the
breach between ourselves and the Zulu people; and with it the
increased difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory settlement for the
future.