The last chapter carried the account of the war forward at express
speed. The reader, who had already on the railway reached the Atbara
encampment and was prepared for the final advance on Khartoum, must
allow his mind to revert to a period when the Egyptian forces are
distributed along the river in garrisons at Dongola, Debba, Korti,
and Merawi; when the reorganisation of the conquered province has been
begun; and when the Desert Railway is still stretching steadily forward
towards Abu Hamed.
The news of the fall of Dongola created a panic in Omdurman. Great
numbers of Arabs, believing that the Khalifa's power was about to
collapse, fled from the city. All business was at a standstill. For
several days there were no executions. Abdullah himself kept his house,
and thus doubtfully concealed his vexation and alarm from his subjects.
On the fifth day, however, having recovered his own confidence, he
proceeded to the mosque, and after the morning prayer ascended his small
wooden pulpit and addressed the assembled worshippers. After admitting
the retreat of the Dervishes under Wad Bishara, he enlarged on
the losses the 'Turks' had sustained and described their miserable
condition. He deplored the fact that certain of the Jehadia had
surrendered, and reminded his listeners with a grim satisfaction of the
horrible tortures which it was the practice of the English and Egyptians
to inflict upon their captives. He bewailed the lack of faith in God
which had allowed even the meanest of the Ansar to abandon the Jehad
against the infidel, and he condemned the lack of piety which disgraced
the age. But he proclaimed his confidence in the loyalty of his subjects
and his enjoyment of the favour of God and the counsels of the late
Mahdi; and having by his oratory raised the fanatical multitude to a
high pitch of excitement, he thus concluded his long harangue: 'It
is true that our chiefs have retired from Dongola. Yet they are not
defeated. Only they that disobeyed me have perished. I instructed the
faithful to refrain from fighting and return to Metemma. It was by my
command that they have done what they have done. For the angel of the
Lord and the spirit of the Mahdi have warned me in a vision that the
souls of the accursed Egyptians and of the miserable English shall leave
their bodies between Dongola and Omdurman, at some spot which their
bones shall whiten. Thus shall the infidels be conquered.' Then, drawing
his sword, he cried with a loud voice: 'Ed din mansur! The religion is
victorious! Islam shall triumph!' Whereupon the worshippers, who to the
number of 20,000 filled the great quadrangle--although they could not
all hear his voice--saw his sword flashing in the sunlight, and with
one accord imitated him, waving their swords and spears, and raising
a mighty shout of fury and defiance. When the tumult had subsided, the
Khalifa announced that those who did not wish to remain faithful might
go where they liked, but that he for his part would remain, knowing that
God would vindicate the faith. Public confidence was thus restored.
In order that the divine favour might be assisted by human effort,
Abdullah adopted every measure or precaution that energy or prudence
could suggest. At first he seems to have apprehended that the Sirdar's
army would advance at once upon Omdurman, following the route of the
Desert Column in 1885 from Korti to Metemma. He therefore ordered Osman
Azrak--in spite of his severe wound--to hold Abu Klea Wells with the
survivors of his flag. Bishara, who had rallied and reorganised the
remains of the Dongola army, was instructed to occupy Metemma, the
headquarters of the Jaalin. Messengers were despatched to the most
distant garrisons to arrange for a general concentration upon Omdurman.
The Emir Ibrahim Khalil was recalled from the Ghezira, or the land
between the Blue and White Niles, and with his force of about 4,000
Jehadia and Baggara soon reached the city. Another chief, Ahmed Fedil,
who was actually on his way to Gedaref, was ordered to return to the
capital. Thither also Osman Digna repaired from Adarama. But it appears
that the Khalifa only required the advice of that wily councillor, for
he did not reduce the number of Dervishes in the small forts along the
line of the Atbara--Ed Darner, Adarama, Asubri, El Fasher--and after a
short visit and a long consultation Osman Digna returned to his post at
Adarama. Last of all, but not least in importance, Mahmud, who commanded
the 'Army of the West,' was ordered to leave very reduced garrisons in
Kordofan and Darfur, and march with his whole remaining force, which
may have numbered 10,000 fighting men, to the Nile, and so to Omdurman.
