+Filipino-American Relations Prior to
August, 1898+
Aguinaldo was in Singapore when America declared war on Spain. The
American consul at that port, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, tells in his own
words what this incident meant to him
Being aware [said Mr. Pratt] of the great prestige of General
Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no one, either at home or
abroad, could exert over them the same influence and control that
he could, I determined at once to see him.
An interview followed and it was arranged that if Admiral Dewey, then
at Hongkong with his squadron should so desire, the Filipino leader
would join him at that port and arrange a plan of cooperation with
the American forces[2]. Pursuant to this understanding, Mr. Pratt
immediately telegraphed to Dewey as follows:
Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with
Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired.
Telegraph.
To which Admiral Dewey (then a Commodore) immediately replied:
Tell Aguinaldo come as soon as possible.
But by the time the Filipino leader reached Hongkong the future Admiral
had been given his papers and was steaming towards Manila Bay. In
heralding the coming of the Americans, however, the insurgent leaders
at Hongkong sent to the Islands a manifesto addressed to the Filipinos
proclaiming the benevolent mission of the invaders, and urging them
not to heed the appeals of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans. The
proclamation read thus:
+Compatriots+: Divine Providence is about to place independence
within our reach. The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but
for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted
people have considered it opportune to extend their protecting
mantle to our beloved country.... At the present moment an American
squadron is preparing to sail to the Philippines.... The Americans
will attack by sea and prevent any reenforcements coming from
Spain.... We insurgents must attack by land.... There where you
see the American flag flying, assemble in number; they are our
redeemers!
Aguinaldo’s proclamation a few days later was of the same tenor:
Filipinos [he said], the great nation, North America, cradle of
liberty and friendly on that account to the liberty of our people
... has come to manifest a protection ... which is disinterested
towards us, considering us with sufficient civilization _to govern
by ourselves_ this our unhappy land.
It has always been a question whether or not a promise to grant the
Filipinos their freedom in the manner that Cuba had been promised
hers was made. American officials, Dewey included, vehemently deny
having made such promise, while the Filipinos and a few later American
students of history stoutly maintain the contrary. Assuming that no
promises were made by properly accredited agents of the American
government, it is certain that the revolutionists were led by the
action of the American forces in the Philippines to believe that the
United States would give them independence. Their frame of mind as a
result of the early assurances received from the American consuls at
Singapore and Hongkong may be gathered from the tone of the following
letter written by Consul Wildman of Hongkong to Aguinaldo:
Do not forget [he said] that the United States undertook this war
for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties
under which they were suffering and not for the love of conquests
or the hope of gain. They are actuated by precisely the same
feelings for the Filipinos[3].
When Aguinaldo arrived in Manila on the American gunboat _McCulloch_
which Dewey had expressly sent to Hongkong to bring the Filipino
leader, he immediately went to see Dewey. The latter at once urged
him to start cooperation. “Go ashore and start your army,” he told
the Filipino[4]. Aguinaldo did the rest. “He began operations towards
Manila,” said Dewey, “and did wonderfully well. He whipped the
Spaniards battle after battle....” And so Dewey’s protégé worked, under
the constant advice and encouragement of the American commander. At
that time, of course, the American land forces had not arrived, and
were not due to arrive for several months. In the meantime the Filipino
army was daily expending its power and risking the lives of its men in
this aggressive land campaign. This accounts for Admiral Dewey’s great
concern in aiding them. Let the Admiral testify to this: “I knew what
he was doing—driving the Spaniards in—was _saving our troops_”[5].
Further testimony of this active cooperation between the two forces is
amply furnished by the Admiral.
They looked on us as their liberators [he testified before the
Senate committee[6]]. Up to the time the army came he (Aguinaldo)
did everything I requested. He was most obedient; whatever I told
him to do he did. _I saw him almost daily_[7].
The reason which prompted the American representative to act so
cordially is best described in his own words:
I was waiting for troops to arrive [testified Dewey] and I thought
that the closer they (the Filipinos) invested the city, the easier
it would be when our troops arrived to march in. The Filipinos were
our friends, assisting us; they were doing our work[8].
And when asked how strong a force Aguinaldo had under his command,
Dewey added: “They could have had any number of men; it was
just a question of arming them. _They could have had the whole
population_”[9]. These declarations took place before an investigating
committee of the Senate in 1902, but that the war department in
Washington knew of the cooperation between the two forces is clear from
the official dispatches sent by Dewey from the scene of battle.
