+The Attitude of President Coolidge+
To lessen the absolute power of the American representatives in the
Philippines, and in order to fulfill the promise of the Philippine
plank in the Democratic platform of 1912 which had declared for an
immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose “to recognize the
independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government”
could be established, Mr. Jones of Virginia introduced a bill in the
House of Representatives in August, 1914. The bill which passed the
House besides providing for a more popular and autonomous form of
government, contained a preamble to the effect that it was and always
had been “the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw
their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their
independence as soon as a stable government could be established
therein.”
When the bill was presented to the Senate, however, the preamble was
slightly changed. Independence, according to the Senate bill was to
be granted when, in the judgment of the United States it would be “to
the permanent interests of the Philippine Islands.” The question thus
naturally arose when the bill was under discussion whether the new
proposal really paved the way for independence.
Suppose [asked Senator Cummings of Iowa] that I believe it would
be better for the people of the Philippine Islands to remain
permanently attached to the United States as a state, with all the
privileges of a state or otherwise, would I not fulfill the promise
or assurance of the preamble in voting to retain the Philippine
Islands as a part of the territory of the United States?
To this question. Senator Hitchcock who was supporting the new preamble
candidly replied, “I presume the Senator would.”
Interest was thus aroused by this sudden revelation that the preamble
as now worded did not explicitly pledge independence after all. To put
an end to this uncertainty, and in order to show the seriousness of the
pledge which the Administration wished to give the Filipinos, Senator
Clarke of Arkansas introduced an amendment authorizing the President of
the United States to definitely “withdraw and surrender all right of
possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, and sovereignty” over
the Philippine Islands and requiring that the transfer of possession
and sovereignty be made absolute in not less than two nor more than
four years. The proposed measure also authorized the President to
acquire land sites desired by the United States for naval and coaling
stations in the Philippines.
So strong was the feeling in the Senate in favor of Philippine autonomy
that this unexpected proposal, grave and far-reaching as it was meant
to be, was successfully carried. When the final vote was taken the
measure was accepted, the vote being fifty-two against twenty-four, the
Democrats solidly voting for it and carrying six Republican ballots
as well. Never had the Filipinos been as near their goal as on this
occasion. It was certainly the most decisive step ever taken by a
branch of the American Congress.
When the news was cabled to the Philippines, the Filipinos greeted
their triumph with enthusiasm and hopes that the House would likewise
vote favorably on the bill. It will be remembered that ever since
the American occupation of 1898 neither House of Congress had made a
definite statement of America’s policy. When the bill, as amended, was
brought before the House, however, it suffered another change.
It was found necessary to hold a conference between the committees of
the two Houses in order to reconcile the varying views regarding the
liberty to be granted the Filipinos. As finally passed and enacted
into law by both Houses, the Jones Bill made the statement that “it
is and always has been the purpose of the people of the United States
to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to
recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be
established therein.” In order to speedily accomplish this purpose the
new law also granted immediately a larger share of self-government in
matters of domestic concern. The importance of this measure, however,
which had the approbation of both Houses, lay in the pledge which for
eighteen years a Republican administration had been able to avoid.
Now, however, not only was America’s word given, but a test had also
been provided—that of a stable government. The problem of the future
must therefore be limited to the question whether the Filipinos had
succeeded in establishing a stable government.
In accordance with the spirit of the new law, Governor Francis Burton
Harrison who had succeeded Cameron Forbes in 1913 immediately began to
place Filipinos in charge of the administration as rapidly as possible,
until the American Governor General, the Vice-Governor, the Secretary
of Public Instruction, the Insular auditor and a few minor officials
were the only Americans left in office. But the theoretical sovereignty
of the American people still remained, a sovereignty based on force
and certainly not sanctioned or even acquiesced in by the Filipino
people.
