+The Beginning of the Conquest+
The people of the United States were allowed to believe that it was a
piece of good fortune that Dewey’s fleet was in Asiatic waters. As a
matter of fact the capture of Manila had been planned long before the
_Maine_ was destroyed and the Spanish war begun.
On the afternoon of December 30, 1924, a discussion was held in New
York City under the auspices of the League for Industrial Democracy.
The subject chosen was American Imperialism, and among the principal
speakers on the occasion was the well-known banker, Otto H. Kahn, who
spoke on “The Myth of American Imperialism.” Feeling, no doubt, the
tremendous significance of his words as a denial that such a force
existed, no time was lost in reproducing the address in full, to be
widely distributed later by the so-called “Committee of American
Business Men.”
Mr. Kahn’s address as printed covered twenty-six pages. Less than half
a page is devoted to the Philippine situation, however, and it is
interesting to read how he dealt with the subject. He said:
Owing to the limitation of the time available, I cannot enter
into the matter of America’s ownership of the Philippines, except
to point out that it came to us as an unforeseen incident of the
Spanish-American war, _unsought and decidedly unwanted_, but,
having come, it involves a national responsibility which, in
self-respect and in duty, we are bound to discharge, and of which
we cannot divest ourselves until it is fairly discharged.
This was a sweeping generalization, and yet it was a statement
representing the widespread belief today among the Americans unfamiliar
with the earlier years of American occupation. Let us, therefore, make
a closer examination of that period, so inadequately understood at the
time but which can now be studied soberly and with fuller knowledge.
Although when war was declared American thought and purpose were
limited to Cuban emancipation, it became apparent that it was
impossible thus to limit her action. War knows but one law. The enemy
must be attacked and destroyed wherever possible. Hence the prompt
occupation of Porto Rico followed, though Porto Rico had not revolted,
for the thought of driving a misgoverning country from one island, and
leaving her in another close by where a similar situation might later
exist was clearly indefensible.
Granting that Spain was to be driven out, what was to be done with
Porto Rico? Of course, Cuba was to have her freedom,—she had been
promised that. But Porto Rico—somehow the analogy did not fit. The
island was smaller, there had been no revolt, and there was great need
of a naval station in that locality. But why go further? Only idealists
questioned the wisdom of doing it, any other nation would have done it,
and so.... Well, that is the way that empires grow!
But there were also the Philippines. And only six hundred miles away
lay Admiral Dewey with his fleet loading coal in Hongkong. What a piece
of good fortune for the American cause. It was but a matter of hours
before Dewey received the order to sail and destroy the enemy fleet.
And yet the most remarkable thing about this naval victory which
immediately thrilled the American nation from coast to coast and
placed the Philippines definitely on the map was that it did not come
unsolicited or unpremeditated. It had been planned months before. Let
us see how and why.
When the possibility of war with Spain became generally accepted,
Admiral Dewey was in the Gulf of California in command of the
_Narragansett_. As a true naval expert the thought of taking the
Philippines came to him.
If war with Spain is declared, the _Narragansett_ will take Manila
[he said]. In command of an efficient force in the Far East,
with a free hand to act in consequence of being so far away from
Washington, I could strike promptly and successfully at the Spanish
forces in the Philippines.
This was in the fall of 1897[1]. He thereupon sought the command of the
Asiatic squadron, and with Mr. Roosevelt’s aid obtained it[2].
Thus it was that while the indignation of a sympathetic American public
was daily increasing at the atrocities in Cuba, Dewey was quietly
but efficiently fitting his squadron, firmly determined to capture
Manila[3]. He sailed on December 7, 1897, more than two months before
the destruction of the _Maine_, with the eyes of the naval authorities
watching him with interest. While lying at anchor in Hongkong there was
flashed to him on February 25, 1898, the following significant cable
from the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy:
+Dewey+, Hongkong:
Order the squadron except the _Monocacy_ to Hongkong. Keep full of
coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain, your duty will
be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic
coast, and start offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep
_Olympia_ until further orders.
(Signed) +Roosevelt+[4].
And yet this was six weeks before war was declared.
The results of the battle in Manila Bay are well known. It literally
electrified the American nation. The significance of such a gallant
victory could not be over-estimated in the eyes of her citizens.
What a horizon had been opened! The stage was set for the beginning
of America’s manifest destiny,—entry into world politics,—into world
power. This was but natural. In the words of Henry Watterson, it was
the natural impulse of a people full of exultation and pride over
the completeness, without precedent in naval war, of the victory
that Dewey had achieved with a skill and intrepidity that conferred
splendor upon American arms. It was the spontaneous outburst of
simplest patriotism to ask that that flag so valiantly planted,
might float there forever in memory of the heroes who raised it[5].
There were also challenging voices, urging that the flag should remain.
Who dares halt it now [cried Senator Beveridge], now when history’s
largest events are carrying it forward, now when we are at last
one people, strong enough for any task, great enough for any glory
destiny can bestow? Blind is he who sees not the hand of God in
events so vast, so harmonious, so benign.
But glory and power were not the only incentives. If in the face of a
sacred pledge to Cuba there had not been wanting counselors who urged
the retention of the island for its commercial possibilities, their
numbers were now augmented as the movement gained momentum. There was a
glamour of romance in the entire project and the spell was difficult to
resist. As the Hon. Frank A. Vanderlip, then Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, aptly put it in 1898,—
Together with the islands of the Japanese Empire, since the
acquirement of Formosa, the Philippines are the pickets of the
Pacific, standing guard at the entrances to trade with the millions
of China and Korea, French Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula, and the
islands of Indonesia to the south. Australia may even be regarded
as in the line of trade. _The possession of the Philippines by
a progressive, commercial power, if the Nicaragua Canal project
should be completed, would change the course of ocean navigation
as it concerns a large percentage of the water-borne traffic of
the world. The project is alluring._ In the undeveloped resources
of the Philippines the sanguine radicals see a great opportunity
for our genius. They recognize that in a decade we might make a
change greater than has been wrought since Magellan’s discovery
until the present time. They see great development companies formed
to cultivate tobacco and sugar by modern methods, others formed to
test the richness of the unknown mineral deposits, and still others
to develop transportation or to reap the treasures of the forest.
