The town of Berber stands at a little distance from the Nile, on the
right bank of a channel which is full only when the river is in flood.
Between this occasional stream and the regular waterway there runs a
long strip of rich alluvial soil, covered during the greater part of the
year with the abundant crops which result from its annual submersion and
the thick coating of Nile mud which it then receives. The situation of
Berber is fixed by this fertile tract, and the houses stretch for more
than seven miles along it and the channel by which it is caused. The
town, as is usual on the Nile, is comparatively narrow, and in all its
length it is only at one point broader than three-quarters of a mile.
Two wide streets run longitudinally north and south from end to end, and
from these many narrow twisting alleys lead to the desert or the river.
The Berber of Egyptian days lies in ruins at the southern end of the
main roads. The new town built by the Dervishes stands at the north.
Both are foul and unhealthy; and if Old Berber is the more dilapidated,
New Berber seemed to the British officers who visited it to be in a more
active state of decay. The architectural style of both was similar.
The houses were constructed by a simple method. A hole was dug in the
ground. The excavated mud formed the walls of the building. The roof
consisted of palm-leaves and thorn bushes. The hole became a convenient
cesspool. Such was Berber, and this 'emporium of Soudan trade,' as it
has been called by enthusiasts, contained at the time of its recapture
by the Egyptian forces a miserable population of 5,000 males and 7,000
females, as destitute of property as their dwellings were of elegance.
The Egyptian garrison of Berber at first consisted only of the 350 men
of the IXth Soudanese, and two companies of the Camel Corps, who arrived
on the 16th of September, having marched across the desert from Merawi.
But the proximity of Osman Digna at Adarama made it necessary speedily
to strengthen the force.
During the latter part of September MacDonald's brigade, with the
exception of half the 3rd Egyptians, was moved south from Abu Hamed, and
by the end of the month the infantry in Berber were swollen to three and
a half battalions. This was further increased on the 11th of October by
the arrival of the XIIIth Soudanese and the remaining half of the 3rd
Egyptians, and thereafter the place was held by five battalions (3rd,
IXth, Xth, XIth, XIIIth), No. 2 Field Battery, and two companies of the
Camel Corps. As all the Dervishes on the right bank of the Nile had fled
to the south of the Atbara, it was found possible to establish a small
advanced post of Camel Corps and friendly Arabs in the village of
Dakhila, at the confluence of the rivers. From this humble beginning the
Atbara fort with its great entrenchment was soon to develop.
The effect of the occupation of Berber upon the tribes around Suakin
was decisive, and the whole country between these towns became at once
tranquil and loyal. Osman Digna's influence was destroyed. The friendly
villages were no longer raided. The Governor of the town became in
reality, as well as in name, the Governor of the Red Sea Littoral.
The route from Suakin to Berber was opened; and a Camel Corps
patrol, several small caravans of traders, and a party of war
correspondents--who might boast that they were the first Europeans to
make the journey for thirteen years--passed safely along it.
It is now necessary to look to the enemy. Had the Khalifa allowed the
Emir Mahmud to march north immediately after the destruction of the
Dervish outpost in Abu Hamed, the course of the operations would have
been very different. Mahmud would certainly have defended Berber with
his whole army. The advance of the Expeditionary Force must have been
delayed until the Desert Railway reached the river, and probably for
another year. But, as the last chapter has described, the sudden seizure
of Abu Hamed, the defection of the riverain tribes, and the appearance
of the gunboats above the Fourth Cataract persuaded Abdullah that the
climax of the war approached, and that he was about to be attacked in
his capital. He accordingly devoted himself to his preparations for
defence, and forbade his lieutenant to advance north of Metemma or
attempt any offensive operations. In consequence Berber fell, and its
fall convinced the Khalifa that his belief was well founded. He worked
with redoubled energy. An elaborate system of forts armed with artillery
was constructed outside the great wall of Omdurman along the river-bank.
