Second Naktong
_The Famous Bean Patch--Planning for Inchon Landing--Return to the
Naktong Bulge--All-Out NKPA Offensive--The Marines Jump Off--Progress
of Brigade Attack--Assault on Hill 117_
It was all over but the mopping-up operations. Battalion areas were
carefully patrolled on 19 August to clear them of NKPA snipers or
stragglers. During this process a patrol ranging along the Naktong
river discovered three enemy 122-mm. howitzers hidden in a strip of
woods on a hill. The pieces had not been touched by Marine air or
artillery. What was more surprising, they were emplaced in a column to
fire over one another--something new and wonderful that the Marines had
never seen before.[319] General Craig concluded that these howitzers
had fired the shells which landed on Marine positions to the bitter end.
[319] This section is derived from: LtGen Edward A. Craig
(Ret), ltr to author, 23 May 54 (Craig, 23 May 54).
The next day the Brigade commander took a helicopter to 24th Division
Headquarters to confer with General Church. There he was informed that
the Marines had been detached from 24th Division operational control
to Eighth Army reserve. Church complimented the Brigade warmly on its
performance, and letters of commendation were later received both from
him and CG EUSAK.
At 1300 on the 21st Craig arrived by helicopter at a new Brigade
bivouac area near Masan that was to be recorded in capital letters
as the Bean Patch. It was just that--a bean patch large enough to
accommodate a brigade. But from this historic spot the Marines were
to fight their way around the peninsula during the next 5 months and
complete the circuit to their identical starting point.
General Craig arrived along with the Brigade advance elements. After
setting up his CP, he reported to General Kean, of the 25th Division,
who was in control of the bivouac area. Kean divulged that the
situation in his sector had deteriorated. The enemy had made several
penetrations, and Brigade assistance might be required in the event of
further breakthroughs. As it was, Kean had been authorized by Eighth
Army to employ Brigade artillery along with his own; and 1/11 proceeded
the next day to the familiar Chindong-ni area in support of 25th
Division Infantry.
Orders were received from Eighth Army for the Brigade infantry to be
prepared to counterattack in the 25th Division sector as part of its
reserve mission. General Craig and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart made a
helicopter reconnaissance of the areas of greatest activity, but events
proved that the Marine rifle battalions were not needed.
_The Famous Bean Patch_
Unit training, including the checking and firing of all weapons, was
conducted at the Bean Patch; and Marine patrols were sent out to the
rear of the 25th Division to watch for infiltrating forces. Patrols in
rugged country were fed hot meals delivered in special containers by
the versatile helicopters of VMO-6.
Truckloads of supplies rolled in daily from Pusan, including some of
the equipment left behind at the docks when the Brigade landed. But no
tentage was available, and the exhausting marches of combat had forced
the men to discard everything except fighting tools. In the lack of
shelter tents, therefore, the Marines lived in the open at the Bean
Patch.
General Craig conferred on 23 August with General Kean and a
distinguished visitor, General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, USA.
Collins was keenly interested in Marine methods of knocking out NKPA
tanks and requested Craig to prepare a memorandum on the subject.
That evening the entire Brigade attended an outdoor entertainment
given on an improvised stage by South Korean girls, who sang and
played native instruments which sounded out of tune to Western ears.
Translations of the songs were forthcoming, since some of the girls
were English-speaking refugees from Seoul University. Afterwards,
General Craig addressed the Brigade, paying a high tribute to his
Marines for their conduct in battle. NKPA prisoners, he said, had told
G-2 interviewers that they earnestly wished to steer clear of “the
Americans in yellow leggings.”
Letters from home and beer from Pusan[320] contributed to good Marine
morale, even though no liberty was granted to nearby towns. On the 29th
an honor guard of 87 Marines received Purple Heart medals at a ceremony
attended by President Syngman Rhee, who arrived in a helicopter
provided by VMO-6. General Craig had paid an official call on him the
day before at Chinhae, being most courteously received. And after the
presentation of medals, President Rhee gave a talk to the Marines.
[320] The offer of Stateside breweries to send free beer to
Korea precipitated a controversy in civilian circles.
Opponents protested on the grounds that some of the
troops were as young as 18. Proponents argued that if
a man was old enough to fight, he was mature enough to
drink a can of beer without harm. The issue was never
definitely settled, though it resulted in a temporary
drought.
He confided to Craig afterwards that he would like to confer some sort
of an award on every man in the Brigade for heroic service in Korea.
This was undoubtedly the inception of the Korean Presidential Unit
Citation which the Brigade later received from the ROK executive.
