By the operations described in the last chapter, the whole of the
regions bordering on the Niles were cleared of hostile forces, dotted
with military posts, and brought back to Egyptian authority. The
Khalifa, however, still remained in Kordofan. After he had made good
his escape from the battlefield of Omdurman, Abdullah had hurried in the
direction of El Obeid, moving by the wells of Shat and Zeregia, which
at that season of the year were full of water after the rains. At Abu
Sherai, having shaken off the pursuit of the friendlies, he halted,
encamped, and busily set to work to reorganise his shattered forces. How
far he succeeded in this will presently be apparent. In the beginning
of November the general drying-up of the country turned the wells at
Abu Sherai into pools of mud, and the Khalifa moved westward to Aigaila.
Here he was joined by the Emir El Khatem with the El Obeid garrison.
This chief and his followers had never been engaged with the 'Turks,'
and were consequently fresh and valiant. Their arrival greatly
encouraged the force which the Khalifa had rallied. A large dem was
formed at Aigaila, and here, since the water was plentiful during
December, Abdullah abode quietly, sending his raiding parties far afield
to collect grain and other supplies.
As soon as the Sirdar, who had returned from England, received the news
of the success at Rosaires he determined to make an attempt to capture
the Khalifa; and on the 29th of December sent for Colonel Kitchener,
to whom as the senior available officer he had decided to entrust this
honourable enterprise. The colonel was directed to take a small
mixed force into Kordofan and to reconnoitre the enemy's position. If
possible, he was to attack and capture Abdullah, whose followers were
believed not to exceed 1,000 ill-armed men. The 'Kordofan Field Force,'
as its officers called it, was formed as follows:
Commanding: COLONEL KITCHENER
Assistant Adjutant-General: LIEUT.-COLONEL MITFORD
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General: MAJOR WILLIAMS
Troops:
Two squadrons Egyptian Cavalry
2nd Egyptians
XIVth Soudanese
Two galloping Maxims
Two mule guns
One company Camel Corps.
Camel transport was drawn from the Atbara and from the Blue Nile. The
troops were conveyed by steamer to Duem, and concentrated there during
the first week in 1899. The camels were collected at Kawa, and, although
several of the convoys had to march as much as 400 miles, the whole
number had arrived by the 10th of January.
The prime difficulty of the operation was the want of water. The
Khalifa's position was nearly 125 miles from the river. The intervening
country is, in the wet season, dotted with shallow lakes, but by January
these are reduced to mud puddles and only occasional pools remain.
All the water needed by the men, horses, and mules of the column must
therefore be carried. The camels must go thirsty until one of the
rare pools--the likely places for which were known to the native
guides--might be found. Now, the capacity of a camel for endurance
without drinking is famous; but it has its limits. If he start
having filled himself with water, he can march for five days without
refreshment. If he then have another long drink, he can continue for
five days more. But this strains his power to the extreme; he suffers
acutely during the journey, and probably dies at its end. In war,
however, the miseries of animals cannot be considered; their capacity
for work alone concerns the commander. It was thought that, partly by
the water carried in skins, partly by the drying-up pools, and partly by
the camel's power of endurance, it might be just possible for a force of
about 1,200 men to strike out 125 miles into the desert, to have
three days to do their business in, and to come back to the Nile. This
operation, which has been called the Shirkela Reconnaissance, occupied
the Kordofan Field Force.
The report of the route from Kohi was considered encouraging. At Gedid
the old wells promised sufficient water to refill the skins, and within
seven miles of the wells were two large pools at which the camels could
be watered. The column, therefore, prepared for the journey. Nothing was
neglected which could increase the water carried or diminish the number
of drinkers. Only twelve cavalry were taken. The horses of the Maxim
guns and the mules of the battery were reduced to the lowest possible
number. Every person, animal, or thing not vitally necessary was
remorselessly excluded. In order to lighten the loads and make room for
more water, even the ammunition was limited to 100 rounds per rifle.
The daily consumption of water was restricted to one pint for men, six
gallons for horses, and five for mules. To lessen the thirst caused by
the heat Colonel Kitchener decided to march by night. An advanced depot
was formed at Gedid and food for two days accumulated there. Besides
this, each unit carried ten, and the column transport seven, days'
rations. Thus the force were supplied with food up till the 9th of
February, and their radius of action, except as restricted by water, was
nineteen days. This was further extended five days by the arrangement
of a convoy which was to set out on the 30th of January to meet them as
they returned.
