THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SIKUKUNI.
We have already, in a previous chapter, explained the circumstances
which led to the war between the Transvaal Boers and Sikukuni,
independent chief of a mixed race of natives commonly called the
_Makatisi_, more properly the _Bapedi_, tribe. The immediate cause
of the war was a border dispute between some of the gradually
encroaching Boer farmers and the natives whom they had displaced,
which ended in the latter taking possession of some cattle belonging
to the former.
This affair took place during a temporary absence of Mr. Burgers
(then President of the Republic), who, on his return, demanded the
cattle at the hands of Sikukuni, and the restraint of his people
within the limits assigned to them by their Boer neighbours. Sikukuni
expressed his willingness to make the required restitution, but took
the opportunity of reminding the President that he laid claim to a
considerable piece of territory already occupied by Boers, to whom
he denied having ever willingly relinquished it. This reply was the
signal for a declaration of war against Sikukuni on the part of the
President and Volksraad, and a large “commando,” or volunteer force,
was called out to attack him early in July, 1876.
This force, consisting of some 3000 Boers and over 4000 of their
Swazi allies, made its way through the country, ravaging and
destroying as it went, until it reached the famous stronghold known
as “Sikukuni’s Town,” upon which it made an unsuccessful night
attack, on August 2nd.
A single reverse was sufficient to dishearten the gallant Boers, who
immediately discovered various reasons which made their return to
their homes absolutely necessary. The commando dispersed, leaving
a force of volunteers composed of stray Englishmen, Germans, and
half-bred natives to occupy a couple of posts (Fort Burgers and
Fort Weber), which they built for the purpose. From these posts
they carried on a system of raiding expeditions upon Sikukuni’s
people, which effectually prevented the cultivation of their land,
and finally produced a scarcity of food amongst them. This state of
things was too harassing to last, and Sikukuni sued for peace, which
was granted him early in 1877, conditionally upon his paying a heavy
fine in cattle.
A month later, and before the fine had been paid, Sir T. Shepstone
had annexed the Transvaal, and, as we have already described, took
over, with the country, its quarrels and demands. He tried to enforce
the fine imposed by the late Boer Government upon Sikukuni, while
remitting the war-tax levied upon the whites. After having been
subjected to so long a course of marauding on the part of the Dutch,
it is not impossible that the chief really had some difficulty in
procuring, at a moment’s notice, the 2000 head of cattle demanded
by Sir T. Shepstone.[156] At all events, the fine was not paid so
promptly as the administrator expected; and the whole country being
in an unsettled condition, perpetual disturbances still took place
between Sikukuni’s people and the border farmers, and also between
the former and petty chiefs who had placed themselves under British
protection.
The most restless of the independent native rulers seems to have been
a woman, Legolwana, a sister of Sikukuni’s, who had her own clan, and
whose head-quarters was a mountain stronghold, called Masellaroon. In
February, 1878, her people had a quarrel (nor was it for the first
time) with a neighbouring native chief under our rule, from whom
they took some cattle. Whether or no there were two sides to the
question, the despoiled chief was our subject, and it so happened
that Legolwana’s people were met in the act of driving off the cattle
by a patrol of Transvaal volunteers, who promptly interfered. This
occurrence led to a general outbreak of hostilities. Legolwana’s men
attacked the two forts simultaneously, and the officers in command,
Captain Clarke and Lieutenant Eckersley, with their men, escaped
from them, and retired to Lydenburg. From thence Captain Clarke sent
embassies to the Swazi king and another independent chief, asking for
assistance against Sikukuni. His invitations, however, were politely
declined, the chiefs in question not caring to interfere, although
wishing to remain upon friendly terms with the English.
