+Conquest by Treaty+
During the war the President had already shown a shrewd instinct for
trading, thus expressed in his own words: “While we are conducting war
and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over
we must keep what we want”[1]. Thus it was that when, after less than
four months of fighting the Spanish government acting through the good
offices of the French government finally decided to ask for peace, she
was, to say the least, taken by surprise at the conditions imposed by
the victorious President.
When the desire for a parley was first brought to the attention of
McKinley he summoned his Cabinet for a protracted conference to discuss
the terms of peace. Those relating to the Philippines naturally
elicited the most attention. Secretary Bliss seeing great commercial
opportunities in the Islands favored taking the entire group. So did
Attorney General Griggs. Secretaries Gage and Long thought a naval
base would be enough. As for the Secretary of State, Mr. Day, we
quote Mr. McKinley’s own words. Commenting on the varying views of his
Cabinet which ranged from the retention of the whole archipelago to one
or two more important islands, McKinley jokingly added, “But Judge Day
only wants a hitching post.”
So much for the administration’s early attitude regarding its
benevolent and kindly intentions towards the Philippines[2].
In response, therefore, to the Spanish Minister’s request for peace, a
request in which that able representative of the Queen Regent assured
the President and his administration that the Spanish treatment of
Cuban insurrection had been adopted solely “to spare the great island
from the dangers of premature independence,” Mr. McKinley submitted the
following conditions for the suspension of hostilities:
First: the relinquishment by Spain of all claim to Cuba and
immediate evacuation of the island.
Second: the cession to the United States of the islands of Porto
Rico and the other islands then under the sovereignty of Spain in
the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones
to be selected by the United States.
Third: that the United States was to be entitled “to occupy and
hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of
a treaty of peace which should determine the control, disposition
and government of the Philippines”[3].
Spain was not alone in her denunciation of these hard terms. The French
ambassador, M. Cambon, through whom the interests of the Spanish
government were being represented in Washington, tried in vain to
secure a modification of these terms, particularly that regarding
Porto Rico which “he characterized as evincing a spirit of conquest
inconsistent with the declaration of disinterestedness with which
the United States had commenced the war”[4]. It should be remembered
also that these terms were made two weeks before the final capture of
Manila. At this early stage it is already evident that the President
failed to recognize in any way the existing fact that there was a
native uprising in the Islands and that a Philippine Republic had been
proclaimed under it.
Five commissioners were appointed to negotiate the final treaty
with Spain but it is significant to notice that three of them were
avowed Imperialists[5] and already known to be in favor of acquiring
territories in the Far East. These three were the Hon. Cushman Davis,
chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Hon. William
P. Frye, member of the same Committee, and the Hon. Whitelaw Reid,
who had formerly held the post of envoy extraordinary and minister
plenipotentiary of the United States to France.
Under such auspicious beginnings it was an easy matter for the
President to communicate with sufficient tact the secret instructions
which were to guide the commissioners in Paris. These secret
instructions were prepared with great detail and care and must be
examined accordingly. In them, the President first expressed in high
sounding language the altruistic purposes with which the war had been
waged.
It is my earnest wish [he said] that the United States in making
peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it
in making war.... The lustre and the moral strength attaching to a
cause which can be properly rested upon the considerate judgment
of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed
by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or
even into adventurous departure on untried paths.
These were fine words, indeed, but, they were meant only for Cuba and
not for the Philippines.
The Philippines [continued the President] stand upon a different
basis. It is none the less true, however, that without any original
thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and
success of our arms at Manila impose upon us obligations which we
cannot disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human
action ... we cannot be unmindful that without any desire or design
on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities
which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation in whose
growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has
plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.
But that these were in fact but weasel words to smooth the instructions
which were to follow now becomes evident. It bluntly appears in the
next paragraph when the President continued thus, “Incidental to our
tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which
American statesmanship cannot be indifferent.” And thus, by elaborate
gradations finally came the President’s real demand expressed in these
words, “The United States cannot accept less than the cession in full
right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon”[6].
