+The Taft Policy in Practice+
Mr. Taft’s Civil Government was adopted on July 4, 1901. What have been
its most beneficent results since then, as proclaimed by the American
officials themselves? The first results were quite evident—more
schools, better roads, and an improved system of sanitation. What did
these mean?
“We have given them education and public improvement,” said the
administration. Let us state this more accurately. “We,” the benevolent
American people have selected American teachers to teach Filipinos
what “we” choose, making the Filipino treasury pay for such expenses.
“We” have decided what improvements were needed, have effected such
improvements under the supervision of American office-holders, and
have later presented the bill to the native taxpayer. These American
officers, technical as well as administrative, have been paid large
salaries and the system has naturally been most expensive to the
impoverished islanders.
From the way these material benefits have been related to the Americans
at home, however, one is led to assume that the improvements effected
have cost the American taxpayer a considerable amount. That the
contrary is true was baldly stated by Secretary of War Stimson who in
his report of 1912 said, “And the cost of all this and of the much more
that has been similarly done has been borne by the Filipino people
themselves.”
Is not this method of improving a nation like the rich man who tells
his poor neighbor that he ought to have a larger house, better
furniture, newer clothes, horses and carriages and forthwith orders
them, but has them charged to his neighbor without consulting him as
to how these bills are to be met? It is a form of charity easy to the
soi-distant benefactor but ruinous to the unhappy neighbor. Surely
if “we” insisted upon teaching the Filipinos the American language,
instead of propagating the already implanted Castilian tongue, “we”
should at least have defrayed that portion of the bill. Evidently this
was a benevolence tinctured with New England thrift. Was not this
policy aptly expressed at that time by Mr. Dooley when he said:
In ivry city in this unfair land we will erect school houses an’
packin’ houses an’ houses iv correction; an’ we’ll larn ye our
language because ’tis aisier to larn ye ours than to larn oursilves
yours. An’ we’ll give ye clothes, if ye pay f’r thim; an’ if ye
don’t, ye can go without. And whin ye’re hungry ye can to th’
morgue—we mane th’ resth’rant—an’ ate a good square meal if ar-rmy
beef. An’ we’ll sind th’ gr-reat Gin’ral Eagan over f’r to larn
ye etiquette, an’ Andhrew Carnegie to larn ye pathriteism with
blowholes into it, an’ Gin’ral Alger to larn ye to hould onto a
job; an’ whin ye’ve become edycated an’ have all th’ blessings if
civilization that we don’t want, that’ll count ye one. We can’t
give ye anny votes, because we haven’t more thin enough to go round
now; but we’ll treat ye th’ way a father shud treat his childher if
we have to break ivry bone in ye’er bodies.
The teaching of the English language, however, did accomplish something
at the expense of the Taft policy. It opened to the Filipinos the
history of the American revolution, the Declaration of Independence.
It opened to them the words of Lincoln that “no man is good enough to
govern another without that other’s consent.” And yet the Taft policy
expected to have these pupils as contented subjects for generations,
enjoying the contempt that was daily being heaped upon them, loving to
be treated as an inferior people. How strange an expectation!
Nor was this prophecy far fetched. Six years after the establishment
of the Taft Government, one of his successors, Governor Smith, was
forced to point out with regret “the growing gulf between the two
peoples” and to say that an era of ill feeling had started between
Americans and Filipinos and, I hesitate to say it, “race hatred”[1].
And no wonder. Let Mr. Leupp, a staunch supporter of the late President
Roosevelt give an idea of the conditions then existing in the Islands.
Speaking of the American residents in the Philippines who, say what one
will, are the only Americans known to the majority of Filipinos, he
said:
These men are the loudest and most bitter in their criticisms
of the conduct of affairs. They disapprove most vigorously the
friendly attitude of our government towards the natives, and
denounce the policy of benevolent assimilation as preposterous and
visionary.... They object to the appointment of so many Filipinos
to office and instead of cultivating the good will of the native
people and creating a demand for American goods, they spend their
time and energy finding fault and making gloomy predictions.