Having obtained reinforcements from the gold-fields and Pretoria,
Captain Clarke marched back to Fort Weber, and re-occupied it with a
force consisting of 40 mounted volunteers under Captains Van Deventer
and Ferreira, 150 Natal Zulus under Lieutenants Lloyd and Dacomb, and
300 Bechuanas under Mr. Tainton.
Captain Clarke’s first intentions were to attack Legolwana and
reduce her to submission. Captain Lacon Hervey, 71st Regiment, gives
the following description of her stronghold in his account of “The
Secocœni War”:
“The town, or kraal, of Legolani consisted of a number of straw and
wattle-and-daub huts, beehive-shaped, situated at the base and on
the terraces of a mountain of rocks and huge boulders 700 feet high,
covered over with thick clumps of bush. The huts at the base of the
mountain were surrounded by an impenetrable hedge of prickly pear;
a single entrance, barricaded with timber, led through an avenue
of prickly pear and cactus into the group of huts surrounded by
palisading, wattle screens, and stone walls. Each group of huts was
commanded by the rocks above; from behind these a direct, flanking,
and enfilade fire could be poured on the attacking party, which, on
account of the intricacy of the ground, would be compelled to advance
in single file along the tortuous goat-paths leading up to the
mountain. In addition to the cover afforded by the caves and fissures
in the rocks, schanzes, or low stone walls, were built up wherever
favourable positions with safe means of retreat presented themselves.
The paths leading from one rock entrenchment, or terrace, to the
one above it, were so concealed by rock and bush as to be difficult
to find. Finally, the Kafirs’ most valued treasure, the cattle, was
placed on the summit of the mountain, on a level plot of ground,
surrounded by a stone wall.”
This stronghold was attacked by Captain Clarke’s orders on the 5th
April, and, “after about two hours’ sharp work, the north of the
hill was carried.”[157] The fighting force, not being sufficient to
complete its work, was ordered to withdraw, after having swept all
the cattle from that side of the hill (277 head of cattle and 211
sheep and goats). A considerable number of Legolwana’s people are
supposed to have fallen in this assault, the loss on our side being
10 killed and 12 wounded, amongst the latter Captain Van Deventer
slightly, and Lieutenant Lloyd severely. These two officers are
reported as having led the attack with great gallantry.
The partial success gained by the storming of Masellaroon (with the
loss of life on our side—considerable under the circumstances) was
not such as to encourage Captain Clarke in the tactics with which
he had commenced his operations. He therefore abandoned all idea of
seizing the native strongholds, and “established a cordon of forts,
about twelve miles from each other ... with a view of harassing the
Kafirs by preventing them from cultivating the Indian corn.”
“Legolwana had sued for peace, but Captain Clarke would not listen to
anything except unconditional surrender, with the guarantee that all
life should be spared.”[158]
Thus, with the usual notion that “no terms can be made with savages,”
which has again and again produced such disastrous consequences for
them and for us, a system of petty warfare was kept up, tedious,
unnecessary, and by which no good could be done nor honour gained. To
the volunteers, many of whom, says Captain Harvey, were “gentlemen
by birth and education,” there may have been some amusement in what
that officer speaks of as “actions of daring individual enterprise,”
and which he describes as follows: “Volunteers went out and lay
ambuscades at night, to surprise and cut off Kafirs proceeding from
kraal to kraal, or to cultivate their fields, and ‘cattle-lifting’
expeditions were planned and boldly carried out;” but the life must
have become monotonous in the extreme before July, when the native
auxiliaries became so discontented with it that some of them were
allowed to return to their homes, while a troop of mounted infantry
was summoned from Pretoria to keep order amongst those who remained.
It was about this time that Colonel Rowlands, V.C., came upon the
scene. This excellent officer, of whose services in 1878-79 so little
mention has been made, was sent out on “special service,” and was
for a short time attached to the staff of Lord Chelmsford (then
General Thesiger) during the Kaffrarian war. He was subsequently
sent by the High Commissioner to Pretoria, which he reached on May
6th. He employed the two following months in an inspection of the
northern and eastern frontiers of the Transvaal,[159] and by dint
of considerable personal exertion was enabled to supply valuable
information to head-quarters. Towards the end of July, Colonel
Rowlands was appointed Commandant of the Transvaal. At this time the
regular forces in the Transvaal consisted only of the 13th Light
Infantry, a few engineers, and departmental staff—quite inadequate
for the work required of them; but the Commander-in-Chief, in
signifying his approval of the manner in which Colonel Rowlands
proposed to distribute the troops already under his command, informed
him that he was about to reinforce the Transvaal with the 80th
Regiment and Frontier Light Horse, with a view to active operations
against Sikukuni.
