Mission Completed
_Collapse of the 9th NKPA Division--Attacks of 5 September--Two Marine
Tanks Killed--The Brigade’s Final Action--Brigade Embarkation at
Pusan--Results of Brigade Operations--Summaries and Conclusions_
The casualties of 2/5 for 3 September totaled 18 dead and 77 wounded,
most of them being taken by Company D. Lieutenant Colonel Murray
ordered the 3d Battalion to pass through the 2d, therefore, and
continue the attack on the right of the MSR at 0800 the next morning.
The 1st Battalion was to resume its advance south of the MSR, while the
Reconnaissance Company far out on the left would move forward to a new
blocking position.[342]
[342] This section is derived from: Brig SAR 3d Bn, 5th
Marines (3/5) SAR, 1–6 Sep 50; Craig, 23 May 54; and
Taplett, 20 Apr 54.
Shortly after dawn on the 4th, the 1st Platoon of engineers went
forward and removed the mines ahead of 1/5’s positions. Preparatory
fires by 1/11 at 0750 routed a group of enemy on the peak on Baker
Company’s front, and the Marine riflemen had a field day as the Reds
threw away their weapons and pelted westward.
Companies A and B jumped off at 0800 and advanced rapidly over the high
ground south of the MSR against negligible resistance. The attackers
frequently observed small groups of enemy fleeing in all directions,
and many of the Communists were cut down by Brigade air, artillery, and
armor. Twelve prisoners were captured before 1/5 reached its half of
Brigade Objective One at 1505. This was the high ground south of the
MSR at Kang-ni, over 3,000 yards from the line of departure.
Shortly after 0800, 3/5 had launched a two-pronged assault against
Hill 117, core of the NKPA 9th Division’s resistance the previous day.
Company G advanced through Easy Company’s lines just above the MSR and
pushed across the intervening rice paddies. The Marines charged over
a small knoll in their path but found the enemy positions unoccupied
except for several dead. Bohn quickly led the company to the southern
slopes of Hill 117, which was strangely quiet by comparison with the
tumult of the previous day. In capturing the southern half of the hill,
Company G killed only 15 North Koreans.
Simultaneously with Bohn’s advance, Company H swung wide to the right
and passed through the thin ranks of Dog Company on the northern tip of
Hill 117. The attackers drove south against negligible resistance and
quickly linked with Company G, securing the objective at 0840.
A connecting road runs from Myong-ni to the MSR, tracing the eastern
base of Hill 117. Since engineers on the previous night had located the
enemy minefield east of the junction on the main road, Taplett moved
his headquarters to the MSR via the connecting road. The lead vehicle,
a personnel carrier loaded with communications men, struck a Communist
mine on the secondary route east of the newly captured objective. The
resulting explosion caused 10 casualties.
By noon the engineers had cleared the road of several Russian-type
mines identical to those found during the night. The two anti-vehicular
minefields were among the first such obstacles encountered by the UN
forces in the Korean conflict.
After seizing Hill 117, Companies G and H continued the attack westward
by advancing abreast on the high ground north of the MSR. Contact with
1/5 on the left was maintained, but the 9th Infantry on the right soon
fell behind and disappeared from sight.
At 1045 Company G ran into machinegun fire coming from the 3/5 area of
the Brigade objective, the hill north of Kang-ni. Taplett blasted the
hill with Marine air and artillery, and the North Koreans were in full
retreat within an hour. MAG-33 and 1/11 rained death on the retreating
Reds and continued to pound the hill preparatory to an assault by
Company G. Bohn led his troops forward and secured the objective at
1515.
Looking across the stream bed to the north of their new positions, the
Marines of George Company spotted enemy infantry escorting a T-34 tank
and withdrawing into the 9th Infantry zone. The Communist column was
quickly dispersed by machinegun fire.
_Collapse of NKPA 9th Division_
Marines following up the 3,000-yard advance along the MSR saw, a
picture of devastation unequalled even by the earlier defeat of the
NKPA 4th Division. Hundreds of enemy dead were strewn along the road,
hillsides and ridgelines. On the MSR between Hill 117 and Kang-ni lay
a long column of North Koreans who had been caught by Marine air and
artillery while attempting to reinforce Red lines. The dead leader was
a lieutenant colonel whose briefcase contained a lengthy artillery
treatise among other less scholarly documents.[343]
[343] _Ibid._
In addition to knocked-out and abandoned Communist tanks, vehicles,
mortars, and antitank guns, the countryside was littered with enough
small arms, ammunition, and gear to equip several hundred men. Even the
North Korean paymaster had been caught in the sweeping tide of Brigade
arms, and Marines distributed a huge quantity of worthless currency
among themselves.
Not only did the Marines reap a harvest of enemy materiel; they also
recaptured a great quantity of United States Army equipment lost
during the Communist drive. American tanks, artillery pieces, mortars,
vehicles, small arms, and ammunition and supply dumps were turned over
to the 2d Division by the Brigade.
The destruction of the enemy camp left Army and Marine intelligence
officers inundated by captured enemy documents. Muster rolls, ledgers,
maps, orders, textbooks, and propaganda material were heaped into
separate piles.
Late in the afternoon of 4 September, the 9th Infantry moved into
positions on the high ground northeast of 3/5. This completed the
advance to Phase Line One of the 2d Division’s counterattack plan.
The second phase line on G-3 maps was drawn through Hill 125 and
Observation Hill, 3,000 yards west of Kang-ni.
When informed that the Brigade had completed the first part of its
mission, General Keiser authorized General Craig to advance toward
Phase Line Two.
Beyond Kang-ni, the Brigade’s right boundary became the MSR, so that
3/5 could not advance westward from its half of Objective One. Major
Charles H. Brush, Murray’s S-3, radioed Newton and passed on orders
for the battalion commander to take the next piece of high ground,
Cloverleaf Hill, just south of the MSR at Hwayong-ni, about a thousand
yards away.
The 1st Battalion struck out through the intervening rice paddy,
Company A on the left and Baker Company just below the MSR. Fenton’s
unit had hardly begun the advance when it was stopped by heavy
machinegun fire coming from the high ground north of Hwayong-ni. Newton
then called for an air strike on the ridge and also requested 3/5 to
keep it covered with supporting fire during Company B’s attack.
Enemy resistance evaporated with accustomed rapidity, and the Marines
reported Cloverleaf Hill secure at 1800. Murray then ordered both front
line battalions to establish night defenses and be prepared to continue
the attack at 0800, 5 September.
The extent and trace of the Brigade front line on the night of 4–5
September was almost identical to that of 24 hours before. Again
Newton’s battalion was in front on the left by a good 1,000 yards, and
Companies A and B were stretched across a line almost a mile long, with
the left flank wide open.
Separated from both 1/5 on the left and the 9th Infantry on the right,
the 3d Battalion established a perimeter defense, even though it was in
the center of the counterattack zone.
There was considerable tension and excitement after darkness on 4
September, although the Brigade lines were never seriously threatened.
The engineers were busy in 1/5’s zone until after midnight, creeping to
the front and flanks to lay mines. The 3d Battalion was shelled heavily
throughout the night, and 1/5’s CP took direct hits killing 1 Marine
and wounding 2 others. One of the wounded was Second Lieutenant James
R. Young, Newton’s Assistant S-3. The artillery liaison officer, First
Lieutenant Joris J. Snyder, was knocked unconscious for several hours,
though he received not a scratch from the 120-mm. explosion a few yards
away.
At 0230 night-fighter planes of Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s VMF(N)-513
bombed the North Korean mortar position causing most of the damage, and
the shelling slackened appreciably. Completing this mission, the Marine
pilots dumped general purpose and fragmentation bombs on enemy vehicles
and troops in the area.[344]
[344] VMF(N)-513 SAR, Appendix 6, 16.
Companies G and H reported movement forward of their lines before dawn,
and 3/5’s 81-mm. mortars quickly illuminated the front, disclosing
several small groups of enemy. There was a flurry of fire, but the Reds
gave no indication of organizing for an assault. One of the groups,
either by error or suicidal folly, stumbled into the area of Taplett’s
CP. A listening post of Weapons Company took the intruders under fire,
killing an NKPA officer and routing the others.