The people here described have sent emissaries to Washington
to convince the authorities that things are all wrong in the
Philippines, that the iron hand of white supremacy should replace
the Taft policy of “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” What they
call a Chamber of Commerce in Manila is really an organization
for bringing about conditions more favorable to the exploitation
of the islands, without reference to the welfare of the natives.
The admission of Chinese labor is the first thing the chamber of
commerce wants in this program.
The relations between the “American element” there and the
Filipinos are most seriously strained; the newspapers which cater
to it never say a word for the Filipinos, nor, for that matter,
the civil government. The despicable “little brown brother” poem
has been widely circulated. It is about as true a picture of the
Filipinos as “the Leopard’s Spots” is of the negro in America.
No one can read its fierce arraignment of the natives and learn
that it is almost a national hymn with our soldiers here, and then
imagine that relations between the two races are very cordial[2].
But for even better testimony, let these American residents speak
their own mind. At a mass meeting held by them in Manila one speaker
expressing his belief that the American government had been weak and
vacillating, added:
Now I believe in “benevolent assimilation” (which quotation was
greeted with laughter). I believe it so strongly that I would, if
necessary, pin it to these islands with the bayonet.
Then, referring to a celebration that the Filipinos had had in which
American and Filipino flags had been displayed, came this ambitious
claim:
They (the Filipinos) did not realize that we, who are here tonight,
are the Government, and that that government could not have been
here without us, and cannot stay here without us.... I believe in
peace and harmony. I always did, and when I had a battalion of
volunteers behind me I felt awful peaceful.... I believe that if we
could put about one hundred thousand American troops here it would
be very peaceful (laughter), exceedingly so, and you would not see
any more Katipunan (Filipino) banners eight or ten feet long, with
their designs emblazoned in silk, going along the streets with a
little six cent American flag carried underneath it. It would be
too peaceful for that.
So much for the bonds of friendship between the two peoples. No wonder
they have led to further bickerings on the part of the American
residents whenever concessions have been granted to the Filipinos. No
wonder too that when, in 1907, the Filipinos were finally granted a
Philippine assembly, they made that the occasion to renew their demand
for independence. Before the establishment of this Philippine Assembly
it was virtually an act of disloyalty to talk of independence. Mr. Taft
himself had refused to permit the Filipinos to organize an independence
party. But with the veil of suppression removed in 1907, the agitation
for a complete separation was formally launched, and has been kept up
since with increasing vigor.
What about the economic blessings given to the country? As the fires
of insurrection were finally suppressed, the Filipinos turned to their
chosen occupation—agriculture. The fields were then in a ravaged
condition as a result of the prolonged period of war. The struggle
had reduced most of the provinces to a state of misery. In his report
of 1902, the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, had acknowledged these
catastrophes. He said,
The ills which have recently befallen the people of the islands
call for active and immediate measures of relief. The people of a
country just emerging from nearly six years of devastating warfare,
during which productive industry was interrupted, vast amounts of
property were destroyed, the bonds of social order were broken,
habits of peaceful industry were lost ... had a sufficiently
difficult task before them to restore order and prosperity. In
addition to this, however, the people of the Philippine islands
have within the past year been visited by great misfortunes.
The rinderpest has destroyed about ninety per cent of all their
carabaos, leaving them without draft animals to till their land
and aid in the ordinary work.... The rice crop has been reduced to
twenty-five per cent of the ordinary crop ... cholera has raged
and is still raging throughout the islands....
And yet on November 19 of that same year, the President was telling
the people of the United States that “the islands have never been as
orderly, as peaceful or as prosperous as now” [3], which statement
properly induced Mr. Burrit Smith to say, “The President’s prosperity
seems to be composed in nearly equal parts of pestilence and famine.”
For indeed, the bare comparison of the statement with the facts made
arguments superfluous.
As late as August 2, 1905, the Representatives of Batangas province
addressed a letter to Governor Taft to show the miserable condition of
the municipality of Balayan. The statistics they offered showed that,
whereas in 1896 the number of inhabitants in that district was 41,308,
in 1905 the number had been reduced to 13,924. There had been 19,500
hectares of cultivated land in 1896—there were only 1,700 in 1905.