The concentration of Arab and black soldiery from Gedaref, Kordofan,
and Darfur continued. Large quantities of grain, of camels and other
supplies, were requisitioned from the people of the Ghezira (the country
lying between the Blue and White Niles) and stored or stabled in the
city. The discontent to which this arbitrary taxation gave rise was
cured by a more arbitrary remedy. As many of the doubtful and embittered
tribesmen as could be caught were collected in Omdurman, where they
were compelled to drill regularly, and found it prudent to protest
their loyalty. The strength and tenacity of the ruler were surprisingly
displayed. The Khalifa Sherif, who had been suspected of sympathising
with the Jaalin, was made a prisoner at large. The direst penalties
attended the appearance of sedition. A close cordon around the city, and
especially towards the north, prevented much information from reaching
the Egyptian troops; and though small revolts broke out in Kordofan in
consequence of the withdrawal of Mahmud's army, the Dervish Empire as
a whole remained submissive, and the Khalifa was able to muster all its
remaining force to meet the expected onslaught of his enemies.
During the first week in October the Sirdar decided to send the
gunboats--which now plied, though with some difficulty, up and down the
Fifth Cataract--to reconnoitre Metemma and discover the actual strength
and position of Mahmud's army. On the 14th the Zafir, Fateh, and Naser
steamed south from Berber, under Commander Keppel, each carrying,
besides its ordinary native crew, fifty men of the IXth Soudanese and
two British sergeants of Marine Artillery. Shortly after daybreak on the
16th the flotilla approached the enemy's position. So silently had they
moved that a small Dervish outpost a few miles to the north of Shendi
was surprised still sleeping, and the negligent guards, aroused by a
splutter of firing from the Maxim guns, awoke to find three terrible
machines close upon them. The gunboats pursued their way, and,
disdaining a few shots which were fired from the ruins of Shendi,
arrived, at about seven o'clock, within range of Metemma. The town
itself stood more than a thousand yards from the Nile, but six
substantial mud forts, armed with artillery, lined and defended the
riverside. Creeping leisurely forward along the east bank, remote from
the Dervish works, the flotilla came into action at a range of 4,000
yards. The fire was at first concentrated on the two northern forts, and
the shells, striking the mud walls in rapid succession or bursting
in the interior, soon enveloped them in dust and smoke. The Dervishes
immediately replied, but the inferiority of their skill and weapons was
marked, and, although their projectiles reached the flotilla, very few
took effect. One shell, however, crashed through the deck of the Zafir,
mortally wounding a Soudanese soldier, and two struck the Fateh. After
the long-range bombardment had continued for about an hour the gunboats
moved forward opposite to the enemy's position, and poured a heavy
and continuous fire of shrapnel and double shell into all the forts,
gradually subduing their resistance. The fugitives from the batteries,
and small parties of Baggara horse who galloped about on the open plain
between the works and the town, afforded good targets to the Maxims, and
many were licked up even at extreme ranges.
No sooner had the gunboats passed the forts than the Dervish fire ceased
entirely, and it was discovered that their embrasures only commanded the
northern approach. As the guns could not be pointed to the southward,
the flotilla need fear nothing from any fort that had been left behind.
The officers were congratulating themselves on the folly of their foes,
when danger threatened from another quarter. The boats had hugged the
eastern bank as closely as possible during their duel with the forts.
They were scarcely a hundred yards from the shore, when suddenly a sharp
fire of musketry was opened from twenty or thirty Dervish rifle-men
concealed in the mimosa scrub. The bullets pattered all over the decks,
but while many recorded narrow escapes no one was actually hit, and the
Maxim guns, revolving quickly on their pivots, took a bloody vengeance
for the surprise. The flotilla then steamed slowly past the town, and,
having thoroughly reconnoitred it, turned about and ran down stream,
again exchanging shells with the Dervish artillery. All firing ceased at
half-past two; but six sailing-boats containing grain were captured on
the return voyage, and with these the gunboats retired in triumph to
a small island six miles north of Metemma, where they remained for the
night.
