The authority of the Khalifa and the strength of his army were for
ever broken on the 2nd of September, and the battle of Omdurman is the
natural climax of this tale of war. To those who fought, and still more
to those who fell, in the subsequent actions the climax came somewhat
later. After the victory the public interest was no longer centred in
the Soudan. The last British battalion had been carried north of Assuan;
the last Press correspondent had hurried back to Cairo or London. But
the military operations were by no means over.
The enemy had been defeated. It remained to reconquer the territory. The
Dervishes of the provincial garrisons still preserved their allegiance
to the Khalifa. Several strong Arab forces kept the field. Distant
Kordofan and even more distant Darfur were as yet quite unaffected by
the great battle at the confluence of the Niles. There were rumours of
Europeans in the Far South.
The unquestioned command of the waterways which the Sirdar enjoyed
enabled the greater part of the Egyptian Soudan to be at once formally
re-occupied. All towns or stations on the main rivers and their
tributaries were at the mercy of the gunboats. It was only necessary to
send troops to occupy them and to hoist the British and Egyptian flags.
Two expeditions were forthwith sent up the White and Blue Niles to
establish garrisons, and as far as possible to subdue the country. The
first, under the personal command of the Sirdar, left Omdurman on the
8th of September, and steamed up the White Nile towards Fashoda. The
events which followed that momentous journey have already been related.
The second expedition consisted of the gunboats Sheikh and Hafir,
together with two companies and the brass band of the Xth Soudanese
and a Maxim battery, all under the command of General Hunter. Leaving
Omdurman on the 19th of September, they started up the Blue Nile to Abu
Haraz. The rest of the Xth Battalion followed as soon as other steamers
were set free from the business of taking the British division to the
Atbara and bringing supplies to Omdurman. The progress of the expedition
up the river resembled a triumphal procession. The people of the
riparian villages assembled on the banks, and, partly from satisfaction
at being relieved from the oppression of the Khalifa and the scourge
of war, partly from fear, and partly from wonder, gave vent to loud and
long-continued cheers. As the gunboats advanced the inhabitants escorted
them along the bank, the men dancing and waving their swords, and the
women uttering shrill cries of welcome. The reception of the expedition
when places of importance were passed, and the crowd amounted to several
thousands, is described as very stirring, and, we are told, such was the
enthusiasm of the natives that they even broke up their houses to supply
the gunboats with wood for fuel. Whether this be true or not I cannot
tell, but it is in any case certain that the vessels were duly supplied,
and that the expedition in its progress was well received by the negroid
tribes, who had long resented the tyranny of the Arabs.
On the 22nd of September a considerable part of the army of Osman Digna,
which had not been present at the battle of Omdurman, was found encamped
on the Ghezira, a few miles north of Rufaa. The Sheikhs and Emirs, on
being summoned by General Hunter, surrendered, and a force of about
2,000 men laid down their arms. Musa Digna, a nephew of Osman and the
commander of his forces, was put in irons and held prisoner. The rest,
who were mostly from the Suakin district, were given a safe-conduct, and
told to return to their homes--an order they lost no time in obeying.
The next day the general arrived at Wad Medina, where the Dervish
garrison--1,000 strong--had already surrendered to the gunboat Sheikh.
These men, who were regular Dervishes, were transported in sailing-boats
to Omdurman; and augmented the number of prisoners of war already
collected. On the 29th of September General Hunter reached Rosaires, 400
miles south of Khartoum, and the extreme limit of steam navigation on
the Blue Nile. By the 3rd of October he had established garrisons of
the Xth Soudanese in Rosaires, at Karkoj, at Sennar (the old seat of the
Government of the province), and at Wad Medina. Having also arranged for
gunboat patrolling, he returned to Omdurman.