The promised reinforcements arrived by degrees from Natal, and
meanwhile there were Pretoria, Middleburg, Lydenburg, and Standerton,
where considerable stores of ammunition, etc. were collected, to
be garrisoned, as well as the cordon of forts, already mentioned,
along the Leolu Mountains, which left no large proportion of the
troops—about 800 of the 13th, and under 300 volunteers and Zulu
police—for service in the field.
However, by the 29th August Colonel Rowlands found himself in a
position to leave Pretoria for the confines of the Transvaal, and
reached Fort Weber on the 13th September. From thence to Fort Burgers
was a long and tedious march through a difficult and trackless
country. The column was forced to make its own road as it went, and
had several skirmishes with Sikukuni’s people _en route_. Reinforced
by the Frontier Light Horse under Major Buller, and a party under
Major Russell from Pretoria, Colonel Rowlands at last reached Fort
Burgers, and, after a few days’ halt for repairs, patrolling, and
scouting the country, recommenced his march towards “Sikukuni’s
Town,” distant about twenty-five miles.
On the 3rd October he advanced with 338 mounted men (Mounted
Infantry, Frontier Light Horse, and Transvaal Volunteers), 130
infantry, and 2 7-pounder mountain guns; his intention being to
establish himself before Sikukuni’s town, thoroughly reconnoitre it,
and, should he find that there was a chance of success, and that the
position could be afterwards held, to attack it when he had brought
up reinforcements.
The position was one of extreme difficulty, greatly increased by
the singular drought which was experienced at the time, both in the
Transvaal and Natal.
From Fort Burgers to Sikukuni’s Town, the approach lay chiefly
through a defile commanded by “kopjes” (piles of rock and boulders,
often some hundred feet in height), of which the enemy did not fail
to take advantage. The weather was intensely hot, the thermometer
standing daily at over 100 in the shade, and the unusual drought had
dried up the springs and small watercourses to an extent previously
unknown.
The camp was fired into on the night before the force sighted
Sikukuni’s Town, but from a considerable distance, causing no damage
beyond one horse wounded, and a general stampede of the slaughter
cattle; a determined advance of the piquets, reinforced by their
supports, quickly driving back the enemy, who did not advance again.
The stronghold was sighted upon the following day, but it soon became
apparent to Colonel Rowlands that, while to attempt its capture with
the small force at his disposal would be a mere reckless sacrifice
of the troops under his command, it was equally impossible to carry
out his original intention of establishing himself before it, under
the existing circumstances of absolute want of water and forage.
Deeply disappointing as was this discovery, Colonel Rowlands was
convinced that his only course under the circumstances was to retire,
and, his opinion being confirmed by the senior officers present, he
reluctantly commenced his return march on the 6th October.
Encouraged by the retreat of the force, the enemy, now in large
numbers, followed and harassed it, almost until it reached the
bivouac, eight miles from Fort Burgers. Thirteen thousand rounds of
ammunition were expended in keeping off the foe during the march,
and both man and beast suffered severely from want of water and the
intense heat of the sun. The force reached Fort Burgers the following
day, with the loss of 1 man wounded; 5 horses were killed, 10 died
of horse sickness, and 4 horses and 1 mule were wounded. Here they
remained for several weeks, in hopes that the summer rains, which it
was natural to expect should fall at this time of year, would enable
them to make a second advance upon Sikukuni’s Town. Meanwhile mounted
patrols, under Major Buller, Major Russell, Captain Clarke, and
Lieutenant Eckersley (in command of Swazi levies), swept the country
in every direction, harrying the natives and capturing their cattle,
but without meeting with any armed opposition. Horse sickness now
set in—that South African scourge, from which the force had hitherto
suffered but slightly, and in single cases, but which at this time
became an epidemic, deaths occurring daily, sometimes but a few
hours after the animal was attacked by the disease. This unfortunate
circumstance added greatly to the difficulties of the situation.