Thus, hardly had Aguinaldo landed to organize his forces when Dewey
cabled to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:
May 20, 1898:
Aguinaldo, the rebel commander in chief, was brought down by
the _McCulloch_. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render
assistance which will be valuable[10].
Just how valuable this assistance proved to be has been shown by
Dewey’s statements in the preceding pages. It took three and a half
months for the American Army to arrive on the scene of action and in
the meantime the telling dispatches of Dewey now survive to inform us
what the Filipino activities actually meant. Thus, a dispatch of June 6
says:
Insurgents have been engaged actively within the province of
Cavite[1] during the last week; they have had several small
victories, taking prisoners about 1800 men, 50 officers; Spanish
troops, not native[11].
Six days later, June 12, comes another telegram from Dewey:
Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded
Manila. They have taken 2500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat
most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the
arrival of the U. S. troops thither; I have advised[12].
A week later and another telling dispatch is sent to Washington:
I have given him (Aguinaldo) to understand that I consider
insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy.... He has
gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of
forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of
the squadron but has kept me advised of his progress which has been
wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water, recruits, arms and
ammunition and to take such arms and ammunition from the arsenal as
he needed. _Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely,
which he has invariably done._
And then follows this convincing statement:
In my opinion these people are superior in intelligence and more
capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am
familiar with both races[13].
But as a forerunner of the breach which was shortly to follow comes the
testimony of Dewey that upon the arrival of the American army, instead
of seeing him daily as he had done in the past, he “had not much to do
with him after the army came”[14].
Although the Admiral had thus lost interest in Aguinaldo’s cooperation,
however, it soon appeared that the commander of the land forces,
General Anderson, who had arrived earlier on the scene of action,
thought differently. Addressing Aguinaldo on July 4, 1898, he said:
+General+:
I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America
whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity ...
has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native
people of the Philippine Islands.
For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations
with you and to have you and your people cooperate with us in the
military operations against the Spanish forces.
(Signed) Gen’l +T. M. Anderson+[15].
Assuming, however, that no promises of independence were made in
writing by properly accredited agents in the name of the American
government, it is certain that the Revolutionists were led to believe
that the United States planned to do for the Philippines what she was
then actively doing for Cuba. As General Anderson aptly put it in
describing the situation at that critical period:
Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt (of Singapore), Wildman
(Hongkong) and Williams (Manila) did or did not give Aguinaldo
assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the
Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their
acts rather than from their statements[16].
Laboring under such a belief the flag of the Philippines was formally
unfurled and independence proclaimed amidst elaborate ceremonies at
Cavite on June 12, 1898[17]. This was exactly two months before the
American forces of occupation finally entered Manila. Events moved
rapidly. The Revolutionary government issued its proclamation providing
for a temporary constitution, until it could be replaced by one
formally drawn by delegates from the archipelago formally assembled. In
the words of the document itself, its purpose was
to abolish with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the Spanish
administration, substituting a more simple and expeditious system
of public instruction for that superfluity of civil service and
ponderous, tardy and ostentatious official routine[18].
Accompanying this provisional constitution whose main object was “to
struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations
including Spain, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the
country for the establishment of a real Republic,” was a presidential
message from Aguinaldo. This is a noteworthy document for it clearly
mirrored the true aspirations of the Filipinos. It concluded as follows:
Thus they have constituted a revolutionary government with wise
and just laws suited to the abnormal conditions confronting
them, and which at the proper time will prepare them for a true
republic. Thus, taking for its only justification the right, for
its sole aid, justice, and for its only means honorable labor, the
government calls upon all its Filipino sons without distinction of
class, and invites them to unite solidly with the object of forming
a noble society ennobled, not by blood or pompous titles, but by
labor and the personal merit of the individual,—a free society
where there is no place for egotism and personal politics which
wither and blight, nor for envy and favoritism which debase, nor
for charlatanry and buffoonery which cause ridicule.
No other course is possible. A people that has given proof of
fortitude and valor in suffering and in danger, of industry
and learning in time of peace, is not made for slavery. These
people are called to be great, to be one of the strong arms of
Providence in directing the destinies of humanity. These people
have sufficient energy and resources to recover from the ruin and
humiliation in which it has been placed by the Spanish government
and to claim a modest but worthy place in the concert of free
nations.
Given at Cavite, June 23, 1898.
(Signed) +Emilio Aguinaldo+[19].