It being now known that bombarding the Dervishes was no less enjoyable
than exciting, it was determined to spend another day with them; and at
four o'clock the next morning the flotilla again steamed southward, so
as to be in position opposite Metemma before daylight. Fire was opened
on both sides with the dawn, and it was at once evident that the
Dervishes had not been idle during the night. It appeared that on the
previous day Mahmud had expected a land attack from the direction of
Gakdul, and had placed part of his artillery and nearly all his army in
position to resist it. But as soon as he was convinced that the gunboats
were unsupported he moved several of the landward guns into the river
forts, and even built two new works, so that on the 17th the Dervishes
brought into action eleven guns, firing from eight small round forts.
The gunboats, however, contented themselves with keeping at a range
at which their superior weapons enabled them to strike without being
struck, and so, while inflicting heavy loss on their enemies, sustained
no injury themselves. After four hours' methodical and remorseless
bombardment Commander Keppel considered the reconnaissance complete,
and gave the order to retire down stream. The Dervish gunners, elated
in spite of their losses by the spectacle of the retreating vessels,
redoubled their fire, and continued hurling shell after shell in
defiance down the river until their adversaries were far beyond their
range. As the gunboats floated northward their officers, looking back
towards Metemma, saw an even stranger scene than the impotent but
exulting forts. During the morning a few flags and figures had been
distinguished moving about the low range of sandhills near the town;
and as soon as the retirement of the flotilla began, the whole of the
Dervish army, at least 10,000 men, both horse and foot, and formed in
an array more than a mile in length, marched triumphantly into view,
singing, shouting, and waving their banners amid a great cloud of dust.
It was their only victory.
The loss on the gunboats was limited to the single Soudanese soldier,
who died of his wounds, and a few trifling damages. The Arab slaughter
is variously estimated, one account rating it at 1,000 men; but half
that number would probably be no exaggeration. The gunboats fired in
the two days' bombardment 650 shells and several thousand rounds of
Maxim-gun ammunition. They then returned to Berber, reporting fully on
the enemy's position and army.
As soon as Berber had been strongly occupied by the Egyptian troops,
Osman Digna realised that his position at Adarama was not only useless
but very dangerous. Mahmud had long been imperiously summoning him to
join the forces at Metemma; and although he hated the Kordofan general,
and resented his superior authority, the wary and cunning Osman decided
that in this case it would be convenient to obey and make a virtue of
necessity. Accordingly about the same time that the gunboats were making
their first reconnaissance and bombardment of Metemma, he withdrew with
his two thousand Hadendoa from Adarama, moved along the left bank of the
Atbara until the tongue of desert between the rivers became sufficiently
narrow for it to be crossed in a day, and so made his way by easy stages
to Shendi.
When the Sirdar heard of the evacuation of Adarama he immediately
determined to assure himself of the fact, to reconnoitre the unmapped
country in that region, and to destroy any property that Osman might
have left behind him. On the 23rd of October, therefore, a flying column
started from Berber under the command of General Hunter, and formed as
follows: XIth Soudanese (Major Jackson), two guns, one company of the
Camel Corps, and Abdel-Azim and 150 irregulars. Lightly equipped, and
carrying the supplies on a train of 500 camels, the small force moved
rapidly along the Nile and reached the post at the confluence on the
24th, and arrived at Adarama on the 29th, after a journey of eighty-four
miles. The report that Osman Digna had returned to the Nile proved to be
correct. His former headquarters were deserted, and although a patrol of
sixty of the Camel Corps and the Arab irregulars scouted for forty miles
further up the river, not a single Dervish was to be seen. Having thus
collected a great deal of negative information, and delaying only to
burn Adarama to the ground, the column returned to Berber.