_Attacks of 5 September_
Marines of the 3d Battalion were startled at daybreak, 5 September,
when a company of North Koreans attacked the 9th Infantry’s left flank
in full view of 3/5’s positions on the adjacent high ground. George,
How, and H & S Companies poured machinegun fire into the mass of Reds
at ranges of 600–1,000 yards. Most of the Red attackers were cut down
before they could flee into the hills west of the Army lines.[345]
[345] This section is derived from: Annex How; 3/5 SAR, 1–6
Sep 50; Taplett, 20 Apr 54; and Fenton, 8 May 54.
Company B, on its high ground south of Hwayong-ni, heard the firing in
3/5’s area at daybreak and steeled itself for a possible counterattack
from the right flank. When Newton received word of the abortive attack
on the 9th Infantry, he ordered his two rifle companies to prepare to
move out at 0800 as planned.
The Marines of Companies A and B were organizing their attack
formation on Cloverleaf Hill when two Air Force P-51’s came in for
an uncontrolled air strike on the high ground north of Hwayong-ni.
Strafing the ridge from north to south, the planes riddled Cloverleaf
Hill as they pulled out of their dives. The 2 exposed companies were
showered with bullets, and it seemed miraculous that only 1 Marine was
wounded.
At 0820, 1/5 jumped off to the west to seize the Brigade’s portion
of Phase Line Two--Hill 125 and Observation Hill. Beyond these hills
lay Obong-ni Ridge, blocking the path to the Naktong River, third and
final phase line of the 2d Division counterattack. Because of its
tactical importance and great significance, battle-scarred Obong-ni was
designated a special objective, apart from the phase lines.
Half a mile west of Hwayong-ni the MSR makes a right-angle turn to the
south, proceeds in that direction for 1,000 yards, then resumes its
westward course through the cut between Hill 125 and Observation Hill.
Companies A and B, with the latter on the right, moved rapidly through
the rice paddy below the MSR after leaving their line of departure
on Cloverleaf Hill. At the road bend mentioned above, the MSR turned
across Baker Company’s front. When Fenton’s unit crossed over to the
base of the high ground leading to Hill 125, Companies A and B were
separated by the MSR as it resumed its westward course. Stevens’ unit
started up the long eastern slopes of Observation Hill, while Fenton’s
men secured the eastern extension of Hill 125.
Obong-ni Ridge rumbled its first greeting to 1/5 at 0935 when mortars
and artillery fired at the Marine attackers from emplacements around
the hill. The Reds were answered immediately by 1/11 and Newton’s
81-mm. mortar platoon; and the rifle companies continued the advance to
Phase Line Two, securing their objectives at 1100.
[Illustration: 2nd NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE
ENEMY COUNTERATTACK--5 SEP. ’50]
Murray ordered 1/5 to hold up until the 9th Infantry tied in on
Fenton’s right. Communist automatic weapons on Obong-ni Ridge fired on
the Marines sporadically during this interlude.
At 1000, while 1/5 was attacking to the west, the 3d Battalion had
swung southward behind Cloverleaf Hill to take positions on the 5th
Marines’ left. This was in preparation for Murray’s contemplated
assault on Obong-ni Ridge by two battalions. It was planned that
Newton’s unit would take the northern half of the long hill and 3/5 the
southern portion.
Company G led the 3d Battalion advance through the rice paddy south of
Cloverleaf Hill. Artillery and 75-mm. recoilless guns paved the way
by raking possible enemy hiding places, enabling the infantrymen to
proceed rapidly. Bohn’s destination was Hill 91, a shoe-like projection
jutting out from the southern reaches of Obong-ni Ridge. Reaching
the base of the high ground, Bohn requested that supporting fires
be lifted. Attached tanks, 75’s, and 1/11 immediately shifted their
destruction to Obong-ni Ridge.
Company G started up the slopes of Hill 91, while an attached 75-mm.
recoilless gun obliterated a wheel-mounted machinegun and its crew
going into position on the crest. The Marines had climbed only a few
yards when Bohn was ordered by Taplett at 1230 to withdraw the company
to Observation Hill.
Company H, then passing between Hill 91 and Observation Hill on its
way to Obong-ni’s eastern approaches, received the same order from the
Battalion commander. The assault on the ridge had been canceled, and
Murray was concentrating his regiment along the MSR.
_Two Marine Tanks Killed_
Throughout the Brigade advance on 5 September, the Marines were
hampered by heavy rain and fog which prevented MAG-33 and VMO-6 from
operating effectively. Thus the enemy was offered a rare opportunity to
mount a daylight attack.[346]
[346] This section is derived from: Annex How; LtCol M. R.
Olson, interv with author, 15 Jun 54; Taplett, 20 Apr
54; Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54 (with comments by Maj J. R.
Stevens); and Fenton, 8 May 54.
After Company B received orders to hold up on Hill 125, Fenton
ordered his men to dig foxholes along the rain-soaked crest facing
Tugok village and Finger Ridge to the west and Obong-ni Ridge to the
southwest. The company commander directed the attached 1st Platoon of
tanks to remain in the road cut, just to the rear of the famous bend
around the forward slopes of Hill 125. Peering through the rain and
fog, the Marine tankmen could see the dead, black hulls of the three
T-34’s knocked out by the Brigade 2 weeks earlier.
At 1420 the sporadic sniping from the front suddenly increased to the
intensity of preparatory fire, and Baker Company was pinned down on its
ridgeline positions. The northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge blazed with
NKPA machineguns, whose chatter was soon joined by that of automatic
weapons concealed in Tugok and at the northern base of Observation
Hill. A Communist antitank gun on Finger Ridge added its voice
intermittently to the chorus.
Fenton’s radio went dead just as he reported the situation to Newton
at his OP on the high ground to the east. As luck would have it, every
other radio in the company area was inoperative because of the mud and
rain; and Fenton was unable to warn the Marine tanks in the road cut
that enemy armor and troops were advancing toward the road bend from
the west.
As the Communist vehicles swung into the turn, a company of Red
soldiers left the road and assaulted Company B’s positions by advancing
up the draw on the Marines’ left front. The intense overhead fire
supporting the Red Infantry enabled them to get well up the forward
slopes. Meanwhile, a squad of North Koreans advanced up the draw
leading from Tugok and harassed Fenton’s right front.
To stop the attack, the Marines were forced to man the crest of Hill
125. Thus exposed to the enemy’s supporting fire, Company B had to pay
a heavy price in casualties.
During the advance of the Communist armor, it was determined that
the first 2 of the 3 vehicles were T-34 tanks and the last a tracked
armored personnel carrier. Fenton immediately deployed his assault
squad on the slopes below his left flank to meet the threat on the MSR.
Lieutenant Pomeroy, unaware of the enemy tanks around the bend,
advanced his M-26’s so that the machineguns on Obong-ni Ridge could be
taken under massed fire. Thus, as the first Marine tank reached the
bend, its 90-mm. gun was pointing to the left front, a quarter turn
away from the enemy armor.
The lead T-34 fired on the Marine vehicle as soon as it came into
view. Before the turret of the M-26 could be turned to take aim,
several more 85-mm. projectiles struck; and the Brigade lost its first
tank to enemy action. The second M-26 in column tried to squeeze by the
first to render assistance, and it too was knocked out by 85-mm. fire
in the restricted passageway.
The crews of both Marine tanks managed to get out of their vehicles
through the escape hatches. Some of the wounded were aided by the
engineer mine-clearance team accompanying the tank column.
Since the road bend was now blocked, the remainder of Pomeroy’s tanks
could do nothing but park in the road cut. It was Marine infantrymen
who stepped in at this point and blunted the NKPA victory on the MSR.
Company B’s assault squad plastered the lead T-34 with 3.5″ rocket fire
and stopped it cold. Shortly afterwards, the 1st Battalion’s assault
platoon reached the fight scene and went into action with its 3.5’s. In
short order the infantrymen had completed the destruction of the first
tank, knocked out the second, and destroyed the enemy personnel carrier.