Mahmud, who was as daring and ambitious as he was conceited and
incapable, received the summons with delight, and began forthwith to
collect his troops.
The Khalifa saw very clearly that he could not trust the riverain
tribes. The Jaalin and Barabra were discontented. He knew that they
were weary of his rule and of war. In proportion as the Egyptian
army advanced, so their loyalty and the taxes they paid decreased.
He therefore abandoned all idea of making a stand at Berber. The Emir
Yunes--who, since he had been transferred from Dongola in 1895, had
ruled the district--was directed to collect all the camels, boats,
grain, and other things that might assist an invading army and send them
to Metemma. The duty was most thoroughly performed. The inhabitants
were soon relieved of all their property and of most of their means
of livelihood, and their naturally bitter resentment at this merciless
treatment explains to some extent the astonishing events which followed
the capture of Abu Hamed. This last place Abdullah never regarded as
more than an outpost. Its garrison was not large, and although it
had now become the most northerly Dervish position, only a
slender reinforcement was added to the force under the command of
Mohammed-ez-Zein.
The power of the gunboats and their effect in the Dongola campaign were
fully appreciated by the Arabs; and the Khalifa, in the hopes of closing
the Sixth Cataract, began to construct several forts at the northern end
of the Shabluka gorge. The Bordein, one of Gordon's old steamers, plied
busily between Omdurman and Wad Hamed, transporting guns and stores; and
Ahmed Fedil was sent with a sufficient force to hold the works when they
were made. But the prophecy of the Mahdi exercised a powerful effect on
the Khalifa's mind, and while he neglected no detail he based his
hopes on the issue of a great battle on the plains of Kerreri, when
the invaders should come to the walls of the city. With this prospect
continually before him he drilled and organised the increasing army at
Omdurman with the utmost regularity, and every day the savage soldiery
practised their evolutions upon the plain they were presently to strew
with their bodies.
But after a while it became apparent that the 'Turks' were not
advancing. They tarried on the lands they had won. The steamers went no
further than Merawi. The iron road stopped at Kerma. Why had they not
followed up their success? Obviously because they feared the army that
awaited them at Omdurman. At this the Khalifa took fresh courage, and
in January 1897 he began to revolve schemes for taking the offensive and
expelling the invaders from the Dongola province. The army drilled and
manœuvred continually on the plains of Kerreri; great numbers of camels
were collected at Omdurman; large stores of dried kisru or 'Soudan
biscuit,' the food of Dervishes on expeditions, were prepared.
The Sirdar did not remain in ignorance of these preparations. The
tireless enterprise of the Intelligence Branch furnished the most
complete information; and preparations were made to concentrate the
troops in Dongola on any threatened point, should the enemy advance.
Regular reconnaissances were made by the cavalry both into the desert
towards Gakdul Wells and along the river. Towards the end of May it was
reported that the Emir Yunes had crossed the Nile and was raiding the
villages on the left bank below Abu Hamed. In consequence the Sirdar
ordered a strong patrol under Captain Le Gallais, and consisting of
three squadrons of cavalry under Captain Mahon, three companies of the
Camel Corps, and 100 men of the IXth Soudanese on camels, with one Maxim
gun, to reconnoitre up the Nile through the Shukuk Pass and as far as
Salamat.
The outward journey was unbroken by incident; but as the patrol was
returning it was attacked by an equal force of Dervishes, and a sharp
little skirmish ensued in which one British officer--Captain Peyton--was
severely wounded, nine Egyptian troopers were killed, and three others
wounded. This proof that the Dervishes were on the move enforced the
greatest vigilance in all the Dongola garrisons.
At the end of May, Mahmud with his army arrived at Omdurman. The Khalifa
received him with delight, and several imposing reviews were held
outside the city. Mahmud himself was eager to march against the 'Turks.'