_Planning for Inchon Landing_
General Craig, it may be recalled, had insisted that replacements be
sent to the Brigade. Thanks to his determination, a long column of
trucks arrived at the Bean Patch with more than 800 Marines just landed
at Pusan.
Some of the 5th Marines outfits had been so thinned by combat that
an appeal was made for volunteers from supporting units to serve
temporarily in rifle companies, with the privilege of returning to
their former status after the emergency. The hearty response was a
tribute to Marine morale as well as Marine basic training which made
every man a potential rifleman. Engineers, shore party troops and
headquarters personnel came forward in such numbers that some could not
be accepted after the arrival of replacements eased the situation.
No attempt was made at the Bean Patch to form the newcomers into third
rifle companies. They were simply used to build up the strength of the
present companies and given intensive unit training.
Rumors of an impending Marine amphibious operation had already filtered
down to every PFC, and there were wild speculations as to when and
where. At least, it could hardly be denied that the Brigade would soon
be taking another voyage; for convoys of tracks left the Bean Patch
every day laden with heavy supplies and equipment to be unloaded at
Pusan.[321]
[321] Brig SAR.
This was once that lower-echelon “scuttlebutt” came close to the mark.
In fact, planning for the Inchon landing had already gone so far that
General Craig sent his chief of staff, G-3 and G-4 to Tokyo to confer
with staff officers of the 1st Marine Division about the projected
operation.[322]
[322] Craig, 23 May 54.
Major General Oliver P. Smith, CG of the 1st Marine Division, had
relieved General Erskine early in July when the latter was sent on a
secret State Department mission. As the ADC of the Division during the
fight for Peleliu in 1944, Smith knew how tough an amphibious operation
can become when it encounters unexpected obstacles. He was determined
to keep his Division intact with its three infantry regiments, the 1st,
5th, and 7th Marines. And after his arrival in Japan with the advance
party, he returned a firm negative to proposals that the 5th Marines
and other Brigade troops remain with the Eighth Army.
It would be putting the case mildly to say that this was the eleventh
hour, The 1st Marine Division (less the 7th Marines) had landed at
Kobe from 28 August to 3 September. And though a typhoon caused a good
deal of damage, little time was lost at the gigantic task of unloading
mixed-type shipping and combat-loading it into assault-type shipping.
The LST’s had to be ready to sail for the target area by 10 September,
and the transports by the 12th.
The Marines at the Bean Patch would have been flattered to know that
they were the objects of an official tug of war at Tokyo. It was
maintained by the EUSAK command and staff that Army morale would be
hurt by taking the Brigade away from the Pusan Perimeter at a critical
moment. On the other hand, General Smith contended that he needed the
Brigade all the more urgently because the 7th Marines,[323] sailing
belatedly from San Diego, would not be able to reach Inchon until a
week after the proposed D-day of 15 September 1950.
[323] Less a battalion making the voyage from the
Mediterranean, where it had been afloat with the Sixth
Fleet.
The Marine general was informed that the decision would depend upon
the tactical situation in Korea. On 30 August he sent a dispatch
to X Corps--the new Army tactical organization activated by CINCFE
especially for the Inchon operation--requesting that the Brigade be
released from its Army commitments on 1 September. In response,
General MacArthur issued an order restoring the unit to the 1st Marine
Division on the 4th.[324]
[324] MCBS, I-II-B-4-6.
At this point the enemy rudely interrupted by launching an all-out
offensive against the Pusan Perimeter on 1 September, and General
MacArthur’s order was rescinded. Even though most of the Brigade’s
heavy equipment was at the Pusan docks, waiting for shipping, GHQFEC
decided that General Craig’s troops should again be used as “firemen”
to extinguish an NKPA conflagration.
Colonel Edward H. Forney, the Marine officer recently named deputy
chief of staff of X Corps, suggested to General Smith the possibility
of substituting an Army unit, the 32d Infantry of the 7th Infantry
Division, for the 5th Marines. Smith demurred on the grounds that these
troops had not been trained for amphibious warfare.
On 3 September, with D-day less than 2 weeks away, a conference was
held in Tokyo to decide the question once and for all. X Corps was
represented by General Wright, the G-3, and General Edward S. Almond,
the new commanding general and former chief of staff, GHQFEC. COMNAVFE
(Admiral Joy), COMSEVENTHFLT (Admiral Struble) and COMPHIBGRUONE
(Admiral Doyle) were the Navy officers present. General Almond
opened the discussion by reiterating that the 32d Infantry would be
substituted for the 5th Marines. In reply, General Smith mentioned
the complications of an amphibious assault landing and urged that the
operations plan be amended if the untrained Army regiment were to be
employed.
