+The Taft Policy Analyzed+
The substitution of white duck in the place of khaki and brass buttons
as the dress of the American official in the Philippines may be said
to characterize Governor Taft’s manner of quelling Filipino opposition
and at the same time reconciling the McKinley representations with
the actual state of affairs in the Islands. Therefore he proposed to
establish Civil Government in order to pacify the natives and to assure
the people at home that things were going along as they should. Of
course, this policy was vehemently opposed by the military commanders
whose real task was to combat the insurrection in some of the
remaining islands. As late as October 8, 1901, for example, while the
administration was publicly saying that the American representatives
were getting along harmoniously, we find this significant telegram from
Washington addressed to the commanding general in Manila,—
+Chaffee+, Manila.
I am deeply chagrined to use the mildest term possible over the
trouble between you and Taft. I wish you to see him personally, and
spare no effort to secure prompt and friendly agreement in regard
to the differences between you. Have cabled him also. It is most
unfortunate to have any action which produces friction and which
may have a serious effect both in the Philippines _and here at
home_. I trust implicity that you and Taft will come to agreement.
Signed: +Theodore Roosevelt+[1].
These disagreements were the natural outcome of having two officials in
the field—one who wanted civil government because he believed in it,
and the other who said there was no place for civil government while
several hundred thousand inhabitants were being herded together in
reconcentration camps.
Now, the term “civil government” is most inviting. Although it does not
necessarily imply a government by the consent of the governed, it at
least distinctly negatives the idea of a government conducted by the
military arm in a country of bleeding, prostrate and hostile people.
To be able to tell the public at home, therefore, that there was civil
government in the Philippines was to put everyone in good humour. What
if General Bell and his army were searching every ravine and mountain
side in Batangas province, a hundred miles or so from Manila, armed
to the teeth and fully determined to kill “every able-bodied man in
sight?” What care that General Smith was making Samar a “howling
wilderness,” ordering his subordinates to “kill and burn,—the more you
kill the better you will please me?” What matter that thousands were
being herded together in reconcentration camps. Civil government it
must be to please the public at home. All disorders in the Islands from
that moment could be described as acts of mere banditti. Of course this
vicious situation was not made known to the American people at that
time, but six years later, when the true facts no longer affected the
safety of the party in power, there came this blunt confession by the
American Governor, General Smith. Said he in his inaugural address:
While the smoke of battle still hung over the hills and valleys of
the Philippines, and every town and barrio in the Islands was hot
with rebellion, she (the United States) replaced military with a
civil régime and on the smouldering embers of insurrection planted
civil government[2].
We are naturally curious to learn what kind of government was thus
being offered by Mr. Taft and what was the nature of the policy back of
it. Under the new régime a civil governor in person of Governor Taft
himself, took the place of the military commander. Though not wearing
gilt braid like the other potentates in Asia he was absolute master of
the central government, as will appear from the nature of his powers.
The legislative branch was composed of the so-called Philippine
Commission. There were originally five members, all Americans,
appointed by the President of the United States but drawing salaries
in excess of that received by American cabinet officers, and like all
the other expenses of the Government paid by the Filipino tax-payers.
This constituted the central civil government. There were besides,
of course, a host of subordinate officers in executive and judicial
positions, Filipinos and Americans alike, the latter holding the best
paid offices. But for all purposes of government, the Americans in the
Commission, of which Mr. Taft, as Governor, was entitled to be one,
ruled the destinies of the nation. They made laws and administered
them; they appointed and removed; they were the “civil government.”
How absolute was the power residing in this body may be shown by an
incident related by an American in the service of that government. One
of the laws passed by the Commission in 1901 [3] had provided that
an American, in order to qualify for a position in the Philippine
judiciary should be more than thirty years of age, and should have the
experience of a five years’ practice in American law courts. In 1903
President Roosevelt wished to give the Hon. Beekman Winthrop a position
on the Philippine Bench. Winthrop, then a recent graduate of the
Harvard Law School, was under thirty years of age. Judge Taft called
his secretary, Mr. Ferguson, to acquaint him of this appointment.