It would entail an endless array of facts and figures to recount the
progress and missteps of the new régime. But a brief survey of the most
undisputed facts would show beyond a doubt that the Filipinos were
not forgetting what had been taught them by the “self-sacrificing”
Americans. Take the matter of schooling and education. Under the Forbes
administration the attendance in public schools had reached 440,000,
but in 1921, when Governor Wood came to assume his duties he found that
the Filipinos had provided accommodations for over 1,100,000. Only
7,512,000 pesos had been spent annually for education in 1913 when
Governor Forbes left; in 1921 over 22,000,000 pesos were employed to
provide for the increased attendance in schools. Of course the number
of schools rose in proportion as well, from 2,934 in 1913, to 5,944 in
the course of Filipino administration, while the number of Filipino
teachers kept pace accordingly—from 7,671 to 17,575.
In the field of transportation the material progress effected was
just as convincing. First class roads increased from a total mileage
of 2,035 kilometers in 1913 to 4,698, or an increase of over 100 per
cent in eight years. So with inter-island coastwise traffic,—from 680
vessels with a net tonnage of 54,396, the number rose to 3,044 with a
net tonnage of 99,376.
In 1913 there were no public dispensaries giving free medical treatment
but within eight years the Filipinos established over 800 such
institutions. There were then also only two insular and six provincial
hospitals, but that was increased under Filipino “misgovernment”
to eleven insular and eleven provincial hospitals. There was only
one organization for infant welfare when the Filipinos took charge
unhampered by an American Governor General. Here was clearly a large
field for improvement as infant mortality in the Islands had in the
past been unusually heavy. They proved themselves equal to the task,
however, for by 1921 there were 615 institutions functioning for this
purpose. Death rates thus fell from 32.28 per thousand for the periods
of 1908-13, to 28.62 from 1914-19, despite the fact that an epidemic of
influenza had ravaged the Islands in 1918.
During this significant period of Philippine autonomy, of course
mistakes were made as mistakes always are made by even the best of all
governments. We do not seek to excuse them or to place responsibility
for them upon the shoulders of the American Governor General who was
on the ground and who was responsible in numerous instances for unwise
appointments. Suffice it to say that marked progress was made during
this period of trial, how marked will be shown by the report of the
investigation made by leading Republicans—of which more anon.
It was no doubt in view of these marked advances and the evident
capacity of the Filipinos to manage their own interests that President
Wilson finally informed Congress that the Filipinos had fulfilled the
required condition set before them.
Allow me to call your attention to the fact [he told the Houses of
Congress on December 7, 1920] that the people of the Philippine
Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since
the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus
fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as the precedent
to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. I
respectfully submit that this condition precedent having been
fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise
to the people of those Islands, by granting them the independence
which they so honorably covet.
If the future of the Philippine Islands had been without regard to
party fortunes in the United States such a recommendation would
undoubtedly have resulted in definite action. But another political
party assumed power on March of the following year and the New
Republican President, Mr. Harding, almost immediately sent a commission
of his own to the Philippines there to make a study of the situation
in order to inform the new administration. In this action is clear
proof of the difficulties that attend the efforts of impartial
Americans to learn the exact state of affairs in the Islands, because
each administration in Washington views the problem from a different
angle and refuses to trust the findings of the party which preceded it.
Two eminent Republicans, both of whom were well-known to be against
Philippine independence, were the chosen investigators. It might
properly have occurred to the President that impartial men should have
been sent, or that at least one member of the commission should have
been in favor of independence. As it was both General Wood and Governor
Forbes who had never changed their views in regard to Philippine
independence were made final arbitrators. No one need question the
honest purposes of both men, as they stood high in the estimation of
their own fellow-citizens, but men are human and when they have for
years maintained a certain point of view they cannot approach the
subject anew with an open or judicial mind. The Filipinos, however,
hoped that they might after a more careful investigation change their
outlook.
The Wood-Forbes mission spent some six months in the Islands. They
brought back a report recommending the continuance of American
control. The commission stated that they had found marked progress
in the Islands, but recommended nevertheless that the hour for
independence had not yet come as the people needed more time “to absorb
and master the powers already in their hands.”
The field of government service was in particular the one in which the
greatest progress had been made.
We find [said the commission] that many Filipinos have shown marked
capacity for government service and that the young generation is
full of promise; that the civil service laws have been in the main
honestly administered[1]. In many positions they have shown marked
capacity and have done better than could reasonably be expected of
an inexperienced and untried people. There are many holding high
positions in the judicial, executive and educational departments
who would be a credit to any government. They are proud as they
may well be, of the advance they have made since the beginning of
American control of the Islands, for _it can be safely stated that
no people under the friendly tutelage of another have made so great
a progress in so short a time_[2].