The column--numbering 1,604 officers and men and 1,624 camels and other
beasts of burden--started from Kohi at 3 P.M. on the 23rd of January,
having sent on a small advanced party to the wells of Gedid twelve hours
before. The country through which their route lay was of barren and
miserable aspect. They had embarked on a sandy ocean with waves of
thorny scrub and withered grass. From the occasional rocky ridges,
which allowed a more extended view, this sterile jungle could be seen
stretching indefinitely on all sides. Ten miles from the river all
vestiges of animal life disappeared. The land was a desert; not the open
desert of the Northern Soudan, but one vast unprofitable thicket, whose
interlacing thorn bushes, unable to yield the slightest nourishment to
living creatures, could yet obstruct their path.
Through this the straggling column, headed in the daylight by the red
Egyptian flag and at night by a lantern on a pole, wound its weary way,
the advanced guard cutting a path with axes and marking the track
with strips of calico, the rearguard driving on the laggard camels
and picking up the numerous loads which were cast. Three long marches
brought them on the 25th to Gedid. The first detachment had already
arrived and had opened up the wells. None gave much water; all emitted
a foul stench, and one was occupied by a poisonous serpent eight feet
long--the sole inhabitant. The camels were sent to drink at the pool
seven miles away, and it was hoped that some of the water-skins could
be refilled; but, after all, the green slime was thought unfit for human
consumption, and they had to come back empty.
The march was resumed on the 26th. The trees were now larger; the
scrub became a forest; the sandy soil changed to a dark red colour; but
otherwise the character of the country was unaltered. The column rested
at Abu Rokba. A few starving inhabitants who occupied the huts pointed
out the grave of the Khalifa's father and the little straw house in
which Abdullah was wont to pray during his visits. Lately, they said, he
had retired from Aigaila to Shirkela, but even from this latter place he
had made frequent pilgrimages.
At the end of the next march, which was made by day, the guides, whose
memories had been refreshed by flogging, discovered a large pool of good
water, and all drank deeply in thankful joy. A small but strong zeriba
was built near this precious pool, and the reserve food and a few sick
men were left with a small garrison under an Egyptian officer. The
column resumed their journey. On the 29th they reached Aigaila, and
here, with feelings of astonishment scarcely less than Robinson Crusoe
experienced at seeing the footprint in the sand, they came upon the
Khalifa's abandoned camp. A wide space had been cleared of bush, and
the trees, stripped of their smaller branches, presented an uncanny
appearance. Beyond stood the encampment--a great multitude of yellow
spear-grass dwellings, perfectly clean, neatly arranged in streets and
squares, and stretching for miles. The aspect of this strange deserted
town, rising, silent as a cemetery, out of the awful scrub, chilled
everyone who saw it. Its size might indeed concern their leader. At
the very lowest computation it had contained 20,000 people. How many of
these were fighting men? Certainly not fewer than 8,000 or 9,000. Yet
the expedition had been sent on the assumption that there were scarcely
1,000 warriors with the Khalifa!
Observing every precaution of war, the column crawled forward, and the
cavalry and Camel Corps, who covered the advance, soon came in contact
with the enemy's scouts. Shots were exchanged and the Arabs retreated.
The column halted three miles to the east of this position, and, forming
a strong zeriba, passed the night in expectation of an attack. Nothing,
however, happened, and at dawn Mitford was sent out with some mounted
'friendlies' to reconnoitre. At ten o'clock he returned, and his report
confirmed the conclusions which had been drawn from the size of the
Aigaila camp. Creeping forward to a good point of view, the officer had
seen the Dervish flags lining the crest of the hill. From their number,
the breadth of front covered, and the numerous figures of men moving
about them, he estimated not fewer than 2,000 Arab riflemen in the
front line. How many more were in reserve it was impossible to say.
The position was, moreover, of great strength, being surrounded by deep
ravines and pools of water.
The news was startling. The small force were 125 miles from their base;
behind them lay an almost waterless country, and in front was a powerful
enemy. An informal council of war was held. The Sirdar had distinctly
ordered that, whatever happened, there was to be no waiting; the troops
were either to attack or retire. Colonel Kitchener decided to retire.
The decision having been taken, the next step was to get beyond the
enemy's reach as quickly as possible, and the force began their retreat
on the same night. The homeward march was not less long and trying than
the advance, and neither hopes of distinction nor glamour of excitement
cheered the weary soldiers. As they toiled gloomily back towards the
Nile, the horror of the accursed land grew upon all. Hideous spectacles
of human misery were added to the desolation of the hot, thorny scrub
and stinking pools of mud. The starving inhabitants had been lured from
their holes and corners by the outward passage of the troops, and hoped
to snatch some food from the field of battle. Disappointed, they
now approached the camps at night in twos and threes, making piteous
entreaties for any kind of nourishment. Their appeals were perforce
unregarded; not an ounce of spare food remained.