It was now November. The Nile was falling fast, and an impassable rapid
began to appear at Um Tiur, four miles north of the confluence. The
Sirdar had a few days in which to make up his mind whether he would keep
his gunboats on the upper or lower reach. As in the latter case their
patrolling limits would have been restricted, and they would no longer
have been able to watch the army at Metemma, he determined to leave them
on the enemy's side of the obstruction. This involved the formation of a
depot at Dakhila ['Atbara Fort'], where simple repairs could be executed
and wood and other necessities stored. To guard this little dockyard
half the 3rd Egyptian battalion was moved from Berber and posted in a
small entrenchment. The other half-battalion followed in a few weeks.
The post at the confluence was gradually growing into the great camp of
a few months later.
A regular system of gunboat patrolling was established on the upper
reach, and on the 1st of November the Zafir, Naser, and Metemma, under
Commander Keppel, again steamed south to reconnoitre Mahmud's position.
The next day they were joined by the Fateh, and on the 3rd the three
larger boats ran the gauntlet of the forts. A brisk artillery duel
ensued, but the Dervish aim was, as usual, erratic, and the vessels
received no injury. It was observed that the position of the Dervish
force was unchanged, but that three new forts had been constructed to
the south of the town. The gunboats continued on their way and proceeded
as far as Wad Habeshi. The Arab cavalry kept pace with them along the
bank, ready to prevent any landing. Having seen all there was to be
seen, the flotilla returned and again passed the batteries at Metemma.
But this time they were not unscathed, and a shell struck the Fateh,
slightly wounding three men.
No other incident enlivened the monotony of November. The Khalifa
continued his defensive preparations. Mahmud remained motionless at
Metemma; and although he repeatedly begged to be allowed to advance
against the force near Berber he was steadily refused, and had to
content himself with sending raiding parties along the left bank of the
Nile, and collecting large stores of grain from all the villages within
his reach. Meanwhile the railway was stretching further and further to
the south, and the great strain which the sudden occupation of
Berber had thrown upon the transport was to some extent relieved. The
tranquillity which had followed the advance to Berber was as opportune
as it was unexpected. The Sirdar, delighted that no evil consequences
had followed his daring move, and finding that he was neither attacked
nor harassed in any way, journeyed to Kassala to arrange the details of
its retrocession.
The convenient situation of Kassala--almost equally distant from
Omdurman, Berber, Suakin, Massowa, and Rosaires--and the fertility of
the surrounding region raise it to the dignity of the most important
place in the Eastern Soudan. The soil is rich; the climate, except in
the rainy season, not unhealthy. A cool night breeze relieves the heat
of the day, and the presence of abundant water at the depth of a few
feet below the surface supplies the deficiency of a river. In the year
1883 the population is said to have numbered more than 60,000. The
Egyptians considered the town of sufficient value to require a garrison
of 3,900 soldiers. A cotton mill adequately fitted with machinery and a
factory chimney gave promise of the future development of manufacture.
A regular revenue attested the existence of trade. But disasters fell
in heavy succession on the Eastern Soudan and blighted the prosperity
of its mud metropolis. In 1885, after a long siege and a stubborn
resistance, Kassala was taken by the Dervishes. The garrison were
massacred, enslaved, or incorporated in the Mahdi's army. The town was
plundered and the trade destroyed. For nearly ten years an Arab force
occupied the ruins and a camp outside them. Kassala became a frontier
post of the Dervish Empire. Its population perished or fled to the
Italian territory. This situation might have remained unaltered until
after the battle of Omdurman if the Dervishes had been content with the
possession of Kassala. But in 1893 the Emir in command of the
garrison, being anxious to distinguish himself, disobeyed the Khalifa's
instructions to remain on the defensive and attacked the Europeans at
Agordat. The Arab force of about 8,000 men were confronted by 2,300
Italian troops, protected by strong entrenchments, under Colonel
Arimondi. After a fierce but hopeless attack the Dervishes were
repulsed with a loss of 3,000 men, among whom was their rash leader. The
engagement was, however, as disastrous to Italy as to the Khalifa. The
fatal African policy of Signor Crispi received a decided impetus, and in
the next year, agreeably to their aspirations in Abyssinia, the Italians
under General Baratieri advanced from Agordat and captured Kassala. The
occupation was provisionally recognised by Egypt without prejudice
to her sovereign rights, and 900 Italian regulars and irregulars
established themselves in a well-built fort. The severe defeat at Adowa
in 1896, the disgrace of Baratieri, the destruction of his army, and
the fall of the Crispi Cabinet rudely dispelled the African ambitions of
Italy. Kassala became an encumbrance. Nor was that all. The Dervishes,
encouraged by the victory of the Abyssinians, invested the fort, and the
garrison were compelled to fight hard to hold what their countrymen
were anxious to abandon. In these circumstances the Italian Government
offered, at a convenient opportunity, to retrocede Kassala to Egypt.