The historic road bend, as seen through the rain and mist, had become a
graveyard of armor. A total of 8 steel monsters were sprawled there in
death: 5 T-34’s and 1 armored carrier of the NKPA, and 2 Pershing tanks
of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.
_The Brigade’s Final Action_
On Hill 125 the fight reached a climax as Marines exchanged grenades
and small-arms fire with the North Koreans slithering up the slopes
in the driving rain. Company B had used all of its 60-mm. mortar
shells and was running low on grenades and small arms ammunition.
Enemy automatic weapons on the ridges to the front were still cutting
down the Marine defenders at 1500 when Fenton sent a runner to Newton
requesting more ammunition.[347]
[347] _Ibid._
The endurance contest was still in progress half an hour later, as the
9th Infantry moved into positions on the high ground north of Hill 125.
Having no communications with his own supporting arms, Fenton sent a
messenger to the Army unit commander, asking that he place artillery
fire on the Marine front.
When Army shells began falling in answer to the request, 1/5’s 81-mm.
mortars belatedly got into the fight and worked over the forward
slopes of Hill 125 to within 50 yards of Company B’s positions. The
heavy supporting fire turned the tide, and enemy pressure slackened
considerably.
During the final stage of the enemy’s attack, Company A was being
relieved on Observation Hill by 3/5. Stevens told his platoon leaders
to leave their grenades and extra ammunition on the hill, since his
orders were to withdraw to the rear. While the relief was taking place,
however, Company A was ordered to reinforce Fenton’s unit against the
enemy’s attack on Hill 125. Muetzel’s 2d Platoon, after recovering its
ammunition, was augmented by a machinegun section, mortar squad, and
two SCR-300 radios, before the young officer led the unit across the
MSR to lend a hand.
When Stevens’ relief by 3/5 was completed, he added the 1st Platoon to
Company B’s reinforcements, and himself withdrew to Cloverleaf Hill
with the 3d Platoon as ordered.
The reinforcements were fed into Fenton’s line as fast as they reached
the summit of Hill 125. By this time every man in Company B had been
committed to the forward wall--mortarmen, clerks, signalmen, and all.
Lieutenant Howard Blank combined his Able Company mortars with those
of the defenders and immediately followed up the artillery and 81-mm.
fire which had blunted the attack. These final concentrations of 60-mm.
mortar fire on Obong-ni and Finger Ridges and the forward slopes of
Hill 125 ended the enemy attack. The surviving Reds withdrew to Tugok.
At 1600, during the dying minutes of the Brigade’s final action in the
Pusan Perimeter, Newton was ordered back to the regimental CP for a
conference. The executive officer, Major Merlin R. Olson, took over 1/5
from the battalion OP on the ridge east of Hill 125.
The 5th Marines commander had called the leaders of his battalions to
brief them on General Craig’s last field directive, which began with
the long awaited words:
“THIS MY OPN ORDER 22-50 X COMMENCING AT 2400 5 SEPT BRIG MOVES BY
RAIL AND MOTOR TO STAGING AREA PUSAN FOR FURTHER OPERATION AGAINST
THE ENEMY X PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF MOVEMENT 5TH MARS WILL STAND
RELIEVED BY ELMS OF 2ND INF DIV COMMENCING AT DARKNESS ... CONCEAL
FROM THE ENEMY ACTIVITIES CONNECTED WITH YOUR WITHDRAWAL....”
Taplett’s 3d Battalion had sustained 24 casualties from artillery and
mortar fire between its occupation of Observation Hill and the time it
was relieved by a company of the 23d Infantry shortly after midnight.
Plodding rearward through mud and driving rain, 3/5’s long column began
its three-and-a-half-mile march to an entrucking point 2,000 yards west
of Yongsan.
Following 3/5 were the weary, mud-soaked troops of the 1st Battalion.
Having successfully defended Hill 125 at a cost of 2 killed and 23
wounded, Baker Company had filed down to the road after being relieved
by another company of the 23d Infantry. Muetzel brought up the rear
with Company A’s contingent, and a battalion column was formed at
Olson’s check point east of Hill 125.
By dawn of 6 September, the two battalions were loading aboard trucks
to follow the rest of the Brigade. Numbed by fatigue and icy rain, the
bent forms huddled together in the cargo vehicles had no regrets as
they bade good-bye to the Pusan perimeter.
_Brigade Embarkation at Pusan_
The movement to Pusan was completed by the morning of 7 September, and
the Brigade troops found themselves back at the docks where they had
landed a little more than a month before. In fact, the docks were to be
their bivouac area during the next 6 days; the men slept in the open
and took their meals on board the transports in which they would soon
be sailing around the peninsula.
The survivors of the Naktong fights--even the latecomers who had joined
the Brigade at the Bean Patch--felt old and worn when they saw the
large draft of shiny new Marines just landed as third rifle companies
organized with their own NCO’s and platoons. The veterans had forgotten
how young and untroubled a Marine could look; how neat and clean he
could appear in a recently issued utility jacket.
The new companies were immediately assigned to their battalions. It
was another job for officers and NCO’s who had the responsibility of
replacing equipment lost in action as well as servicing ordnance, motor
transport and other heavy equipment which had been sent from the Bean
Patch to Pusan late in August.[348]
[348] Col J. L. Stewart, interv with author, 10 Jun 54.
General Craig and his staff had their headquarters in one of the Pusan
University buildings. There was no opportunity for planning, let alone
rehearsals, for the forthcoming amphibious assault at Inchon. Craig
and his officers had all they could do to get the Brigade ready for
embarkation.
Among the tasks to be accomplished in less than a week, it remained
to give some weapons training to the 3,000 troops of the 1st Korean
Marine Regiment. This newly raised unit, attached to the Brigade for
embarkation, was to make a name for itself within the next year and
become the fourth rifle regiment of the 1st Marine Division. But in
September 1950 there were great gaps in the training of the KMC’s. The
men kept their rifles scrupulously clean, and they could strip an M-1
expertly, but few of them had ever fired a shot.
Marine NCO’s had the hazardous duty of giving the eager and excited
KMC’s their first target practice after eight rounds of ammunition for
each man had been acquired. No Marine casualties resulted, fortunately,
but puffed and bruised cheeks were the rule among Koreans having their
first experience with an M-1’s recoil.
There was, of course, no end of “scuttlebutt” going the rounds of the
Marines as to their destination. One day the troops were lined up in
formation and read a long lecture on the hydrographic aspects of the
west coast port of Kunsan. It is to be hoped that this red herring made
some impression upon the Koreans who were listening, since Pusan was a
headquarters of enemy spies. As for the Marines, most of them concluded
that at least Kunsan could be eliminated from the list of possible
objectives.
The secret was well kept by Brigade officers in the higher echelons.
Two engineer officers, First Lieutenant Ernest P. Skelt and
Commissioned Warrant Officer Willard C. Downs, were given the secret
mission of constructing wooden scaling ladders for the next operation.
This project gave rise to more rumors, but it is safe to say that few
men in the ranks knew the answer when the Brigade was deactivated at
0001 on 13 September 1950. The components immediately resumed their old
unit designations in the 1st Marine Division and sailed to take part in
the amphibious assault on Inchon scheduled for the 15th.[349]
[349] The Inchon-Seoul operation of the 1st Marine Division
and 1st Marine Air Wing from 15 September to 7 October
1950 is to be the subject of Volume II of this
historical series devoted to Marine operations in Korea.
_Results of Brigade Operations_
As the mountains behind Pusan faded from sight, General Craig and his
men could reflect that the Brigade’s 67 days of existence had been
productive. Altogether, the Marine air-ground team had fought three
difficult offensive operations in a month while traveling 380 miles
with a third of its organic transportation plus Army vehicles.
Total casualties for the Brigade included 148 KIA, 15 DOW, 9 MIA (seven
of whom were later reclassified as KIA after recovery of the bodies)
and 730 WIA.[350] It was estimated that the Marines inflicted total
casualties of 9,900 killed and wounded on opposing NKPA units. Enemy
losses of arms and equipment were on such a scale as to impair the
effectiveness of the forces concerned.