But there was one Dervish force which had no intention of surrendering
to the invaders, and whose dispersal was not accomplished until three
fierce and critical actions had been fought. Ahmed Fedil, a zealous and
devoted adherent of the Khalifa, had been sent, after the defeat on
the Atbara, to collect all the Dervishes who could be spared from the
Gedaref and Gallabat provinces, and bring them to join the growing army
at Omdurman. The Emir had faithfully discharged his duty, and he was
hurrying to his master's assistance with a strong and well disciplined
force of no fewer than 8,000 men when, while yet sixty miles from the
city, he received the news of 'the stricken field.' He immediately
halted, and sought to hide the disaster from his soldiers by announcing
that the Khalifa had been victorious and no longer needed their
assistance. He even explained the appearance of gunboats upon the river
by saying that these had run past the batteries at Omdurman and that the
others were destroyed. The truth was not, however, long concealed; for
a few days later two emissaries despatched by Slatin arrived at the
Dervish camp and announced the destruction of the Omdurman army, the
flight of the Khalifa, and the fall of the city. The messengers were
authorised to offer Ahmed terms; but that implacable Dervish flew into
a rage, and, having shot one, sent the other, covered with insults and
stripes, to tell the 'Turks' that he would fight to the bitter end. He
then struck his camp, and marched back along the east bank of the Blue
Nile, with the intention of crossing the river near its confluence
with the Rahad, and so joining the Khalifa in Kordofan. His Dervishes,
however, did not view this project with satisfaction. Their families
and women had been left with large stores of grain and ammunition
in Gedaref, under a strong garrison of 3,000 men. They urged their
commander to return and collect these possessions. Ahmed at first
refused, but when on arriving at the place of passage he found himself
confronted with a gunboat, he resolved to make a virtue of necessity and
set out leisurely for Gedaref.
On the 5th of September Colonel Parsons, in command of the forces at
Kassala, heard through the Italian Governor of Eritrea of the victory
at Omdurman. The next day official news arrived from England, and in
conformity with previous instructions he set out on the 7th for Gedaref.
It was known that Ahmed Fedil had marched towards Omdurman. It was
believed that Gedaref was only weakly held, and the opportunity of
cutting the most powerful remaining Dervish army from its base was
too precious to be neglected. But the venture was desperate. The whole
available strength of the Kassala garrison was mustered. With these
1,350 motley soldiers, untried, little disciplined, worn with waiting
and wasted by disease, without cavalry, artillery, or machine guns,
and with only seven British officers, including the doctor, Gedaref was
taken, and, having been taken, was held.
After two long marches Colonel Parsons and his force arrived at El
Fasher, on the right bank of the Atbara. Their advance, which had
hitherto led them through a waterless desert, was now checked by a
raging torrent. The river was in full flood, and a channel of deep
water, broader than the Thames below London Bridge and racing along
at seven miles an hour, formed a serious obstacle. Since there were no
boats the soldiers began forthwith to construct rafts from barrels that
had been brought for the purpose. As soon as the first of these was
completed, it was sent on a trial trip. The result was not encouraging.
The raft supported ten men, occupied five hours in the passage, was
carried ten miles down stream, and came back for its second journey
on the afternoon of the next day. It was evident that this means of
transport was out of the question. The only chance of success--indeed,
of safety--lay in the force reaching and taking Gedaref before the
return of Ahmed Fedil. All depended upon speed; yet here was a hopeless
delay. After prolonged discussion it was resolved to act on the
suggestion of an Egyptian officer and endeavour to build boats. The work
proved easier than was anticipated. The elastic wood of the mimosa scrub
supplied the frames; some tarpaulins--fortunately available--formed
the outer covering. The Egyptian soldiers, who delighted in the work,
succeeded in making daily from such materials one boat capable of
carrying two tons; and in these ingenious contrivances the whole force
crossed to the further bank. The camels, mules, and horses of the
transport--their heads supported with inflated water-skins tied under
their jowls--were made to swim across the river by the local Shukrieh
Arabs. Such was the skill of these tribesmen that only one camel and one
mule were drowned during the operation. The passage was completed on the
16th, and the next day the advance was resumed along the west bank of
the Atbara. At midday on the 18th Mugatta was reached, and at dawn on
the 20th the little force--having filled their water-skins, tightened
their belts, and invoked the assistance of the various gods they
worshipped--started off, and marched all day in single file through the
thick bush which lies between the Atbara and Gedaref. The column retired
to rest peacefully during the night of the 21st, although within twelve
miles of Gedaref. But at midnight startling news arrived. A deserter
from the Dervishes made his way into the camp and informed Colonel
Parsons that the Emir Saadalla awaited him with 3,500 men two miles
before the town. The situation was grave. A retreat through the broken
country and thick bush in the face of a powerful and triumphant enemy
seemed impossible. There was no alternative but to attack.