The march of events continued. On June 27 rules for the conduct of
executive business were announced. On July 25, the members of the
Cabinet were named, and the Congress assembled in the town of Malolos
on September 15. The Revolutionary Government was now ready to merge
into the Republic. Thus it came about that on August 6, one week
before the occupation of Manila by the American forces, Aguinaldo as
President issued an address to the foreign governments in which he
stated that his revolutionary government was then the ruling power
in fifteen provinces of the island of Luzon, where complete order
and perfect tranquillity reigned under the administration of civil
authorities duly elected for that purpose, and that the Filipino army
was then holding 9,000 Spanish prisoners of war who were being treated
according to the rules of war[20]. This proclamation was substantiated
by a secret investigation conducted at that time by Major Bell with the
purpose of ascertaining the strength of the Filipinos in the event that
General Merritt had trouble with them[21]. “There is not a particle
of doubt,” concluded Major Bell, “that Aguinaldo and his leaders
will resist any attempt of any government to reorganize a colonial
government there”[22].
And who was this man Aguinaldo, the recognized leader of the Filipino
cause? Let John Barrett, the strong supporter of the powers that be,
give a picture of the Filipino and his successes. Writing from the
scene of action, having personally known the Filipino and having seen
him put aboard the American gunboat at Hongkong for the direct purpose
of going to Cavite to organize an army and make war upon the Spaniards
in cooperation with the American forces, Mr. Barrett continues thus:
After his arrival at Cavite he organized with wonderful rapidity
a provisional government, and in a short time had an army which
was capturing Spanish outposts with the frequency of trained
regulars....
The impression went abroad among the masses of the people that
Aguinaldo had arrived to establish an independent government, and
that the Americans would assist him. The actual working of his
government under the guns of our ship was sufficient evidence to
them of our approval.... These influences had a tremendous effect.
Before Aguinaldo had been in Cavite a month he not only had more
soldiers than he could arm, but contributions of large sums of
money, with unlimited amounts of rice and other raw food supplies
brought in by the people for the support of his Army.
Of the Congress, Mr. Barrett says:
By the middle of October he had assembled at Malolos a Congress
of one hundred men.... These men whose sessions I repeatedly
attended, conducted themselves with great decorum and showed a
knowledge of debate and parliamentary law that would not compare
unfavorably with the Japanese Parliament. The executive portion of
the government was made up of a ministry of bright men who seemed
to understand their respective positions.
The army of Aguinaldo seems to have been the greatest of his
achievements in the estimation of Mr. Barrett.
He had over twenty regiments [wrote Mr. Barrett] of comparatively
well-dressed soldiers carrying modern rifles and ammunition. I saw
many of these regiments executing not only regimental but battalion
and company drill with a precision that astonished me.... The
people in all the different towns took great pride in this army.
Nearly every family had a father, son or cousin in it. Wherever
they went they aroused enthusiasm for the Filipino cause[23].
Such an estimate of Aguinaldo is largely corroborated by those
Americans who directly came in contact with him. Thus Mr. Jacob
Schurman, President of the First Philippine Commission, characterized
him as having
enjoyed the confidence of the insurgents and their sympathizers
and abettors ... in virtue of his patriotic services, his attested
honesty and his remarkable gift of surrounding himself with able
coadjutors and administrators[24].
“_He (Aguinaldo) was the incarnation of the feelings of the
Filipinos_,” adds General MacArthur[25].
It is difficult to understand the success of the insurgent forces
against the better trained Spaniards otherwise than by ascribing it
to the unusual intelligence on the part of their leaders and the firm
determination of the people. Six weeks before the American occupation
of Manila, for example, John T. McCutcheon, reporting for the Chicago
_Record_ narrated the march of events in a special dispatch dated the
24th of June, as follows:
All during the week following there was constant evidence of the
strife that was being waged between Cavite and Malate.... Imus,
Bacoor, Las Pinas and Paranaque were captured in less than a
week notwithstanding the fact that the Spaniards had splendid
guns and ammunition in unlimited quantities, supported by five
mountain batteries and rapid fire guns.... Over in Cavite the calm
passionless statements of great victories that Aguinaldo gave us
were being substantiated every day for hundreds and hundreds of
Spanish soldiers were being marched in and placed in prison!...
Closely following the remarkable insurgent successes in Cavite
Province, where the whole district had been captured in eight days,
came stories of other successful operations in Pampanga Province;
Macabebe and San Fernando were captured and the great Spanish
General Molet fled in terror to Manila. Over one thousand Spanish
soldiers had been taken prisoners and their arms given out to
natives as quickly as possible.... Our respect for the insurgent
prowess had grown a great deal, for by June 30 they had taken
almost every province in Luzon, with the exception of isolated
garrisons and were hammering away at the doors of Manila[26].