Other items had suffered even more, rice having fallen from 39,020 to
12,500 cavanes, sugar from 520,000 to 12,300; maize from 110,000 to
10,000, cows 3,680 in 1896, only 80 left seven years later; oxen from
4,110 to 433; hens from 96,000 before the war to only 5,000 four years
after the establishment of civil government. Consider what a story
those figures tell.
In addition to these calamities there had been placed upon the
shoulders of the entire population an internal revenue tax, of which
Professor Paul S. Reinsch said:
Outside of Italy it would be hard to find a system of taxation that
so efficiently scours the whole field of business. The merchants
and professional men of a country like the United States would look
upon it as a most unbearable burden.
In the light of these hardships, it would be reasonable to expect that
the economic policy of the United States towards the Islands would be
guided by the desire to make them as prosperous as possible. And yet
the first few years of American legislation in this matter showed a
series of blunders which resulted in heaping further hardships upon the
already prostrated people.
When the Islands were under the dominion of Spain the native
planters had had the benefit of a limited Spanish market, but when
the United States sovereignty was extended to the archipelago this
market was taken away, and in its place nothing was given. The first
tariff act passed by the American Congress to regulate the trade of
the Philippines was that of March 8, 1902. It allowed Philippine
products coming into the United States a reduction of 25%, from the
regular Dingley rates. Governor Taft realized how ineffective this
reduction was, and he pleaded very earnestly with Congress to give
his “Filipinos” something in lieu of the privileges they had under
Spain. But the sugar and tobacco interests in the United States checked
his efforts because they were afraid that Philippine products would
endanger their domestic crops.
There were one or two “jokers” in this tariff legislation of 1902 also
that are already well-known. One was the clause which abolished the
export tax on Philippine produce coming to the United States. Among
these native products was the world-famous Philippine hemp. This native
product was at the time sorely needed in the home markets, and the
object of the law was clearly to favor the exportation of this article
to the United States exclusively and thus defeat the British and other
foreign exporters in Manila from getting their share of the article in
question.
The method by which this was accomplished was even more vicious, and
really constituted the big “joker” of the tariff act. It will be
remembered that export taxes were collected on Philippine produce
as they left the custom house in Manila. Now the levying of taxes
on exports is strictly prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States, but the Supreme Court at Washington had said that the
Constitution did not extend to the Philippines. Among the articles thus
taxed was hemp, but the tariff law of 1902 now said that if the hemp
shipped from Manila was proved to have been consumed in the United
States, then the export duties already paid would be refunded to the
shipper in order to give him the true benefit of a reduction. This odd
method of administering the law was thus double-edged. It not only gave
the American exporter a tremendous advantage over his British rival,
but it also favored the American shipper over the Filipino planter.
This was so because when the native planter sold his crop he was forced
to sell it at the current price which assumed that an export tax would
be levied upon it. To an American shipper the recovery of this export
duty later was a matter of routine, as he could easily prove through
his American offices that the hemp was in fact received and consumed
in the United States. But the Filipino planter or broker dealing on a
much smaller scale could not, without difficulty and expense, follow
his few bales into the markets of the United States and then prove to
the custom officials that the hemp was in fact consumed there. The
result of this American legislation was apparent—only the big fish,
like the American Hemp trust, got the benefit of this so-called favored
reduction.
Governor Taft and his commission saw the injustice thus placed on the
native planters, and they earnestly besought Congress to remove such
legislation from the statute books of the United States.
“These refundable duties,” they said in their report of 1904, “are in
effect a gift of that amount to the manufacturers of the United States
who use hemp in their operations”[4].
Their report of the following year was just as earnest in its complaint.
“It is a direct burden upon the people of the Philippine Islands,”
they said, “because it takes from the Insular treasury export duties
collected from the people and gives them to manufacturers of hemp
products in the United States.”
Surely this was a poor way to make the Filipinos learn to value their
association with the United States, and Mr. Taft’s commission tried to
impress the American Congress with this consideration.
“It seems hardly consistent,” they said, that “with our expressions of
purpose to build and develop the Philippine Islands ... we are thus
enriching a few of our own people at their (Filipino) expense”[5].