We find [said the commission] that the legislative chambers
are conducted with dignity and decorum and are composed of
representative men[3].
These statements having been made by men known to have been opposed to
Philippine independence should be interpreted in the strongest light
possible. Can they be applied also to most of the state legislatures in
America?
Nevertheless, the commission finally concluded by submitting the
following recommendations:
1. We recommend that the present general status of the Philippine
Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and
thoroughly master the powers already in their hands.
2. We recommend that the responsible representative of the United
States, the Governor General, have authority commensurate
with the responsibilities of his position. In case of failure
to secure the necessary corrective action by the Philippine
Legislature, we recommend that Congress declare null and void
legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting, or
dividing the authority granted by the Governor General under act
of Congress No. 240 known as the Jones Bill.
3. We recommend that in case of a deadlock between the Governor
General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of
appointments the President of the United States be authorized to
make and render the final decision.
The first general recommendation naturally meant retention for another
indefinite period of years,—a continuation of the Taft policy. The
other two meant the diminishing of powers already in the hands of
the Filipinos. The American Congress has not acted on either of the
latter, but when General Wood was appointed governor shortly after
the submission of this report it was evident to all that he would to
a large extent be influenced in the exercise of his powers by the
recommendations which he himself had made. Many there were, therefore,
who feared that a clash between him and the native legislators was
inevitable.
To put it mildly the attitude of the new Governor was that the Chief
Executive being the representative of American sovereignty was entitled
to exercise an authority over the Philippines equal to or even more
than that of the President of the United States over his own people,
inasmuch as the Governor’s veto is practically final, whereas that of
an American president may be and is in fact frequently overridden by
a legislature. Nay, more, as we have seen that the American auditor
appointed by the Governor was to have final authority over the
Philippine expenditures.
The claim of the Filipinos on the other hand may be gathered from the
words of one of its greatest leaders. Senator Osmenà. Speaking before
the Philippine barristers, he expressed Filipino sentiment in these
words:
The Filipinos know that theirs is now an autonomous régime; that
they and not the Governor General, are being subjected to a test;
that they and not the Governor General are in duty bound to
establish a stable government here, and that they and only they
are committed to the task of hastening the day for the granting
of their independence. They, therefore, have the right to follow
and be guided by their own leaders and to expect that their
control in the government of their own country be real, ample and
effective.... To surrender our present lease of governmental power
or our control over internal affairs for one reason or another, is
not only sheer cowardice; it is downright desertion of duty—treason
against the Nation[4].
Here then were two conflicting positions—the Governor claiming for
himself greater power as an executive than that wielded by an American
president, and the Philippine legislature asserting that in matters of
domestic concern they, as representatives of the people and responsible
to them, should be the ones to decide the local problems of the day.
The legislative session of 1922-23 left little doubt in the minds
of men that the conflict would not be long delayed. Following the
resignation of the Philippine Cabinet and the Council of State because,
as the Filipino leaders alleged, the Governor General was overriding
the clear law, the Filipinos decided to appeal their case to the
American people. Knowing how impossible it is for the Filipinos
to arouse the interest of Americans in these matters, they hoped,
nevertheless, that they might succeed in laying their case before
Congress. For that purpose they sent a commission to Washington headed
by Speaker Roxas of the Philippine House of Representatives.
The Commission came to state that Governor General Wood had been guilty
of illegal and arbitrary acts and that the irritation caused by his
course had led various Philippine leaders to resign their official
positions.
This event, [added the Filipino spokesman] grave and serious as
it is, once more demonstrates that the immediate and absolute
independence of the Philippines which the whole country demands,
is the only complete and satisfactory settlement of the Philippine
problem.