He had no experience of modern rifles, and felt confident that he
could easily destroy or at least roll back the invading forces. Partly
persuaded by the zeal of his lieutenant, and partly by the wavering and
doubtful attitude of the Jaalin, the Khalifa determined early in June to
send the Kordofan army to occupy Metemma, and thereby either to awe the
tribe into loyalty, or force them to revolt while the Egyptian troops
were still too distant to assist them. He summoned the chief of the
Jaalin, Abdalla-Wad-Saad, to Omdurman, and informed him that the Jaalin
territories were threatened by the Turks. In the goodness of his heart,
therefore, and because he knew that they loved the Mahdi and practised
the true religion, he was resolved to protect them from their enemies.
The chief bowed his head. The Khalifa continued that the trusty Mahmud
with his army would be sent for that purpose; Abdalla might show his
loyalty in furnishing them with all supplies and accommodation. He
intimated that the interview was over. But the Jaalin chief had the
temerity to protest. He assured the Khalifa of his loyalty, and of the
ability of his tribe to repel the enemy. He implored him not to impose
the burden of an army upon them. He exaggerated the poverty of Metemma;
he lamented the misfortunes of the times. Finally he begged forgiveness
for making his protest.
The Khalifa was infuriated. Forgetting his usual self-control and
the forms of public utterance, he broke out into a long and abusive
harangue. He told the chief that he had long doubted his loyalty, that
he despised his protestations, that he was worthy of a shameful death,
that his tribe were a blot upon the face of the earth, and that he hoped
Mahmud would improve their manners and those of their wives.
Abdalla-Wad-Saad crept from the presence, and returned in fury and
disgust to Metemma. Having collected the head men of his tribe, he
informed them of his reception and the Khalifa's intent. They did not
need to be told that the quartering upon them of Mahmud's army meant the
plunder of their goods, the ruin of their homes, and the rape of their
women. It was resolved to revolt and join the Egyptian forces. As a
result of the council the Jaalin chief wrote two letters. The first
was addressed to the Sirdar, and reached General Rundle at Merawi by
messenger on the 24th of June. It declared the Jaalin submission to the
Government, and begged for help, if possible in men, or, failing that,
in arms; but ended by saying that, help or no help, the tribe were
resolved to fight the Dervishes and hold Metemma to the death. The
second letter--a mad and fatal letter--carried defiance to the Khalifa.
Rundle, who was at Merawi when the Jaalin messenger found him, lost
no time. A large amount of ammunition and 1,100 Remington rifles were
speedily collected and hurried on camels across the desert by the
Korti-Metemma route, escorted by a strong detachment of the Camel Corps.
The Khalifa did not receive his letter until the 27th of June. But he
acted with even greater promptitude. Part of Mahmud's army had already
started for the north. Mahmud and the rest followed on the 28th. On the
30th the advanced guard arrived before Metemma. The Jaalin prepared to
resist desperately. Nearly the whole tribe had responded to the summons
of their chief, and more than 2,500 men were collected behind the walls
of the town. But in all this force there were only eighty serviceable
rifles, and only fifteen rounds of ammunition each. Abdalla expected
that the Dervishes would make their heaviest attack on the south side
of Metemma, and he therefore disposed his few riflemen along that front.
The defence of the rest of the town had perforce to be entrusted to the
valour of the spearmen.
On the morning of the 1st of July, Mahmud, with a force variously
estimated at 10,000 or 12,000 men, began his assault. The first attack
fell, as the chief had anticipated, on the southern face. It was
repulsed with severe loss by the Jaalin riflemen. A second attack
followed immediately. The enemy had meanwhile surrounded the whole town,
and just as the Jaalin ammunition was exhausted a strong force of the
Dervishes penetrated the northern face of their defences, which was held
only by spearmen. The whole of Mahmud's army poured in through the
gap, and the garrison, after a stubborn resistance, were methodically
exterminated. An inhuman butchery of the children and some of the women
followed. Abdalla-Wad-Saad was among the killed.
A few of the Jaalin who had escaped from the general destruction fled
towards Gakdul. Here they found the Camel Corps with their caravan of
rifles and ammunition. Like another force that had advanced by this
very road to carry succour to men in desperate distress, the relief had
arrived too late. The remnants of the Jaalin were left in occupation of
Gakdul Wells. The convoy and its escort returned to Korti.