Towards the end of the journey the camels, terribly strained by their
privation of water, began to die, and it was evident that the force
would have no time to spare. One young camel, though not apparently
exhausted, refused to proceed, and even when a fire was lighted round
him remained stubborn and motionless; so that, after being terribly
scorched, he had to be shot. Others fell and died all along the route.
Their deaths brought some relief to the starving inhabitants. For as
each animal was left behind, the officers, looking back, might see first
one, then another furtive figure emerge from the bush and pounce on
the body like a vulture; and in many cases before life was extinct the
famished natives were devouring the flesh.
On the 5th of February the column reached Kohi, and the Kordofan Field
Force, having overcome many difficulties and suffered many hardships,
was broken up, unsuccessful through no fault of its commander, its
officers, or its men.
For nearly a year no further operations were undertaken against the
Khalifa, and he remained all through the spring and summer of 1899
supreme in Kordofan, reorganising his adherents and plundering the
country--a chronic danger to the new Government, a curse to the local
inhabitants, and a most serious element of unrest. The barren and almost
waterless regions into which he had withdrawn presented very difficult
obstacles to any military expedition, and although powerful forces
were still concentrated at Khartoum, the dry season and the uncertain
whereabouts of the enemy prevented action. But towards the end of August
trustworthy information was received by the Intelligence Department,
through the agency of friendly tribesmen, that the Khalifa, with all
his army, was encamped at Jebel Gedir--that same mountain in Southern
Kordofan to which nearly twenty years before he and the Mahdi had
retreated after the flight from Abba Island. Here among old memories
which his presence revived he became at once a centre of fanaticism.
Night after night he slept upon the Mahdi's stone; and day after
day tales of his dreams were carried by secret emissaries not only
throughout the Western Soudan, but into the Ghezira and even to
Khartoum. And now, his position being definite and his action highly
dangerous, it was decided to move against him.
On the 13th of October the first Soudanese battalion was despatched in
steamers from Khartoum, and by the 19th a force of some 7,000 men, well
equipped with camel transport, was concentrated at Kaka, a village on
the White Nile not far north of Fashoda. The distance from here to
Jebel Gedir was about eighty miles, and as for the first fifty no water
existed; the whole supply had to be carried in tanks. Sir Reginald
Wingate, who was in command of the infantry, reached Fungor, thirty
miles from the enemy's position, with the two leading battalions (IXth
and Xth Soudanese) on the 23rd of October, only to find news that the
Khalifa had left his camp at Jebel Gedir on the 18th and had receded
indefinitely into the desert. The cast having failed, and further
progress involving a multiplication of difficulties, Lord Kitchener,
who was at Kaka, stopped the operations, and the whole of the
troops returned to Khartoum, which they reached in much vexation and
disappointment on the 1st of November.
It was at first universally believed that the Khalifa's intention was
to retire to an almost inaccessible distance--to El Obeid or Southern
Darfur--and the officers of the Egyptian army passed an unhappy
fortnight reading the Ladysmith telegrams and accusing their evil
fortune which kept them so far from the scene of action. But soon
strange rumours began to run about the bazaars of Omdurman of buried
weapons and whispers of revolt. For a few days a vague feeling of unrest
pervaded the native city, and then suddenly on the 12th of November came
precise and surprising news. The Khalifa was not retreating to the south
or to the west, but advancing northward with Omdurman, not El Obeid, as
his object. Emboldened by the spectacle of two successive expeditions
retreating abortive, and by, who shall say what wild exaggerated tales
of disasters to the Turks far beyond the limits of the Soudan, Abdullah
had resolved to stake all that yet remained to him in one last desperate
attempt to recapture his former capital; and so, upon the 12th of
November, his advanced guard, under the Emir Ahmed Fedil, struck the
Nile opposite Abba Island, and audaciously fired volleys of musketry at
the gunboat Sultan which was patrolling the river.
The name of Abba Island may perhaps carry the reader back to the very
beginning of this story. Here, eighteen years before, the Mahdi had
lived and prayed after his quarrel with the haughty Sheikh; here
Abdullah had joined him; here the flag of the revolt had been set up,
and the first defeat had been inflicted upon the Egyptian troops; and
here, too, still dwelt--dwells, indeed, to this day--one of those same
brothers who had pursued through all the vicissitudes and convulsions
which had shaken the Soudan his humble industry of building wooden
boats. It is surely a curious instance of the occasional symmetry of
history that final destruction should have befallen the last remains of
the Mahdist movement so close to the scene of its origin!