“Fergy,” he said, in his good natured manner, “make me out a commission
for Beekman Winthrop as a judge of First Instance.”
“You can’t do it. Governor,” his secretary properly replied. “It’s
against the law. He’s not old enough.”
“I can’t, eh?” said the Governor humorously. “I’ll show you. Send me a
stenographer.”
The stenographer came and the Governor dictated a new law, striking
out the thirty year old requirement from the old statute and inserting
twenty-five in its place. In addition to the requirement that the
appointee must have practiced law for a period of five years, another
phrase was added, as follows: “or be a graduate of a reputable law
school”[4].
Secretary Ferguson was then summoned anew. The governor told him to get
the rest of the members of the Commission. This was done immediately,
and within a few minutes the new statute had been passed and made the
law of the land.
“Now,” said Governor Taft good naturedly to the law-abiding Ferguson,
“make out that commission”[5].
Although Mr. Winthrop with his Harvard record did make a good judge,
the incident is narrated merely to show how absolutely five Americans
could make, publish and execute Philippine laws. Even the English
despots on the mainland of Asia could not have exercised more despotic
power.
So much for the framework of Governor Taft’s civil government. Now what
did it aim to accomplish? In judging the Taft policy as announced by
its founder it is well to remember always that the statements of facts
and conditions and the nature of the people dealt with come from the
lips of persons who are speaking in their own defense and who in most
cases were possible candidates for higher offices in the future. Being
mere men, they naturally tend to present their own side of the case.
In this matter, the men from whom we expect the desired information,
become advocates of the policy to be examined rather than impartial
reporters.
Now all that these high colonial officials then said may have been
true. Certainly, a majority of their countrymen believed their
statements, because they said them. Suppose the declarations had been
false,—the American people would have believed them just the same. It
is natural that what American governors say concerning the Filipino
will be accepted as gospel truth by their countrymen however little
they may believe the assertions of their rulers at home. Past events
in the history of this nation itself have always shown that although
statements of presidents, governors and mayors in describing their own
administration are severely criticized by those directly concerned, yet
these same people will accept the statements of their officers abroad
as gospel truth. Thus, after the Civil War what the carpet-bag officers
said was considered true, while the criticism of eminent Southerners
was considered as “rebel talk.” And so this much can also be said of
the future—that no matter who the governor may be in the Philippines,
the declaration of the American will be accepted in the United States
rather than that of a Filipino. This is the insurmountable difficulty,
for the side of the Filipino will, therefore, never be understood by
Americans.
Let us, however, judge the Taft programme on its face as the founder
himself and those who have since followed him characterize the policy.
In the first place, then, it is noticed that Mr. Taft’s programme was
founded on one great assumption, namely, that the American people
were and would continue to be unselfish in their attitude towards the
Filipino, and hence that they could be trusted to keep men in office
who would carry out this policy, no matter how absolute a power they
might be able to wield from that position.
Thus, Governor Taft clearly stated his first position:
The people of the United States have under their _guidance and
control_ in the Philippines, an archipelago of 3000 islands, the
population of which is about 7,600,000 souls. Of this 7,000,000 are
Christians, 600,000 are Moros or other Pagan tribes[6].
Now, up to Mr. Taft’s régime, there had never been any talk at all in
official circles about the possibility of ever letting the Filipinos
have their independence. No such idea had ever been suggested by
President McKinley, the man most responsible for the acquisition of
the Islands. True it was that he had spoken of giving the Filipinos
“individual rights,” and perhaps some ultimate participation in their
government, but that the complete withdrawal of American sovereignty
should ever follow had not been considered by him.
But in 1901 the imperialist flame had burned itself out and America’s
second thought had succeeded. Hence Judge Taft’s purpose to improve
the people and prepare them for the hour of their liberation. Just
when this independence was to be granted, however, no one could or
would tell. Mr. Taft, however, offered the solution of this intricate
problem and we may believe his purpose has not changed since.