With these secret instructions in hand the commissioners departed for
Paris. There they were joined by other American observers fresh from
their Philippine campaigns. Among them were Admiral Dewey, General
Merritt, Major Bell and General Green who had come for the purpose
of presenting their statement to aid the commissioners in their
negotiations. The tenor of their reports was practically the same,
holding that it would not be wise to return all of the Islands or even
a part of them to Spain, that the cession of the archipelago would be a
“good business proposition” and that the Filipinos would not offer much
resistance to American rule. How totally without foundation the latter
statement was became evident during the Filipino-American war. One of
the opinions submitted which no doubt produced a marked effect on the
later negotiations came from the Belgian consul in Manila, M. Andre.
His statement was that:
The United States can assure a steady government in these islands
and in their hands the country will increase in wealth, and will,
in a short time, be able to return to the United States the money
laid out[7].
Thus it was that on October 26, before the subject of the Philippines
was actually brought to the attention of the Peace Conference,
the President cabled his commissioners to the effect that recent
information had convinced him that the cession of Luzon alone was out
of the question and therefore, influenced as he said “by the single
consideration of duty and humanity,” he directed that, “the cession
must be of the whole archipelago or none.” “The latter,” he continued,
“is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required”[8].
Now throughout these proceedings it is at once apparent that no
thought, no consideration, not even a voice was given to the Filipino
people. A representative of the Filipinos, Mr. Agoncillo, went to
Paris and later to Washington to seek a hearing before the commission,
but the doors of both council chambers were slammed in his face and
the authorities in Washington would not receive him. He could obtain
a hearing nowhere. The whole matter was a business proposition, and
the commissioners treated it accordingly. The secrecy with which
the President’s designs were guarded may be gathered from the fact
that the “Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain,” which included
also the private communications between the chief executive and his
commissioners, were carefully concealed from the American public until
January 31, 1901, that is, after the Presidential elections of 1900 had
been successfully passed. Even then the papers only came to light after
having been extracted from the jealous custody of the Executive by a
Senate resolution demanding them. They were then published as Senate
Document, 148, 56th Congress, Second Session.
It is one of the most significant features of this conquest, that
at the time when the great issue was at stake neither the Filipinos
who were most interested in the outcome nor the Americans who faced
the parting of the ways were ever taken into the confidence of the
Administration.
It is difficult to understand how the commissioners finally came to
an agreement regarding the Philippines. They could, of course, have
followed McKinley’s claim and demanded the islands by conquest. But
such a position seemed unwarrantable to the commissioners who wired
the President accordingly on November 3. Furthermore, the Spanish
commissioners feared utter repudiation at home. To lose Cuba and her
possessions in the West Indies, “the last memory of a glorious past,”
was sorrowful enough, but to lose the Philippines as well was indeed
pitiful. But the President stood firm in his demands for the entire
archipelago, and so a friendly concession was made whereby the title
to the Philippines was apparently bought, “the United States to pay
Spain the sum of twenty million dollars within three months after the
exchange of ratifications of the present treaty.” Considering that the
Islands had a total land area almost equal to that of England, Ireland,
Scotland, and Wales, and a population of more than seven million it was
not a bad bargain at all, and the President certained lived up to his
reputation for shrewdness and ability to drive a good business bargain.
And in that manner was the President’s original intention fully
accomplished. For in the words of one of his own appointed
commissioners, Mr. Davis, it was of the utmost importance that the
United States should have a “commanding commercial position” in the
waters of the East, “in view of the astounding changes which the
Chinese Empire has been subjected to and is destined to further
undergo.”
I am interested that this country shall have its share of trade
of that great empire [he said]. California, Washington and Oregon
have scarcely more than two millions of people. I want to see the
commercial development of that part of our country expand until
there shall be twenty millions of people there; and I do honestly
and sincerely believe, from all I have studied and thought on
the subject, that the retention of the Philippine Islands, and
their adjustment to our needs and destiny, is a necessary and
indispensable step in the advancement to which I have so alluded.
The well-known historian, James Ford Rhodes, contributes much light to
this chapter of American history. “It is true,” he wrote in 1922, “that
McKinley was inconsistent in his public words.” For “in his message of
December, 1897, he had said, ‘forcible annexation ... cannot be thought
of; that by our code of morality would be criminal aggression!’” And
yet “one cannot read the proceedings of the Peace Commission in
Paris,” adds Mr. Rhodes, “and see in any other light than that our
taking of the Philippines _was_ ‘forcible annexation’”[9].