The news which had reached Khartoum set all wheels in motion. The IXth
and XIIIth Soudanese Battalions were mobilised on the 13th of November
and despatched at once to Abba Island under Colonel Lewis. Kitchener
hurried south from Cairo, and arrived in Khartoum on the 18th. A field
force of some 2,300 troops--one troop of cavalry, the 2nd Field
Battery, the 1st Maxim Battery, the Camel Corps, IXth Soudanese, XIIIth
Soudanese, and one company 2nd Egyptians--was immediately formed, and
the command entrusted to Sir Reginald Wingate. There were besides some
900 Arab riflemen and a few irregular mounted scouts. On the 20th
these troops were concentrated at Fashi Shoya, whence Colonel Lewis had
obliged Ahmed Fedil to withdraw, and at 3.30 on the afternoon of the
21st the expedition started in a south-westerly direction upon the track
of the enemy.
The troops bivouacked some ten miles south-west of Fashi Shoya, and
then marched in bright moonlight to Nefisa, encountering only a Dervish
patrol of about ten men. At Nefisa was found the evacuated camp of Ahmed
Fedil, containing a quantity of grain which he had collected from the
riverain district, and, what was of more value, a sick but intelligent
Dervish who stated that the Emir had just moved to Abu Aadel, five miles
further on. This information was soon confirmed by Mahmud Hussein,
an Egyptian officer, who with an irregular patrol advanced boldly in
reconnaissance. The infantry needed a short rest to eat a little food,
and Sir Reginald Wingate ordered Colonel Mahon to press on immediately
with the whole of the mounted troops and engage the enemy, so as to
prevent him retreating before an action could be forced.
Accordingly cavalry, Camel Corps, Maxims, and irregulars--whose
fleetness of foot enabled them, though not mounted, to keep pace with
the rest--set off at their best pace: and after them at 9.15 hurried the
infantry, refreshed by a drink at the water tanks and a hasty meal.
As they advanced the scrub became denser, and all were in broken and
obstructed ground when, at about ten o'clock, the sound of Maxim firing
and the patter of musketry proclaimed that Mahon had come into contact.
The firing soon became more rapid, and as the infantry approached it was
evident that the mounted troops were briskly engaged. The position which
they occupied was a low ridge which rose a little above the level of the
plain and was comparatively bare of scrub; from this it was possible
at a distance of 800 yards to overlook the Dervish encampment huddled
around the water pools. It was immediately evident that the infantry and
the battery were arriving none too soon. The Dervishes, who had hitherto
contented themselves with maintaining a ragged and desultory fire from
the scrub, now sallied forth into the open and delivered a most bold and
determined charge upon the guns. The intervening space was little
more than 200 yards, and for a moment the attack looked as if it might
succeed. But upon the instant the IXth and XIIIth Soudanese, who had
been doubled steadily for upwards of two miles, came into line,
filling the gap between Mahon's guns and dismounted Camel Corps and the
irregular riflemen; and so the converging fire of the whole force was
brought to bear upon the enemy--now completely beaten and demoralised.
Two Dervishes, brothers, bound together hand and foot, perished in
valiant comradeship ninety-five paces from the line of guns. Many were
slain, and the remainder fled. The whole Egyptian line now advanced upon
the encampment hard upon the tracks of the retreating enemy, who were
seen emerging from the scrub on to a grassy plain more than a mile away,
across which and further for a distance of five miles they were pursued
by the cavalry and the Camel Corps. Three hundred and twenty corpses
were counted, and at least an equal number must have been wounded. Ahmed
Fedil and one or two of his principal Emirs escaped to the southward
and to the Khalifa. The Egyptian loss amounted to five men wounded. The
troops bivouacked in square formation, at about four o'clock, near the
scene of action.
A question of considerable difficulty and some anxiety now arose. It was
learned from the prisoners that the Khalifa, with about 5,000 fighting
men, was moving northwards towards the wells of Gedid, of which we
have already heard in the Shirkela reconnaissance, and which were some
twenty-five miles from the scene of the fight. The troops were already
fatigued by their severe exertions. The water pool was so foul that even
the thirsty camels refused to drink of it, and moreover scarcely any
water remained in the tanks. It was therefore of vital importance to
reach the wells of Gedid. But supposing exhausted troops famishing for
water reached them only to be confronted by a powerful Dervish force
already in possession! Sir Reginald Wingate decided, however, to face
the risk, and at a few minutes before midnight the column set out again
on its road. The ground was broken; the night was sultry: and as the
hours passed by the sufferings of the infantry began to be most acute.
Many piteous appeals were made for water. All had perforce to be refused
by the commander, who dared not diminish by a mouthful his slender store
until he knew the true situation at Gedid. In these circumstances the
infantry, in spite of their admirable patience, became very restive.