To put it briefly, Judge Taft insisted then and insists even today,
that upon the American people rests the duty of solving the Philippine
problem, asserting also that they are capable of accomplishing the
task when the time comes to decide upon it once and for all. In the
meantime,—well, let Judge Taft himself speak:
As a friend of the Filipinos [he said] it is my anxious desire to
enlarge that class of Americans who have a real interest in the
welfare of the Islands, and who believe that the United States
can have no higher duty or function than to assist the people
of the Islands to prosperity and a political development which
shall enable them to secure to themselves the enjoyment of civil
liberty[7].
All of this sounded well indeed, but note in the first place that
“civil liberty” does not mean political liberty, far less independence.
The method by which this new structure was to be achieved was also
carefully stated by its founder.
“The first requisite of prosperity in the Islands,” he said, “is
tranquillity, and this should be evidenced by a well-ordered
government.”
How long this upbuilding would require, Judge Taft was not sure then,
but this much he was willing to concede.
It may be that when the Filipinos have been transformed into a
people capable of safely maintaining an independent self-government
they will ask it, and then I have no doubt that it will be accorded
them.
This promising remark, however, loses its value in the light of the
language which followed it.
It may be however [added Judge Taft] _and I think quite as likely_
that by that time the Filipinos will be so well satisfied with the
good resulting from a union with the United States that they will
prefer to maintain a relation like that which now binds Canada and
Australia to Great Britain, and that _the United States will then
value its association with this pearl of the Oriental tropics_. But
whatever the ultimate decision it is certain that the time cannot
arise for a considerable period, probably several generations.
Judge Taft thus advocated a policy of waiting several generations
which means indefinitely, before the question could be decided. In
the meantime he would oppose permitting the Filipinos to talk or
ask for their freedom for, he said, “The Filipinos should learn the
disadvantages that arise to everybody in the country from political
agitation for a change in the form of government in the immediate
future.”
During this wait of several generations, however, it is apparent from
Judge Taft’s words that it was his hope that the United Sates would
really learn to value its association with “this pearl of the Oriental
tropics.”
It is estimated [he temptingly told the New York Chamber of
Commerce] that not more than five million acres of land are owned
by natives in the islands, and that remaining sixty-five million is
owned by the government.
That is, the United States government. Now it so happened that soon
after the acquisition of the Philippines, the American Congress had
passed a law limiting the number of acres which a company might buy.
This was intended to prevent a few Americans from monopolizing the
land. This limitation in Judge Taft’s opinion was “much too low for
the cultivation of sugar.” However, “there is a provision in the law,”
added the Judge, “by which irrigation companies may own stock in land
companies, _so that probably the limitations may be evaded if private
profit requires_.” Curious that such a suggestion should have come from
the highest officer of the land charged with the duty of enforcing the
law.
Here then, was Judge Taft’s policy as he presented it in 1904, and as
he would, no doubt, still present it today: The American people, a
self-sacrificing and conscientious nation, having no object in view
save the benefit of the Filipinos, should retain the absolute control
of the Philippines indefinitely, or at least for several generations,
meanwhile introducing education, sanitary improvements and other good
things, all of which were to be paid for by the Filipinos. In due time
the _American people would decide_, first—whether they had proved
themselves fit for independence, and second, whether independence was
good for them. The hope that the Filipinos themselves would in due
time lose the desire for freedom was, of course, not to be abandoned.
During this long period of several generations the Americans could and
would in fact be invited to acquire larger and larger interests in the
Islands while the Filipinos would be permitted such “civil liberties”
as Congress might choose to grant them.
Finally, as if to support the wisdom of this policy and the
reasonableness of giving the Filipinos such limited freedom, Judge Taft
finally added: “To make the Declaration of Independence apply equally
to the Filipinos as to the American colonists, is to be blind to the
plainest facts and to sacrifice truth to an impossible dogma and a
rhetorical phrase.”
Each of these proposals will now be taken up in order to show not
only the fallacy of expecting to see the plan work out, but also to
point out the viciousness underlying the policy which Judge Taft then
believed to be right.