[350] Brig SAR, basic report.
In its initial operation, as a component of Task Force Kean, the
Brigade had the major part in the first sustained Eighth Army
counterattack--the military equivalent of a hard left jab which rocks
an opponent back on his heels. General MacArthur, when reporting to
the United Nations, asserted that “this attack not only secured the
southern approaches to the beachhead, but also showed that the North
Korean forces will not hold under attack.”[351]
[351] MCBS, I-II-A-18-19. This valuable operational study
by Marine senior officers has been the guide for the
summaries and analyses of Brigade results in these pages.
The Communist drive in this sensitive area came closest of all NKPA
thrusts to the vital UN supply port of Pusan. Up to that time the NKPA
units spearheading the advance--the 6th Infantry Division and the 83d
Motorcycle Regiment--had never suffered a reverse worth mentioning
since the outset of the invasion. Then the counterattack by the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade hurled the enemy back 26 miles in 4 days
from the Chindong-ni area to Sachon.
It was estimated that the Marine air-ground team killed and wounded
1,900 of the enemy while destroying nearly all the vehicles of an NKPA
motorized battalion in addition to infantry armament and equipment. The
enemy threat in this critical area was nullified for the time being,
and never again became so serious. Marine efforts assisted Army units
of Task Force Kean in taking new defensive positions and defending
them with fewer troops, thus freeing some elements for employment on
other fronts. Finally, the Marines earned more time and space for the
building up of Eighth Army forces in preparation for a decisive UN
counteroffensive.
The next Brigade operation, the first battle of the Naktong, ranks with
the hardest fights of Marine Corps history. The enemy, after showing
skill and aggressiveness in breaching the last natural barrier of
the Pusan Perimeter, widened his Naktong bridgehead and took strong
defensive positions in preparation for an all-out offensive while still
maintaining his material superiority.
Only two Eighth Army units were available for a counterattack--the 27th
Infantry and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The Army regiment
being needed in reserve on the southern front, the “firemen of the
Pusan Perimeter” were placed under the operational control of the 24th
Infantry Division on the central front. There the Marines had the
mission of clearing the enemy from Obong-ni Ridge and two other large
hill masses of the Naktong Bulge.
The NKPA 4th Infantry Division had taken maximum advantage of strong
defensive terrain in accordance with the precepts taught by Soviet and
Chinese Communist military instructors. This enlarged bridgehead was
credited by CINCFE with giving the enemy the capability of mounting a
serious threat to the main railroad from Pusan to Taegu.
It took a bitter and costly effort on the part of the Brigade, but the
result was the most smashing defeat ever given an NKPA major unit up to
this time. This reverse turned into a rout and slaughter toward the end
as Marine air, artillery, armor, and mortars inflicted terrible losses.
Broken NKPA forces were cut down in flight or while trying to swim the
Naktong.
If the Brigade’s first operation may be likened to a hard left jab,
the fight in the Naktong Bulge is comparable to a solid right dealing
a knockdown blow. The enemy lurched back to his feet, it is true, but
the three rifle regiments of the NKPA 4th Infantry Division had to be
filled up with hastily trained recruits.
Arms ranging from rifles to howitzers were abandoned as impediments
by the routed Communists, so that the rebuilt NKPA 4th Infantry
Division needed new armament and equipment of all sorts. General
MacArthur’s summary of the action, reported to the UN Security Council
on 18 September 1950, stated that “attacks by the United States 24th
Division and the Marines eliminated a major penetration of the Naktong
defense line on 18 August. Here, the enemy 4th Division was decisively
defeated, lost its bridgehead, and was thrown westward across the
Naktong River, suffering very heavy losses in both personnel and
equipment.”
Never before had a major NKPA unit taken such a staggering defeat. As
evidence of recent victories won over United States troops, the 4th
Infantry Division had brought captured American machineguns and 105-mm.
howitzers into the Naktong Bulge. Among the most important results
achieved by the Brigade, therefore, was the hurt done to Red Korean
morale.
Not only was the enemy’s Naktong bridgehead liquidated; he also lost
heavily in time, which was becoming more valuable to him than space if
he hoped to profit from his rapidly dwindling advantage in numbers. Not
until 10 days later did the Communists establish another bridgehead in
the Naktong Bulge area, and then it was their misfortune to encounter
the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade again.
During the early morning hours of 1 September 1950, the enemy made his
final effort to smash through to Pusan. Again the 27th Infantry was
needed on another front, so that the Marines, as the only other mobile
reserve unit, were committed under the operational control of the 2d
Infantry Division, The seriousness of the situation in the Naktong
Bulge is indicated by the fact that the enemy had enlarged his new
bridgehead with a penetration of about 4,000 yards in the sector of
the 2d Division. Elements of four enemy divisions had been identified
on the central front when the Marines jumped off on the morning of 3
September.
The Brigade’s 3-day fight did not end as decisively as the first battle
of the Naktong. That is because it was an unfinished fight. The Marines
were pulled out on the night of 5 September, after gains of 2,500 to
3,000 yards that day, and it can only be conjectured what General Craig
and his men might have accomplished during the next 48 hours.
As it was, the Brigade had a prominent part in disrupting the enemy’s
effort to sever the Pusan-Taegu lifeline. Heavy losses both in
personnel and equipment were inflicted on NKPA forces, and the Marines
helped to reduce the enemy’s new bridgehead by 8,000 to 10,000 yards.
Not only had the enemy lost the battle; he had lost the war, as it
proved, for EUSAK staff officers were even then planning a great
UN counterstroke in the Pusan Perimeter. This drive was to be in
conjunction with the amphibious assault on Inchon.
The turning point in the UN fortunes of war owed in no small measure to
the three counterattacks by the Marines in the Pusan Perimeter. As for
the overall effects, it would be hard to improve upon the analysis and
evaluation in the Marine Corps Board Study:
“A careful examination of any of these operations in which Marines
engaged discloses that a single failure would have a profound
effect upon the entire UN effort.... On 3 separate occasions the
Brigade was attached to the defending UN forces at points of
dangerous enemy penetrations and 3 times Marine units spearheaded
the counterattacking elements and effectively stopped the enemy’s
efforts, seizing the initiative from him, inflicting serious losses
upon him, and forcing the abandonment of immediate attempts at
decisive penetration.”[352]
[352] MCBS, I-II-A-36.
_Summaries and Conclusions_
No Marine tactical organization of history ever did more than the
Brigade to uphold the tradition of the Corps as a force-in-readiness.
The transition from activation to embarkation took only 6 days, and it
may be recalled that the Brigade became the first United States unit
to get into the fight after crossing the Pacific from the American
mainland.
Although the components had been hastily thrown together without
opportunity for training or rehearsals, there were singularly few
instances of tactical fumbling during the early actions. Some of the
men had their only weapons familiarization instruction in actual
battle, when they fired new arms for the first time. But thanks to the
steadying influence of combat-wise company officers and NCO’s, the
Marines of the Brigade soon gained competence.
The Brigade command and staff faced unusual problems arising from
such factors as emergency situations, hurried planning, oral orders,
incomplete intelligence, and lack of adequate maps. There were
decisions now and then which officers would not have made if they had
been endowed with the wisdom of knowledge after the event. But on the
basis of information at the time, the Brigade command and staff need
no whitewashing from history. Marine victories, on the other hand,
may be attributed in large degree to a high order of leadership and
professional ability in the upper echelons as well as on the company
and platoon level.
It might have been argued that it was a waste to commit amphibious
specialists to the operations of mountain warfare. But Marines were
also trained as infantry, and gravel-crunching fighting men were needed
to correct an illusion held by many of their countrymen. Atomic bombs,
guided missiles, jet planes, and other marvelous new weapons had
convinced a large section of the public that the day of push-button
warfare was at hand. These Americans sincerely believed that wars could
be waged at long distance, and the Marines of the Brigade served their
country well by demonstrating that even in the tactical millenium it
was necessary to seek out the enemy and close with him. For if there
was any outstanding figure of the conflict in Korea, it was some second
lieutenant making split-second decisions which meant life or death for
a platoon holding a hill position against enemy attack in the darkness.