By August the insurgents had surrounded the city with fourteen miles
of trenches, the water and food supply had been cut off, internal
trade paralyzed and the inhabitants of the unfortunate city reduced
to horseflesh diet. Such was the result of a three and a half months’
blockade with Dewey guarding the harbor and the Filipinos closing in
by land[27]. So closely were the Filipinos besieging Manila that when
General Anderson arrived with his land forces to commence offensive
hostilities he was compelled to request from Aguinaldo permission to
occupy a part of the Filipino fighting line and trenches[28].
Capitulation of the city turned out to be a mere matter of form under
these circumstances. Through the Belgian consul, M. Andre, stationed in
Manila, Commodore Dewey and General Merritt arranged with the Spanish
commandants for the surrender of the city. There was to be no real
fighting, no resistance except the display of a white flag after the
firing of a few shots to save the delicate honor of the Castilians. But
one thing the Spaniards demanded, and that was that no Filipino troops
were to enter the city. To this arrangement the Americans agreed[29].
General Anderson, thereupon, notified Aguinaldo to forbid his troops
to enter the city. The unpleasant information was naturally received
with indignation, for it meant that the Filipinos must lie in their
trenches and watch all the glory of the capture fall to thousands of
American troops whose contribution to the victory had consisted in
their amiable presence on the American transports that had brought them
from San Francisco. Further than this, until the treaty of Paris was
decided upon the Filipinos had no way of knowing whether the Americans
were to turn them back to Spain or set them free. If it was to be the
former then the Revolution would continue and it was natural that the
Filipinos should wish to be in possession of the capital city.
Fearing as he had reason to fear, that the order to stay back would not
be obeyed, General Anderson sent his troops to hold the main bridge
into the city with no other purpose than to fire, if necessary, upon
their late friends. As Anderson himself put it in addressing Aguinaldo:
“Unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the lines of the city’s
defences before Thursday, the fifteenth instant, I shall be compelled
to resort to forcible action”[30].
The situation was very critical [said General Greene]. Our soldiers
believed that the Filipinos had fired upon them and the Filipinos
were almost beside themselves with rage and disappointment. The
friendly relations we had with Generals Ricarte and Noriel alone
prevented the conflict with them then and there[31].
But if the break between them had been averted in August, it failed to
end the tension between the two armies.
It is now worth while to view the situation as it stood at that time.
We held Manila and Cavite [said General Anderson] the rest of the
Island (Luzon) was held not by Spaniards but by the Filipinos.
On the other islands the Spaniards were confined to two or three
fortified towns[32].
Even these were later captured by the natives also, so that General
Otis adds:
Thus, in December, 1898, we find that in northern and southeastern
Luzon, in (the islands of) Mindoro, Samar, Leyte, Panay and even
on the coast of Mindanao and in some of the smaller islands, the
aggressive Tagalog present in person and, whether civilian or
soldier, supreme in authority[33].
Shortly after the occupation of Manila, two officers of Admiral Dewey’s
squadron, with the latter’s permission, made an intimate inspection of
the interior of the island to bring back a report of which Admiral
Dewey himself said that it contained “the most complete and reliable
information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern
part of Luzon.” This report was forwarded to Mr. Long, the Secretary of
the Navy and, in response to a Senate resolution may be found reported
in Senate Document 196, 56th Congress, 1st Session, bearing date of
February 26, 1900. Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox, the two officers in
question, spent two months in their travels and they saw and heard even
more than that which was reported by the commanders from Manila.
As a tribute to the efficiency of Aguinaldo’s government and
the law abiding character of his subjects [wrote Mr. Sargent] I
offer the fact that Mr. Wilcox and I pursued our journey through
in perfect security and returned to Manila with only the most
pleasing recollections of the quiet and orderly life which we found
the natives to be leading under their new régime (the Filipino
Republic).
The travellers also had an opportunity to witness some of the
ceremonies inaugurating civil government under the new-born republic.
They describe those which occurred in the province of Caaygan as
follows:
The Presidentes of all the towns in the provinces were present at
the ceremony.... Colonel Tirona made a short speech.... He then
handed the staff of office to the man who had been elected governor
of the Province. This officer also made a speech in which he
thanked the military forces and assured them that the work they had
begun would be perpetuated by the people, where every man, woman
and child stood ready to take up arms to defend their newly won
liberty and to resist with the last drop of their blood the attempt
of _any nation_ whatever to bring them back to their former state
of dependence. He then knelt, placed his hand on an open Bible, and
took the oath of office.