The British press of that year, however, showed the incongruity even
more effectively. A cartoon was presented entitled “Doctrine and
Practice” representing Dame Europe in a garden haughtily saying to an
intruder, “To whom do I owe the pleasure of this intrusion?” To which
the person addressed replies,—“Ma’am, my name is Uncle Sam.” And this
rejoinder follows, “Any relation to the late Colonel Monroe?”[10].
It certainly would have seemed impossible after all that had passed
and the help which the United States had asked and accepted from the
Filipinos as their allies, that the future of the Islands should be
determined without even inviting a suggestion from their people as
to what should be the terms of peace. The United States had always
insisted that governments rest on the consent of the governed;
the President had taken pains to assure the world that “forcible
annexation” was not to be thought of as it would be “criminal
aggression”; it had even been insisted that “our priceless principles”
could not change under “a tropical sun” and that it was with no thought
of gain but solely for the good of the Filipinos and the sake of
humanity that the American nation was fighting at all, and yet the
Washington administration refused, not only to invite suggestion, but
even to receive and listen to the envoy whom the Filipinos sent to
express their views as to the future of the seven million people who
had proved themselves most efficient allies and whose help the American
commanders had been glad to invite and accept.
It is all a striking instance of the crimes which have been committed
in the name of liberty.
But although the President and his commissioners were highly satisfied
with the treaty, their work was far from accomplished. That document
had to be ratified and for that purpose all the forces and arguments
and all the enthusiasm which the President thought he had found in
a tour of the middle west were now employed. The struggle for its
ratification, therefore, soon got under way but this fact must be at
once noticed,—that although the people were being urged to stand behind
the treaty they did not and could not know what the treaty really meant.
And this unfortunate situation was so because to the political leaders
of that time the provisions of the treaty meant one of several
things. To the majority the cession of the Philippines if ratified
meant that America was to be definitely launched upon a policy of
colonial expansion. In the past the Federal government had acquired
territory on the continent, but in such cases it had also meant
eventual statehood by and with the consent of its inhabitants. But the
Philippine issue widely differed from this. Not only had the Filipinos
not been consulted in the matter, but the administration itself had
made it clear that it was not prepared to favor the extension of
American citizenship to the natives[11].
Now, there were certain men in the Senate who wished to ratify the
treaty and yet were opposed to a policy of colonization. Hence, they
proposed to amend it or to pass a resolution clearly stating that
the Philippines would ultimately, if not immediately, be given their
independence. A number of such resolutions were therefore offered but
they all failed to pass.
Another group of Senators, though not perhaps strictly opposed to some
other more reasonable policy of expansion, nevertheless objected to the
treaty as it then stood because it was an injustice to the Filipinos.
This element could not understand why the Cubans should be treated
differently from the Filipinos in the face of an official statement
made by Admiral Dewey to the effect that “the Filipinos were better
fitted for self-government than the Cubans were”[12]. As Senator Mason
ably put it,—
Tell me why we should adopt one plan for Cuba and another for the
Philippines? Do you say ... “We promised we would not steal Cuba,
but we did not promise not to steal the Philippines?” Do you say,
with Shylock, “Is it so nominated in the bond?” ... Will you tell
me please, how grand larceny and criminal aggression in Cuba become
high Christian civilization in the Philippines?
This powerful group of practical anti-imperialists, headed by such
men as Senator Hoar, Carl Schurz, and ex-President Harrison, stoutly
maintained that the principles underlying the structure of the American
republic were not compatible with the policy of holding colonies. They
urged the argument that the United States could have no subjects under
her suzerainty, because she herself was composed of free citizens. And,
finally, they attacked the administration’s intention of governing a
subject people without the latter’s consent.
A selfish element among the Senators also had to be contended with.
This group was made up of those who feared that annexation of the
Philippines would eventually mean the introduction of the Filipinos
in some form or another into American life. The idea was apparently
repugnant to them. Such an attitude was no doubt, however, a result of
misinformation and downright prejudice against Asiatics in general.
Senator McLaurin characterized the extent of this feeling when he said
that he was against “the incorporation of a mongrel and semibarbarous
population into our body politic,” which was “inferior to, but akin
to the Negro in moral and intellectual qualities and capacity for
self-government.”
So heavily laden was the atmosphere with these objections against
ratification, that it became doubtful whether the administration would
be vindicated. It remained for Senator Lodge with his fluent language
and adroit reasoning, and Mr. Bryan’s mistaken policy to swing the
senatorial sentiment in the other direction.