But while the attention of the Khalifa was directed to these matters, a
far more serious menace offered from another quarter. Unnoticed by the
Dervishes, or, if noticed, unappreciated, the railway was stretching
farther and farther into the desert. By the middle of July it had
reached the 130th mile, and, as is related in the last chapter, work had
to be suspended until Abu Hamed was in the hands of the Egyptian forces.
The Nile was rising fast. Very soon steamers would be able to pass the
Fourth Cataract. It should have been evident that the next movement in
the advance of the 'Turks' impended. The Khalifa seems, indeed, to
have understood that the rise of the river increased his peril,
for throughout July he continued to send orders to the Emir in
Berber--Yunes--that he should advance into the Monassir district, harry
such villages as existed, and obstruct the frequent reconnaissances from
Merawi. Yunes, however, preferred to do otherwise, and remained on the
left bank opposite Berber until, at length, his master recalled him to
Omdurman to explain his conduct. Meanwhile, determined with mathematical
exactness by the rise of the Nile and progress of the railway, the
moment of the Egyptian advance arrived.
At the end of July preparations were made, as secretly as possible, to
despatch a flying column against Abu Hamed. The Dervish garrison, under
Mohammed-ez-Zein, was not believed to exceed 600 men, but in order that
there should be no doubt as to the result it was determined to employ a
strong force.
A brigade of all arms was formed as follows:--
Commanding: MAJOR-GENERAL HUNTER
Cavalry....... One troop
Artillery ...... No. 2 Field Battery
[This battery consisted of six Krupp guns, two Maxims, one Gardner gun,
and one Nordenfeldt--an effective medley.]
Infantry....... MACDONALD'S BRIGADE
--3rd Egyptian
--IXth Soudanese
--Xth "
--XIth "
Major-General Sir Archibald Hunter, the officer to whom the operation
was entrusted, was from many points of view the most imposing figure in
the Egyptian army. He had served through the Nile Expedition of 1884-85,
with some distinction, in the Khedive's service. Thenceforward his rise
was rapid, even for an Egyptian officer, and in ten years he passed
through all the grades from Captain to Major-General. His promotion was
not, however, undeserved. Foremost in every action, twice wounded--once
at the head of his brigade--always distinguished for valour and conduct,
Hunter won the admiration of his comrades and superiors. During the
River War he became, in spite of his hard severity, the darling of the
Egyptian Army. All the personal popularity which great success might
have brought to the Sirdar focussed itself on his daring, good-humoured
subordinate, and it was to Hunter that the soldiers looked whenever
there was fighting to be done. The force now placed under his command
for the attack upon Abu Hamed amounted to about 3,600 men. Until that
place was taken all other operations were delayed. The Sirdar awaited
the issue at Merawi. The railway paused in mid-desert.
The troops composing the 'flying column' concentrated at Kassingar, a
small village a few miles above Merawi, on the right (or Abu Hamed) bank
of the Nile. General Hunter began his march on the 29th of July. The
total distance from Kassingar to Abu Hamed is 146 miles. The greatest
secrecy had been observed in the preparation of the force, but it was
known that as soon as the column actually started the news would be
carried to the enemy. Speed was therefore essential; for if the Dervish
garrison in Abu Hamed were reinforced from Berber, the flying column
might not be strong enough to take the village. On the other hand, the
great heat and the certainty that the troops would have to fight an
action at the end of the march imposed opposite considerations on
the commander. To avoid the sun, the greater part of the distance was
covered at night. Yet the advantage thus gained was to some extent
neutralised by the difficulty of marching over such broken ground in the
darkness.
Throughout the whole length of the course of the Nile there is no more
miserable wilderness than the Monassir Desert. The stream of the river
is broken and its channel obstructed by a great confusion of boulders,
between and among which the water rushes in dangerous cataracts. The
sandy waste approaches the very brim, and only a few palm-trees, or here
and there a squalid mud hamlet, reveal the existence of life. The line
of advance lay along the river; but no road relieved the labour of the
march. Sometimes trailing across a broad stretch of white sand, in which
the soldiers sank to their ankles, and which filled their boots with
a rasping grit; sometimes winding over a pass or through a gorge of
sharp-cut rocks, which, even in the moonlight, felt hot with the heat of
the previous day--always in a long, jerky, and interrupted procession of
men and camels, often in single file--the column toiled painfully like
the serpent to whom it was said, 'On thy belly shalt thou go, and dust
shalt thou eat.'