There is a variety of feeling among the Filipinos [adds Mr.
Sargent] in regard to the debt of gratitude they owe the United
States. In every town we found men who said that our nation had
saved them from slavery and others who claimed that without our
interference their independence would have been recognized before
this time. On one point they were united, however, viz. that
whatever our government may have done for them, it has not gained
the right to annex them.
Of course, it must be remembered that all this region outside of Manila
and its environments was “_terra incognita_” to the thousands of
American soldiers stationed in Manila and to the millions of Americans
at home. That is why with the help of the censored press during the war
that followed, American public opinion utterly failed to realize what
an efficient government the Filipinos had established several months
before the treaty of Paris. The first intimate glimpse accorded the
volunteer army of occupation occurred in the fall of the following year
when that peaceful territory was finally overrun by the invading army
of the greatest republic in the world.
No one can read the evidence here presented without seeing that the
representatives of the United States in the islands and the government
in Washington knew that the Filipinos believed that the United States
would give them independence and in that belief were helping the
Americans; that while their help was needed nothing was done to disturb
that belief but, on the contrary, pains were taken not to disturb it,
if not indeed to encourage it, and the Filipinos were allowed to fight
the battles of the invaders. Among gentlemen, or in a country where
the principle of estoppel is recognized, such conduct would be held
equivalent to a binding promise.
Can the “great nation North America” afford to adopt a lower standard
of decency?
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER IV
[1] Cavite is five miles across the bay from Manila.
[2] Note: Consul Pratt’s official report regarding this early
state of the Filipino-American relations is preserved in Sen.
Doc. 62, part 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898-99, pp. 341 _et
seq._
[3] Cong. Rec., April 17, 1900, p. 4287.
[4] From Dewey’s statement to the Senate Committee—see Sen. Doc.
331, part 3, p. 2928.
[5] Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, p. 2928.
[6] _Ibid._, p. 2934.
[7] _Ibid._, p. 2967.
[8] Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, p. 2936.
[9] _Ibid._, p. 2940.
[10] See Navy Dept. Report, 1898, App., p. 100.
[11] _Ibid._, p. 102.
[12] _Ibid._, p. 106.
[13] _Ibid._, p. 103.
[14] Sen. Doc. 331, part 3, pp. 2928 and 2956.
[15] See Sen. Doc. 56th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 208.
[16] “Our Rule in the Philippines,” _North American Review_, Feb.,
1900, p. 272.
[17] See Justice George Malcolm’s _Philippine Government_, p. 124.
[18] Sen. Doc. 62, pp. 432-437; quoted also in Foreman’s _The
Philippine Islands_, 3d, 1906, p. 448.
[19] Quoted in Millet’s _Expedition to the Philippines_, p. 49.
Foreman’s _The Philippine Islands_, 3d, 1906, pp. 454, 455.
[20] Sen. Doc. (1898), No. 208, p. 99.
[21] Sen. Doc. 62, 1898, p. 379.
[22] _Ibid._, p. 380.
[23] John Barrett in the _Review of Reviews_, July, 1899.
[24] _Philippine Affairs—a Retrospect and Outlook_, address by Mr.
Shurman before members of Cornell Univ.
[25] Statement before Senate Committee, Sen. Doc. 331, 1902, p.
1926.
[26] Note: These accounts are substantiated by Official Reports.
See War Dept. Rep. 1899, vol. 1, part 4, and Otis Report, p.
13; also Report of Shurman Commission, vol. 1, p. 172.
[27] War Dept. Rep. 1899, vol. 1, part 4, p. 13.
[28] Latane, _America as a World Power_, p. 85; also Cong. Record,
56th Cong., 1st Sess., Proceedings in the Senate, Jan. 11,
1900, p. 769.
[29] See Dewey’s _Autobiography_, pp. 273, 274, for a carefully
guarded account of these arrangements.
[30] Sec. of War Annual Rep. 1899, I, part 4, p. 9.
[31] See Charles B. Elliott’s _The Philippine Islands_, Chapter
XII, “Capture of Manila,” p. 317.
[32] _North American Review_, Feb., 1900.
[33] Report of Gen. Otis for Aug. 21, 1899; also quoted in
Harper’s _History of the War in the Philippines_, p. 99.