+The Campaign of 1900+
A fair estimate of the strained relations existing between Filipino
and American in 1900 is easily gathered from the account of what had
gone before. On the part of the Filipinos it may safely be said that
there was never any faltering, any concealment of what they wanted.
They knew what they were struggling for, and at all times and places,
by proclamation, by acts, and otherwise, they had made it plain that
independence was the goal to attain which they had pledged their lives,
their fortunes and their sacred honor[1].
The policy of the Washington administration, on the other hand, had
been so vague and so evasively expressed that the public itself did
not know what it was. Those officials who had been most solicitous
with regard to the welfare of the Filipinos and the benevolent aims of
the American people were the first to combat any attempt to express by
Congressional action what these purposes were to be.
In deference to the state of American public opinion, therefore,
and in preparation for the coming presidential elections of 1900,
Mr. McKinley sent two commissions to the islands. One went early in
1899 and arrived there only to find that the war of conquest was on.
The second commission headed by Mr. Taft arrived a year later, while
the American forces were still giving Aguinaldo a chase through the
mountain fastnesses of Luzon. This commission was charged with the duty
of laboring for the peace and prosperity of the Islands, “in the firm
hope that through their labors all the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands may come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave
victory to American arms at Manila.”
Both of these commissions were appointed by the President, without
asking Congress to authorize either, to define its duties or to fix
the commissioners’ salaries. They were, therefore, the representatives
of Mr. McKinley, responsible to him, and paid out of the public funds
as he saw fit. This has been the sad feature of this phase of the
Philippine venture. The commissions went to the Islands, not for the
purpose of reviewing the findings of the Paris Peace Commission and
thus righting any wrongs that had been committed, but to represent
President McKinley who in the approaching elections was definitely
committed to the justice of the policy which had taken the Islands for
the benevolent purposes so vaguely expressed two years before.
This policy of President McKinley was based on the assumption that
Filipinos were unfit for self-government. It was a pity, therefore,
that such an able person as Mr. Taft should have come, not to decide
on the Filipino’s capacity for independence, but rather as an advocate
of the President. “Well, we are in it, and now we must do the best we
can.” Of all stages in this long conquest of the Islands, this has
been the most deplorable, for all dealings with the Filipinos have
been based on the proposition that they are unfit to take care of
themselves. Consequently all measures of self-government granted to
them by an altruistic Congress are mere “privileges,” and so become
a standing affront to the intelligence of the native. And the more
power and latitude given to the Filipinos to assert themselves, the
more dissatisfaction is there bound to occur in their dealings with a
sovereign power which assumes to make such grants on the grounds of
benevolence alone. As an American observer has aptly put it,
government and governed thus get wider apart as the years go by,
and the _raison d’être_ of the former being the mental deficiencies
of the latter, it must, in self defense, assert those deficiencies
the more offensively, the more vehemently they are denied[2].
Now the hope of the administration in Washington was to prove that the
stubborn resistance of the Filipinos was not as great as was claimed
by the military authorities. From the beginning, therefore, the Taft
Commission tried to reconcile the subjugation of the Philippines with
the liberation of Cuba. Surely no more difficult task could have faced
them. Nevertheless, they hoped with all the ardor and benevolence of
the President himself that the Filipinos were in fact praying for
American sovereignty. And the wish became father to the thought, with
the result that friction between Mr. Taft and the military authorities
who had for two years been pouring powder and lead into the enemy’s
camps and receiving a goodly amount in return, now began to threaten.
Mr. Taft’s message of optimism and good-will regarding the Philippine
situation is still well-known. “A great majority of the people long
for peace and are entirely willing to accept the establishment of a
government under the supremacy of the United States,” he reported
to the Secretary of War in November, 1900[3]. Said report was
naturally circulated immediately throughout the length and breadth
of these United States to the glory and triumph of the President’s
administration. But it so happened that the Secretary of War during
those hectic days was also receiving official reports from the
military men in the field of battle which led him to admit four years
later, when no further harm would result from it, that in 1900 (sixteen
days after the Taft Commission arrived in Manila), “over 70,000
American soldiers from more than 500 stations held a still vigorous
enemy in check”[4].