The column started at 5.30 in the evening, and by a march of sixteen
and a half miles reached Mushra-el-Obiad at about midnight. Here a
convenient watering-place, not commanded by the opposite bank, and the
shade of eight or ten thorny bushes afforded the first suitable bivouac.
At 3.30 P.M. on the 30th the march was continued eight and a half miles
to a spot some little distance beyond Shebabit. The pace was slow, and
the route stony and difficult. It was after dark when the halting-place
was reached. Several of the men strayed from the column, wandered in the
gloom, and reached the bivouac exhausted. General Hunter had proposed to
push on the next day to Hosh-el-Geref, but the fatigues of his troops in
the two night marches had already been severe, and as, after Abu Haraz,
the track twisted away from the river so that there was no water for
five miles, he resolved to halt for the day and rest. Hosh-el-Geref was
therefore not reached until the 1st of August--a day later than had been
expected; but the rest had proved of such benefit to the troops that the
subsequent acceleration of progress fully compensated for the delay. The
column moved on again at midnight and halted at daybreak at Salmi. In
the small hours of the next morning the march was resumed. The road
by the Nile was found too difficult for the Maxim guns, which were on
wheels, and these had to make a detour of twenty-eight miles into the
desert while the infantry moved ten miles along the river. In order
that the Maxims should not arrive alone at Dakfilli, General Hunter had
marched thither with the IXth Soudanese at 11 P.M. on the previous day.
The rest of the column followed a few hours later. On the 4th, by an
eighteen-mile march through deep sand, El Kab was reached. A single
shot was fired from the opposite bank of the river as the cavalry
patrol entered the village; and there was no longer any doubt that the
Dervishes knew of the advance of the column. Both the troops and the
transport were now moving admirably; nevertheless, their sufferings were
severe.
The nights were consumed in movement. Without shade the soldiers could
not sleep by day. All ranks wearied, and the men would frequently,
during the night marches, sink down upon the ground in profound slumber,
only to be sternly aroused and hurried on. But the pace of the advance
continued to be swift. On the 5th, the force, by a fourteen-mile march,
reached Khula. Here they were joined by Sheikh Abdel-Azim with 150
Ababda camel-men from Murat Wells. Up to this point three Egyptians had
died and fifty-eight men had been left behind exhausted in depots. A
double ration of meat was issued to the whole force. The column moved
on during the night, and arrived at Ginnifab at 8 A.M. on the morning
of the 6th. Here startling news of the enemy was received. It was known
that Mohammed-ez-Zein was determined to fight, and a trustworthy report
was now received that a large force was coming down from Berber to
support the Abu Hamed garrison. In spite of the long marches and the
fatigues of the troops, General Hunter resolved to hurry on. He had
already made up the day spent at Abu Haraz. He now decided to improve on
the prescribed itinerary, accelerate his own arrival and anticipate
that of the Dervish reinforcements. Accordingly the troops marched all
through the night of the 6-7th with only a short halt of an hour and a
half, so as to attack Abu Hamed at dawn. After covering sixteen miles
of bad ground, the 'flying column' reached Ginnifab, 144 miles from
Kassingar and only two from the Dervish post, at 3.30 on the morning
of the 7th of August. A halt of two hours was allowed for the troops to
prepare themselves. Half the 3rd Egyptian Battalion remained as escort
to the transport and reserve ammunition, and then the force moved off in
the darkness towards the enemy's position.