Senator Lodge’s presentation deserves first attention because of the
open and high-handed manner in which he presented his case. Briefly,
his attitude was that ratification did not necessarily mean annexation
or colonization. The time to decide the latter, in his opinion, was
after the treaty had been accepted. This was directly opposed to the
prevailing view that to accept the treaty meant to enter upon an era
of colonial expansion. But the Senator was not to be daunted. He took
as his weapon, and he followed as his method of attack, the road which
adroit diplomats and statesmen have constantly followed when arguments
have failed them—the vanity of human nature.
Let the Senator’s own words testify to this:
When that treaty is ratified [he contended] we have full power and
are absolutely free to do with those islands as we please, and
the opposition to its ratification may be summed up in a single
sentence—that the American people and the American Congress are not
to be trusted with that power and with that freedom of action in
regard to the inhabitants of those distant islands. Every one of
the resolutions thus far offered on this subject _is an expression
of distrust_ in the future and in our dealings with other people.
It is a well-meant effort to make us give bonds to Fate by means of
a Congressional resolution.
The resolutions which the Senator meant were those declaring that
the United States did not intend to make a permanent colony of the
Philippines, and that ultimately or immediately the Filipinos would be
granted self-government.
Could a more direct appeal to the vanity of the American people have
been made?
Suppose we ratify the treaty [continued the Senator] the islands
pass from the possession of Spain into our possession without
committing us to any policy. _I believe we can be trusted as a
people_ to deal honestly and justly with the islands and their
inhabitants thus given to our care[13].
It is well to recall this language of the late Senator in view of
the contention being made today that Congress cannot alienate the
Philippines. If the spokesman of the administration of 1898 insisted
that the ratification of the treaty would not commit the United States
to any policy with regard to the Philippines, and that the Congress
could later deal with the Islands in accordance with the wishes of the
people, will Congress now repudiate the theory which then prevailed and
which largely induced the Senate to ratify the treaty? Can the United
States afford to give her enemies this new ground for distrust?
But let the Senator continue once more,—“It is for us to decide the
destiny of the Philippines, not for Europe, and we can do it alone and
without assistance.” On another occasion he made this most flowery
statement,—
To the American people and their government I am ready to intrust
my life, my liberty, my honor and, what is far dearer to me than
anything personal to myself, the life and liberty of my children
and my children’s children. If I am ready thus to trust my children
to the government which the American public create and sustain,
am I to shrink from intrusting to that same people the fate and
fortune of the Philippine Islands?
Evidently it did not occur to the venerable senator that these
Filipinos were not to have a voice in the government which he praised
so eloquently and that, therefore, in the words of Daniel Webster,—
No matter how easy may be the yoke of a foreign power, no matter
how lightly it sits upon the shoulders, if it is not imposed upon
him by the voice of his own nation and of his own country, he
cannot and he means not to be happy under its burden.
But the Senator’s point had been made. He had convinced many opponents
of the treaty that refusal to ratify unless accompanied by a statement
of America’s honest intentions meant a distrust of America’s honest
abilities to give the Filipinos a square deal. These men thought that
such a resolution would mean giving bonds to Spain and to Europe for
America’s good conduct.
A further element also entered into the struggle which aided the
administration in its fight. It was Mr. Bryan’s arrival in Washington
urging the Democrats to ratify the treaty. Like Senator Lodge, Mr.
Bryan contended that the treaty as it then stood did not commit the
country to a policy of colonization. That policy was to be decided in
the coming elections when the attitude towards the Filipino could be
more plainly expressed[14]. And so confident was the great commoner
that the American public would oppose indefinite if not permanent
annexation of the Islands that he was willing to risk the issue until
1900.
The ratification of the treaty [he said] instead of committing the
United States to a colonial policy really clears the way for the
recognition of the Philippine Republic.... Could the independence
of the Filipinos be secured more easily by diplomacy from a foreign
and hostile nation than it can through laws passed by Congress and
voicing the sentiments of the American people? If independence
is more desirable to our people than a colonial policy, who is
there and what is there to prevent the recognition of Philippine
independence? It is absurd to say that the United States can be
transformed from a republic to an empire without consulting the
voters[15].