Another solution, offered by Admiral Struble, was baited with
reciprocal concessions. He suggested that the Brigade be employed
briefly for counterattacks in the Pusan Perimeter, but that meanwhile
the 32d or some other 7th Infantry Division regiment be moved from
Japan to Korea. There it would become a floating reserve for EUSAK,
thus releasing the Brigade units to take their former places in the 1st
Marine Division for the Inchon operation. This compromise was finally
accepted, and orders were issued for the Brigade to be withdrawn from
Eighth Army control at midnight on 5 September.
The first intimations to reach the troops at the Bean Patch were
received on the 1st, at 0810, when the Brigade was alerted for a
possible move by CG EUSAK to an unknown destination. At 1109 came
the warning order for a road lift to the Miryang assembly area. The
confirmation followed at 1215, with all units being scheduled to move
out at 1330.[325]
[325] Brig SAR.
The Marines had another date with destiny.
_Return to the Naktong Bulge_
General Craig set up his CP in the Miryang area at 1800 on 1 September.
Billeting officers, having gone ahead by helicopter, were prepared
to take care of Brigade units as they arrived. Among them was the
1st Battalion of the 11th Marines, which had been returned from 25th
Division control to the Brigade.
The news from the front was depressing. Heavy attacks had been received
all day along the 2d and 25th Infantry Division fronts. An enemy
penetration of 4,000 yards was made at the expense of the 2d Division,
with the old familiar Naktong Bulge being occupied again by Red Koreans
who had gained a firm foothold on the east bank of the river.
This meant that General Craig’s men, now under operational control of
the 2d Division, were likely to revisit some scarred parcels of Korean
real estate they had hoped never to see again. Major General Lawrence
B. Keiser, commanding the 2d Division, informed the Brigade commander
that several of his companies had been cut off by enemy advances which
pushed his lines back almost to Yongsan.[326] There was a good deal of
NKPA infiltration, he added, in his rear.
[326] Craig, 23 May 54.
It had been a full day, and at 2230 that night Craig received orders
from the Eighth Army to move the Brigade at first light to a reserve
position south of Yongsan and in the rear of the 9th Infantry of the 2d
Division.
At 0630, on 2 September, the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines arrived
at its assigned covering position on the road leading to Yongsan. The
remainder of the Brigade moved out to assembly positions during the
day.[327]
[327] Brig SAR.
Craig proceeded by helicopter at 0830 to the 2d Infantry Division
headquarters for a conference with Keiser to plan the move of the
Brigade into his lines. Afterwards, the Marine general devoted the rest
of the morning to reconnaissance of the terrain by helicopter. On the
way he stopped at Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP and learned that the
5th Marines units were well established along the road leading to the
front.
The planning conference for the projected counterattack began at 1430
in the 2d Infantry Division CP. General Craig was accompanied by his
assistant G-3, Major Frank R. Stewart, Jr., since his regular G-3
had not yet returned from the 1st Marine Division briefing at Tokyo.
General Keiser and his staff officers emphasized the gravity of the
situation in the 2d Division sector. They wanted General Craig to
counterattack that very afternoon on a widely extended front, but he
objected on both counts.
As for the time element, he pointed out that the hour was late. Some of
his units were not even in their assembly positions, and others were
still detraining or in trucks. Smoke and haze had resulted in such low
visibility that planes could not operate effectively. Finally, Craig’s
TACRON had not arrived and he was out of touch with the aircraft
carriers. He did not wish to commit his force piecemeal without air
support; and in the end the Army staff officers agreed with him on the
advisability of the Marines attacking in the morning.[328]
[328] Craig, 23 May 54.
Next came a discussion as to the nature of the Marine counterattack.
Craig cited the risks and disadvantages of advancing on too wide a
front. He suggested that the 2d Infantry Division specify the Marine
objectives and allow him to attack in such formations as he deemed
most effective. Keiser and his staff assented, and the Marine officers
hurried back to the Brigade CP.
_All-Out NKPA Offensive_
Glancing at the big picture, there could be no doubt that the enemy was
making an all-out effort to smash through the Pusan Perimeter. Late
in August it became evident that he was massing troops. The blow fell
in the early morning hours of 1 September. The direction of the main
attack remained in doubt until that afternoon, when it was revealed as
a bid for a breakthrough in the Naktong Bulge which would expose the
Pusan-Taegu lifeline.