Very early on the morning of the 22nd--the same day on which General
Hunter on the Blue Nile was compelling Musa Digna and his followers to
surrender--Colonel Parsons and the Kassala column set forth to march
into Gedaref and to fight whatever force it might contain. For the first
two hours the road lay through doura plantations and high grass which
rose above the heads even of men mounted on camels; but as the town was
approached, the doura ceased, and the troops emerged from the jungle on
to an undulating moorland with occasional patches of rushes and withered
grass. At half-past seven, and about three miles from Gedaref, the
enemy's scouts were encountered. A few shots were fired. The soldiers
pressed their march, and at eight o'clock had reached a small knoll,
from the top of which an extensive view was obtainable. The column
halted, and Colonel Parsons and his officers ascended the eminence to
reconnoitre.
A most menacing spectacle confronted them. Scarcely a mile away a strong
force of Dervishes was rapidly advancing to meet the invaders. Four
lines of white figures rising out of the grass showed by their length
the number, and by their regularity the discipline, of the enemy. The
officers computed the strength of their antagonists at not fewer than
4,000. Subsequent investigation has shown that the Emir Saadalla marched
out of Gedaref with 1,700 riflemen, 1,600 spearmen, and 300 horse.
The swiftness of the Dervish advance and the short space that intervened
between the forces made it evident that a collision would take place
within half an hour. The valley was rocky, and overgrown with grass and
reeds; but to the right of the track there rose a high saddleback hill,
the surface of which looked more open, and which appeared to command
the approaches from Gedaref. The troops knew nothing of the country;
the Dervishes understood it thoroughly. The high ground gave at least
advantage of view. Colonel Parsons resolved to occupy it. Time was
however, very scanty.
The order was given, and the column began to double across the valley
towards the saddleback. The Dervishes, perceiving the nature of the
movement, hurried their advance in the hope of catching the troops on
the move and perhaps of even seizing the hill itself. But they were too
late. Colonel Parsons and his force reached the saddleback safely, and
with a few minutes to spare climbed up and advanced along it in column
in the direction of Gedaref--the Arab battalion leading, the 16th
Egyptians next, and last of all the irregulars.
The Dervishes, seeing that the troops had already reached the hill and
were moving along it towards the town, swung to their left and advanced
to the attack. Thereupon at half-past eight the column wheeled into line
to meet them, and standing in the long grass, which even on the summit
of the hill was nearly breast-high, opened a heavy and destructive fire.
The enemy, although suffering severe loss, continued to struggle bravely
onward, replying vigorously to the musketry of the soldiers. At nine
o'clock, while the frontal attack was still undecided, Colonel Parsons
became aware that a strong force of Dervishes had moved round the left
rear and were about to attack the hospital and transport. He at once
sent to warn Captain Fleming, R.A.M.C., who combined the duties of
medical officer and commander of the baggage column, of the impending
assault, and directed him to close up the camels and meet it. The Arab
Sheikhs, who in the absence of officers were acting as orderlies, had
scarcely brought the news to Fleming, when the Dervish attack developed.
The enemy, some 300 strong, rushed with great determination upon the
baggage, and the escort of 120 Arab irregulars at once broke and fled.
The situation became desperate; but Ruthven with thirty-four Supply
Department camel-men hastened to meet the exultant enemy and protect the
baggage column, and the transport was stubbornly defended. In spite of
all their efforts the rear of the baggage column was broken and cut up.
The survivors escaped along the saddleback. The British officers, with
their small following, fell back towards their main body, hotly pressed
by the enemy.
At this moment Captain Ruthven observed one of his native officers,
lying wounded on the ground, about to fall into the hands of the
Dervishes and perish miserably. He immediately went back and, being a
man of great physical strength, carried the body off in his arms. The
enemy were, however, so close that he was three times compelled to set
his burden down and defend himself with his revolver. Meanwhile the
retirement towards the main body continued and accelerated.