First, then, as to this “impossible dogma and rhetorical phrase” known
as the Declaration of Independence. Did the framers of this document
really mean it to apply only to the revolting colonists? Against Mr.
Taft’s word we quote Abraham Lincoln’s estimate of that Declaration.
Its authors meant it to be [he said] as, thank God, it is now
proving itself—a stumbling block to all those who in after times
might seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths
of despotism. _They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed
tyrants_, and they meant that when such should reappear in this
fair land and commence their vocation, they would find at least one
hard nut to crack.
But Governor Taft did try to crack this nut by confusing expansion with
imperialism. He said,
Since the foundation of our government the people of the United
States, that is the states as distinguished from the territories,
have been engaged in governing other people. We did it in the case
of Louisiana. We have done it in the case of every territory that
was subsequently admitted to the United States.
finally adding that if this governing of other people who have no voice
in the government is to violate the Declaration of Independence, then
“we have been violating the Declaration of Independence for a hundred
years.”
There is this to remember, however, in the cases with which Governor
Taft sought to justify his action. The people of the United States
beginning as a fringe of inhabitants on the edge of a continent
adopted a Constitution to which they consented. This constitution
gave to their Congress control over the unoccupied land not belonging
to any state, and in the exercise of that power Congress adopted the
policy of letting persons settle on this land and organize territorial
government, and as the settlers became sufficiently numerous in any
region, that region was admitted to statehood. To the establishment
of this policy the people as a whole had consented beforehand, and
every man who settled in that territory did so with knowledge of that
policy. In the case of Louisiana, that huge tract of land was acquired
by treaty and by purchase, whereby the United States bound itself to
incorporate its inhabitants in the Union and to give them all the
rights of American citizens.
Contrast this with the Philippine situation of 1904 when Governor
Taft made these statements or even with the situation today. In those
islands there were then some eight millions of people who had resisted
American sovereignty until overcome by force of arms. United as a
people in desiring their independence, Mr. Taft would refuse it to them
because in the estimation of those who had conquered them they were not
fit to govern themselves. Is it possible that so able a lawyer as Judge
Taft failed to detect this difference between the American government
of territories and the government of Filipinos against their will?
Still Mr. Taft seemed to be satisfied that it was enough to give the
Filipinos “civil liberties.” This, he said, had been “secured to every
man, woman and child among the Christian Filipinos,” these rights
being equivalent to those “contained in the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution of the United States except the right to bear arms and the
right to be tried by jury.”
But was it true then, and is it true now, that such rights as the
Filipinos were given were really equivalent to the Bill of Rights
in the Constitution? They were not rights—they were mere privileges
granted by an absolute foreign power resting on an Act of Congress
which could be repealed at will. Was that freedom? A free man is one
whose rights are his and cannot be taken away from him against his
will. This was instead an absolute government, in name by the American
people, and in fact by the President and his officers.
There are those, however, who might say that the course of events
has since justified Judge Taft’s policy, and that creation of the
Philippine Assembly in 1907 and the Senate in 1916, are convincing
proofs of this gradual extension of liberty to the Filipinos. How much
liberty these measures really meant will be taken up in the succeeding
chapters. For the present—attention is focussed on Judge Taft’s policy
alone.
Let us assume, therefore, that Judge Taft’s programme is faithfully
carried out. The question remains who is to decide when the Filipinos
are fit for independence? Certainly not the American residents in
the Islands who, having invested their money there and having always
regarded the Filipinos as inferiors would naturally exert their utmost
influence to perpetuate American sovereignty. Governor Taft himself
distrusted these Americans for, as he told the New York Chamber of
Commerce,
The American merchants easily caught the feeling of hostility
and contempt felt by many of the soldiers for the Filipinos, and
were most emphatic in condemning the policy of the government in
attempting to attract the Filipinos and make them so far as might
be a part of the new order.