The offer was accepted, and an arrangement made. The advance of the
Khedivial forces into the Dongola province relieved, as has been
described, the pressure of the Dervish attacks. The Arabs occupied
various small posts along the Atbara and in the neighbourhood of the
town, and contented themselves with raiding. The Italians remained
entirely on the defensive, waiting patiently for the moment when the
fort could be handed over to the Egyptian troops.
The Sirdar had no difficulty in coming to a satisfactory arrangement
with General Caneva, the Italian commander. The fort was to be occupied
by an Egyptian force, the stores and armament to be purchased at a
valuation, and a force of Italian Arab irregulars to be transferred to
the Egyptian service. Sir H. Kitchener then returned to the Nile,
where the situation had suddenly become acute. During November Colonel
Parsons, the 16th Egyptian Battalion, and a few native gunners marched
from Suakin, and on the 20th of December arrived at Kassala. The Italian
irregulars--henceforth to be known as the Arab battalion--were at once
despatched to the attack of the small Dervish posts at El Fasher and
Asubri, and on the next day these places were surprised and taken with
scarcely any loss. The Italian officers, although a little disgusted at
the turn of events, treated the Egyptian representatives with the
most perfect courtesy, and the formal transference of Kassala fort was
arranged to take place on Christmas Day.
An imposing ceremonial was observed, and the scene itself was strange.
The fort was oblong in plan, with mud ramparts and parapets pierced for
musketry. Tents and stores filled the enclosure. In the middle stood
the cotton factory. Its machinery had long since been destroyed, but
the substantial building formed the central keep of the fort. The tall
chimney had become a convenient look-out post. The lightning-conductor
acted as a flagstaff. The ruins of the old town of Kassala lay brown
and confused on the plain to the southward, and behind all rose the
dark rugged spurs of the Abyssinian mountains. The flags of Egypt and
of Italy were hoisted. The troops of both countries, drawn up in line,
exchanged military compliments. Then the Egyptian guard marched across
the drawbridge into the fort and relieved the Italian soldiers. The
brass band of the 16th Battalion played appropriate airs. The Italian
flag was lowered, and with a salute of twenty-one guns the retrocession
of Kassala was complete.
Here, then, for a year we leave Colonel Parsons and his small force to
swelter in the mud fort, to carry on a partisan warfare with the Dervish
raiders, to look longingly towards Gedaref, and to nurse the hope that
when Omdurman has fallen their opportunity will come. The reader, like
the Sirdar, must return in a hurry to the Upper Nile.
Towards the end of November the Khalifa had begun to realise that the
Turks did not mean to advance any further till the next flood of the
river. He perceived that the troops remained near Berber, and that
the railway was only a little way south of Abu Hamed. The blow still
impended, but it was delayed. As soon as he had come to this conclusion,
he no longer turned a deaf ear to Mahmud's solicitations. He knew that
the falling Nile would restrict the movements of the gunboats. He knew
that there were only 2,000 men in Berber--a mere handful. He did not
realise the tremendous power of rapid concentration which the railway
had given his enemies; and he began to think of offensive operations.