By 1906 the situation had not abated. When the American Governor
General Ide returned to the United States he frankly said, “By
annexation we killed the Spanish market for Philippine sugar and
tobacco, and our tariff shuts these products from the United States,
and today both these industries are prostrated”[6].
It would be fruitless to examine in detail all the steps taken by
the powerful American elements at home and abroad to aid their own
interests at the expense of others. Dr. Parker Willis, Professor
of Economics in the Washington and Lee University, after making an
exacting study of the tariff laws, finally added this convincing
summary:
Wines were taxed in such a way as to discriminate against the light
Spanish beverages and in favour of the Californian. Canned goods
were taxed according to weights of the cans, a plan which favoured
Chicago and St. Louis producers as against English. Beer was so
rated that the American product shipped in barrels was favoured
against the beer of other countries. Every effort was made to help
the American and hamper the foreign shipper[7].
An even more scholarly discussion of these discriminations was
published in the Journal of Political Economy for March, 1903.
And yet in the midst of these calamities and discriminations, President
Roosevelt was telling the American Congress, that,
No great civilized power has ever managed with such wisdom and
disinterestedness the affairs of people committed by the accident
of war to its hands[8].
Mr. Taft realized the burdens which American interests, afraid of the
so-called Asiatic competition, were thus placing on the industries of
the Philippines. He, therefore, labored hard, quietly and with infinite
patience, and finally after a campaign of nine years succeeded in
convincing the sugar and tobacco industries in the United States that a
little Philippine produce would do them little harm and would put the
Islanders in good humor. The Payne tariff law was therefore enacted in
1909, permitting the free entrance of Philippine produce up to certain
limits prescribed by the Act.
This relief was by no means satisfactory, however, for the new tariff
proposed to continue the tax on exports shipped to foreign countries
from Manila. Well did the Hon. Oscar W. Underwood tell Congress:
When you put a tax on your people for engaging in export trade,
to that extent you lessen their ability to successfully meet
their foreign competitor, and reduce the territory in which they
can successfully dispose of their surplus products abroad. _Our
forefathers in writing the Constitution of the United States,
recognizing the false principle on which the export tax was based,
put it in the fundamental law of the land that the United States
Government should not lay export_ _taxes. If we enact this law, we
write into the statute book for the Philippine Islands, legislation
which is little short of barbarous, legislation that no government
in the civilized world except Turkey and Persia, and other second
class nations countenance today[9]._
The protest was vain, for the American hemp interests won and the
provision for an export tax was adopted. The Hon. Manuel Quezon arguing
for the repeal of this export tax two years later, ably put forth this
unanswerable argument:
Although it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States that the provisions of the Constitution are not in force in
the Philippines, I have serious doubts as to whether said decision
also meant that this government has the power to enact laws for the
islands which are expressly prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States[10].
In 1909, a distinguished son of Boston, the Hon. W. Cameron Forbes,
assumed the position of Governor General in the Philippines. He was
able, conscientious, and unselfish, and thoroughly convinced that the
Taft program was justified, and, as an untiring worker, was determined
to make this policy a true blessing to the Filipinos. During the
four years that he occupied that exalted position, he sacrificed his
health and his comfort in exchange for the consciousness that comes
from a job well done. His extreme courtesy, his marked sympathy for
the aspirations of the Filipinos and his deep-rooted interest in all
affairs appurtenant to the Islands made him a most gracious person to
deal with, and during his administration he made friends readily and
kept them for all time. Certainly, then, if the policy founded by Judge
Taft was the right one, no more admirable person could have been found
to administer it. If we must oppose him and criticize him, therefore,
we do so not on personal grounds but because he pursued a policy which
we believe was wrong—because the undertaking in which he engaged was
hopeless.
Governor Forbes’s inaugural address aptly characterized his policy.
Improvement in the material conditions of the Islands and the people
was the keynote of his speech, and he declared that capital was the
greatest need of the country.