As for the organ of these American settlers which is so frequently
heard in the United States, Judge Taft had this to say:
The American newspapers ... also took the tone of their advertisers
and their subscribers and hence it is that the American community
in the Philippines today is largely an anti-Filipino community,
prone apparently in dealing with the natives to call them names,
to make fun of them and to deride every effort toward their
advancement and development.
Let the reader of today, therefore, read the reports of these papers
and American residents with a grain of salt, for they are not
disinterested and impartial judges.
Where, then, are we to find “the good sense and virtue of the American
people,” which will in time adequately and faithfully decide the
question? Can the Americans at home be entrusted with this task of
deciding the destinies of several million Filipinos? It is submitted
that they cannot do so, because nearly all, if not actually all the
elements necessary for a real knowledge of the conditions existing
in the islands or for the creation of genuine sympathy with the
aspirations of the Filipinos, are sorely lacking in the hearts and
minds of the American people.
First, as to a knowledge of the true conditions in the Islands. Well,
we remember the censorship during the war. One cannot forget also
that Governor Taft’s own testimony before the Senate Committee, when
information was desired in 1902, gave no idea of the true extent to
which torture, destruction and reconcentration had been carried on
in the attempt to conquer the Islands. Men are human the world over
and whenever they speak of that which may reflect on their personal
positions they will put the best face possible upon the matter so as to
provoke the least hostile criticism. When these men speak, therefore,
their administration as well as the whole policy of the political party
in Washington which placed them in power is put on trial. Governor Taft
himself, may have been above temptation in these matters, but would
there be many like him?
This mental attitude on the part of the highest officials in the
Islands and those most closely connected with them is largely
substantiated by a confession made by an ex-official himself, the
Hon. W. Morgan Shuster, a former member of the Philippine Commission.
Writing in 1914 in the January issue of the _Century Magazine_, he said:
The records of our congressional committee and of the War
Department are filled with reports, speeches, letters, testimony
and statistics _going to show what the party then in power wanted
the American people to think about the Filipinos_. If any one
thought differently, he became at once, in official eyes, a
dreamer, an anti-imperialist, or a demagogue. His opinions were
taboo in high governmental circles, and he was deemed an unsafe
man to hold important office. This was only natural and I recall
it merely to show how the opinion of the American people on the
question has really been formed.
Then followed this convincing statement:
The opinion of the ordinary American citizen as to the Filipinos
is largely influenced by the statements or the pronouncements of
the very few men in public life who have had, or were thought to
have had, exceptional facilities for knowing the real facts and
situation. Thus the views of ex-Presidents Roosevelt and Taft,
of ex-Secretary of War Root, of Senator Lodge, of the different
Philippine governors and members of the Philippine Commission and
of the commanding generals who have served in the islands have been
the real source of “American Public opinion.”
As a matter of fact [confessed Mr. Morgan Shuster] it is doubtful
whether the views of any of these gentlemen were reached in a
strictly impartial and judicial manner. With the possible exception
of Mr. Taft, _they took up the subject as I did, with a previously
formed conviction that the facts were going to sustain the accepted
government belief and policy, which were that the Filipinos were
not fit to be, and should not of right be, independent, at least
for a very long time to come_. How long few ventured to predict. It
is said that Mr. Taft when invited by President McKinley to go to
Manila as head of the Civil Commission, stated that he was opposed
to our holding the islands. That, however, was before he had been
intimately connected with the administrative policies already
adopted, which were based on the opposite belief.
How about the minor American officials? How would they report the
progress of the Filipino for self-government? Does the question warrant
an answer? Pray, how else than in the same characteristic manner in
which their superior officers approached the problem? Indeed how
could they be expected to do otherwise? On that side was their bread
buttered! Time has shown that many of these men did not stop there, but
have gone to the extent of deliberately misrepresenting conditions in
the Islands. While on leave of absence at home or having permanently
retired from Philippine service, these men have launched a propaganda
from the speaking platform and the printed page wilfully slandering the
natives whom they detest.