Many men fell exhausted to the ground; and it was with a feeling of
immense relief that at nine o'clock on the morning of the 24th news
was received from the cavalry that the wells had been occupied by them
without opposition. All the water in the tanks was at once distributed,
and thus refreshed the infantry struggled on and settled down at midday
around a fine pool of comparatively pure water.
At Gedid, as at Nefisa, a single Dervish, and this time a sullen fellow,
was captured, and from him it was learned that the Khalifa's army
was encamped seven miles to the south-east. It was now clear that his
position was strategically most unfavourable. His route to the north
was barred; his retreat to the south lay through waterless and densely
wooded districts; and as the seizure of the grain supplies which had
resulted from Fedil's foraging excursions rendered his advance or
retirement a matter of difficulty, it seemed probable he would stand.
Wingate, therefore, decided to attack him at dawn. Leaving the transport
under guard by the water with instructions to follow at four o'clock,
the troops moved off at midnight, screened in front at a distance of
half a mile by the cavalry and their flanks protected by the Camel
Corps. The road was in places so thickly wooded that a path had to be
cut by the infantry pioneers and the artillery. At three o'clock, when
about three miles from the enemy's position, the force was deployed into
fighting formation. The irregular riflemen covered the front; behind
them the XIIIth and IXth Soudanese; and behind these, again, the Maxims
and the artillery were disposed. Cautiously and silently the advance was
resumed, and now in the distance the beating of war drums and the long
booming note of the Khalifa's horn broke on the stillness, proclaiming
that the enemy were not unprepared. At a few minutes before four o'clock
another low ridge, also comparatively bare of scrub, was reached and
occupied as a position. The cavalry were now withdrawn from the front,
a few infantry picquets were thrown out, and the rest of the force lay
down in the long grass of the little ridge and waited for daylight.
After about an hour the sky to the eastward began to grow paler with the
promise of the morning and in the indistinct light the picquets could
be seen creeping gradually in; while behind them along the line of the
trees faint white figures, barely distinguishable, began to accumulate.
Sir Reginald Wingate, fearing lest a sudden rush should be made
upon him, now ordered the whole force to stand up and open fire; and
forthwith, in sudden contrast to the silence and obscurity, a loud
crackling fusillade began. It was immediately answered. The enemy's
fire flickered along a wide half-circle and developed continually
with greater vigour opposite the Egyptian left, which was consequently
reinforced. As the light improved, large bodies of shouting Dervishes
were seen advancing; but the fire was too hot, and their Emirs were
unable to lead them far beyond the edge of the wood. So soon as this was
perceived Wingate ordered a general advance; and the whole force, moving
at a rapid pace down the gentle slope, drove the enemy through the trees
into the camp about a mile and a half away. Here, huddled together under
their straw shelters, 6,000 women and children were collected, all of
whom, with many unwounded combatants, made signals of surrender and
appeals for mercy. The 'cease fire' was sounded at half-past six.
Then, and not till then, was it discovered how severe the loss of the
Dervishes had been. It seemed to the officers that, short as was the
range, the effect of rifle fire under such unsatisfactory conditions of
light could not have been very great. But the bodies thickly scattered
in the scrub were convincing evidences. In one space not much more
than a score of yards square lay all the most famous Emirs of the
once far-reaching Dervish domination. The Khalifa Abdullah, pierced by
several balls, was stretched dead on his sheepskin; on his right
lay Ali-Wad-Helu, on his left Ahmed Fedil. Before them was a line of
lifeless bodyguards; behind them a score of less important chiefs; and
behind these, again, a litter of killed and wounded horses. Such was the
grim spectacle which in the first light of the morning met the eyes
of the British officers, to some of whom it meant the conclusion of
a perilous task prolonged over many years. And while they looked in
astonishment not unmingled with awe, there scrambled unhurt from under
a heap of bodies the little Emir Yunes, of Dongola, who added the few
links necessary to complete the chain.
At Omdurman Abdullah had remained mounted behind the hill of Surgham,
but in this his last fight he had set himself in the forefront of the
battle. Almost at the first discharge, his son Osman, the Sheikh-ed-Din,
was wounded, and as he was carried away he urged the Khalifa to save
himself by flight; but the latter, with a dramatic dignity sometimes
denied to more civilised warriors, refused. Dismounting from his
horse, and ordering his Emirs to imitate him, he seated himself on his
sheepskin and there determined to await the worst of fortune. And so it
came to pass that in this last scene in the struggle with Mahdism the
stage was cleared of all its striking characters, and Osman Digna alone
purchased by flight a brief ignoble liberty, soon to be followed by a
long ignoble servitude.
Twenty-nine Emirs, 3,000 fighting men, 6,000 women and children
surrendered themselves prisoners. The Egyptian losses were three killed
and twenty-three wounded.