About the time when this delegation took its headquarters in Washington
there was a bill pending before the Committee on Insular Affairs
favoring Philippine independence. The Boston _Globe_ of March 9, 1924,
reported the progress of this bill in these terms:
The United States House of Representatives Committee on Insular
Affairs has this week voted to report out a bill favoring
Philippine independence by a vote of eleven to five. The Filipino
representatives in this country were jubilant. They felt that there
is a strong sentiment in the present Congress.... Just as the
rejoicing was highest ... President Coolidge dropped a bombshell
upon their festival of hope.
Now, what was this bombshell with which the President could defeat
Filipino aspirations without consulting Congress? It was an open letter
from the President addressed to the Filipino delegates in reply to
their list of grievances growing out of the intolerable situation in
the Islands. The President’s letter was written along familiar lines,
but it must be considered carefully, bearing in mind that it was
published just as the Insular Committee was proposing to report a bill
to grant the Islands their independence and, in the language of the New
York _Times_ of March 14, “blocked any such bill in Congress,” and was
intended to do so.
Said the President to the head of the Philippine Commission:
The extent to which the grievances which you suggest are shared
by the Filipino people has been a subject of some disagreement.
The American Government has information which justifies it in the
confidence that a very large proportion, at any rate, and possibly
a majority of the substantial citizenry of the Islands, does not
support the claim that there are grounds for serious grievances.
But does a general statement of this sort carry conviction? From whom
did the information come? What is meant by “substantial citizenry?”
What did the President mean by “the American Government”? Lincoln said
it was a “government by the people,” but the people had not received
such information nor had Congress, their chosen representatives. If
there was any reliable information why did not the President make it
known to the people or to Congress? Surely, if the President would
not rely upon the unanimous voice of the Philippine legislature,
a legislature which, in the opinion of the Wood-Forbes Report is
“composed of representative men,” it was imperative that the President
give the people the information which he had received, in order
that they might judge its value. The question is a question for the
people—not for Mr. Coolidge alone.
The President went on to say also that, “a considerable section of the
Filipino people is further of the opinion that at this time any change
which would weaken the tie between the Filipinos and the American
nation would be a misfortune to the Islands.” What is this considerable
section? What is the evidence of such a feeling? The President has no
right to act upon information which he will not disclose.
It has been years since the desire for independence by Filipinos
was firmly established. Every year since the organization of the
Philippine Legislature in 1916, and before that the Philippine Assembly
in 1907, a resolution has been adopted unanimously asking the Congress
of the United States to grant independence. There is not a single
dissenting vote in the Houses when this matter is brought up. All
political parties in the Islands are for immediate independence and
they vie with each other in their efforts to secure their country’s
freedom. There is not a single man in the Philippines who can be
elected to office if he does not advocate independence. Even the
Wood-Forbes Report substantiated this attitude, for they “found
everywhere, among the Christian Filipinos (which compose ninety per
cent of the population) the general desire for independence.” If the
President, therefore, had evidence to the contrary upon which he
could safely rely, it should have been published. It is a familiar
rule of law that “fraud lurks in general statements”—“_Dolus latet in
generalibus._”
But the President went on instead to speak of the altruism of the
United States in helping the Filipinos.
A great responsibility came _unsought_ to the American people [he
said] referring to the period of 1898. It was not imposed upon
them because they had yielded to any designs of imperialism or of
colonial expansion. The fortunes of war brought American power
to your Islands, playing the part of an unexpected and welcome
deliverer.
This claim that the Islands came to the United States unsought by the
fortunes of war has been dealt with in earlier chapters of this volume.
It was not to be wondered, however, that the President should have
again alluded to this period of the conquest in such a high-handed
manner. This method was adopted by McKinley twenty-seven years before
and it has since been handed down intact and accepted by the American
people, because they have always been too busy to look at the sources
of information or to even examine with a grain of salt these statements
though made by men presenting their side of the case and defending the
policies for which they are responsible.
But the most naïve suggestion in the President’s letter was his
statement to the commission and, through them to the Filipino people,
that they would “do well to consider most carefully the value of their
intimate association with the American nation.” These were Governor
Taft’s words nineteen years before when he expressed the hope that the
Filipinos would learn to value their connection with the United States,
while the United States would then also appreciate this “pearl of the
Oriental tropics.” Do not both these suggestions look toward permanent
retention?