The three squadrons of MAG-33 provided support which the Brigade
reported as “the best close air support in the history of the Marine
Corps ... outstanding in its effectiveness.” Army infantry officers
were frankly envious on occasion; and Colonel Paul L. Freeman, USA,
commanding the 23d Infantry, commented that “the Marines on our left
were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal
to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it
like artillery. It was ‘Hey, Joe--This is Smitty--Knock the left of
that ridge in front of Item Company.’ They had it _day and night_. It
came off nearby carriers, and not from Japan with only 15 minutes of
fuel to accomplish mission.”[353]
[353] Quoted in MCBS, I-II-A-35; and I-IV-B-9.
The UN forces, of course, had complete supremacy in the air. On two
occasions the Marines of the Brigade were briefly strafed by NKPA night
hecklers making a “scalded-cat” raid. During the interlude at the Bean
Patch an enemy plane winged its way under cover of darkness to cut
loose with a brief burst of machinegun bullets before disappearing into
the night. But United States Air Force planes had virtually destroyed
the little NKPA air force during the first few weeks of the war, so
that the men of the Brigade were virtually unopposed in the air.
The time interval between a request for Marine air support and
the actual delivery varied according to local conditions, but the
ground forces seldom had cause for complaint. All-weather Squadron
VMF(N)-513, based at Itazuke, Japan, was prevented by reason of
faulty communications and liaison from responding to every request
for dawn, dusk or night support during early Brigade operations, but
such missions were flown effectively in the Naktong Bulge. Meanwhile,
the Corsairs of VMF-214 and VMF-323, orbiting on station and always
available for short notice employment, gave fresh proof that the
Navy-Marine concept of carrier-based tactical aircraft was sound in
practice. Following are the statistics of MAG-33 operations in Korea
from 3 August to 14 September 1950:
_Missions in close support_
_Squadron_ _Total _Miscellaneous -------------------------------
sorties_ sorties_ _USMC_ _Army_ _ROK_ _Total_
VMF-214 670 162 337 111 60 508
VMF-323 498 90 304 83 21 408
VMF(N)-513 343 264 21 50 8 79
------------------------------------------------------
Totals 1511 516 662 244 8 995[354]
[354] MCBS, II, Appendix 64.
Demands on the time of the original 4 helicopters of VMO-6 made it
necessary to fly 2 more machines in from Japan. The rotary-wing
aircraft had so many “firsts” to their credit in the Pusan Perimeter
that a major tactical innovation was obviously in the making. The
flights of General Craig, Colonel Snedeker and Lieutenant Colonel
Stewart alone were enough to indicate that the helicopter was capable
of working a revolution in command and staff procedures.
Altogether, the participation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was
an important factor in stopping the NKPA invasion in August 1950 and
punishing the invaders so severely that they were ripe for a crushing
defeat the following month. The Marines, moreover, did a great deal
to restore the national pride of countrymen who had been hurt and
bewildered by the outcome of the first month’s operations.
It was humiliating to read on the front page that only 5 years after
reaching our greatest military strength of history, United States
troops were being pushed around by Asiatic peasants of a Soviet-trained
organization calling itself the North Korean People’s Army. Perhaps
these Americans did not remember that the decline in our Armed Forces
was due to overwhelming popular demands for the disbanding of our
victorious armies of 1945. At any rate, the United States paid the
penalty of unpreparedness in 1950 when its first ground-force units
were beaten by better trained and equipped NKPA troops. Worse yet,
correspondents at the front intimated that these defeats were due to
the softness of our youth. It was charged that United States troops had
been so pampered by motor transport that they could no longer march,
let alone fight.
The Marines helped to change all that. The Marines and the better Army
units proved that they were more than a match for the enemy when it
came to marching as well as fighting. The Marines did their best to
restore the pride of Americans who read about the advance to Kosong or
the fight on Obong-ni Ridge. The Marines, in short, deserved the pat on
the back conveyed in a dispatch to the Brigade on 23 August 1950 from
their Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates:
“I AM VERY PROUD OF THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR AIR-GROUND TEAM. KEEP ON
HITTING THEM, FRONT, FLANKS, REAR, AND TOPSIDE! WELL DONE!”
APPENDIX A
Glossary of Military and Aeronautical Terms
AKA--Attack cargo ship.
APA--Attack transport ship.
ADC--Assistant Division Commander.
BAR--Browning automatic rifle.
BLT--Battalion landing team.
BuAer--Bureau of Aeronautics
CCF--Chinese Communist Forces (refers to entire Chinese force employed
in Korea).
CG--Commanding general.
CINCFE--Commander in Chief, Far East.
CincPacFlt--Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
CINCUNC--Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.
CNO--Chief of Naval Operations.
CO--Commanding officer.
COMNAGFE--Commander Naval Air Group Far East
COMNAVFE--Commander Navy Far East.
COMPHIBGRUONE--Commander Amphibious Group One.
COMSEVENTHFLT--Commander Seventh Fleet.
COS--Combined Operations Section.
CP--Command Post.
CSG--Combat Service Group.
CTF--Commander Task Force.
CVG--Carrier Air Group.
DOW--Died of wounds.
EUSAK--Eighth United States Army in Korea.
FAC--Forward Air Controller.
FEAF--Far East Air Force.
FECOM--Far East Command.
FL--Flight leader.
FMF--Fleet Marine Force (Pac = Pacific; Lant = Atlantic).
GHQFEC--General Headquarters, Far East Command.
HF--High frequency (radio).
InfDiv--Infantry Division.
JCS--Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JOC--Joint Operations Center.
KIA--Killed in action.
KMC--Korean Marine Corps.
KVA--Korean Volunteer Army.
LSD--Landing ship, dock.
LST--Landing ship, tank.
MAG--Marine Aircraft Group.
MCBS--Marine Corps Board Study.
MGCIS--Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron.
MIA--Missing in action.
MSR--Main supply route.
MTACS--Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron.
NCO--Noncommissioned officer.
NK--North Korea(n).
NKPA--North Korean Peoples Army.
OP--Observation post.
OY--Light observation plane.
POL--Petroleum oil lubricants.
POW--Prisoner of war.
ProvCasCo--Provisional Casual Company.
RCT--Regimental Combat Team.
ROK--Republic of Korea.
SAC--Supporting Arms Center.
SAR--Special Action Report.
SecNav--Secretary of the Navy.
TAC--Tactical Air Coordinator.
TAC X Corps--Tactical Air Command, X Corps.
TACC--Tactical Air Control Center.
TACP--Tactical Air Control Party.
TACRON--Tactical Air Control Squadron.
TAD--Tactical Air Direction.
TADC--Tactical Air Direction Center.
TAO--Tactical Air Observer.
TAR--Tactical air request.
T/E--Table of equipment.
T/O--Table of organization.
UN--United Nations.
VHF--Very high frequency (radio).
VMF--Marine fighter type aircraft (squadron).
VMF(N)--Marine night fighter type aircraft, all-weather (squadron).
VMO--Marine observation type aircraft (squadron).
VMR--Marine transport type aircraft (squadron).
WIA--Wounded in action.
APPENDIX B
Command and Staff List of the First Provisional Marine Brigade
_7 July--13 September 1950_
Commanding General BrigGen Edward A. Craig
Deputy Commander BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman
Chief of Staff Col Edward W. Snedeker
G-1 Maj Donald W. Sherman
G-2 LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman
G-3 LtCol Joseph L. Stewart
G-4 LtCol Arthur A. Chidester
_Special Staff Section_
Adjutant Capt Harold G. Schrier
Supply Officer Maj James K. Eagan
Air Officer Maj James N. Cupp
Signal Officer Maj Elwin M. Stimpson
Air Observer Capt Edwin L. Rives
Signal Supply Officer 1stLt Joseph E. Conners
Engineer Supply Officer Capt William R. Gould
Liaison Officer LtCol Edward R. Hagenah
Brigade Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering, Jr., USN
Brigade Dental Officer LtComdr Jack J. Kelly, USN
_Headquarters and Service Battalion_
(32 officers--183 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer Maj Richard E. Sullivan
Executive Officer Capt Samuel Jaskilka (to 18 Aug 50)
CoComdr, Hq Co 1stLt Nathaniel F. Mann, Jr.