Colonel Parsons and his force were now between two fires. The frontal
attack was within 200 yards. The rear attack, flushed with success,
were hurrying impetuously forward. The defeat and consequent total
destruction of the Kassala column appeared certain. But in the nick of
time the Dervish frontal attack, which had been suffering heavily from
the fire of the troops, wavered; and when the Arab battalion and the
16th Egyptians advanced upon them to complete their discomfiture, they
broke and fled. Colonel Parsons at once endeavoured to meet the rear
attack. The Arab battalion, whose valour was more admirable than their
discipline, continued to pursue the beaten enemy down the hill; but
the 16th Egyptians, on being called upon by their commanding officer,
Captain McKerrell, faced steadily about and turned to encounter the
fresh attack.
The heavy fire of the regular battalion checked the Dervish advance, and
Captain Fleming, the rest of the dismounted camel-men, and Ruthven
still carrying his native officer, found safety in their ranks. [For
his gallantry on this occasion Captain Ruthven has since received the
Victoria Cross.] A short fierce musketry combat followed at a range of
less than a hundred yards, at the end of which the assailants of the
baggage convoy were completely repulsed. The action was now practically
over and success was won. The Arab battalion, and those of the
irregulars that had rallied, advanced and drove the enemy before them
towards Gedaref, until at ten o'clock, both their front and rear attacks
having failed, the Dervishes abandoned all resistance and a general rout
ensued. No cavalry or artillery being available, further pursuit was
impossible.
The town of Gedaref surrendered at noon. The Dervish Emir, Nur Angara,
who with 200 black riflemen and two brass guns had been left in command
of the garrison, made haste to submit. The remainder of the Dervishes,
continuing their flight under the Emir Saadalla, hurried to tell the
tale of defeat to Ahmed Fedil.
The casualties suffered by the Kassala column in the action were severe
in proportion to their numbers and the duration of the fight. The
seven British officers escaped untouched; but of the 1,400 soldiers and
irregulars engaged, 51 were killed and 80 wounded--a total of 131. The
Dervishes left 500 dead on the field, including four Emirs of rank.
The victory had been won, the enemy were routed, and the town was
taken: it had now to be defended. Colonel Parsons took possession of
the principal buildings, and began immediately to put them in a state of
defence. This was fortunately an easy matter. The position was good and
adaptable. It consisted of three large enclosures, capable of holding
the entire force, situated in echelon, so as to protect each other by
their fire, and with strong brick walls six feet high. All were at once
set to work to clear the approaches, to level the mud houses without,
and to build ramparts or banquettes within the walls. The three
enclosures thus became three forts, and in the principal work the two
captured brass guns were mounted, in small bastions thrown out from the
north and west corners. While the infantry were thus engaged, Ruthven
and his camel-men made daily reconnaissances of the surrounding country,
and eagerly looked for the first appearance of Ahmed Fedil.
By great good fortune a convoy of ammunition from Mugatta reached
Gedaref on the afternoon of the 27th. At dawn the next day Ruthven
reported that the advance guard of Ahmed Fedil was approaching the town.
The attack began at half-past eight. The Dervishes, who fought with
their customary gallantry, simultaneously assaulted the north, south,
and west faces of the defences. Creeping forward through the high
doura, they were able to get within 300 yards of the enclosures. But the
intervening space had been carefully cleared of cover, and was swept by
the musketry of the defenders. All attempts to cross this ground--even
the most determined rushes--proved vain. While some made hopeless
charges towards the walls, others crowded into a few straw shelters
and mud huts which the troops had not found opportunity to remove, and
thence maintained a ragged fire. After an hour's heavy fusillade the
attack weakened, and presently ceased altogether. At ten o'clock,
however, strong reinforcements having come up, the Dervishes made a
second attempt. They were again repulsed, and at a quarter to eleven,
after losing more than 500 men in killed and wounded, Ahmed Fedil
admitted his defeat and retired to a clump of palm-trees two miles to
the west of the town. The casualties among the defenders were five men
killed, one British officer (Captain Dwyer) and thirteen men wounded.