Granting, therefore, that Americans at home might conceivably wish
to know the true facts upon which to base the exercise of their good
sense and judgment, there are no means by which they can easily learn
them. This is the unhappy result of the intolerable situation where one
nation insists on governing another without that other’s consent. For
outside of these official dispatches and perhaps a few other accounts
by prolific writers of sensationalism and trash, whose main object is
to secure a wide circulation for their volumes, nothing from the side
of the Filipino can ever be forthcoming. The political retentionist
sees to it that nothing is printed except official dispatches and
perhaps an occasional report concerning Filipino incapacity. The case
for the petitioner is “crowded out by the press of other matter,” that
the conspiracy of silence may continue.
But the question which always remains is whether the American people
will ever take an interest in the matter even if they do have reliable
information. Are they not so immersed in their own affairs, so busy in
their struggles to make money and so indifferent by reason of the great
distance separating them that even the intelligent men have not and
cannot give the necessary time to understand the Philippine situation?
If the people of the greatest American cities accept corrupt and
ignorant government which affects them directly rather than take the
time and trouble necessary to improve it, what chance is there of their
devoting time to the affairs of an alien people thousands of miles away?
The Filipinos can, therefore, only rely for justice upon the American
officials governing them. Now against a foreign oppressor men rely on
armies and navies, but against domestic tyranny they can only raise
the shield of a constitution. This restraint on arbitrary power is
the only protection of the individual against the government which
rules him. Great as is an Anglo-Saxon’s confidence in his fellowmen,
for example, he has employed in the past, and he is today employing
this device to protect himself from being ridden by men of the same
blood and color as himself. The unwritten English Constitution has
grown up from the efforts of English subjects to restrain English
kings. Americans have erected similar safeguards to prevent American
Presidents, governors, judges and even legislatures from oppressing
American citizens.
If a citizen of Massachusetts needs protection against his fellow
citizens, if the American people dare not give their President and
Congress a power unfettered by a constitution, is it not too clear for
argument that the shield of a constitution is far more needed by the
Filipinos to protect them from a government authorized by men who do
not know them and only learn of them through the reports of others who
present their side of the case most strongly and who openly regard the
natives as their inferiors?
But there is even another safeguard lacking against which laws and
even constitutions are ineffectual when the true liberties of a people
are threatened. This is public opinion, the force which, more than
anything else will restrain the rulers of every modern state. An
enlightened public opinion, however, can exist only where the public is
informed and when the public is interested. Neither of these conditions
can be relied upon in America’s dealing with the absolute government of
the Philippines. The absence of the former has already been treated in
this and preceding chapters. Of the latter it can safely be said that
popular indifference and lack of genuine interest have characterized
the occupation of the Philippines ever since the establishment of civil
government. Once the novelty of the conquest had worn away, it has been
impossible to induce the American people to take more than a passing
interest in the conduct of Philippine affairs. The complaints of the
Filipinos fall upon the ears of men, who though supposed to judge them,
know nothing of them and care little to learn about them. Say what you
will of an American’s intelligence, of his energy and high purposes and
fitness to govern himself, it is because he knows not and cares not
what is done in the Philippines that he and his fellowmen are unfit to
govern the islands.
But the Taft policy, however, proposed and it has in fact succeeded
in its proposal, that these inferior natives with whom the great body
of Americans would not care to associate, should be given only such
measure of free government as unenlightened and unsympathetic Americans
think them qualified to use, exercising in doing so a power unfettered
by any constitution and unrestrained by any informed and interested
public opinion.
Now it may be that in the future as in the past, a group of really
disinterested Americans of high calibre will take a serious view of
their duty and responsibility in the Islands—that is, the kind of
duty and responsibility that the Taft programme calls for. Such an
instance occurred shortly after the establishment of the Taft régime
when several thousands of Americans signed a petition for Philippine
independence. Governor Taft described these men as “a number of
excellent and prominent gentlemen.”—and well he might. Could not these
“excellent and prominent gentlemen” be trusted with the problem?
Apparently not in Mr. Taft’s opinion, for he told the New York Chamber
of Commerce at the time when the petition was presented that “the good
people who signed the petition” should not “intermeddle with something
the effect of which they are very little able to understand[8].”