_Detachment, 1st Signal Battalion_
(4 officers--99 enlisted men)
DetComdr Capt Earl F. Stanley
_Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion_
(6 officers--112 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer Capt Arthur W. Ecklund
_Company C, 1st Medical Battalion_
(5 officers--94 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer Comdr Robert A. Freyling, USN
_Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion_
(12 officers--213 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer Maj William L. Batchelor
_Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion_
(9 officers--209 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer Capt George W. King
_Detachment, 1st Ordnance Battalion_
(5 officers--119 enlisted men)
DetComdr 1stLt Meyer La Bellman
_Company A, 1st Tank Battalion_
(9 officers--173 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer Capt Gearl M. English
PlatComdr 1st Plat 1stLt William D. Pomeroy
PlatComdr 2d Plat 2dLt Robert M. Winter
(to 3 Sep 50, WIA)
2dLt John S. Carson (3 Sep 50, KIA)
PlatComdr, 3d Plat 2dLt Granville G. Sweet
_1st Battalion, 11th Marines_
(44 officers--474 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer LtCol Ransom M. Wood
Executive Officer Maj Francis R. Schlesinger
Headquarters Battery:
Commanding Officer Capt James W. Brayshay
Service Battery:
Commanding Officer 1stLt Kenneth H. Quelch
Battery A:
Commanding Officer Capt James D. Jordan
Battery B:
Commanding Officer Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter
Battery C:
Commanding Officer Capt William J. Nichols, Jr.
_Detachment, 1st Service Battalion_
(11 officers--161 enlisted men)
DetComdr Capt Thomas M. Sagar
_Detachment, 1st Combat Service Group_
(5 officers--104 enlisted men)
DetComdr Maj Thomas J. O’Mahoney
_Detachment, Reconnaissance Company_
(2 officers--37 enlisted men)
DetComdr Capt Kenneth J. Houghton
_Detachment, Military Police Company_
(2 officers--36 enlisted men)
DetComdr 1stLt Nye G. Rodes
_1st Amphibian Tractor Company_
(10 officers--244 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer Maj James P. Treadwell
_1st Amphibian Truck Platoon_
(1 officer--75 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer 1stLt James E. Condra
_VMO-6_
Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk
_5th Marines_
(132 officers--2452 enlisted men)
Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray
Executive Officer LtCol Lawrence C. Hays, Jr.
S-1 1stLt Alton C. Weed
S-2 Maj William C. Esterline
S-3 LtCol George F. Waters, Jr.
(to 29 Aug 50)
Maj Charles H, Brush, Jr.
S-4 Maj Harold Wallace
Special Staff, 5th Marines:
Chaplain LtComdr Orlando Ingvolstad, Jr., USN
Medical Officer Lt (jg) William E. Larsen, USN
(to 11 Aug 50)
LtComdr Byron D. Casteel
Supply Officer Capt John V. Huff
Motor Transport Officer Capt William F. A. Trax (to 15 Aug 50)
1stLt James O. Alison
Ordnance Officer CWO Bill E. Parrish
Disbursing Officer Capt Kenneth L. Shaw
Communications Officer Maj Kenneth B. Boyd
Naval Gunfire Officer Lt Jerry C. Ragon, USN
Air Officer 1stLt Leo R. Jillisky
1st Battalion, 5th Marines:
Commanding Officer LtCol George R. Newton
Executive Officer Maj Merlin R. Olson
CO, H & S Company Capt Walter E. Godenius
CO, Company A Capt John R. Stevens
CO, Company B Capt John L. Tobin (to 17 Aug 50, WIA)
Capt Francis I. Fenton, Jr.
CO, Weapons Company Maj John W. Russell
2d Battalion, 5th Marines:
Commanding Officer LtCol Harold S. Roise
Executive Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II
CO, H & S Company 1stLt David W. Walsh
CO, Company D Capt John Finn, Jr. (to 8 Aug 50, WIA)
Capt Andrew M. Zimmer (to 17 Aug 50, WIA)
1stLt Robert T. Hanifin, Jr.
(to 22 Aug 50)
1stLt H. J. Smith
CO, Company E Capt George E. Kittredge
(to 7 Aug 50, WIA)
1stLt William E. Sweeney (to 18 Aug 50)
Capt Samuel Jaskilka
CO, Weapons Company Maj Walter Gall (to 10 Aug 50)
Maj Theodore F. Spiker
3d Battalion, 5th Marines:
Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett
Executive Officer Maj John J. Canney
CO, H & S Company 1stLt Arthur E. House, Jr. (to 22 Aug 50)
1stLt Harold D. Fredericks
CO, Company G 1stLt Robert D. Bohn
CO, Company H Capt Joseph C. Fegan, Jr.
(to 18 Aug 50, WIA)
Capt Patrick E. Wildman
CO, Weapons Company Capt Patrick E. Wildman (to 19 Aug 50)
Maj Murray Ehrlich
_Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Air Wing_
Commanding General BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman
Chief of Staff Col Kenneth H. Weir
Marine Air Group 33:
Commanding Officer Col Allen C. Koonce (to 20 Aug 50)
Col Frank G. Dailey
Deputy Commander LtCol Norman J. Anderson
Executive Officer LtCol Radford C. West
CO, VMF-214 LtCol Walter E. Lischeid
CO, VMF-323 Maj Arnold A. Lund
CO, VMF(N)-513 Maj Joseph H. Reinburg
CO, Hq Squadron Capt Norman D. Glenn
CO, Service Squadron LtCol James C. Lindsay
CO, MTACS-2 Maj Christian C. Lee
APPENDIX C
Citations and Commendations
September 29, 1950
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION
The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in
citing for outstanding and heroic performance of duty on the field of
battle during the period 2 August 1950–6 September 1950.
THE FIRST UNITED STATES PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE
for the Award of
THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION
The First United States Provisional Marine Brigade was a vital element
in the first major counterattack against the enemy.
In late July and early August 1950, the enemy had swept through the
Chulla Provinces and had rapidly approached along the south Korean
coast to a point only 35 miles from the vital port of Pusan. Together
with the 25th Infantry Division, the First United States Provisional
Marine Brigade, from 7 August to 12 August 1950, played a major role in
attacking and driving back the enemy.
During the period 17 August to 20 August 1950 in conjunction with the
24th Infantry Division and units of the 2d Infantry Division, the
First United States Provisional Marine Brigade attacked a great pocket
of enemy forces who had successfully crossed the Naktong River and
established a firm beachhead on the eastern bank. The Brigade attacked
with such determination and skill as to earn the admiration of all who
saw or knew of its battle conduct.
Later, on the night of 31 August-1 September, the enemy again launched
an all-out offensive against the United Nations Forces. The First
United States Provisional Marine Brigade was in Army reserve at that
time. With the 2d Infantry Division, the Brigade again was committed in
almost the same area of its earlier action against the Naktong pocket
in the neighborhood of Yongsan. Again the gallant Marine forces were
instrumental in preventing the enemy from capturing their objective and
cutting the north-south lines of communication of the United Nations
Forces.
The brilliant performance of duty in combat in Korea of each individual
of the First United States Provisional Marine Brigade is in accord with
the highest traditions of the military service.
This citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential
Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual of the First United States
Provisional Marine Brigade which served in Korea in the stated period.
(Signed) SYNGMAN RHEE
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the
PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the
FIRST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, REINFORCED
for service as set forth in the following CITATION:
“For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces
in Korea from 7 August to 7 September 1950. Functioning as a mobile,
self-contained, air-ground team, the First Provisional Marine Brigade,
Reinforced, rendered invaluable service during the fierce struggle to
maintain the foothold established by friendly forces in the Pusan area
during the early stages of the Korean conflict. Quickly moving into
action as numerically superior enemy forces neared the Naktong River
on the central front and penetrated to within 35 miles of Pusan in the
southern sector, threatening the integrity of the entire defensive
perimeter, this hard-hitting, indomitable team counterattacked serious
enemy penetrations at three different points in rapid succession.