Mr. Bryan may or may not have been justified in taking this attitude,
but he certainly failed to foresee the nature of the campaign which
his opponents were to launch in order to vindicate the President’s
Philippine policy.
While the discussions on the treaty were thus rapidly coming to a close
the situation in the Philippines was constantly becoming menacing.
American transports bearing thousands of soldiers were being massed in
Manila. The insurgents who, it will be remembered, had surrounded the
city were being gradually pushed further and further back. In many
instances these advances by the Americans were also made in violation
of the protocol with Spain which had declared that America was merely
“to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending
the conclusion of the treaty.” Generally these orders compelling
the Filipinos to make more and more humiliating withdrawals were
accompanied with gratuitous threats to use force. What friendship had
been left at the time of the occupation had given way to suspicion.
Perhaps no one more than Senator Bacon realized the danger which these
relations meant.
While there is not a declaration of war [he said] while there is no
avowal of hostile intent, with two such armies fronting each other
with such diverse intents and resolves, it will take but a spark
to ignite the magazine which may explode.... They (the Filipinos)
are opposed to the occupation of their islands by the United States
troops [warned the Senator] because of the apprehension that it is
the purpose of the United States government to maintain a permanent
dominion over those islands; and whenever, we shall by such
resolutions as these, say solemnly to the world that such is not
our purpose, there is no longer any danger or difficulty[16].
That such was also the view taken by the Filipino leaders and observed
by the American commander was also clear. “They begged,” said General
Otis, “for some tangible concession from the United States government,
one which they could present to the people and which might serve to
allay excitement” [17].
Two days before the vote was taken, however, every attempt to declare
America’s real purpose with regard to the Philippines had failed. On
that fateful day the hostilities between the Americans and Filipinos
against which Mr. Bacon had warned his countrymen finally broke
out. The Administration immediately claimed that the insurgents had
treacherously begun the hostilities, but even with this inducement to
support the treaty, that document was finally ratified with but one
vote to spare.
But it was not yet too late to hear the protest of the Filipinos
even if it had been ignored for so long a time. The opponents of
colonization immediately commenced their efforts to pass their
resolutions plainly putting the benevolent attitude which the President
and his supporters had been so vaguely hinting at. That of Mr.
McEnery’s supplemented by Mr. Bacon’s amendment was, in particular, the
most clear and reasonable of all. It read as follows:
+Resolved+, further, that the United States hereby disclaim any
disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their
determination, when a stable and independent government shall have
been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the government
of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said
government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all
rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave
the government and control of the Islands to their people.
Surely, the issue could not have been more plainly put. If the United
States really intended and could be trusted to deal honestly and fairly
with the Filipinos, now was the time to announce her policy. This
resolution still gave the United States a wide latitude of discretion
as to when the Filipinos could have their cherished freedom. Even
Senator Lodge should have had no apprehension in the matter. There were
here no bonds to be given to Europe, no distrust in the good faith
and judgment of the American people. The resolution merely sought to
decide whether the Filipinos would at some distant time in the future
eventually be granted that which had been given to Cuba. But this
resolution also failed to pass and in its failure the true purpose of
the Administration was made clear. The vote was a tie and the casting
vote of the Vice-President was cast against it.
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER V
[1] Olcott’s _Life of McKinley_, vol. ii, p. 165; also James F.
Rhodes’ _The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_, p. 100.
[2] Olcott’s _Life of McKinley_, vol. ii, p. 63.
[3] _Foreign Relations_, 1898, p. 820.
[4] Elliott, _The Philippines_, Ch. XIII, The Treaty of Peace, p.
322.
[5] Rhodes, _The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_, p. 102.
[6] _Foreign Relations_, 1898, p. 907.
[7] Sen. Doc. 62, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 389.
[8] _Foreign Relations_, 1898, p. 935.
[9] Rhodes, _The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations_, p. 107.
[10] See _Punch_ for Aug. 6, 1898.
[11] Kalaw _The Case for the Filipinos_, p. 45.
[12] Navy Dept. Rep., 1898, App. p. 103.
[13] Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 24, 1899.
[14] Hoar, _Autobiography_, vol. ii, p. 332.
[15] Speech at Democratic banquet, St. Paul, Minn., Feb. 14, 1899.
[16] Con. Record, Jan. 18, 1899, p. 1899.
[17] Otis’ Report, p. 82.