General MacArthur was the official most apprehensive of the true
warlike conditions existing in the Islands. While Mr. Taft was crying,
“Peace! peace! the Filipinos want peace,” General MacArthur was cabling
an entirely different story to Washington.
Wherever throughout the archipelago there is a group of insurgent
army [he wrote to the Secretary of War], _it is a fact beyond
dispute_ that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance
thereof. In other words, towns regardless of the fact of American
occupation and town organization are the actual bases for all
insurgent military activities.... Indeed it is now the most
important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely
pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio; a manœuver quickly
accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people and the ease
with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance
of a peaceful citizen[5].
Further cold military facts concerning the stubbornness of Filipino
resistance are contributed by the General.
The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost
complete unity of action of the entire population. _That such unity
is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion._ Intimidation
has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end, but fear as the
only motive is _hardly sufficient to account for the united and
apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people_. One
traitor in each town would effectually destroy such a complex
organization[6].
Secretary of War Root knew of this side of the picture also, but he
took care not to reveal it to the voting public, at least not until
the elections of 1900 had been safely met. Yet he did not ignore these
ominous warnings. In reply to General MacArthur’s request that nothing
be done to diminish his armed forces unless absolutely necessary, he
sent his assurances through the Adjutant General in the following
convincing dispatch:
Secretary of War directs (that) no instructions from here be
allowed (to) interfere or impede (the) progress (of) your
military operations which he expects you (to) force to successful
conclusion[7].
And as if these precautionary measures were not sufficient there
followed shortly after this grim inquiry to General Wood in Cuba:
+Wood+, Havana: Secretary of War is desirous to know if you can
give your consent to the immediate withdrawal (of the) Tenth
Infantry from Cuba. Imperative that we have (the) immediate use of
every available company we can lay our hands on for service in the
Philippines.
Signed: +Corbin+[8].
Thus it was that while the American people were being happily and
successfully pacified with Mr. Taft’s optimistic reports endorsed by
the Secretary of War, the latter was also acting in full coöperation
with the military representatives in the Islands urging MacArthur to
force the natives to really plead for peace by employing the more
customary and efficacious arguments—powder and lead.
In the light of these events, therefore, it was but natural to suppose
that the question of imperialism would be the main issue in the
presidential campaign of 1900. Everything had pointed that way. It
is therefore interesting to compare the attitude of the Republican
party at the beginning of the campaign with the attitude adopted a
year before in order to secure acquiescence in the treaty. Attention
has been called to Senator Lodge’s argument for ratification that the
treaty only gave the American people power to determine the fate of the
Philippines, but did not commit them to any policy. This position was
accepted and endorsed by the President and his Cabinet. In pursuance
of this he told the American people ten days after the ratification
that,
The whole subject is now with Congress; and Congress is the voice,
the conscience, and the judgment of the American people. Upon
their judgment and conscience can we not rely?... Our priceless
principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the
flag.
Secretary Long also sought to emphasize this compliance of the
President with the laws of the land by saying that if the treaty had
been rejected it would
have taken out of the hands of the people and put into the
hands of one man, the President, absolute authority over the
Philippines, limited only by the indefinite scope of what is
called the war power, wielded by a purely military arm holding
a naked sword. Think of that for imperialism. It is a great
credit to the President [he concluded] that, like Julius Cæsar
and George Washington, he has refused this offer of a “kingly
crown.” On the contrary, the good old democratic plan has been
adopted of putting the disposition of these Islands into the hands
of the American people who will duly express their will through
their representatives in Congress assembled. I have no doubt the
President is delighted to have the elephant off his hands and on
theirs[9].
These were indeed fine words yet the events which followed after they
were uttered showed how little was meant by them. For after the treaty
was ratified Congress was not consulted as to what should be done with
the Philippines. No extra session was called to consider this very
important question. Nay more, when the next regular session of Congress
convened on December 5, 1899, the President said in his message:
It does not seem desirable that I should recommend at this time
a specific and final form of government for these islands. When
peace shall be restored, it will be the duty of Congress to
construct a plan of government which shall establish and maintain
freedom and order and peace in the Philippines. The insurrection
is still existing; and, when it terminates, further information
will be required as to the actual condition of affairs before
inaugurating a permanent scheme of civil government.... As long as
the insurrection continues, the military arm must necessarily be
supreme.