The village of Abu Hamed straggles along the bank of the Nile, and
consists of a central mass of mud houses, intersected by a network of
winding lanes and alleys, about 500 yards long by perhaps 100 yards
wide. To the north and south are detached clusters of ruined huts,
and to the south there rises a large, ragged pile of rocks. The ground
slopes gradually up from the river, so that at a distance of 300 yards
the village is surrounded on three sides by a low plateau. Upon this
plateau stand three stone watch-towers, which were erected by General
Gordon. The Dervish garrison were strongly posted in shelter trenches
and loop-holed houses along the eastern face of the village. The towers
were held by their outposts.
Making a wide circuit to their left, and then swinging round to the
right, so as to front facing the river, the brigade silently moved
towards the enemy's position, and at a quarter past six occupied the
plateau in a crescent-shaped formation; the XIth Soudanese on the right,
opposite the north-east corner of the village; the battery, escorted by
the remaining half-battalion of the 3rd Egyptians, next; then the IXth
in the centre, and the Xth Soudanese on the left flank. As the troops
approached the watch-towers the Dervish outposts fell back and the force
continued to advance until the edge of the plateau was reached. From
here the whole scene was visible.
The day was just breaking, and the mist hung low and white over the
steel-grey surface of the river. The outlines of the mud houses were
sharply defined on this pale background. The Dervish riflemen crouched
in the shelter trench that ran round the village. Their cavalry, perhaps
a hundred strong, were falling in hurriedly on the sandy ground to the
south near the ragged rocks. The curve of the hills, crowned with the
dark line of the troops, completed and framed the picture. Within this
small amphitheatre one of the minor dramas of war was now to be enacted.
At half past six the battery came into action, and after a few shells
had been fired at the loopholed houses in the left centre of the
position, a general advance was ordered. In excellent order the three
Soudanese battalions, with General Hunter, Lieut.-Colonel MacDonald, and
the other British officers on horseback in front of their line, advanced
slowly down the hill, opening a destructive fire on the entrenchment.
The distance was scarcely three hundred yards; but the crescent
formation of the attack made the lines of advance converge, and before
half the distance was covered the Xth were compelled to halt, lest the
XIth Soudanese on the right flank should fire into them. The Dervishes
remained silent until the troops were within a hundred yards, when they
discharged two tremendous volleys, which were chiefly effective upon the
halted battalion. Major Sidney, Lieutenant Fitzclarence, and a dozen
men were shot dead. More than fifty men were wounded. All the Soudanese
thereupon with a loud shout rushed upon the entrenchment, stormed it,
and hunted the Dervishes into the houses. In the street-fighting which
followed, the numbers of the troops prevailed. The advance scarcely
paused until the river bank was reached, and by 7.30 Abu Hamed was in
the possession of the Egyptian forces.
The Dervish horsemen, who had remained spectators near the southern crag
during the attack, fled towards Berber as soon as they saw the attack
successful. Scarcely any of the infantry escaped.
In this action, besides the two British officers, Major H. M. Sidney and
Lieutenant E. Fitzclarence, 21 native soldiers were killed; 61 native
soldiers were wounded.
The news of the capture of Abu Hamed was carried swiftly by camel and
wire to all whom it might concern. The Sirdar, anticipating the result,
had already ordered the gunboats to commence the passage of the Fourth
Cataract. The camp at Railhead sprang to life after an unaccustomed
rest, and the line began again to grow rapidly. The Dervishes who were
hurrying from Berber were only twenty miles from Abu Hamed when they met
the fugitives. They immediately turned back, and retired to the foot of
the Fifth Cataract, whence after a few days' halt they continued their
retreat. Their proximity to the captured village shows how little time
the column had to spare, and that General Hunter was wise to press
his marches. The Emir who commanded at Berber heard of the loss of the
outpost on the 9th. He sent the messenger on to Metemma. Mahmud
replied on the 11th that he was starting at once with his whole army to
reinforce Berber. Apparently, however, he did not dare to move without
the Khalifa's permission; for his letters, as late as the 20th, show
that he had not broken his camp, and was still asking the Emir for
information as to the doings of the 'Turks.' Of a truth there was plenty
to tell.