But Mahmud should not go alone. The whole strength of the Dervish army
should be exerted to drive back the invaders. All the troops in
Omdurman were ordered north. A great camp was again formed near Kerreri.
Thousands of camels were collected, and once more every preparation was
made for a general advance. At the beginning of December he sent his
own secretary to Mahmud to explain the plan, and to assure him of early
reinforcements and supplies. Lastly, Abdullah preached a new Jehad, and
it is remarkable that, while all former exhortations had been directed
against 'the infidel'--i.e., those who did not believe in the Mahdi--his
letters and sermons on this occasion summoned the tribes to destroy not
the Egyptians but the Christians. The Khalifa had no doubts as to who
inspired the movement which threatened him. There were at this time
scarcely 150 Europeans in the Soudan; but they had made their presence
felt.
The Sirdar was returning from Kassala when the rumours of an intended
Dervish advance began to grow. Every scrap of information was
assiduously collected by the Intelligence Department, but it was not
until the 18th of December, just as he reached Wady Halfa, that the
General received apparently certain news that the Khalifa, Mahmud, all
the Emirs, and the whole army were about to march north. There can be
no doubt that even this tardy movement of the enemy seriously threatened
the success of the operations. If the Dervishes moved swiftly, it looked
as if a very critical engagement would have to be fought to avoid a
damaging retreat. Sir H. Kitchener's reply to the Khalifa's open intent
was to order a general concentration of the available Egyptian army
towards Berber, to telegraph to Lord Cromer asking for a British
brigade, and to close the Suakin-Berber route.
The gunboat depot at the confluence, with only a half-battalion escort,
was now in an extremely exposed position. The gunboats could not steam
north, for the cataract four miles below the confluence was already
impassable. Since they must remain on the enemy's side, so must their
depot; and the depot must be held by a much stronger force. Although the
Sirdar felt too weak to maintain himself even on the defensive without
reinforcements, he was now compelled to push still further south. On the
22nd of December Lewis's brigade of four battalions and a battery were
hurried along the Nile to its junction with the Atbara, and began busily
entrenching themselves in a angle formed by the rivers. The Atbara fort
sprang into existence.
Meanwhile the concentration was proceeding. All the troops in Dongola,
with the exception of scanty garrisons in Merawi, Korti, and Debba,
were massed at Berber. The infantry and guns, dropping down the river
in boats, entrained at Kerma, were carried back to Halfa, then hustled
across the invaluable Desert Railway, past Abu Hamed, and finally
deposited at Railhead, which then (January 1) stood at Dakhesh. The
whole journey by rail from Merawi to Dakhesh occupied four days, whereas
General Hunter with his flying column had taken eight--a fact which
proves that, in certain circumstances which Euclid could not have
foreseen, two sides of a triangle are together shorter than the third
side. The Egyptian cavalry at Merawi received their orders on the 25th
of December, and the British officers hurried from their Christmas
dinners to prepare for their long march across the bend of the Nile to
Berber. Of the eight squadrons, three were pushed on to join Lewis's
force at the position which will hereinafter be called 'the Atbara
encampment,' or more familiarly 'the Atbara'; three swelled the
gathering forces at Berber; and two remained for the present in the
Dongola province, looking anxiously out towards Gakdul Wells and
Metemma.
The War Office, who had been nervous about the situation in the
Soudan since the hasty occupation of Berber, and who had a very lively
recollection of the events of 1884 and 1885, lost no time in the
despatch of British troops; and the speed with which a force, so
suddenly called for, was concentrated shows the capacity for energy
which may on occasion be developed even by our disjointed military
organisation. The 1st Battalions of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, of
the Lincoln Regiment, and of the Cameron Highlanders were formed into a
brigade and moved from Cairo into the Soudan. The 1st Battalion of
the Seaforth Highlanders was brought from Malta to Egypt, and held
in immediate readiness to reinforce the troops at the front. Other
battalions were sent to take the places of those moved south, so that
the Army of Occupation was not diminished.