This was a distinct invitation to Congress to leave the “elephant” on
his hands, and the invitation was accepted. But it will be observed
that the question of holding the islands—the question upon which the
Senate divided equally, the question which the treaty left open—was
treated by the President as settled. His words were: “The Islands lie
under the shelter of our flag. They are ours by every title of law and
equity. They cannot be abandoned.”
Who settled this question? Not Congress which had never considered it.
It was the President by his proclamation of December 21, 1898, six
weeks before the treaty was ratified. Thus did the President assume
the “kingly crown” which his Secretary had praised him for declining.
With this “crown” the President sanctioned a war without the authority
of Congress, he refused to parley, and he told Congress that the
question was not open for their consideration and would not be until
the conquest by arms had been completed. What wearer of a “kingly
crown” could more despotically have dealt with a question of such vital
importance to two nations? The voice, the conscience and the judgment
of the American people had thus been stifled, and now the President was
brought to judgment.
Senator Lodge had also forgotten his words employed during the debate
for ratification. Gone were the Senator’s honeyed phrases about the
good judgment and sense of the American people in giving the Filipinos
their just dues.
We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the
Philippines solely on account of others, [he now told the members
of the National Convention]. While we regard the welfare of these
people as a sacred trust, _we regard the welfare of the American
people first. We believe in trade expansion._
Although these dreams of military glory and commercial advantage were
still dazzling the eyes of men, however, the leaders were not sure that
the voting public would sanction such sentiments as those of Senator
Lodge. It was well-known that in the ranks of the ruling party itself,
there were strong dissenters, such as Senators Hoar and Bacon, and men
like Boutwell, Hepburn, Henderson, Harrison, Edmunds, Reed and many
others prominent in Republican circles. The list of eminent citizens
opposed to a policy of colonization, furthermore, was to say the least
full of potential power as the campaign which they led had gained a
marked number of supporters. To name only a few of the more noted
leaders there were Carl Schurz, Grover Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, Jane
Addams, Wayne McVeagh, Champ Clarke, Thomas Mott Osborne, Jacob Gould
Schurman and a host of others.
Therefore, when the moment came to openly announce their platform, the
Republican leaders adopted this sugar-coated promise with regard to the
Philippines:
Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and
wherever sovereign rights were extended it became the high
duty of the Government to maintain its authority; to put down
armed insurrection and to confer the blessings of liberty and
civilization upon all the rescued people. The largest measure of
self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall
be secured by law.
The real issue of permanent or indefinite retention was thus evaded.
However, it was really not necessary to openly assert it, for inasmuch
as the Islands were said now by the President to be unconditionally
annexed to the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Peace without
any reservation whatsoever, a mere continuation of the present status
really held no promise of ultimate freedom to the Filipinos.
Wise Republicans had realized this and they made the best use of it.
By thus stating their policy, they were placed on the defensive with
regard to the imperialist issue. Instead of openly having to assert
it they merely had to check any attempt or movement to alienate the
possession of the Islands, which they declared had been unconditionally
annexed to the nation by the terms of the treaty of Paris.
We can understand this situation better by comparing the status of
the Filipinos in the eyes of the Republican party with that of the
Cubans. In 1900 American control in Cuba was, it will be remembered,
still in effect. The control of the government was not delivered to
the Cuban people until May 20, 1902. But in the meantime the Cubans
were from the very start “free and independent” and a truly sovereign
people,—the presence of American control being merely temporary for
the purpose of “pacification.” The Filipinos were, on the other hand,
to remain subjects of the Americans for how long no one knew,—or at
least no one would tell. In the meantime they were to be given only
the “largest measure of self-government which shall be consistent with
their welfare and our duties.” The “our duties” here referred to the
duties, so-called, of an absolute, sovereign power vested in the tender
hands of an alien Congress sitting ten thousand miles away and in no
way representative of, or responsible to the people whose liberties and
rights lay in their hands.