Despite heavy casualties of the past 2 months, NKPA overall strength
was estimated as high as 133,000 men as the result of filling the
ranks with hastily trained replacements. Thirteen infantry regiments,
3 security regiments and the remnants of the original 3 armored
regiments were believed to be participating in the offensive.[329]
[329] Maj H. D. Stewart, “Rise and Fall of an Army,” _Military
Review_, 30, no. 11:32–35 (Feb 51).
For 2 months the Eighth Army had been purchasing time with space,
and the enemy realized that time was now fighting on the side of the
United Nations. The first ground force unit sent by a member nation to
reinforce United States and ROK troops was the British 27th Infantry
Brigade, which landed and took over a sector early in September. But
the enemy knew that other UN contingents had been promised.
The reorganized ROK army, moreover, had recovered from its early
disasters and was giving a good account of itself in the northern
sectors of the Pusan Perimeter. There the 1st, 3d, 6th, 8th, and
Capital Divisions had not only maintained their tactical integrity
throughout August but even delivered several counterattacks.[330]
[330] U. S. Dept of State, “Fifth Report to the Security
Council, October 5, 1950,” _United Nations Action in
Korea under Unified Command_ (Washington: GPO, 1950).
The NKPA numerical superiority, in short, could not last much longer.
It was now or never if the invaders hoped to batter their way to Pusan,
and Pyongyang staked everything on a final offensive.
The brunt fell upon the United States 2d Infantry Division. Troops from
four enemy divisions were identified on this sensitive front, well
supported by armor and artillery. Within a few hours pressure became so
great that EUSAK decided to send the Marine mobile reserve to the aid
of the Army troops.
Not only was the terrain familiar to Marines who had fought their way
up Obong-ni Ridge, but they were renewing acquaintance with the same
enemy outfit. For G-2 reports confirmed that the NKPA 4th Infantry
Division was back again at the old stand--or at least such survivors as
had emerged with a whole skin from their defeat of 17–18 August in this
area.
Perhaps because of the large numbers of new recruits filling the ranks,
the retreaded outfit followed in reserve just behind the NKPA 9th
Infantry Division as it crossed the Naktong and drove eastward. The 9th
was one of the enemy units hastily raised from constabulary forces for
purposes of the invasion. Assigned to guard duty at Seoul throughout
July and half of August, the troops devoted themselves wholeheartedly
to the pleasant mission of forcing South Koreans to “volunteer” as
soldiers or laborers against their own people. Thus the division could
be considered a fresh and rested outfit, though deficient in training
and combat discipline as compared to the older NKPA units.
Troops from the enemy’s 2d and 10th Divisions were also identified on
the front of the United States 2d Infantry Division, but the Marines
had no contacts with these units.[331]
[331] _Ibid._
_The Marines Jump Off_
General Keiser’s operational directive for the 3 September
counterattack was half a page in length. As in the case of the first
Naktong counterstroke, the Marine brigade was placed opposite the
center of the Bulge, with the mission of driving westward “to restore
former 9th Infantry positions.” This time, however, Craig’s force was
scheduled to jump off 4 miles east of Observation Hill; for the North
Koreans were knocking at the gates of Yongsan.
The Brigade’s line of departure was a long north-south ridgeline about
a thousand yards west of Yongsan and directly south of Myong-ni. This
high ground was occupied on 2 September by the 9th Infantry. When the
Marines passed through the next morning, the Army unit was to swing
northward to attack on the Brigade right. Still farther north, the
23d Infantry had orders to hold positions on the right of the 9th and
maintain contact with friendly units by patrolling.[332]
[332] 2d InfDiv Op Dir, 2 Sep 50; and Brig Op Order 19-50.
On the Brigade’s left, a special task force of the Army’s 72d Tank
Battalion and 2d Engineer Battalion was to attack southward from Il-li
to the Naktong River line below the Bulge. There it would link with the
25th Division’s right.
The fact that the Communists upset the plan by smashing through the 9th
Infantry lines on the night of 2–3 September was both bad and good news
from the standpoint of the Marines. It was bad because an overextended
friendly unit had been shattered by many times its numbers and forced
into a disorganized withdrawal. It was good because the enemy was
plowing ahead at full steam, obviously unaware that he was shortly due
for a blow that would find him off balance and send him reeling.