Is it not also safe and reasonable to assume that ever since 1898 the
Filipinos have carefully considered the possible value of a permanent
or even an indefinite connection with the United States? Is it not
clear that having so considered it they have unequivocally expressed
for the last twenty-five years their ardent desire to terminate these
relations? What, therefore, did the President expect to gain by urging
them to reconsider a question which they have already studied and on
which their attitude has never varied?
Even with the presence of the American flag in the Islands today the
archipelago is one of the most poorly protected lands in the world.
Any considerable force can easily overthrow the scanty representation
of American arms in the Islands, and it is absurd to believe that the
American people would permit a President or a Secretary of War to
send the forces necessary to protect eleven millions of “inferior”
people. Nor have the Filipinos forgotten that when their peace was last
endangered during the World War, orders were given to the American
military and naval forces to leave the Islands in the event of a
threatened attack.
What respect does the President pay to the solemn promise made by
the government of the United States in the Jones Law that as soon
as the Filipinos had established a stable government they should be
granted their independence? Here is a promise and a test to decide
when independence should be granted. The Filipinos have contended that
this test has been satisfied by them. President Wilson upheld this
contention and President Coolidge added some support to this when he
said in his letter that:
In education, in cultural advancement, in political conceptions and
institutional development, the Filipino people have demonstrated a
capacity which cannot but justify high hopes for their future.
But the President stated his conclusion, nevertheless, that
there had not been thus far a full realization of the fundamental
ideals of Democratic government. There have been evidences of a
certain inability or unwillingness to recognize that this type
of governmental organization rests upon the theory of complete
separation of the legislative, executive and judicial functions.
There have been many evidences of a disposition to extend the
functions of the legislature and thereby curtail the proper
authority of the executive,
which under the veil of generality means that the Governor General and
the Philippine legislature have disagreed. Such disagreements are not
rare in the realm of American national and state government, but it
has never been suggested that they were proof of political incapacity
on the part of the legislatures or of infallibility on the part of the
President. Is the President entitled to make this opinion of his, with
no statements of the facts on which he relies, binding on two nations?
Are not his fellow-citizens entitled to weigh the “evidences” to which
he refers?
In a word, therefore, we find the President brushing aside the test of
a stable government made by Congress in 1916 and substituting in its
place several tests of his own, such as a legislature acting in entire
harmony with a Governor appointed by him but paid out of the taxes
raised from the Filipino people. Wherein does the President get the
authority to make this test? How many independent nations in the world
today can establish the clear recognition of the separation of powers
which the President wants the Filipinos to achieve before independence
is granted them? Even in the United States the relative weight of each
department in the Federal government varies from time to time and in no
other country in the world does the American experiment prevail—and yet
they are all independent.
Suppose the President’s test is applied to himself. Where does our
constitution give him the power to determine the future of eleven
millions of men and their relations with the United States? Who gives
him the right to decide whether their government corresponds with
the American ideals or not? Did not the Supreme Court of the United
States unequivocally declare that the “Constitution of the United
States did not follow the flag” into the Philippines, as it does in the
American territories? Did not even McKinley himself announce from the
beginning of the occupation that America had no intention of applying
her own theories of government in the Islands, but intended rather to
insure the welfare of the Filipinos with due respect for even their
“prejudices if necessary”?[5] The powers which the President now
exercises are not executive. They are legislative and the President
usurped them to prevent Congress from exercising its legitimate right
to decide the Philippine issue.
The relations of the United States with the Philippines are peculiarly
a subject to be dealt with by Congress. This was asserted at the outset
of the occupation and has never been questioned. What right has the
President to interfere with their deliberations and seek to impose
his opinion upon them? History repeats itself, and as the Islands
were acquired and held and a war declared by the President, without
consulting Congress, so now the Executive usurps the function of
Congress and would continue the occupation of the Islands because he
approves it.
This new and impossible test set by the President really meant and will
continue to mean unless changed, that the promise made by an American
Congress in 1916 can be treated as “a scrap of paper” in order to give
place to a policy which gives the Filipinos no hope of independence as
long as an excuse may be found by the President for holding that the
government of the Islands is not what it should be, or that it does not
correspond with his ideals. Apply such tests to the American cities and
which would be left to govern itself?