The platform, therefore, connoted absolute ownership—ownership secured
through a treaty with Spain. Hence to them there was no such thing
as a war going on against the Filipinos. The fighting going on under
the tropical skies was but “an armed insurrection” against the “legal
authority” of the United States. As the President himself had described
it a few months before: “There is a rebellion in _one_ of the Islands
now, but it will be put down as we put down all rebellions against the
United States”[10].
When the time came for the Democrats to summon their forces, however,
they failed to meet the situation. True it is that the Convention
proclaimed imperialism to be “the paramount issue of the campaign.”
Their platform with regard to the Philippines was also particularly
clear. Besides condemning and denouncing the Philippine policy of the
McKinley administration it further added these significant proposals:
We favor an immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose to give
to the Filipinos:
1. A stable form of government.
2. Independence.
3. Protection from outside interference such as has been given for
nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America.
The first two proposals certainly were reasonable enough if we are to
believe that America’s mission in the Philippines was purely to aid
the Filipinos, and yet such a declaration has never been made by the
Republican party to this day.
The failure to meet the issue of 1900 is found in Mr. Bryan’s
insistent demands that the silver question be also injected in the
Democratic banner. This clouded the issue and weakened their forces,
for instead of giving combat on the clean cut issue of imperialism
which they could have easily shown was of transcendant importance,
Mr. Bryan diverted an undue amount of attention to a discussion of
monetary standards. Further than this, the injection of the latter
question meant the loss of full support by the gold Democrats as well
as anti-imperialist Republicans who, though vehemently condemning
the Philippine policy of their President were unwilling to see their
country adopt a false and dangerous system of currency. Prominent
leaders of the campaign, therefore, urged Mr. Bryan to change his views
but he stood firm[11].
And thus the issue was obscured. To the conservative men of the country
at large it seemed a choice between free silver and an undecided
Philippine policy with full assurances on the part of the Republicans
that God who moved mysteriously had placed the Islands in American
hands in the interests of civilization and humanity.
We must not forget also the spectacular campaign of misrepresentation
that swept the country from the printed page and the stump. This is
what the Secretary of War, Mr. Root, told a gaping public about the
beginning of the war. Said he:
On the night of February 4, the day before the Senate approved the
treaty, an army of Tagalogs, a tribe inhabiting the central part
of Luzon, under the leadership of Aguinaldo, a Chinese half-breed,
attacked in vastly superior numbers our little army in possession
of Manila, and after a desperate and bloody fight was repulsed in
every direction[12].
And again:
The day was not then, but it came on the 4th of February when a
body of Filipino troops marched under cover of night, swiftly and
silently, through our lines, regardless of the sentry’s challenge,
and, when he fired, volleys of musketry and roar of cannon upon
every side commenced the proposed destruction of our little army.
Compare such flagrant statements with the official reports of General
Otis given in a previous chapter (Chapter VI) and preserved in the
archives of the War Department and we have an idea how far this
defender of the administration deviated from the truth.
Here again is General Otis’s report:
An insurgent approaching the picket [of a Nebraska regiment]
refused to halt or answer when challenged.
The candidate for the vice-presidency, Mr. Roosevelt, also contributed
a picture.
The reasoning which justifies our having made war against “Sitting
Bull” [said the exponent of a strenuous life] also justifies our
having checked the outbreaks of Aguinaldo and his followers,
directed, as they were against Filipino and American alike.... To
grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo [he continued] would
be like granting self-government to an Apache reservation under
some local chief.
It was indeed a bold man who would say such libelous words, and yet
they were not uttered on the spur of the moment at some political
rally. They are to be found verbatim in Roosevelt’s letter of
acceptance of his nomination for the vice-presidency. Such a carefully
prepared document naturally went all over the country and helped form
the opinions of many who were only too glad to believe ill of the
people with whom their country was at war.
But we must not forget the President. What did he have to say relative
to the Philippine war?
The American people [he said] are asked by our opponents to yield
the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines to a
small fraction of the population—a single tribe out of eighty or
more inhabiting the archipelago. We are asked to transfer our
sovereignty to a small minority in the islands without consulting
the majority, and to abandon the largest portion of the population
which has been loyal to us to the cruelties of the guerrilla
insurgent bands, and to this end repress the opposition of the
majority.