Low hanging clouds and smoke made for poor visibility on the morning
of the 3d when General Craig set out on his customary prebattle
reconnaissance by helicopter. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel
Stewart, who had just returned from the 1st Marine Division planning
conferences at Tokyo.
“We couldn’t see anything but an occasional mountain peak,” Craig
recalled at a later date. “After flying around for some time, we had
almost decided to return to the CP and complete the tour by jeep. Then
Colonel Stewart noticed a hole in the clouds, and we dropped to an
altitude where we had a good view of the front.”[333]
[333] Craig, 23 May 54.
What Craig and Stewart saw was a long column of Marines fighting their
way toward the line of departure.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s plan of attack for the 5th Marines called
for the 1st and 2d Battalions to advance westward astride the Yongsan
road, with 2/5 on the right. Taplett’s 3d Battalion would initially be
in reserve, blocking the southern approaches to Yongsan.[334]
[334] Annex How.
At 0450, 3 September, 2/5 detrucked about 800 yards from Yongsan
and marched forward in a route column. Moving into the town a short
time later, the Marines received small arms fire from snipers hidden
in buildings, ditches and culverts. Most of them were liquidated as
the column pushed through to the road junction at the western end of
Yongsan by 0630.[335]
[335] _Ibid._
At this fork a secondary route branches from the main road through the
large village of Myong-ni, about 2,000 yards northwest of Yongsan.
Although still 1,000 yards from the designated line of departure, the
2d Battalion came under moderate fire from its right front. Moreover,
dawn had brought indications of considerable activity and confusion
ahead of the Marines. Ignoring the fire, Roise went forward about 500
yards to a low hill lying athwart the MSR. There he was jolted by the
discovery that the 9th Infantry’s lines had collapsed.[336]
[336] _Ibid._
On the right of the road there was no friendly situation worthy of the
name. To the left of the MSR, an Army tank unit was parked behind the
little hill which Roise had reached, and to the front were 4 of its
tanks--2 destroyed and 2 abandoned. Included in the wreckage ahead were
2 burned-out NKPA T-34’s.
Three hundred yards to the west, on the high ground south of the main
road, Army troops were retreating from 1/5’s line of departure. The
soldiers had buckled under an onslaught by the NKPA 9th Division,
which had launched an all-out attack at first light.[337]
[337] _Ibid._
Having observed evidence of the confusing situation from their
helicopter, Craig and Stewart landed some distance behind Yongsan and
proceeded forward by jeep and foot. The Brigade commander located 1/5’s
CP south of Yongsan and discovered that the battalion was slightly out
of position. During 2/5’s delay in moving through the city, Murray had
ordered Newton to swing westward and align his unit for the attack as
best he could. Darkness, coupled with confusion caused by the Army’s
withdrawal and 2/5’s fight, had caused the 1st Battalion to move south
of Chukchon-ni instead of Yongsan, as planned. Craig instructed 1/5’s
commander to make a 500-yard correction northward during the actual
attack.[338]
[338] Craig, 23 May 54 (with comments by LtCol M. R. Olson, 17
Jun 54).
Roise was meanwhile taking the situation in hand north of the MSR. At
0645 he called Marine tanks forward to cover the withdrawal of 9th
Infantry troops from the high ridge in 1/5’s zone.
Second Lieutenant Robert M. Winter led his platoon of M-26’s into hull
defilade next to 2/5’s OP on the low hill and unleashed overhead fire
in support of the Army troops. The pursuit by the North Koreans began
to lag.
_Progress of Brigade Attack_
Despite enemy artillery fire in the 2d Battalion zone, Companies
D and E jumped off from the road junction at 0715 to clear the
Yongsan-Myong-ni road and secure the 5th Marines’ right flank.[339]
[339] This section is derived from: Brig SAR; Muetzel, 5–6
Jan 50 (with comments by Col G. R. Newton, Maj J. R.
Stevens, and Capt G. C. Fox); and Craig, 23 May 54.
While this move was in progress, the last of the 9th Infantry troops
vacated 1/5’s line of departure to the left front. Roise immediately
smothered that ridgeline with fire from Marine tanks, artillery, air,
mortars, and machineguns.
Despite this blanket of steel, enemy guns from the high ground were
able to fire across the MSR at Company E as it cleared a series of
hills below Myong-ni. These hills had been designated 2/5’s line of
departure the previous day, but now were considered part of the first
objective.
At 0800, when Captain Samuel Jaskilka reported that Easy Company had
completed its mission, Roise ordered Company D to push through Myong-ni
and take the hill just northwest of that village.