After the retreat of the force from before Sikukuni’s Town, the
enemy made several determined attacks upon the forts in the Mamalubi
Valley, especially upon Fort Faugh-a-Ballagh; and although these
attacks were in every case successfully resisted, they necessitated
the strengthening of the garrisons of the forts along this line.
Lord Chelmsford (then General Thesiger) had previously given notice
to Colonel Rowlands that a column from the Transvaal, under the
command of the latter, would be required to co-operate with the
Ama-Swazi in the invasion of Zululand. The 13th Regiment, Frontier
Light Horse, and Lieutenant Nicholson’s guns, were all to be
available for that purpose as soon as the Sikukuni affair (which was
then lightly considered) should be settled. By this arrangement, the
80th Regiment and volunteers alone were reserved for the defence of
the Transvaal. As the season was now far advanced, Colonel Rowlands
was obliged to make the best arrangements he could for the defence
of the border with the force—an absurdly small one, considering
the disturbed state of the country—which would be left after the
withdrawal of those intended by the General for the Zulu invasion.
His chief adviser, Captain Clarke, was of opinion that a precipitate
retirement from the valleys of the Steelport and Speckboom rivers
would be unadvisable. These valleys contained large numbers of Kafir
gardens, and, by holding them a little later, the natives would be
prevented from sowing their crops for another season, and starvation
would ensue. With this object in view, Fort Burgers was garrisoned
with 100 of the 13th Regiment, and some 50 mounted volunteers,
while Colonel Rowlands himself retired to Speckboom Drift, about
thirteen miles from Fort Burgers, where he constructed another
fort in such a position as to cover the junction of four important
roadways. Having completed this work, he determined to attack some
native strongholds in the Steelport Valley, into which he marched,
with 3 guns, 140 mounted men, 340 infantry, and 250 natives, on
the 26th October. Moving before daybreak the following morning, he
commenced the attack, at 7 A.M., upon a large kraal, built upon a
mountain spur. Here there was some sharp work, difficult positions
seized, and the valley finally cleared. Several kraals were burnt,
about 12,000 lb. of grain destroyed, and 100 head of cattle taken.
Sixteen of the enemy were “accounted for,” the loss on the side of
the attacking party being 1 killed and 10 wounded. At 10 o’clock the
same morning the Commandant returned to his camp on the Steelport,
and, a few days later, to the new fort at Speckboom Drift. Despatches
from head-quarters awaited him here, instructing him to withdraw
altogether, and as speedily as possible, from the enemy’s country.
Arrangements were immediately made for the evacuation of Fort
Burgers, which was the advanced post on the direct road to Sikukuni’s
Town, the withdrawal of troops and stores being masked by a strong
patrol under Captain Carrington, composed of mounted volunteers and
native foot levies, who were sent, _viâ_ Fort Burgers and Origstaadt
Valley, to the Oliphant River. The head-quarters of the 13th Regiment
(340), Russell’s Mounted Infantry (63), and Lieutenant Nicholson’s
two mountain guns, left camp for Lydenburg—the whole under the
command of Lieut.-Colonel Gilbert, 13th Light Infantry—immediately;
and in a few days’ time Fort Burgers was emptied and demolished.
Captain Carrington’s patrol having returned, after capturing 345
head of cattle, and meeting no enemy except a small guard and the
cattle-herds, Colonel Rowlands marched from Speckboom about the
7th November, leaving at that fort a sufficient force to guard the
ammunition and stores which remained there. About thirteen miles
from Lydenburg he halted and constructed a small fort, to cover
the principal road leading to that town, and which he purposed to
garrison with a detachment of volunteers.
Considerable difficulty was now experienced by Colonel Rowlands
in arranging the small force to be left at his disposal, so as to
efficiently protect the great length of frontier, extending from
Fort Mamalubi (under the west side of the Leolu range, and about
twenty-five miles from Oliphant’s River) to Kruger’s Post on the
east, besides garrisoning Pretoria, Middleburg, and Lydenburg, in
which were large quantities of supplies and war _matériel_. His plans
were laid with due consideration for the nature of the country and
the enemy, and after careful consultation with those officers who
were supposed to be most fully acquainted with both. Nevertheless
they did not meet with full approval from head-quarters, from whence
Colonel Rowlands finally received orders to remain where he was,
and be responsible for the arrangements he had made, instead of
proceeding at the head of No. 5 Column to the eastern border for the
invasion of Zululand, as originally intended. Shortly afterwards
Lieut.-Colonel Gilbert was directed to proceed with the 13th Light
Infantry and Lieutenant Nicholson’s guns to Derby, Lieut.-Colonel
Buller having preceded him to that place, which was now removed from
under Colonel Rowlands’s command and placed under that of Colonel
Wood.