On the 4th of August the gunboats El Teb and Tamai approached the Fourth
Cataract to ascend to the Abu Hamed-Berber reach of the river. Major
David was in charge of the operation. Lieutenants Hood and Beatty (Royal
Navy) commanded the vessels. Two hundred men of the 7th Egyptians were
towed in barges to assist in hauling the steamers in the difficult
places. The current was, however, too strong, and it was found necessary
to leave three barges, containing 160 soldiers, at the foot of the
rapids. Nevertheless, as the cataract was not considered a very
formidable barrier, Major David determined to make the attempt. Early on
the 5th, therefore, the Tamai tried the ascent. About 300 local Shaiggia
tribesmen had been collected, and their efforts were directed--or, as
the result proved, mis-directed--by those few of the Egyptian soldiers
who had not been left behind. The steamer, with her engines working at
full speed, succeeded in mounting half the distance. But the rush of
water was then so great that her bows were swept round, and, after a
narrow escape of capsizing, she was carried swiftly down the stream.
The officers thought that this failure was due to the accidental fouling
of a rope at a critical moment, and to the fact that there were not
enough local tribesmen pulling at the hawsers. Four hundred more
Shaiggia were therefore collected from the neighbouring villages, and in
the afternoon the Teb attempted the passage. Her fortunes were far
worse than those of the Tamai. Owing to the lack of co-operation and
discipline among the local tribesmen, their utter ignorance of what was
required of them, and the want of proper supervision, the hauling power
was again too weak. Again the bows of the steamer were swept round, and,
as the hawsers held, a great rush of water poured over the bulwarks. In
ten seconds the Teb heeled over and turned bottom upwards. The hawsers
parted under this new strain, and she was swept down stream with only
her keel showing. Lieutenant Beatty and most of the crew were thrown, or
glad to jump, into the foaming water of the cataract, and, being carried
down the river, were picked up below the rapids by the Tamai, which was
luckily under steam. Their escape was extraordinary, for of the score
who were flung into the water only one Egyptian was drowned. Two other
men were, however, missing, and their fate seemed certain. The capsized
steamer, swirled along by the current, was jammed about a mile below the
cataract between two rocks, where she became a total wreck. Anxious to
see if there was any chance of raising her, the officers proceeded in
the Tamai to the scene. The bottom of the vessel was just visible above
the surface. It was evident to all that her salvage would be a work
of months. The officers were about to leave the wreck, when suddenly
a knocking was heard within the hull. Tools were brought, a plate was
removed, and there emerged, safe and sound from the hold in which they
had been thus terribly imprisoned, the second engineer and a stoker.
When the rapidity with which the steamer turned upside down, with the
engines working, the fires burning, and the boilers full--the darkness,
with all the floors become ceilings--the violent inrush of water--the
wild career down the stream--are remembered, it will be conceded that
the experience of these men was sufficiently remarkable.
Search was now made for another passage. This was found on the 6th,
nearer the right bank of the river. On the 8th the Metemma arrived with
300 more men of the 7th Egyptians. Three days were spent in preparations
and to allow the Nile to rise a little more. On the 13th, elaborate
precautions being observed, the Metemma passed the cataract safely, and
was tied up to the bank on the higher reach. The Tamai followed the next
day. On the 19th and 20th the new gunboats Fateh, Naser, and Zafir, the
most powerful vessels on the river, accomplished the passage. Meanwhile
the Metemma and Tamai had already proceeded up stream. On the 23rd the
unarmed steamer Dal made the ascent, and by the 29th the whole flotilla
reached Abu Hamed safely.
After the arrival of the gunboats events began to move at the double.
The sudden dart upon Abu Hamed had caused the utmost consternation among
the Dervishes. Finding that Mahmud was not going to reinforce him,
and fearing the treachery of the local tribes, Zeki Osman, the Emir in
Berber, decided to fall back, and on the 24th he evacuated Berber and
marched south. On the 27th General Hunter at Abu Hamed heard that
the Dervish garrison had left the town. The next day he despatched
Abdel-Azim, the chief of Irregulars, and Ahmed Bey Khalifa, his brother,
with forty Ababda tribesmen, to reconnoitre. These bold fellows pushed
on recklessly, and found the inhabitants everywhere terrified or
acquiescent. Spreading extraordinary tales of the strength of the army
who were following them, they created a panic all along the river, and,
in spite of a sharp fight with a Dervish patrol, reached Berber on the
31st. As there was no armed force in the town, the enterprising allies
rode into the streets and occupied the grain store--the only public
building--in the name of the Government. They then sent word back to Abu
Hamed of what they had done, and sat down in the town, thus audaciously
captured, to await developments.