The Dervishes remained for two days in the palm grove, and their leader
repeatedly endeavoured to induce them to renew the attack. But although
they closely surrounded the enclosures, and maintained a dropping fire,
they refused to knock their heads against brick walls a third time;
and on the 1st of October Ahmed Fedil was forced to retire to a more
convenient camp eight miles to the southward. Here for the next three
weeks he remained, savage and sulky; and the Kassala column were content
to keep to their defences. A few convoys from Mugatta made their way
into the forts under the cover of darkness, but for all practical
purposes the blockade of the garrison was complete. Their losses in
action had reduced their strength. They were not abundantly supplied
with ammunition. The smell of the putrefying corpses which lay around
the walls and in the doura crop, together with the unhealthy climate and
the filth of the town, was a fertile source of disease. A painful and
racking fever afflicted all ranks, and at one time as many as 270 of the
400 regular soldiers were prostrated. The recurring night alarms added
to the fatigues of the troops and the anxieties of the seven officers.
The situation was indeed so unsatisfactory that Colonel Parsons was
compelled to ask for assistance.
Major-General Rundle, who in the Sirdar's absence held the chief
command, immediately organised a relief expedition. The IXth, XIIth, and
half of the XIIIth Soudanese, with three companies of the Camel Corps,
under Colonel Collinson, were at once sent from Omdurman to the mouth of
the Rahad river. The infantry were conveyed in steamers; the Camel Corps
marched along the bank, completing the whole distance of 130 miles in
fifty-six hours. The Blue Nile garrisons, with the exception of the post
at Rosaires, were also concentrated. By the 8th of October the whole
force was collected at Abu Haraz. Five hundred camels, which had marched
from Omdurman, and every available local beast of burden joined the
transport of the column. On the 9th the XIIth Soudanese started up the
Rahad river for Ain el Owega. From this point the road leaves the river
and strikes across the desert to Gedaref, a distance of 100 miles; and
in the whole distance water is only found at the wells of El Kau. Owing
to this scarcity of water it was necessary to carry a supply with the
troops. The transport being insufficient to provide for the whole force,
the march had to be made in two columns. The Camel Corps and the XIIth
Soudanese, about 1,200 strong, set forth under Colonel Collinson from
Ain el Owega on the 17th, and reached Gedaref safely on the 22nd. Warned
of their arrival, Ahmed Fedil, having made a feeble night attack which
was repulsed by the garrison with a loss to themselves of two Soudanese
wounded, realised that he had now no chance of recapturing the town.
Preparations were indeed made to attack him; but on the 23rd of October,
when a reconnaissance was made in the direction of his camp, the Dervish
force was seen moving off in a southerly direction, their retreat
covered by a strong rearguard, which was intended to perform the double
duty of protecting the retirement and preventing desertion.
The operations conducted by Colonel Parsons thus ended in complete
success. Great difficulties were overcome, great perils were
encountered, great results were obtained. But while we applaud the skill
of the commander and the devotion of his subordinates, it is impossible
not to criticise the rash and over-confident policy which sent such a
weak and ill-equipped force on so hazardous an enterprise. The action of
Gedaref, as has been shown, was, through no fault of the officers or
men of the expedition, within an ace of being a disaster. But there were
other critical occasions when only the extraordinary good fortune which
attended the force saved it from destruction. First, the column was not
discovered until it reached Mugatta; secondly, it was not attacked in
the thick bush; thirdly, the Dervishes gave battle in the open instead
of remaining within their walls, whence the troops could not have driven
them without artillery; and, fourthly, the reserve ammunition arrived
before the attack of Ahmed Fedil.
After his defeat before Gedaref, Ahmed Fedil reverted to his intention
of joining the Khalifa in Kordofan, and he withdrew southwards towards
the Dinder river with a following that still numbered more than 5,000.
To pass the Nile in the face of the gunboats appeared impossible. He did
not, however, believe that steamers could navigate the higher reaches
of the rivers, and in the hopes of finding a safe crossing-place he
directed his march so as to strike the Blue Nile south of Karkoj. Moving
leisurely, and with frequent delays to pillage the inhabitants, he
arrived on the Dinder, twenty-five miles to the east of Karkoj, on the
7th of November. Here he halted to reconnoitre. He had trusted in the
Karkoj-Rosaires reach being too shallow for the gunboats; but he found
two powerful vessels already patrolling it. Again frustrated, he turned
southwards, meaning to cross above the Rosaires Cataract, which was
without doubt impassable to steamers.