The attention of the former officer was now turned to the disposition
of the force that remained to him, and to the raising of new corps
of volunteers and strengthening those already formed, which he
deemed necessary for the security of the Transvaal. To this work he
set himself with great energy and considerable success, stifling
thereby the disappointment which it was but natural that he should
feel at being excluded from the Zulu campaign. Towards the close of
the month, however, he received a letter from the General, asking
him to spare two companies of the 80th Regiment to take the place of
the force under Colonel Gilbert, which had been moved to Luneburg,
and which shortly after joined Colonel Wood’s column. Somewhat
to his surprise, he was reminded that Derby was _in his command_,
and was told that the General commanding would be glad if he would
proceed there in person to _reassure the Swazis_. That same day the
two companies of the 80th, under Major Creagh, were put in orders
to march as directed, and Colonel Rowlands followed a week later,
leaving the forces defending the northern border under the able
command of Major Carrington, who, however, took such instructions
from Captain Clarke as he considered necessary to give as
Commissioner of that district under His Excellency the Administrator
of the Transvaal.
At Derby there was, not unnaturally, some slight confusion owing
to this double appointment of officers in command; but having
overcome this difficulty, Colonel Rowlands set himself seriously
to consider the situation, which was by no means a promising one.
A force composed of two companies of Europeans and 250 natives,
collected from the neighbouring country, was clearly useless for any
aggressive purposes, while the Swazis, though ready and willing to
co-operate with an English force large enough to support them, were
evidently far from satisfied with the number collected at Derby.
That town, or hamlet rather, consisting of but two houses in point
of fact, is situated from twenty to five-and-twenty miles from the
Zulu border of a part of Zululand peopled by some of the most warlike
tribes of that nation, and so small a garrison as the above did
but invite attack and disaster. Upon these considerations Colonel
Rowlands determined to reinforce himself from Pretoria and Lydenburg.
He sent instructions to Major Tyler, 80th Regiment, to send him
three companies of the 80th, two Armstrong guns, and a troop of
Weatherley’s Border Horse, but directing him to consult the colonial
authorities as to whether the troops could be safely spared, before
complying with the order.
At this time, about the middle of January, the Zulus throughout this
northern and thickly-populated part of the country were perfectly
quiet and even friendly. There was still a possibility that the
difficulty between their king and the English might be settled
without bloodshed, and the people were evidently anxious to avoid
giving cause of offence. Colonel Rowlands, who employed his time
while waiting for his reinforcements (which would take some weeks to
arrive) in reconnoitring the country, found the roads open and the
inhabitants inoffensive. At this period he also attempted to organise
a frontier force of farmers—Englishmen, Boers, and Germans—whom he
summoned to a meeting for consideration of the question. From fifty
to sixty attended, and, after hearing his address, their spokesman
responded to the effect that they were willing to take service
for the defensive object proposed, but that it was to be clearly
understood that by uniting themselves to a common protective cause
(course?), they did not thereby acknowledge allegiance to the British
crown. But a committee, subsequently formed to consider details
connected with the proposed force, fell out amongst themselves, and
the scheme was abandoned.
On the 26th January, Colonel Rowlands received from Sir T. Shepstone
the news of the disaster at Isandhlwana; and from this time nothing
but contradictory orders and impossible commands seem to have reached
him at his distant post. He heard of the troops he had intended
for special purposes being ordered elsewhere; he was directed by
Lord Chelmsford to take orders from his junior, Colonel Wood; he
received different instructions, entirely opposed to each other,
concerning the calling out of the Swazi allies; nevertheless, in
spite of the confusion which reigned at that unhappy epoch, he kept
his head, and went steadily on with the plans he had formed. By the
second week in February he had, with some difficulty, collected
a force of something under a thousand Europeans and natives, and
was prepared to operate. It seemed, however, impossible to get any
distinct orders or definite instructions from those in command,
either military or civil; and representations having been made to him
by the border Boers that a Zulu impi was about to attack them from
the Tolaka Mountains, he marched out with a portion of his force in
that direction, leaving Major Tucker (80th) in command of the rest.