. . . . . . . . . .
The long story now approaches its conclusion. The River War is over. In
its varied course, which extended over fourteen years and involved
the untimely destruction of perhaps 300,000 lives, many extremes and
contrasts have been displayed. There have been battles which were
massacres, and others that were mere parades. There have been occasions
of shocking cowardice and surprising heroism, of plans conceived in
haste and emergency, of schemes laid with slow deliberation, of wild
extravagance and cruel waste, of economies scarcely less barbarous, of
wisdom and incompetence. But the result is at length achieved, and the
flags of England and Egypt wave unchallenged over the valley of the
Nile.
At what cost were such advantages obtained? The reader must judge for
himself of the loss in men; yet while he deplores the deaths of brave
officers and soldiers, and no less the appalling destruction of the
valiant Arabs, he should remember that such slaughter is inseparable
from war, and that, if the war be justified, the loss of life cannot
be accused. But I write of the cost in money, and the economy of the
campaigns cannot be better displayed than by the table below:
Railway: £E 1,181,372
Telegraph: £E 21,825
Gunboats: £E 154,934
Military Expenditure: £E 996,223
TOTAL EXPENDITURES: £E 2,354,354 (£E1 = £1 0s.6d.)
For something less than two and a half millions sterling active military
operations were carried on for nearly three years, involving the
employment--far from its base--of an army of 25,000 disciplined troops,
including an expensive British contingent of 8,000 men, and ending
in the utter defeat of an enemy whose armed forces numbered at the
beginning of the war upwards of 80,000 soldiers, and the reconquest and
re-occupation of a territory measuring sixteen hundred miles from north
to south and twelve hundred from east to west [Lieut.-Colonel Stewart's
Report: Egypt, No.11, 1883], which at one time supported at least twenty
millions of inhabitants. But this is not all. Of the total £E2,354,354
only £E996,223 can be accounted as military expenditure. For the
remaining £E1,358,131 Egypt possesses 500 miles of railway, 900 miles of
telegraph, and a flotilla of steamers. The railway will not, indeed, pay
a great return upon the capital invested, but it will immediately pay
something, and may ultimately pay much. The telegraph is as necessary as
the railway to the development of the country; it costs far less, and,
when the Egyptian system is connected with the South African, it will
be a sure source of revenue. Lastly, there are the gunboats. The reader
cannot have any doubts as to the value of these vessels during the
war. Never was money better spent on military plant. Now that the
river operations are over the gunboats discharge the duties of ordinary
steamers; and although they are, of course, expensive machines for goods
and passenger traffic, they are by no means inefficient. The movement of
the troops, their extra pay, the supplies at the end of a long line of
communications, the ammunition, the loss by wear and tear of uniforms
and accoutrements, the correspondence, the rewards, all cost together
less than a million sterling; and for that million Egypt has recovered
the Soudan.
The whole £E2,354,354 had, however, to be paid during the campaigns.
Towards this sum Great Britain advanced, as has been related, £800,000
as a loan; and this was subsequently converted into a gift. The cost to
the British taxpayer of the recovery and part acquisition of the Soudan,
of the military prestige, and of the indulgence of the sentiment known
as 'the avenging of Gordon' has therefore been £800,000; and it may
be stated in all seriousness that English history does not record
any instance of so great a national satisfaction being more cheaply
obtained. The rest of the money has been provided by Egypt; and this
strange country, seeming to resemble the camel, on which so much of her
wealth depends, has, in default of the usual sources of supply, drawn
upon some fifth stomach for nourishment, and, to the perplexity even of
those best acquainted with her amazing financial constitution, has stood
the strain.
'The extraordinary expenditure in connection with the Soudan campaign,'
wrote Mr. J.L. Gorst, the Financial Adviser to the Khedive in his Note
of December 20, 1898 [Note by the Financial Adviser on the Budget of
1899: EGYPT, No. 3, 1899], 'has been charged to the Special Reserve
Fund. At the present moment this fund shows a deficit of £E336,000, and
there are outstanding charges on account of the expedition amounting to
£E330,000, making a total deficit of £E666,000.'
'On the other hand, the fund will be increased, when the accounts of the
year are made up, by a sum of £E382,000, being the balance of the share
of the Government in the surplus of 1898, after deduction of the excess
administrative expenditure in that year, and by a sum of £E90,000, being
part of the proceeds of the sale of the Khedivial postal steamers. The
net deficit will, therefore, be £E194,000; and if the year 1899 is as
prosperous as the present year, it may be hoped that the deficit will
disappear when the accounts of 1899 are closed.'
A great, though perhaps academic, issue remains: Was the war justified
by wisdom and by right?