For the sake of clarity let us again state the problem in the
Philippines as it arose in 1923 and as it exists today. General Wood
and the Filipinos have been and continue to be at issue, the latter
asserting that the Governor’s course has been arbitrary and lawless.
History has invariably shown that when a military officer is placed
in civil authority he is apt to irritate the people over whom he is
placed. Here was an issue—is it not reasonable to suppose that an
impartial tribunal should have settled the problem? The least partial
tribunal to which the Filipinos could state their case was Congress,
but the President took it into his own hands, and has assumed to decide
it without action by Congress.
It is a fundamental fact in the government of one people by another
that the governing power stands by its own representatives, believes in
them and is determined to sustain them. And so the President sustained
his representative on this occasion. He told the complaining Filipinos
that he had “full confidence in the ability, good intentions, fairness
and sincerity” of General Wood, and pronounced him, “a hard working,
painstaking and conscientious administrator,” finding no evidence that
he had “acted with any other than the purposes of best serving the real
interests of the Filipino people.”
What do these words mean? Only that the President approves his
appointee. But General Wood may have had one idea as to the “real
interest” of the Filipinos, and the Filipinos a very different one. He
may have sincerely adopted what he considered the proper means, and
yet in the judgment of others they may have been improper. A man may
be “hard working, painstaking and conscientious” in the pursuit of
what he thinks is good for a population, and yet be an unsuccessful
administrator lacking sympathy, wisdom and tact.
Are there not in the United States differences and deadlocks
between “conscientious, painstaking and hard working” Presidents
and Congresses; between Governors of “ability, good intentions and
fairness” and state legislatures, and between mayors and councils
in the most progressive cities of America? When a President is tried
on articles of impeachment as was Andrew Johnson, when members of
a Cabinet are forced to resign because of blundering stupidity or
dishonesty, when elected governors are sent to the state penitentiaries
for dishonest practices, do such catastrophes prove that the country is
not fit for self-government?
No one need question the honest purposes of the President or of General
Wood, but the principles on which the American government was founded
are eternal, and consistently with them the fate of a nation cannot be
decided by a few men. The New York _Times_ of March 14, 1924, gives
a glaring example of the practice which in 1898 permitted a few men
to conquer the Islands. The dispatch in question came from Washington
and described a “conference in the office of the Secretary of War”
which, the paper said, “may have an important hearing on Philippine
independence _as several American business men who have interests in
the Philippines attended_.” A list of these business men was given.
One had “extensive interests in the Islands,” another was “a member of
the Chamber of Commerce,” a third had “large sugar plantations” and a
fourth was a “hemp importer.” With these were joined Secretary Weeks,
General McIntyre and Ex-Vice-Governor Gilbert, the latter being one
of the strongest advocates of indefinite control. Here were a few
Americans with private interests at stake met to advise the Secretary
of War as to what should be done in the Philippines, and although there
were several Filipino officials in Washington at that time, not one was
present.
Is it not wiser and safer to leave the question in the hands of the
representatives of the American people, and let the issue be settled
after open debate in Congress, rather than permit the President to
dispose of the Islands according to the counsel of men whom he believes
“able to give the best advice” but whom he does not name, or by secret
meetings between the Secretary of War and interested American business
men?
Just as President McKinley deliberately settled the fate of the
Islands without consulting Congress in accordance with the desires of
a few selfish Americans who believed in trade expansion, President
Coolidge in March, 1924, blocked favorable action by Congress in behalf
of the Filipinos and, at the behest apparently of a few American
capitalists, undertook to settle the future of the Philippines for many
years to come. The letter of the President was but one step in this
well-conceived scheme to hold the Islands permanently, or at least
until the interest of these trade expansionists no longer warrants
the maintenance of “a door to the commercial markets of the Far East.”
The plan will succeed, unless the American people realize in time what
“benevolent assimilation” really means.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER XII
[1] Wood-Forbes Report, p. 45.
[2] _Ibid._, p. 18.
[3] _Ibid._, p. 45.
[4] Speech on Dec. 7, 1923, Manila.
[5] Instructions to first Philippine Commission.