On the 22nd of October Colonel Lewis, with two companies of the Camel
Corps and three squadrons of cavalry, started from Omdurman with
the object of marching through the centre of the Ghezira and of
re-establishing the Egyptian authority. His progress was in every way
successful. The inhabitants were submissive, and resigned themselves
with scarcely a regret to orderly government. Very little lawlessness
had followed the defeat of the Khalifa, and whatever plundering there
had been was chiefly the work of the disbanded irregulars who had fought
at Omdurman under Major Wortley's command on the east bank of the Nile.
In every village Sheikhs were appointed in the name of the Khedive,
and the officers of the cavalry column concerned themselves with many
difficult disputes about land, crops, and women--all of which they
settled to their satisfaction. Marching through Awamra, Haloosen, and
Mesalamia, Colonel Lewis reached Karkoj on the 7th of November, almost
at the same time that Ahmed Fedil arrived on the Dinder.
For the next six weeks the movements of the two forces resembled a game
of hide-and-seek. Ahmed Fedil, concealed in the dense forest and jungle
of the east bank, raided the surrounding villages and worked his way
gradually towards the Rosaires Cataract. Colonel Lewis, perplexed by
false and vague information, remained halted at Karkoj, despatched vain
reconnaissances in the hopes of obtaining reliable news, revolved deep
schemes to cut off the raiding parties, or patrolled the river in the
gunboats. And meanwhile sickness fell upon his force. The malarial
fever, which is everywhere prevalent on the Blue Nile in the autumn,
was now at its height. More than 30 per cent of every garrison and every
post were affected. The company holding Rosaires were stricken to a man,
and only the two British officers remained fit for duty. The cavalry
force which had marched through the Ghezira suffered the most severely.
One after another every British officer was stricken down and lay
burning but helpless beneath the palm-leaf shelters or tottered on to
the friendly steamers that bore the worst cases north. Of the 460 men
who composed the force, ten had died and 420 were reported unfit for
duty within a month of their arrival at Karkoj.
During the end of November the Sheikh Bakr, who had deserted the
Dervishes after their retreat from Gedaref, arrived at Karkoj with 350
irregulars. He claimed to have defeated his former chief many times, and
produced a sack of heads as evidence of his success. His loyalty being
thus placed beyond doubt, he was sent to keep contact with the Dervishes
and encouraged to the greatest efforts by the permission to appropriate
whatever spoils of war he could capture.
Meanwhile Ahmed Fedil was working his way slowly southward along a deep
khor which runs almost parallel to the Blue Nile and is perhaps
twenty miles from it. As soon as the position of the Dervish Emir
was definitely known, Colonel Lewis moved his force, which had been
strengthened by detachments of the Xth Soudanese, from Karkoj to
Rosaires. Here he remained for several days, with but little hope of
obstructing the enemy's passage of the river. On the 20th of
December, however, full--though, as was afterwards found, not very
accurate--information was received. It was reported that on the 18th
Ahmed Fedil had reached the village of Dakhila, about twenty miles south
of the Rosaires post; that he himself had immediately crossed with his
advanced guard, and was busily passing the women and children across the
river on rafts.
On the 22nd, therefore, Colonel Lewis hurried the Sheikh Bakr up the
west bank to cut off their flocks and harass the Dervishes who had
already crossed the river. The irregulars accordingly departed; and
the next day news was brought that the Dervish force was almost equally
divided by the Blue Nile, half being on one bank and half on the other.
At midday on the 24th the gunboats Melik and Dal arrived from Omdurman
with a detachment of 200 more men of the Xth Soudanese under Major
Fergusson, and thirty men of the IXth Soudanese under Captain Sir Henry
Hill. With this addition the force at Colonel Lewis's disposal consisted
of half the Xth Soudanese, a small detachment of the IXth Soudanese, two
Maxim guns, and a doctor. Besides the regular troops, there were also
the band of irregulars under the Sheikh Bakr, numbering 380 men, 100 men
under the Sheikh of Rosaires, and a few other unclassified scallywags.
Colonel Lewis determined to attack what part of Ahmed Fedil's force
still remained on the east bank of the river, and on Christmas Day, at
five o'clock in the afternoon, he marched with every man he could muster
in the direction of Dakhila.