[Illustration: 2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE
3–5 SEPTEMBER 1950
1st PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE ATTACHED TO 2nd INFANTRY DIVISION
SHOWING PRINCIPAL MARINE ATTACKS AND ENEMY POSITIONS, WITHDRAWALS, &
COUNTERATTACK]
By this time the entire Brigade was shifting into high gear. Winter’s
tanks on the little hill straddling the MSR were joined by the 1st
Platoon, Able Company Engineers. The Army armored unit behind the
southern portion of the hill suddenly went into hull defilade and added
its firepower to that of the Marine M-26’s. Craig, Snedeker and Stewart
crawled to the crest of the hill on the right side of the MSR and
studied the front from positions between the Marine tanks and Roise’s
OP.
The NKPA 9th Division had been stopped in its tracks when the Brigade’s
supporting arms connected. Then the Reds concentrated their fire on the
little hill where Craig’s OP was located. Lieutenant Winter was shot
through the neck and one of his men wounded while aiding him. Before
being evacuated, the painfully wounded tank officer offered General
Craig a bottle of whiskey left in his M-26.
Chaplains Sporrer and Hickey were taken under machinegun fire as they
walked forward on the MSR toward the hill. “It’s lucky they’re poor
shots,” said Sporrer as a second and third burst cracked over his head.
The two chaplains arrived just in time to administer to the wounded
being carried off the hill by the engineers.
At 0855, the 1st Battalion jumped off from below Chukchon-ni. The
attack having been launched too far to the south, Companies A and B had
to veer northwest as they advanced toward the enemy-held ridge 1,000
yards away. Fenton’s unit was on the right, gradually closing on the
MSR as it moved forward.
To the south, Stevens deployed his 1st, 2d, and 3d Platoons from right
to left in that order, the latter being slightly withheld to protect
the open left flank.
As the men of 1/5 waded into the knee-deep muck of the rice paddy, they
came under long-range small-arms fire from their objective. Newton
countered immediately by plastering the ridge with artillery and mortar
fire. The advance continued and only a few casualties were taken by
the time the companies reached a drainage ditch midway across the rice
paddy. Here the long skirmish line paused to check its direction and
place the wounded on dikes where they would be seen by corpsmen.
During the advance from the drainage ditch to the base of the ridge,
1/5’s commander frequently called on air, artillery and mortars to
blast enemy automatic weapons on the crest and forward slopes of the
objective. Company A had the added support of an Army tank destroyer
which gave overhead fire from the hill south of Chukchon-ni. On one
occasion Marine 75’s joined with the Army weapon to silence Communist
guns in a small village at the base of the ridge.
Throughout the rice-paddy crossing, the Marines were constantly meeting
Army stragglers, some of whom had been isolated in enemy territory for
as long as three days. Most of the soldiers were wounded, and all were
weaponless and near exhaustion.
At 1100 Fenton and Stevens radioed Newton that they were ready for the
assault, and the battalion commander immediately showered the objective
with 81-mm. mortar fire to smother North Korean machineguns.
Beyond the edge of the rice paddy in Company A’s zone, a sharp step led
to the gentle incline at the base of the ridge. After a few yards, the
gradual slope gave way to a steep rise which shot up abruptly to the
crest of the high hill.
Lieutenant Muetzel’s 2d Platoon held up at the step, using its
protection against enemy fire while 1/5’s mortar barrage was falling.
During the pause Technical Sergeant McMullen brought the 1st Platoon
into position on Muetzel’s right and Lieutenant Fox aligned his 3d
Platoon on the left.
As soon as the supporting fire lifted, Muetzel jumped to his feet and
shouted the command to assault. Every man in Company A’s skirmish
line responded by scrambling up the hillside. The Marines made such a
fearful racket that a whole company of alarmed North Koreans suddenly
jumped up from concealed foxholes on the forward slope and fled toward
the summit.
The panic-stricken Reds were easy targets for Company A’s riflemen and
BAR men. Halting on the gentle incline, the Marines carefully took aim
and killed most of the enemy soldiers. When the Communist survivors
disappeared over the crest, Company A again surged upward and within
minutes carried the summit.