It would have struck a disinterested inquirer as singular that “a
single tribe out of eighty,” a small portion of the population, had
been able to wage war so long against a powerful American army and the
“largest portion of the population which had been loyal to us”.
These so-called Philippine tribes have been receiving such notoriety to
this day that we might as well pause now and see how much weight should
be given to these statements. The existence of tribes has been decided
by ethnologists, who claim to see among the brown-skinned natives
certain differences which stamp them into the category of tribesmen.
Now, even as early as 1901, men like Governor Taft were vehemently
maintaining that these differentiations were purely theoretical and of
little value.
The word “tribe” [he said], gives an erroneous impression. There
is no tribal relation among the Filipinos. There is a racial
solidarity among them undoubtedly. They are homogeneous. I
cannot tell the difference between an Ilocano and a Tagalog or a
Visayan.... To me all Filipinos are alike.
Mr. Schurman, President of the first Philippine commission,
representing McKinley in 1899, was just as earnest in his convictions.
Nothing could more unhappily describe ... these people than the
word “tribe” [he said]. Let us drop so misleading a term, and speak
of them as communities, and let us call the aggregate of these
communities the Philippine nation.
In 1903 a census of the Philippines was taken by the American
officials, and in comparing the tables of this census with that of the
United States, we find these American representatives saying, “Those of
the Philippine census are somewhat simpler, the differences being due
mainly to the homogeneous character of the population of the Philippine
islands”[13].
A report made by Senator Lodge himself, the staunchest supporter of
the administration, was also procurable at the time the President made
these statements. This report, “Senate Document 171, 56th Congress,
First Session,” had been prepared for the Committee on the Philippines.
What did it show?
The inhabitants of the Philippines [said the report] belong to
three sharply distinct races—the Negrito race, the Indonesian, and
the Malayan race. It is universally conceded that the Negritos are
the disappearing remnants of a people which once populated the
entire archipelago [while now] but a few scattered and numerically
insignificant groups of them remain.... It is believed that not
more than 25,000 (twenty-five thousand) of them exist in the entire
archipelago, and the race seems doomed to early extinction.
The report also gave a table of eighty-four tribes, so-called, by the
scientists to whom we must owe obedience. But these tables showed that
twenty-one of this number belonged to the Negritos, so that one quarter
of the President’s eighty tribes were described in the official report
as “a few scattered and numerically insignificant groups” of a race
“doomed to early extinction.” Both numerically and otherwise they were
and they continued to be as insignificant a part of the population as
are the Norridgewock Indians in Maine or the Mashpees in Massachusetts.
But could these facts be gathered from the President’s statements?
Taking now the next group, the Indonesian, we find that Senator Lodge’s
report confined this race to the island of Mindanao. Sixteen tribes
are classified under it, one fifth of the President’s eighty, and the
whole number was estimated also at 250,000. Thirty-seven of the eighty
tribes, therefore, contained only 275,000 out of a population of over
7,000,000 people. But to turn to the report. The rest of the tribes,
forty-seven in number, were Malays, and of these eight, including the
Moros who were given as 100,000, numbered 6,350,000 people, leaving for
the other thirty-nine tribes about 375,000. We therefore, find that out
of the eighty-four tribes in the report, seventy-six contained only
about 650,000. “Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men.”
Of the rest, the six million three hundred and fifty thousand, all were
Malays, all were Catholics softened by three centuries of intimate
contact with Spain, and they lived chiefly in Luzon and the Visayan
Islands, where the war was waging in full vigor. From these official
reports, and those of Mr. McKinley’s own witnesses, Taft, Schurman and
Lodge, what must we say of the President’s language?
In spite of these spirited pictures, however, the campaign proved to be
less exciting than that of 1896[14]. Because of the confusing issues,
party dissenters were numerous, and on both sides also many more
thousands, though faithfully following the party banner gave it only a
half hearted support. Other thousands refrained from voting[15].
With the elections of 1900 out of the way, however, and the novelty
of the possession having waned, came America’s second sober thought.