The officer selected for the command of the British brigade was a man of
high character and ability. General Gatacre had already led a brigade in
the Chitral expedition, and, serving under Sir Robert Low and Sir Bindon
Blood had gained so good a reputation that after the storming of the
Malakand Pass and the subsequent action in the plain of Khar it was
thought desirable to transpose his brigade with that of General
Kinloch, and send Gatacre forward to Chitral. From the mountains of the
North-West Frontier the general was ordered to Bombay, and in a stubborn
struggle with the bubonic plague, which was then at its height, he
turned his attention from camps of war to camps of segregation. He left
India, leaving behind him golden opinions, just before the outbreak of
the great Frontier rising, and was appointed to a brigade at Aldershot.
Thence we now find him hurried to the Soudan--a spare, middle-sized
man, of great physical strength and energy, of marked capacity and
unquestioned courage, but disturbed by a restless irritation, to which
even the most inordinate activity afforded little relief, and which
often left him the exhausted victim of his own vitality.
By the end of January a powerful force lay encamped along the river
from Abu Hamed to the Atbara. Meanwhile the Dervishes made no forward
movement. Their army was collected at Kerreri; supplies were plentiful;
all preparations had been made. Yet they tarried. The burning question
of the command had arisen. A dispute that was never settled ensued. When
the whole army was regularly assembled, the Khalifa announced publicly
that he would lead the faithful in person; but at the same time he
arranged privately that many Emirs and notables should beg him not
to expose his sacred person. After proper solicitation, therefore, he
yielded to their appeals. Then he looked round for a subordinate. The
Khalifa Ali-Wad-Helu presented himself. In the Soudan every advantage
and honour accrues to the possessor of an army, and the rival chief
saw a chance of regaining his lost power. This consideration was
not, however, lost upon Abdullah. He accepted the offer with apparent
delight, but he professed himself unable to spare any rifles for the
army which Ali-Wad-Helu aspired to lead. 'Alas!' he cried, 'there
are none. But that will make no difference to so famous a warrior.'
Ali-Wad-Helu, however, considered that it would make a great deal of
difference, and declined the command. Osman Sheikh-ed-Din offered to
lead the army, if he might arm the riverain tribes and use them as
auxiliaries to swell his force. This roused the disapproval of Yakub.
Such a policy, he declared, was fatal. The riverain tribes were
traitors--dogs--worthy only of being destroyed; and he enlarged upon
the more refined methods by which his policy might be carried out.
The squabble continued, until at last the Khalifa, despairing of any
agreement, decided merely to reinforce Mahmud, and accordingly ordered
the Emir Yunes to march to Metemma with about 5,000 men. But it was then
discovered that Mahmud hated Yunes, and would have none of him. At this
the Khalifa broke up his camp, and the Dervish army marched back for a
second time, in vexation and disgust, to the city.
It seemed to those who were acquainted with the Dervish movements that
all offensive operations on their part had been definitely abandoned.
Even in the Intelligence Department it was believed that the break-up
of the Kerreri camp was the end of the Khalifa's determination to move
north. There would be a hot and uneventful summer, and with the flood
Nile the expedition would begin its final advance. The news which was
received on the 15th of February came as a great and pleasant surprise.
Mahmud was crossing the Nile and proposed to advance on Berber without
reinforcements of any kind. The Sirdar, highly satisfied at this
astounding piece of good fortune, immediately began to mass his
force nearer the confluence. On the 21st the British at Abu Dis were
instructed to hold themselves in readiness. The Seaforths began their
journey from Cairo, and the various battalions of the Egyptian army
pressed forward towards Berber and Atbara fort. On the 25th, Mahmud
being reported as having crossed to the right bank, the general
concentration was ordered.