Who were these men whose ability to understand the Philippine situation
Judge Taft so seriously questioned? The list included Cardinal Gibbons,
Archbishop Farley, more than fifty bishops, more than sixty judges, a
long list of college presidents and leading educators, such as Eliot
of Harvard, Schurman of Cornell, himself not without experience in
the Philippines, and ex-President Cleveland. There were also Andrew
Carnegie, Charles Francis Adams, Wayne McVeagh and thousands of other
respected and prominent men in private life. Here were the spiritual
and the intellectual leaders of America. If they were “little able to
understand,” to whom in the United States could the Filipinos look
for leadership in their behalf? If these American leaders must not
“intermeddle,” how can Judge Taft justify his “abiding confidence in
the power of the American people to reach a right conclusion?”
If, therefore, the Americans in the Islands as well as the good and
intelligent Americans at home cannot be trusted, no one is left, unless
by “the good sense and judgment of the American people,” Mr. Taft
really meant the President, the Secretary of War, and their appointees,
who in the past have been indifferent to human rights and only too
ready to seek commercial advantage.
It has been constantly urged, however, that this “benevolent
despotism,” for that is what the Taft programme really meant then and
now, was merely a step towards preparing the Filipinos for eventual
independence. This argument is being used to this day, and will
continue to be so used by all those who seek to hide the vicious
character of their scheme. For this method of dealing with the problem
unfits rather than prepares the Filipinos for independence.
The policy of Governor Taft, in the first place, creates a new race
problem because his position rests entirely upon the assumption that
the Filipinos, being unfit to govern themselves, should be governed by
a race of superior people. Everything, therefore, that the American
officials in the Philippines say about the fitness of the Filipino will
be accepted as gospel truth by the great majority. They will never take
the word of the Filipino against the word of the American. The side
of the Filipino will, therefore, not only never be understood in this
country but will suffer greatly as the years go by because the more
stubbornly the Filipino asserts his fitness for self-government, the
more vehemently will his caretakers in the Islands deny it.
The Taft policy moreover creates a far more serious obstacle to
independence, for during this period of education paid for by the
Filipino it calls for the investment of large amounts of American
capital in the Islands hoping that in that manner the Americans will,
as the years go by, learn to value truly “this pearl of the Oriental
tropics.” Stripped of its sugar coating the Taft policy is to keep the
Islands for generations and to plant there in the meantime American
citizens and American capital. Now there is nothing clearer in the
history of all nations than the inevitable alliance between financial
and political power. Wherever capital goes it seeks to control the
government in its own interest. If invested in a weak foreign state its
owners seek to own the government of that state or, failing in this,
exert their efforts to make the home government interfere and control
it. This was the origin of the Boer War. This laid the basis for the
Indian Empire, and like influences have inspired English, French, and
German aggression in Asia and Africa.
Such also are the vicious results which the Taft programme insures.
Every dollar of American capital implanted in those Islands becomes
a rivet which binds them to the United States, and every American
residing there learns to argue soon enough against Philippine
independence. State it as you will, the Taft policy means indefinite
retention maintained by the absolute power of the United States until
the Filipinos become contented subjects. The “Philippines for the
Filipinos,” degenerates into the “Philippines for the Americans,” with
as much liberty to the Filipinos thrown in as is not inconsistent with
American interests. Well did Senator Lodge say several years before,
“We believe in trade expansion.”
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER X
[1] _Correspondence Relating to War with Spain_, vol. ii, p. 1297.
[2] Report of the U. S. Phil. Comm., 1907, pt. 1, p. 229.
[3] Act No. 136, U. S. Phil. Comm.
[4] Act No. 1024, U. S. Phil. Comm., Oct. 10, 1903.
[5] Incident related by Ferguson himself and narrated by Judge
Blount in _The American Occupation of the Philippines_, p.
444.
[6] Speech before the New York Chamber of Commerce, April 21,
1904.
[7] _Ibid._
[8] _The Outlook_, April 30, 1904.