The changing mind of the American people could not long endure the
logic of the arguments which both friend and foe of the administration
now put forward with somewhat friendly moderation. Power, commerce,
and military glory ceased to be invoked as the arguments for the
indefinite retention of the Philippines. The administration now
defended its Philippine policy on other grounds—namely, philanthropy.
It was urged that the duty of educating the Filipinos, of teaching
them the rudiments of self-government and leading them out into the
bright sunlight of western civilization was the mission of the American
representatives in the Philippines.
But there were also those who though happy in feeling that the wave of
imperialism was on the wane nevertheless realized, that at bottom the
mischief was the same.
It is a significant concession to public opinion [said Senator
Carmack] that we no longer hear the argument of greed and avarice
and the hunger for other men’s possessions openly and defiantly
proclaimed. I cannot help thinking [he added] that something
has been yielded and something gained when the President of the
United States no longer talks of seizing “points of vantage” and
no longer defends our Philippine venture by glorifying England’s
despotic rule over subject races and her bloody march to empire
across the bodies and through the blood of slaughtered people. It
may not signify any change of heart or of purpose, but it shows
a realization of the fact that the public conscience is awake,
and it shows that the authors of this policy begin to understand
that they cannot justify “criminal aggression” by pointing to
the profits of the crime. It is a cheering sign that the second
sober thought has come, that the better nature of the American
people is again in the ascendant, when the party responsible
for a bucaneering war is compelled to veil the grossness of its
designs[16].
This second sober thought of America also brought a marked innovation
into the local problems of the archipelago. Prior to 1901 the seed
of greedy imperialism among the Americans in the Islands had already
blossomed into full bloom. Those then, were the days when men talked
of “the Empire.” Life was gay and irresponsible for the white man, and
many there were indeed who felt and acted like petty kings. Into this
paradise of power and prestige now came Mr. Taft as Civil Governor to
recognize the rights of the Filipino. Mr. Taft brought with him into
that new field something which Filipinos had never seen to any marked
degree among the American civilians and military officers with whom
they had come in contact. He brought sympathy, courtesy and friendly
understanding. He gathered around him those Filipino insurgents in
1901 who, having realized the futility of their efforts to combat
the American forces, had bowed to the inevitable and had resolved to
dedicate their efforts towards making the best of the situation.
This was a great concession to the Filipinos and they appreciated it.
The new governor gained popularity as the days went by, for as each
revolting province was whipped into submission Mr. Taft followed in
the wake of the army to institute civil government and promise the
natives that if they threw down their arms they would have peace and
local self-government. Thus it was that his resounding battle cry of
“The Philippines for the Filipinos” gained in power as well as in
volume as the new governor went about quietly conquering the population
with words rather than with swords. And in so doing he began a new
programme which meant, when carefully analyzed, a permanent colonial
system, maintained by the absolute power of the United States until
the Filipinos become contented subjects. It meant and it means today
Philippine independence—never. To that matter attention must now be
directed.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER IX
[1] See Coolidge’s _America as World Power_, p. 154.
[2] Judge Blount, _American Occupation of the Philippines_, p.
294.
[3] Report of Taft Philippine Commission, 1900, p. 17.
[4] Sec. Root’s Address at the 1904 Republican Convention, p. 62.
Published by Blanchard & Co., N. Y.
[5] MacArthur’s Report, Oct. 1, 1900; also War Dept. Rep., 1900,
vol. i, pt. 5, pp. 61-62.
[6] War Dept. Rep., 1900, vol. i, pt. 5, pp. 61-62.
[7] _Correspondence Relating to War with Spain_, vol. ii, p. 1226.
[8] _Ibid._, p. 1249.
[9] Speeches at the Home Market Club, Boston, Feb. 16, 1899.
[10] Speech at Warren, Ohio, Oct. 18, 1899.
[11] Stanwood, _A History of the Presidency, 1897-1907_, vol. ii,
p. 57.
[12] Speech at Youngston, Ohio, Oct. 25, 1900.
[13] _Philippine Census_, vol. ii, p. 9.
[14] Latene, _America as a World Power_, p. 131.
[15] _World Almanac_, 1901, p. 119.
[16] Speech in the Senate, May 31, 1902.