Undeterred by roadblocks, heavy hostile automatic weapons and highly
effective artillery fire, extremely difficult terrain and intense heat,
the Brigade met the invaders with relentless determination and, on each
crucial occasion, hurled them back in disorderly retreat. By combining
sheer resolution and esprit de corps with sound infantry tactics and
splendid close air support, the Brigade was largely instrumental in
restoring the line of defense, in inflicting thousands of casualties
upon the enemy and in seizing large amounts of ammunition, equipment
and other supplies. The brilliant record achieved by the unit
during the critical early days of the Korean conflict attests to
the individual valor and competence of the officers and men and
reflects the highest credit upon the First Provisional Marine Brigade,
Reinforced, and the United States Naval Service.”
All of the First Provisional Marine Brigade except the First Amphibian
Tractor Company participated in operations against enemy aggressor
forces in Korea from 7 August to 7 September 1950.
The following reinforcing units of the First Provisional Marine Brigade
participated in operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from
7 August to 7 September 1950:
Forward Echelon, First Marine Aircraft Wing (less ground personnel)
Marine Air Group Thirty-Three, Reinforced (less ground personnel)
Marine Observation Squadron Six plus Helicopter Section, Headquarters
Squadron
Air Support Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two
United States Army: Counter Intelligence Corps and Military
Intelligence Special Detachment personnel attached to the
Headquarters Company, Headquarters and Service Battalion, First
Provisional Marine Brigade.
For the President,
(Signed) R. A. ANDERSON
_Secretary of the Navy_
HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)
Office of the Commanding General
APO 301
22 August 1950
Subject: Commendation
Thru: Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division
To: Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade
1. It gives me great pleasure to commend you, your officers and men,
for the part your organization played in the successful attack which
began 17 August 50 against a determined enemy occupying a bridgehead
east of the NAKTONG RIVER in the vicinity of KUJIN-SAN and ended only
when the bridgehead had been eliminated with great loss of men and
equipment to the enemy.
2. Through excellence in leadership and grit and determination in all
ranks, your organization helped materially in preventing the enemy from
penetrating our lines at a critical time. In so doing it has upheld
the fine tradition of the Marines in a glorious manner and by close
cooperation has proved unification of the services a success.
3. Please accept my sincere thanks and congratulations. I ask that you
convey to your splendid command, the traditional “Well Done.”
WALTON H. WALKER
_Lieutenant General, United States Army_
_Commanding_
HEADQUARTERS
24TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 24, 28 August 1950
To: Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, APO 25
1. I am pleased and privileged to add my personal commendation to that
of the Army Commander. And, on behalf of all officers and enlisted
personnel of my command, I desire to express our sincere appreciation
for the decisive and valiant offensive actions conducted by your
command which predominately contributed to the total destruction of the
Naktong pocket.
2. The esprit, aggressiveness and sheer determination continuously
displayed by all personnel of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in
the face of fierce enemy resistance and counteraction has aroused the
highest admiration of every member of my command.
JOHN E. CHURCH
_Maj Gen, USA_
_Commanding_
HEADQUARTERS
1ST PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE, FMF (REINFORCED)
_c/o_ Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.
1355
1:DWS/1dp
Ser 596
9 Sep 1950
From: The Commanding General
To: All officers and men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF
(Reinforced)
Subj: Letter of commendation from the Commanding General, Eighth
United States Army in Korea, of 22 August 1950 with first
endorsement by the Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division
Encl: (1) Copy of subj ltr and endorsement
1. It is with extreme pride in your accomplishments that I publish to
all officers and men of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade the enclosed
copy of a letter from the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army
in Korea, and endorsement by the Commanding General, 24th Infantry
Division, United States Army, commending the Brigade.
2. The realization that your professional skill, esprit de corps,
outstanding bravery, and determination to succeed in all missions
has been specifically commended by the Army and Division Commanders
under whom the Brigade was serving at the time is indeed a source of
gratification to me as it will also be to you.
(Signed) E. A. Craig
E. A. CRAIG
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Appleman, Roy E., LtCol, USA, Ms history of UN operations in Korea,
July–November, 1950. Copy in Office of the Chief of Military
History, Washington, D. C. (OCMH).
Byrnes, James F. _Speaking Frankly._ New York: Harper and Brothers,
1947.
Dallin, David J. _Soviet Russia and the Far East._ New York: Yale
University Press, 1948.
Geer, Andrew. _The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in
Korea._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.
General Headquarters, Far East Command, General Staff, Allied
Translator and Interpreter Section.
Interrogation Reports Series.
Research Supplement No. 1, _North Korean Forces_.
Research Supplement No. 2, _Documentary Evidence of North Korean
Aggression_.
Research Supplement No. 4, _Enemy Forces_.
Research Supplement No. 94, _North Korean Security Forces_;
_North Korean Second Infantry Division_; _North Korean Fourth
Infantry Division_.
Research Supplement No. 100, _North Korean Air Force_; _North
Korean Sixth Infantry Division_.
Research Supplement No. 106, _North Korean Artillery_.
General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence
Section, General Staff, Theater Intelligence Division, Order of
Battle Branch. _Supplement: Order of Battle Information, North
Korean Army, General History of North Korean Units._ Processed;
copy at OCMH.
Giusti, Ernest H. “Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter.” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, 36, No. 5:20–21 (May 1952).
-- --. _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps in the Korean Conflict._
Processed; copy at USMC Historical.
Green, A. Wigfall. _Epic of Korea._ Washington: Public Affairs Press,
1950.
Grew, Joseph C. _Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years._
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952. 2 vols.
Karig, Walter, Capt, USN. _Battle Report: The War in Korea._ New
York: Rinehart, 1952.
Montross, Lynn. _Cavalry of the Sky._ New York: Harper and Brothers,
1954.
-- --. _War Through the Ages._ New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946.
Oliver, Robert T. _Why War Came to Korea._ New York: Fordham
University Press, 1950.
Opie, Redvers, _et al._ _The Search for Peace Settlements._
Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1951.
Stewart, H. D., Maj. “Rise and Fall of an Army.” _Military Review_,
30, No. 11:32–35 (February 1951).
Tompkins, Pauline. _American-Russian Relations in the Far East._ New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1949.
Gugeler, R. A., Capt, “Attack Along a Ridgeline.” _Combat Actions in
Korea._ Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954, 20–30.
U. S. Department of the Army. _Russian Combat Methods in World War
II._ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. (DA Pamphlet No.
20-230).
U. S. Department of State. “Fifth Report to the Security Council,
October 5, 1950.” _United Nations Action in Korea under Unified
Command._ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950 (State Dept
Publications 3986, International Organization and Conference Series
III 6).
U. S. Department of State. _Guide to the UN in Korea._ Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1951 (State Dept Publications 4229, Far
Eastern Series 47).
U. S. Department of State. _United States Relations with China, with
Special Reference to the Period 1944–49, Based on the Files of the
Department of State._ Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949
(State Dept Publications 3573, Far Eastern Series 30).
U. S. Marine Corps Board. _An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine
Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50)._
Processed; copy in USMC Historical. 2 vols.
U. S. Military Academy, Department of Military Art and Engineering.
_Operations in Korea._ West Point, 1953.
Wood, Ransom M. “Artillery Support for the Brigade in Korea.” _Marine
Corps Gazette_, 35, No. 6:16–17 (June 1951).