_Assault on Hill 117_
The 1st Battalion secured its initial objective about noon on 3
September. Company B’s next target was a continuation of the ridge
running parallel to the MSR for 1,000 yards and topped by 4 conspicuous
peaks. Able Company’s second objective was a hill stretching across its
front beyond a 200-yard valley. This hill was connected to Stevens’
first objective by a narrow razorback ridge on the right which offered
a poor route of approach.[340]
[340] _Ibid._
The two companies paused on their newly won positions to reorganize,
evacuate wounded, and wait for a resupply of ammunition. There they
came under heavy fire from the reverse slopes of their first objective
and the high ground to the west. Several casualties were taken before
Corsairs, requested by Newton, appeared for an air strike. As the
Marine fighter planes unloaded their ordnance, large groups of enemy
broke. Most of the Reds fled down the northern slopes, crossed the MSR
and ascended Hill 117 in 2/5’s zone.
Newton reacted to reports of the rout by throwing heavy artillery fire
across the enemy’s avenues of retreat. The hillsides and road were soon
littered with bodies and equipment.
While 1/5’s attack on its first objective was in progress, Company
D had secured the 5th Marines’ right flank by clearing Myong-ni of
moderate resistance and seizing the hill to the northwest of the large
village. The new company commander, First Lieutenant H. J. Smith,
reported to Roise that he was receiving considerable machinegun and
mortar fire from Hill 117. This high ground lay directly across 2/5’s
front, stretching northward from the MSR to a point about 500 yards
west of Myong-ni.
Smith’s reports, together with the news of the enemy’s withdrawal
to Hill 117 from 1/5’s zone, led Roise to order Company D to attack
the high ground from the north and cut off the North Korean retreat.
Shortly after 1200, Smith’s company jumped off to the southwest from
its positions above Myong-ni and fought across the rice paddies
circling the objective.
Company E could not advance from the chain of hills won earlier in the
day because of enemy troops along the high ridge in Baker Company’s
zone south of the MSR. But Jaskilka’s men supported the attack on 117
by fire.
A platoon of 75’s from First Lieutenant Almarion S. Bailey’s Anti-Tank
Company, taking positions on Jaskilka’s right, quickly knocked out an
enemy gun on the objective. The Communists answered with 85-mm. fire
from a concealed T-34 tank, killing 2 and wounding 7 of the recoilless
rifle crews.
Company D gained a foothold on one of Hill 117’s spurs against light
resistance. As the unit advanced south toward the crest, however, enemy
troops pouring across the MSR from 1/5’s zone had boosted the ranks
of the defenders to approximately two battalions. Smith’s company was
caught in its isolated position 500 yards from the rest of 2/5 and
blasted by North Korean artillery, mortars, and automatic weapons.
Casualties mounted at such a staggering rate that the Marines were hard
put to retain their foothold on the northern tip of the hill.
While the 2d Battalion was maneuvering and fighting on the right of
the road, the 2d Platoon of tanks pushed westward along the MSR from
its early morning position 500 yards west of Yongsan. The Brigade
armor became heavily engaged with enemy antitank weapons, and several
casualties were taken as Marines exposed themselves from unbuttoned
M-26’s to spot Communist emplacements. Second Lieutenant John S.
Carson, who had taken over the platoon after Winter was wounded, fell
before enemy machinegun fire and died instantly.
Going into hull defilade on another low hill overlooking the MSR, the
2d Platoon surprised three T-34 tanks on the road ahead and quickly
destroyed them with 90-mm. fire. The tankmen then turned their
guns on a wealth of targets spread across the front: Red antitank
weapons, machinegun positions, troop concentrations, and groups either
retreating or attempting to reinforce.
About noon, Second Lieutenant Sweet’s 3d Platoon joined the 2d and
added its firepower to the fusillade. Another T-34 was knocked out when
Sweet’s men blasted a thicket suspected of concealing an antitank gun.
A fifth North Korean tank went out of action when it was abandoned by
its crew on the left side of the road.
In the afternoon of 3 September, enemy resistance across 1/5’s front
weakened proportionately as it grew stronger in the 2d Battalion zone.
Newton launched his attack on Objective Two at 1510, after MAG-33 and
1/11 had softened up the North Korean positions.[341]
[341] _Ibid._
Company B drove down the ridgeline paralleling the MSR and in little
more than an hour had seized its part of the objective, a peak directly
across the road from Hill 117. During the 1,000-yard advance, Fenton
reported another large group of enemy fleeing to 2/5’s zone. The
information was quickly relayed to Roise, who had ample reason by this
time to curse the fortunes of war.
In Company A’s zone, Stevens and his platoon leaders worked out a
classic scheme of maneuver for seizing Hill 91, their part of the
battalion objective. McMullen’s 1st Platoon and the company machineguns
were to remain in position as the base of fire, while Muetzel’s 2d
Platoon feinted across the 200-yard valley to the front. Fox’s 3d
Platoon, earmarked for the main effort, would then circle to the south
and flank the enemy’s right.