And so this gentleman, who stood high in the councils of the
administration, finally concluded:
We thus see with sudden clearness that some of the most revered of
our political maxims have outlived their force [and then adds],
a new mainspring ... has become the directing force ... the
mainspring of commercialism[6].
Thus began and thus was fostered the campaign for the retention of the
Philippines. As a distributing centre, with half the population of the
world living within a radius of 3500 miles from Manila, the possession
of the islands was indeed “alluring.”
In that proud hour of nation-wide rejoicing accompanied by the vast
commercial possibilities which victory had disclosed, the American
multitude failed to hear the voice of the Filipinos. To the former
annexation meant, and could now mean only annexation like the previous
acts of American expansion. No thought was here given to the wishes of
the eight million natives in the Islands who, under the rule of Spain,
had taken part in thirty-six distinct uprisings as a protest against
the cruelties and injustices from which they had suffered in the same
manner as had the Cubans.
There had been, of course, vague reports of a revolution then existing
in the Philippines just as one had been existing in Cuba. Could not the
Islands be turned over to the revolutionists? True, there had been no
definite promises such as those made to a nearer neighbor, but should
not Spain’s title, if any, be forfeited for the same reasons that her
claims to Cuba were being ignored? The Americans whose interests in
the occupation sprang purely from altruistic and sympathetic motives
thought that the Filipinos were entitled to the same treatment as
the Cubans. Could the Filipino rebels have organized an island
government of their own? If not, would an American protectorate for a
limited number of years have been more plausible? These were natural
inquiries, but any reports which might to some extent have answered
these questions were not forthcoming. The islands were too far
distant,—half the people of the country did not know where they were.
Of course, there were those who also believed with good reason that the
intervention in Cuba was actuated by purely altruistic motives—that of
a helping hand to a weaker nation. Thus, the venerable Senator Hoar,
writing many years afterwards about this agitating period, said,
I believed then, and I believe now, that it was our duty to deliver
them (the Philippines) from Spain, to protect them against her, or
against the cupidity of any other nation until the people could
have tried fully the experiment of self-government in which I have
little doubt they would have succeeded[7].
But there were also those who, in a spirit of evil ambition, had
already decided to retain the Philippines, if retention would benefit
the United States. On August 2, 1898, a commissioner was appointed by
the Secretary of State to “investigate and report on financial and
industrial conditions in the Philippine Islands.” This was eleven
days before the capture of Manila. The report that followed by
Commissioner Edward Harden and which was sent to the Secretary of the
Treasury, covered the field examined as well as the existing conditions
permitted. It spoke of the present situation of Philippine industry
and predicted the future possibilities that awaited the hand of a
modern expert. That regarding Manila hemp, the leading industry of the
Islands, specially deserved attention.
Manila hemp [said the report] is used in the manufacture of cordage
of a superior class. For ships’ purposes it is superior to any
other material considering its cost and wearing qualities.... _It
is found nowhere else in the world_.... There is a great future
for this product. There are vast tracts of uncultivated land ...
where it flourishes with greatest vigor, and _all that is needed is
capital and enterprise to open it up_[8].
Not apparently content with the preliminary investigations conducted by
these executive departments, the President himself decided to take a
hand. He therefore dispatched the following cable to Admiral Dewey on
August 13, the day after the signing of the protocol ending hostilities:
+Dewey+, c/o American Consul:
The President desires to receive from you any important information
you may have of the Philippines, the desirability of the several
islands, the character of their population, coal and other mineral
deposits, their harbor and commercial advantages and in a naval and
commercial sense which would be the most advantageous.
+Allen+, Secretary[9].
Of course, these proceedings were not made known to the public at that
time. This powerful minority in order to fulfill their imperialistic
aims had already embarked on a program unique in its nature and
fraught with hazardous consequences, as events later proved. Briefly,
their plan was to conceal their well-devised scheme of retention, and
should such project be forcibly exposed,—to justify it, all the while
pretending to be working solely for the good of the Filipinos. Their
real feeling was, however, bluntly expressed by Mr. Denby of McKinley’s
first Philippine Commission when he said:
The cold practical question remains: will the possession of these
islands benefit us as a nation? If they will not, set them free
tomorrow and let their peoples, if they please, cut each other’s
throats[10].
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER III
[1] Dewey, _Autobiography_, p. 168.
[2] Roosevelt, _Autobiography_, p. 231.
Dewey, _Autobiography_, p. 168.
[3] Dewey, _Autobiography_, p. 170.
[4] Dewey, _Autobiography_, p. 179.
[5] Henry Watterson, _History of the Spanish American War_, p. 277.
[6] Frank A. Vanderlip, _Century Magazine_, Aug., 1898, cited in
Sen. Doc. 62, pt. 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 561.
[7] Hoar, _Autobiography of Seventy Years_, vol. ii, p. 315.
[8] Sen. Doc. 169, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., 1898.
[9] See Appendix, Bureau of Navigation Reports, p. 122.
[10] _The Forum_, Feb., 1899, “Why the Treaty Should be Ratified.”