Capital [he said] demands a stable government. Capital is not
particularly interested in the color or design of the flag, it
wants just and equitable laws, sound and uniform currency on the
part of the government, just and fair treatment in the courts. The
faith of the United States is pledged that all of these benefits
shall be permanently assured to the Filipinos ... There is not on
the horizon discernible any cloud which indicates the possibility
of any kind of disturbance in the present status of these Islands,
either from within or without, by war or insurrection. The United
States is strong, determined, fixed in her policy and not to be
dissuaded or coerced. The development of the Philippines will
proceed along the lines originally set forth, strictly adhered
to by each successive administration and by the gradual process
in line of declared policy.... The government should offer every
reasonable inducement to capital and should make more liberal the
land and mining laws and lessen the restrictions which are at
present discouraging investors.
In a word, then, Governor Forbes’s policy was to introduce more
capital from sources foreign to the Philippines, and thus create
material prosperity. To induce American and other foreign investors
to settle in the Islands it was also his aim to assure these men
that their investments would be protected by American control. His
ideal was not, however, novel for it was the deal also of many in his
generation and of those who had preceded him in office. This policy is
opposed, therefore, simply because it creates an interest hostile to
Philippine independence, because it makes separation more difficult
and more costly. It was capital which brought on the Boer War, it
was capital which led to the conquest of India, it is capital which
promotes the aggression of the strong upon the weak, and so to the
policy of introducing material improvements by foreign capital while
the Philippines are yet in a state of dependence, their people are
absolutely opposed.
If the Filipinos must be taught something about Yankee ingenuity,
let them be taught to help themselves with their own resources, and
not with the money of others. Set before them, as was set before the
founders of the American republic, “the glorious prospect of entire
independence,” that it may “breathe into them anew the breath of life,”
as it did into the breasts of those who have gone before them. And if
foreign capital must come into the Philippines, as it will inevitably
come, let it come when the Islands are independent, so that it may
settle as it has settled in Mexico and Cuba with the full understanding
that it is the native government upon which it must depend for
security. This policy, though investments may be slow at first, will
encourage foreign capital more and more as the peoples of the world
learn to look upon the Filipinos as human beings anxious to contribute
their modest share to the welfare of mankind. Is this not infinitely
better than the policy which to this day tells the sensitive Filipinos,—
no matter what you think, we shall act without regard to your
wishes as we alone are fit to judge of your ability; we alone will
decide when independence is
good for you; meanwhile you shall have no voice in your government save
that which we choose to give you.
How absolute the American control of the Philippine treasury has
been to this day was stated in the leading editorial of the Boston
_Transcript_ for September 24, 1925, from which the following is a
quotation:
The American people are brought to a crisis in their and the
government’s relations with the Philippine Islands by the decision
of the Philippine Supreme Court that rulings of the insular auditor
are not definitive, but may be appealed to the local courts. _The
power of the Philippine auditor (an American official) subject
to that of the Governor-General and the United States Secretary
of War, is absolutely necessary to the maintenance of American
authority in the islands...._ The present decision has been
promptly appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and no doubt
a prompt ruling will be handed down from that tribunal. If it
should sustain the Philippine decision, the decisive authority of
the American government in the islands would be at an end, and the
islands themselves might as well be turned over to the Filipinos.
In other words one subordinate official with a salary of six thousand
dollars must have absolute control over the use which is made of taxes
raised from eleven millions of people. What nation would submit to
such tyranny? How would such an officer appointed by the Governor of
New York be received in Massachusetts?
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XI
[1] Speech before Manila Quill Club, Jan. 25, 1909.
[2] _New York Evening Post_, June 11, 1904.
[3] Speech at Memphis, Nov. 19, 1902.
[4] Report of U. S. Phil. Comm., 1904, pt. 1, p. 26.
[5] Report of U. S. Phil. Comm., 1905, pt. 1, p. 72.
[6] _New York Independent_, Nov. 22, 1906.
[7] _Our Philippine Problem_, pp. 274-5.
[8] Message to Congress, Jan. 27, 1908.
[9] Speech in House of Rep., May 18, 1909, See Cong. Rec., p.
2009.
[10] Speech in House of Rep., Aug. 19, 1911.