Moving in single file along a track which led through a dense forest of
thorny trees, the column reached Adu Zogholi, a village thought to be
half, but really not one-third, of the way to Dakhila, at eleven o'clock
on Christmas night. Here they bivouacked until 3 A.M. on the 26th, when
the march was resumed in the same straggling order through the same
tangled scrub. Daylight found them still several miles from the Dervish
position, and it was not until eight o'clock that the enemy's outposts
were discovered. After a few shots the Arab picket fell back, and the
advance guard, hurrying after them, emerged from the forest upon the
open ground of the river bank, broken only by palms and patches of high
grass. Into this space the whole column gradually debouched. Before them
the Blue Nile, shining in the early sunlight like a silver band, flowed
swiftly; and beyond its nearest waters rose a long, bare, gravel island
crowned with clumps of sandhills, to the shelter of which several
hundred Dervishes, surprised by the sudden arrival of the troops,
were scampering. Beyond the island, on the tall tree-clad cliff of the
further bank, other minute figures moved and bustled. The discordant
sound of horns and drums floating across the waters, and the unfurling
of many bright flags, proclaimed the presence and the intention of the
hostile force.
The Dervish position was well chosen and of great defensive strength. A
little to the north of Dakhila the Blue Nile bifurcates--one rapid but
shallow stream flowing fairly straight under the east bank; another very
deep stream running in a wide curve under the west bank, cutting into
it so that it is precipitous. These two branches of the river enclose
an island a mile and a quarter long by 1,400 yards wide, and on this
island, surrounded by a natural moat of swiftly flowing water, was the
Dervish dem. The western side of the island rose into a line of low
sandhills covered with scrub and grass, with a steep reverse slope
towards the foreshore of the river-bank; and here, in this excellent
cover, what eventually proved to be three-quarters of the force of Ahmed
Fedil were drawn up. Backed against the deep arm of the river they
had no choice, nor indeed any other wish, but to fight. Before them
stretched a bare slope of heavy shingle, 1,000 yards wide, over
which their enemies must advance to the attack, Behind them the high
precipitous west bank of the river, which rose in some places to a
height of fifty feet, was lined with the 300 riflemen who had already
crossed; and from this secure position Ahmed Fedil and four of his Emirs
were able to watch, assist, and direct the defence of the island. The
force on the island was under the sole command of the Emir Saadalla, of
Gedaref repute; but, besides his own followers, most of the men of the
four other Emirs were concentrated there.
The prospect was uninviting. Colonel Lewis discovered that he had
absurdly under-rated the strength and discipline of the Dervish force.
It had been continually reported that the defeats at Gedaref had
demoralised them, and that their numbers did not exceed 2,000 men.
Moreover, he had marched to the attack in the belief that they were
equally divided on both sides of the river. Retreat was, however,
impossible. Strong as was the position of the enemy, formidable as was
their strength, the direct assault was actually safer than a retirement
through the nineteen miles of gloomy forest which lay between the
adventurous column and Rosaires. The British officer immediately
determined to engage. At nine o'clock the two Maxims, which represented
the artillery of the little force, came into action in good positions,
while the Xth Soudanese and most of the irregulars lined the east bank.
Musketry and Maxim fire was now opened at long range. The Dervishes
replied, and as the smoke of their rifles gradually revealed their
position and their numbers, it soon became evident that no long-range
fire could dislodge them; and Colonel Lewis resolved, in spite of the
great disparity of force and disadvantage of ground, to attack them with
the bayonet. Some time was spent in finding fords across the interposing
arm of the river, and it was not until past ten o'clock that Bakr's
men crossed on to the island, and, supported by a company of the Xth
Soudanese, advanced towards the enemy's right and took up a position at
about 800 yards from their line, to cover the rest of the passage.
Colonel Lewis now determined to turn the enemy's left from the north,
attack them in flank, and roll them into the deep part of the river.
With the Xth Soudanese, under Colonel Nason and Major Fergusson, he
marched northwards along the river's edge, sheltering as far as possible
under the curve of the bank from the fire, which now began to cause
casualties. Having reached the position from which it was determined
to deliver the attack, the battalion deployed into line, and, changing
front half left, advanced obliquely by alternate companies across the
bare shingle towards the sandhills. As they advanced, a galling fire was
opened upon the left flank by two hundred Dervishes admirably placed on
a knoll. Major Fergusson was detached with one company to dislodge them.