If the reader will look at a map of the Nile system, he cannot fail to
be struck by its resemblance to a palm-tree. At the top the green and
fertile area of the Delta spreads like the graceful leaves and foliage.
The stem is perhaps a little twisted, for the Nile makes a vast bend
in flowing through the desert. South of Khartoum the likeness is again
perfect, and the roots of the tree begin to stretch deeply into the
Soudan. I can imagine no better illustration of the intimate and
sympathetic connection between Egypt and the southern provinces. The
water--the life of the Delta--is drawn from the Soudan, and passes along
the channel of the Nile, as the sap passes up the stem of the tree, to
produce a fine crop of fruit above. The benefit to Egypt is obvious;
but Egypt does not benefit alone. The advantages of the connection
are mutual; for if the Soudan is thus naturally and geographically an
integral part of Egypt, Egypt is no less essential to the development
of the Soudan. Of what use would the roots and the rich soil be, if
the stem were severed, by which alone their vital essence may find
expression in the upper air?
Here, then, is a plain and honest reason for the River War. To unite
territories that could not indefinitely have continued divided; to
combine peoples whose future welfare is inseparably intermingled; to
collect energies which, concentrated, may promote a common interest; to
join together what could not improve apart--these are the objects which,
history will pronounce, have justified the enterprise.
The advantage to Great Britain is no less clear to those who believe
that our connection with Egypt, as with India, is in itself a source of
strength. The grasp of England upon Egypt has been strengthened twofold
by the events of the war. The joint action and ownership of the two
countries in the basin of the Upper Nile form an additional bond between
them. The command of the vital river is an irresistible weapon. The
influence of France over the native mind in Egypt has been completely
destroyed by the result of the Fashoda negotiations; and although she
still retains the legal power to meddle in and obstruct all financial
arrangements, that power, unsupported by real influence, is like a
body whence the soul has fled, which may, indeed, be an offensive
encumbrance, but must ultimately decompose and crumble into dust.
But, apart from any connection with Egypt, Britain has gained a vast
territory which, although it would be easy to exaggerate its value,
is nevertheless coveted by every Great Power in Europe. The policy
of acquiring large waterways, which has been pursued deliberately or
unconsciously by British statesmen for three centuries, has been carried
one step further; and in the valley of the Nile England may develop
a trade which, passing up and down the river and its complement the
railway, shall exchange the manufactures of the Temperate Zone for the
products of the Tropic of Cancer, and may use the north wind to drive
civilisation and prosperity to the south and the stream of the Nile to
bear wealth and commerce to the sea.
APPENDIX B
TEXT OF THE SOUDAN AGREEMENT OF THE 19TH OF JANUARY, 1899, AND OF THE
DECLARATION OF THE 21ST OF MARCH, 1899
AGREEMENT BETWEEN HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE OF EGYPT, RELATIVE TO THE FUTURE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SOUDAN
WHEREAS certain provinces in the Soudan which were in rebellion against
the authority of His Highness the Khedive have now been reconquered
by the joint military and financial efforts of Her Britannic Majesty's
Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive; AND whereas
it has become necessary to decide upon a system for the administration
of and for the making of laws for the said reconquered provinces, under
which due allowance may be made for the backward and unsettled condition
of large portions thereof, and for the varying requirements of different
localities; AND whereas it is desired to give effect to the claims
which have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by right of
conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working and
development of the said system of administration and legislation; AND
whereas it is conceived that for many purposes Wady Halfa and Suakin
may be most effectively administered in conjunction with the reconquered
provinces to which they are respectively adjacent: NOW, it is hereby
agreed and declared by and between the Undersigned, duly authorised for
that purpose, as follows:- ART. I.
The word 'Soudan' in this Agreement means all the territories South of
the 22nd parallel of latitude, which: 1. Have never been evacuated by
Egyptian troops since the year 1882; or 2. Which having before the
late rebellion in the Soudan been administered by the Government of
His Highness the Khedive, were temporarily lost to Egypt, and have been
reconquered by Her Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Government,
acting in concert; or 3. Which may hereafter be reconquered by the two
Governments acting in concert.
ART. II.
The British and Egyptian flags shall be used together, both on land and
water, throughout the Soudan, except in the town of Suakin, in which
locality the Egyptian flag alone shall be used.
ART. III.
The supreme military and civil command in the Soudan shall be vested in
one officer, termed the 'Governor-General of the Soudan.' He shall be
appointed by Khedivial Decree on the recommendation of Her Britannic
Majesty's Government, and shall be removed only by Khedivial Decree,
with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.
ART. IV.