While halted at the Assegai River upon this expedition, he received
a despatch from Colonel Wood, requesting him to march his force from
Derby to Luneburg to his support. Sending a note to Major Tucker,
directing him to start for Luneburg next morning, he continued his
march, attacked and took the Tolaka Mountain, and then proceeded
towards Luneburg with his own force. He was now about eighteen miles
from where his head-quarters camp under Major Tucker would be, with
a broken and hilly country to pass through, over which he had great
difficulty in conveying his wounded (fortunately but few), and the
captured women and children. These captives were, on this account,
offered their freedom, but refused to accept it, which, perhaps, was
not unnatural, seeing that their homes and crops were destroyed, and
they had no longer any means of livelihood.
The force passed through the Intombi Valley, laying the country waste
for miles on either side of the road as it went, and met on its way
messengers from Colonel Wood, requesting the immediate presence of
the mounted corps. But upon the 23rd February, Colonel Rowlands
received a memorandum to the effect that the Lieut.-General, by
desire of the High Commissioner, wished him to proceed at once back
to Pretoria, to prepare some defence against the Boers, who had
assumed a threatening attitude. Upon the receipt of this order he
quitted the Luneburg district, and arrived on the 6th of March at
the capital of the Transvaal. Here there were but 200 infantry and
some few mounted volunteers; but by Colonel Rowlands’s exertions the
number was soon swelled to 600 or 700, by the addition of city corps
and other volunteers.
A considerable number of Boers who had never willingly accepted
the annexation of their country by the English, had taken the
opportunity, offered by the general confusion which reigned after
the disaster of the 22nd January, of endeavouring to regain the
independence of their state. Mass meetings were held to discuss the
subject, and finally a large body of armed men formed a camp at no
great distance from Pretoria. The situation appeared a very serious
one; and the High Commissioner himself travelled to Pretoria to
endeavour by his honeyed words to calm an agitation which might prove
so singularly inconvenient should the angry feelings of the indignant
Boers find vent in blows. On the 12th of April, just two years from
the day of the annexation, Sir B. Frere met a deputation of the
Transvaal farmers at Erasmus Spruit, about six miles from Pretoria,
and held a long discussion with them upon the subject of their
rights and wrongs. They repeatedly and plainly asserted that Sir
T. Shepstone had coerced the people into submission by threatening
them with the Zulus, and declared unanimously that nothing would
satisfy them but the recovery of their liberties. Sir Bartle Frere
gave them to understand in return that this was the only thing for
which they might not hope. He assured them that he looked upon the
_voortrekkers_ as an honour to their race, and that he felt proud to
belong to the same stock. The Queen, he told them, felt for them “as
for her own children;”[160] and he hoped to tell her that she had “no
better subjects in her empire,” than amongst them. The committee,
however, retired in complete dissatisfaction, and addressed a
petition to Her Majesty, in which they remark, “unwilling subjects
but faithful neighbours we will be;” and more than hint that they are
prepared to “draw the sword” to prove how much they are in earnest.
The excitement, however, calmed down for the time being, and Sir
Bartle Frere departed.
During his stay in Pretoria, he desired Colonel Rowlands to
make preparations to resume hostilities against Sikukuni, and
accordingly, by the end of May, that officer had increased the
number of his mounted volunteers by 450. He then made a vain attempt
to induce Lord Chelmsford to spare him another regiment of regular
troops; but finding that this was decidedly refused, and that no
operations were likely to take place in the Transvaal for some time,
he accepted the General’s offer of a brigade in the lower column.
On the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley at Port Durnford, he applied to
that general for the command in case operations should be resumed in
the Transvaal. To this he had a strong claim, both on account of his
experience and of his laborious services there; but the request was
refused.