[Illustration: 2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE]
Muetzel’s unit jumped off with Company B at 1510, crossed the
low ground, and ascended a draw leading to Hill 91. The Marines
miscalculated, however, and climbed too far up the slope, so that
they came within grenade range of the crest and were pinned down by
machinegun fire. The platoon was split, with Muetzel and two squads on
the left of the draw and Corporal Raymond E. Stephens and his squad on
the right.
During the preparatory artillery barrage, Fox had led his platoon
around to the enemy’s right Hank, concealed en route by a rice-paddy
bank. Not knowing when the supporting fire would lift, he withheld his
squads from an assault line by a wide safety margin. Thus when the
artillery ceased, the North Koreans had time to come out of their holes
and hit the envelopment with small arms fire. Fox was wounded, and
command passed to Technical Sergeant George W. Bolkow who worked the
platoon up into the enemy positions.
The 3d Platoon’s assault was sparked by Corporal Virgil W. Henderson
and his 3d Squad, who worked to the rear of a troublesome machinegun
position and destroyed it. During the attack Henderson was painfully
wounded in the jaw by a Communist bullet.
Since both forward platoons had SCR 300 radios, Muetzel heard the
report that Fox was wounded. Concluding that the envelopment had faded,
the 2d Platoon leader requested and received permission to make a
frontal assault on Hill 91 from his position on the forward slopes.
Enemy mortar fire had added to the woes of Muetzel’s diversionary
thrust. And though an OY-2 of VMO-6 had given information leading to
the destruction of the mortar position, the beleaguered platoon leader
sought the relative safety of a frontal assault.
Corporal Stephens, acting on his own initiative across the draw, had
worked his squad up to the razorback ridge and around the enemy’s left
flank. Thus the hapless North Koreans on Hill 91 were hit by a “triple
envelopment” when Stephens struck from the north, Muetzel from the east
and Bolkow from the south.
Company A reported its objective seized at 1630, and Newton ordered
Stevens and Fenton to dig in for the night.
Both Roise and Newton were confronted by serious space factors on the
night of 3–4 September. The 2d Battalion’s front was more than 2,000
yards long and formed a right angle. A gap of 500 yards stretched
between Company D’s precarious position on the northern tip of Hill 117
and Easy Company’s lines below Myong-ni. This left Smith’s depleted
unit isolated and Jaskilka’s right dangling.
The 1st Battalion’s right flank was exposed more than 1,000 yards along
the MSR; and its front was almost a mile in length, with a 200-yard
valley separating the two rifle companies. The Brigade Reconnaissance
Company was deployed on high ground far out on Newton’s left flank, but
this was hardly ample protection for the many avenues of approach in
the south.
Exhibiting his characteristic faith in high explosives, Newton
called on the 1st Platoon, Able Company Engineers, to contribute
their sundry lethal devices to 1/5’s infantry defense. Beginning at
1800, 3 September, one group of engineers fanned out to the front
and right flank of Company B’s lines. Despite fire from Hill 117 and
enemy positions to the west, the demolitions men strung out dozens of
antipersonnel mines, hand grenades, and blocks of TNT wrapped with
60-penny spikes. Before darkness set in, Baker Company’s forward slopes
had the potential of an active volcano.
In Company A’s zone, Technical Sergeant David N. Duncan and Sergeant
Bryan K. White led the other half of the engineer platoon in laying
a similar field of obstacles. Duncan crowned his handiwork with a
40-pound shaped charge hooked up in a gully with a trip wire.
Staff Sergeant Saweren J. Dennis and his 2d Squad of engineers crept
forward at midnight 1,000 yards on the MSR and laid an antitank
minefield across the road near the southern tip of Hill 117. On the way
Dennis discovered an enemy antitank minefield embedded in the road.
Although the engineers had never seen a Russian wooden-box mine before,
knowledge gained from the study of intelligence manuals during the
Brigade’s sea voyage enabled them to detect, remove, and disarm every
mine in the field during darkness. The work was delayed a few minutes
when Dennis traced a clanking sound to the roadside ditch and killed a
Communist soldier frantically trying to insert a loaded magazine into
his submachinegun.
Before the engineers completed their work and retired to 1/5’s
lines, Nature added an obstacle of her own to any enemy plans for a
counterattack. A rainstorm broke, and the heavy downpour, accompanied
by unseasonably icy winds, wrought misery on friend and foe alike for
the rest of the night.