The astonishing news of the fall of Berber reached General Hunter on
the 2nd of September. He immediately telegraphed to Merawi. Sir Herbert
Kitchener was confronted with a momentous question: should Berber be
occupied or not? It may at first seem that there could be little doubt
about the matter. The objective of the expedition was Omdurman. The
occupation of Berber by an Egyptian garrison would settle at once the
difficulties near Suakin. The town was believed to be on the clear
waterway to the Dervish capital. The moral effect of its capture upon
the riverain tribes and throughout the Soudan would be enormous. Berber
was, in fact, the most important strategic point on the whole line
of advance. This great prize and advantage was now to be had for the
asking.
The opposite considerations were, however, tremendous. Abu Hamed marked
a definite stage in the advance. As long as Merawi and the other posts
in Dongola were strongly held, the line from Abu Hamed to Debba was
capable of easy defence. Abu Hamed could soon be made impregnable to
Dervish attack. The forces in Dongola could be quickly concentrated on
any threatened point. At this moment in the campaign it was possible
to stop and wait with perfect safety. In the meantime the Khalifa would
steadily weaken and the railway might steadily grow. When the line
reached the angle of the river, it would be time to continue the
systematic and cautious advance. Until then prudence and reason
counselled delay. To occupy Berber was to risk much. Mahmud, with a
large and victorious army, lay at Metemma. Osman Digna, with 2,000 men,
held Adarama almost within striking distance. The railway still lagged
in the desert. The Dongola garrisons must be weakened to provide a force
for Berber. The Dervishes had the advantage of occupying the interior of
the angle which the Nile forms at Abu Hamed. The troops in Berber
would have to draw their supplies by a long and slender line of camel
communication, winding along all the way from Merawi, and exposed, as a
glance at the map will show, throughout its whole length to attack.
More than all this: to advance to Berber must inevitably force the
development of the whole war. The force in the town would certainly have
its communications threatened, would probably have to fight for its
very existence. The occupation of Berber would involve sooner or later
a general action; not a fight like Firket, Hafir, or Abu Hamed, with
the advantage of numbers on the side of the Egyptian troops, but an even
battle. For such a struggle British troops were necessary. At this time
it seemed most unlikely that they would be granted. But if Berber was
occupied, the war, until the arrival of British troops, would cease to
be so largely a matter of calculation, and must pass almost entirely
into the sphere of chance. The whole situation was premature and
unforeseen. The Sirdar had already won success. To halt was to halt in
safety; to go on was to go on at hazard. Most of the officers who had
served long in the Egyptian army understood the question. They waited
the decision in suspense.
The Sirdar and the Consul-General unhesitatingly faced the
responsibility together. On the 3rd of September General Hunter received
orders to occupy Berber. He started at once with 350 men of the IXth
Soudanese on board the gunboats Tamai, Zafir, Naser, and Fateh. Shortly
after daybreak on the 5th the Egyptian flag was hoisted over the town.
Having disembarked the infantry detachment, the flotilla steamed south
to try to harass the retreating Emir. They succeeded; for on the next
day they caught him, moving along the bank in considerable disorder,
and, opening a heavy fire, soon drove the mixed crowd of fugitives,
horse and foot, away from the river into the desert. The gunboats then
returned to Berber, towing a dozen captured grain-boats. Meanwhile the
Sirdar had started for the front himself. Riding swiftly with a small
escort across the desert from Merawi, he crossed the Nile at the Baggara
Cataract and reached Berber on the 10th of September. Having inspected
the immediate arrangements for defence, he withdrew to Abu Hamed, and
there busily prepared to meet the developments which he well knew might
follow at once, and must follow in the course of a few months.