Laws, as also Orders and Regulations with the full force of law, for the
good government of the Soudan, and for regulating the holding, disposal,
and devolution of property of every kind therein situate, may from
time to time be made, altered, or abrogated by Proclamation of the
Governor-General. Such Laws, Orders, and Regulations may apply to the
whole or any named part of the Soudan, and may, either explicitly or by
necessary implication, alter or abrogate any existing Law or Regulation.
All such Proclamations shall be forthwith notified to Her Britannic
Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, and to the President of the
Council of Ministers of His Highness the Khedive.
ART. V.
No Egyptian Law, Decree, Ministerial Arrete, or other enactment
hereafter to be made or promulgated shall apply to the Soudan or
any part thereof, save in so far as the same shall be applied by
Proclamation of the Governor-General in manner hereinbefore provided.
ART. VI.
In the definition by Proclamation of the conditions under which
Europeans, of whatever nationality, shall be at liberty to trade with or
reside in the Soudan, or to hold property within its limits, no special
privileges shall be accorded to the subjects of any one or more Power.
ART. VII.
Import duties on entering the Soudan shall not be payable on goods
coming from Egyptian territory. Such duties may, however, be levied on
goods coming from elsewhere than Egyptian territory; but in the case of
goods entering the Soudan at Suakin, or any other port on the Red Sea
Littoral, they shall not exceed the corresponding duties for the time
being leviable on goods entering Egypt from abroad. Duties may be levied
on goods leaving the Soudan, at such rates as may from time to time be
prescribed by Proclamation.
ART. VIII.
The jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals shall not extend, nor be
recognised for any purpose whatsoever, in any part of the Soudan, except
in the town of Suakin.
ART.IX.
Until, and save so far as it shall be otherwise determined by
Proclamation, the Soudan, with the exception of the town of Suakin,
shall be and remain under martial law.
ART. X.
No Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents shall be accredited in
respect of nor allowed to reside in the Soudan, without the previous
consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.
ART. XI.
The importation of slaves into the Soudan, as also their exportation, is
absolutely prohibited. Provision shall be made by Proclamation for the
enforcement of this Regulation.
ART. XII.
It is agreed between the two Governments that special attention shall be
paid to the enforcement of the Brussels Act of the 2nd of July, 1890,
in respect to the import, sale, and manufacture of fire-arms and their
munitions, and distilled or spirituous liquors.
Done in Cairo, the 19th of January, 1899.
Signed: BOURTROS GHALI-CROMER.
DECLARATION RELATIVE TO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN
CENTRAL AFRICA
(Signed at London, March 21st, 1899)
THE Undersigned, duly authorised by their Governments, have signed the
following declaration:--The IVth Article of the Convention of the 14th
of June, 1898, shall be completed by the following provisions, which
shall be considered as forming an integral part of it: 1. Her Britannic
Majesty's Government engages not to acquire either territory or
political influence to the west of the line of frontier defined in the
following paragraph, and the Government of the French Republic engages
not to acquire either territory or political influence to the east of
the same line. 2. The line of frontier shall start from the point where
the boundary between the Congo Free State and French territory meets the
water-parting between the watershed of the Nile and that of the Congo
and its affluents. It shall follow in principle that water-parting up
to its intersection with the 11th parallel of north latitude. From this
point it shall be drawn as far as the 15th parallel in such manner as
to separate, in principle, the Kingdom of Wadai from what constituted in
1882 the Province of Darfur; but it shall in no case be so drawn as to
pass to the west beyond the 21st degree of longitude east of Greenwich
(18° 40' east of Paris), or to the east beyond the 23rd degree
of longitude east of Greenwich (20° 40' east of Paris). 3. It is
understood, in principle, that to the north of the 15th parallel the
French zone shall be limited to the north-east and east by a line which
shall start from the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with
the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich (18° 40' east of Paris),
shall run thence to the south-east until it meets the 24th degree of
longitude east of Greenwich (21° 40' east of Paris), and shall then
follow the 24th degree until it meets, to the north of the 15th parallel
of latitude, the frontier of Darfur as it shall eventually be fixed. 4.
The two Governments engage to appoint Commissioners who shall be
charged to delimit on the spot a frontier-line in accordance with the
indications given in paragraph 2 of this Declaration. The result of
their work shall be submitted for the approbation of their respective
Governments. It is agreed that the provisions of Article IX of the
Convention of the 14th of June, 1898, shall apply equally to the
territories situated to the south of the 14° 20' parallel of north
latitude, and to the north of the 5th parallel of north latitude,
between the 14° 20' meridian of longitude east of Greenwich (12th degree
east of Paris) and the course of the Upper Nile.
Done at London, the 21st of March, 1899.
(L.S.) SALISBURY.
(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.