The remaining four companies continued the attack.
The Dervish musketry now became intense. The whole front of the island
position was lined with smoke, and behind it, from the high cliff of
the west bank, a long half-circle of riflemen directed a second tier
of converging bullets upon the 400 charging men. The shingle jumped and
stirred in all directions as it was struck. A hideous whistling filled
the air. The Soudanese began to drop on all sides, 'just like the
Dervishes at Omdurman,' and the ground was soon dotted with the bodies
of the killed and wounded. 'We did not,' said an officer, 'dare to
look back.' But undaunted by fire and cross-fire, the heroic black
soldiers--demons who would not be denied--pressed forward without the
slightest check or hesitation, and, increasing their pace to a swift run
in their eagerness to close with the enemy, reached the first sandhills
and found cover beneath them. A quarter of the battalion had already
fallen, and lay strewn on the shingle.
The rapidity of their advance had exhausted the Soudanese, and Lewis
ordered Nason to halt under cover of the sandhills for a few minutes,
so that the soldiers might get their breath before the final effort.
Thereupon the Dervishes, seeing that the troops were no longer
advancing, and believing that the attack was repulsed, resolved to
clinch the matter. Ahmed Fedil from the west bank sounded the charge on
drum and bugle, and with loud shouts of triumph and enthusiasm the whole
force on the island rose from among the upper sandhills, and, waving
their banners, advanced impetuously in counter-attack. But the Xth
Soudanese, panting yet unconquerable, responded to the call of their
two white officers, and, crowning the little dunes behind which they had
sheltered, met the exultant enemy with a withering fire and a responding
shout.
The range was short and the fire effective. The astonished Arabs wavered
and broke; and then the soldiers, nobly led, swept forward in a
long scattered line and drove the enemy from one sandy ridge to
another--drove them across the rolling and uneven ground, every fold of
which contained Dervishes--drove them steadily back over the sandhills,
until all who were not killed or wounded were penned at the extreme
southern end of the island, with the deep unfordable arm of the river
behind them and the fierce black soldiers, roused to fury by their
losses, in front.
The Sheikh Bakr, with his men and the rest of the irregulars, joined the
victorious Soudanese, and from the cover of the sandhills, now in the
hands of the troops, a terrible fire was opened upon the Dervishes
crowded together on the bare and narrow promontory and on the foreshore.
Some tried to swim across the rushing river to their friends on the west
bank. Many were drowned--among them Saadalla, who sank horse and man
beneath the flood. Others took refuge from the fire by standing up
to their necks in the stream. The greater part, however, escaped to a
smaller island a little further up the river. But the cover was bad,
the deep water prevented further flight, and, after being exposed for
an hour and a half to the musketry of two companies, the survivors--300
strong--surrendered.
By 11.30 the whole island was in the possession of the troops. It was,
however, still swept and commanded by the fire from the west bank. The
company which had been detached to subdue the Dervish riflemen were
themselves pinned behind their scanty cover. Major Fergusson was
severely wounded and a third of his men were hit. To withdraw this
company and the wounded was a matter of great difficulty; and it was
necessary to carry the Maxims across the river and bring them into
action at 400 yards. Firing ceased at last at three o'clock, and the
victors were left to measure their losses and their achievement.
There was neither time nor opportunity to count the enemy's dead, but
it is certain that at least 500 Arabs were killed on the island. Two
thousand one hundred and twenty-seven fighting men and several hundred
women and children surrendered. Five hundred and seventy-six rifles,
large quantities of ammunition, and a huge pile of spears and swords
were captured. Ahmed Fedil, indeed, escaped with a numerous following
across the Ghezira, but so disheartened were the Dervishes by this
crushing defeat that the whole force surrendered to the gunboat Metemma
at Reng, on the White Nile, on the 22nd of January, and their leader was
content to fly with scarcely a dozen followers to join the Khalifa.
The casualties among the troops in the action amounted to 41 killed and
145 wounded, including Major Fergusson; and the Xth Soudanese, on whom
the brunt of the fighting fell, suffered a loss of 25 non-commissioned
officers and men killed, 1 British officer, 6 native officers, and 117
non-commissioned officers and men wounded, out of a total strength of
511. The rest of the loss was among the irregulars, 495 of whom took
part in the engagement.