Index
_Achernar_ (AK), USS, 53, 64, 90
Africa, 8
Aircraft, American:
AD (Skyraider), 47
B-29 (Superforts), 47
F4U (Corsair), 48, 98, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 151, 181, 186, 193,
194, 221, 243
F-51 (Mustangs), 140, 231
Four-engine Marine aircraft, 65
Helicopters, 50, 87, 90, 95, 111, 131, 140, 148, 150
HO3S-1 helicopter, 50, 95, 101
Japan-based Air Force planes, 38
Light Observation planes, 50, 90, 126, 150, 151
OY-2 observation planes, 95, 110, 224
R4D transport, 110
Aircraft, enemy:
Il-10 ground attack bombers, 29
PO-2 primary trainers, 29
YAK-type, 38, 47
YAK-7B fighters, 29
YAK-18 advanced trainers, 29
Russian-made, 17
Air Force, U. S., 140, 231, 243
Far East Air Forces, U. S., 47, 110
Fifth Air Force, 66, 90, 141
Bomber Command, Far East Air Force, 47
Air Support, U. S., 47, 110
Air Support Section. _See_ Marine Units
Almond, MajGen Edward A., USA, 56, 211
Alaska, 4
Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS). _See_ Far
East Command
_Alshain_ (AKA) USS, 53
American Military Government. _See_ Korea, Republic of
Ammunition, American, 98
90-mm., 63, 193
81-mm. mortar, 190
60-mm. mortar, 153, 235
3.5-inch rocket, 193, 235
Ammunition, enemy:
122-mm., 126
85-mm., 235
Anderson, Corpsman William H., USN, 137
_Anderson_ (APA), USS, 53, 64, 90
Andong, 96
Anglo-American blockading force, 47.
_See also_ Navy, U. S.
Antung, 21
Appleman, LtCol Roy E., USA, 34_n_, 45
Arkadis, 2dLt Nickolas A., 184, 191
Armageddon, 37
Army forces, U. S., 174
Army, U. S. troops. _See_ U. S. Ground Forces; and Army units
Army, U. S., Units:
General Headquarters, Far East, 41, 56, 60, 62
Army of occupation in Japan, U. S., 43
Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 43, 45, 46, 47, 57, 59, 62,
65–68, 69 _map_, 70, 88, 90, 92, 96, 98, 99, 103, 143, 150,
207, 208, 210–212, 214, 239, 240
X Corps, 210, 211
2d Infantry Division, 88, 174, 212–215, 229, 236, 241
7th Infantry Division, 43, 211
24th Infantry Division, 43, 45–47, 67, 68, 88, 96, 98, 173–176, 207,
240
25th Infantry Division, 43, 45–47, 67, 68, 88, 99, 100, 103–106,
124, 147, 148, 150, 152, 208, 212, 215
1st Cavalry Division, 43, 46, 67, 68, 96
5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 88, 96, 100, 103, 106, 111–113,
123, 143,152
1st Battalion, 5th RCT, 123, 124
2d Battalion, 5th RCT, 112, 152
9th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 175–179, 182, 186, 187, 196
29th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 46, 67, 68
9th Infantry Regiment, 174, 212, 215–218, 228–231, 233, 235
19th Infantry Regiment, 175, 196
21st Infantry Regiment:
1st Battalion, 175, 178, 196
23d Infantry Regiment, 215, 236, 237, 243
24th Infantry Regiment, 122, 148
2d Battalion, 116, 117, 120
27th Infantry Regiment, 103, 105, 240, 241
2d Battalion, 103
32d Infantry Regiment, 211
34th Infantry Regiment, 46, 175–177, 196
35th Infantry Regiment, 100, 123
8th Field Artillery Battalion, 126
90th Field Artillery Battalion, 147
159th Field Artillery Battalion, 150
555th Field Artillery Battalion, 147, 150–152
2d Engineer Battalion, 215
72d Tank Battalion, 215
8076th Surgical Hospital, 194
Task Force Hill, 174
Task Force Kean, 101, 112, 120, 122–124, 147, 151, 239
Task Force Perry, 67
Task Force Smith, 45, 174
Korean Military Advisory Group, 33
Pusan Logistical Command, 88, 96
Asia, 6, 13, 17, 41
Austria, 10
_Badoeng Strait_ (CVE-116), USS, 53, 64, 89, 90, 92, 95, 98, 139, 142
Bailey, Cant Almarion S., 192_n_, 221
Barstow, California, 51, 63. _See also_ Marine Corps Supply Depot
Barth, BrigGen George B., USA, 99, 150
Barrett, Sgt Edward F., 121
Bartlett, Col Eugene M., USA, 65
Bataway, Sgt Melvin R., 168 _pic._
Batchelor, Maj William L., 143
Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 48, 58
Battles:
Changchun, 13
Mukden, 7, 13
Stalingrad, 10, 19, 23, 24
Tsinan, 13
Tsushima, 7
Valmy, 7
Yalu, 7
Bean Patch, 166 _pic._, 207, 208, 210, 211, 237, 243
Blackmon, Sgt Thomas, 109
_Black Swan_, HMS, 40
Blank, Lt Howard, 236
Bohn, 1stLt Robert D., 104, 104_n_, 119, 122, 129_n_, 132, 135,
135_n_, 136, 137, 201, 201_n_, 203, 204, 206, 228, 233
Bolkow, TSgt George W., 224
Bougainville, 52
Boxer Rebellion, 6
Brigade Commander. _See_ Craig, BrigGen E. A.
Brush, Maj Charles H., 174
Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer), 52
Buettner, Sgt Lee, 108
Bulgaria, 16
Byrnes, James F., U. S. Secretary of State, 2, 3_n_.
Cahill, 2dLt John H., 104, 105_n_, 106, 108–115, 115_n_, 117,
119, 204, 206
Cairo Conference, 1
Canzona, 1stLt Nicholas A., 156
Caribbean, 53
Carr, 1stLt Ira T., 117
Carson, 2dLt John S., 222
Casteel, LtCdr Byron D., USN, 194
Casualties:
Army, 67
enemy, 97, 123
Marine, 109–111, 113, 116, 117, 122, 155, 161 _pic._, 163 _pic._,
186, 206, 227, 237, 239
Cates, Gen Clifton B., 48, 48_n_, 49_n_, 49, 53, 54, 58, 60, 244
Central Powers, 7
Changchon, 144, 146, 147, 151, 152
ambush, 145 _map_
Changchun, Battle of, 13
Changwon, 92–95, 99, 103, 105, 110, 111, 113, 143
Chemulpo (Inchon), 4, 7
Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 12, 14
Chidester, LtCol Arthur A., 66, 88, 91, 160 _pic._
Chief of Naval Operations. _See_ Sherman, Adm Forrest P.
Chief of Staff to General MacArthur. _See_ Almond, MajGen Edward A.,
USA
China, 1, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12–14, 16, 23, 25, 53
Civil War in, 13, 14, 22
Japanese invasion of, 1937, 8, 10
China-Russia-Japan Triangle, 3
Chindong-ni, 100, 103, 103_n_, 104–106, 107 _map_, 110–113, 115, 119,
120, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 132, 147, 148, 150, 152, 208,
239
Chinese Civil War, 153
Chinese Communists, 10, 12, 13, 19, 20
Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 20, 31
8th Route Army, 23, 24
56th Army, 96
164th Infantry Division, 21
166th Infantry Division, 21, 96
Northeast Democratic United Army, 20
Chinese Nationalists, 12, 13, 20, 22, 25
Chinese Nationalist army, 13
Chinhae, 66, 95, 99, 209
Chinju, 46, 66, 67, 68, 70, 97, 98, 100, 112, 122, 123, 143
Chinnampo, 31
Chistyakov, Gen Ivan (Russian), 10, 19
Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA, 23, 24
Chongjin, 21
Chongju, 36
Chorwon, 31
Chukchon-ni, 217, 219
Chuminjin, 40
Chunchon, 32, 39, 40
Church, BrigGen John H., USA, 41, 46, 173–176, 178, 207
“Citizen-Marines”. _See_ Marine Corps Organized Reserve
Civil War, U. S., 54
_Clymer_ (APA), USS, 53, 91, 92
“Cold War”, 6, 9, 13
Cole, Lt Doyle, 140
Collins, Gen J. Lawton, USA, 208
Combat zone, reconnaissance of, 66
Commandant of the Marine Corps. _See_ Cates, Gen Clifton B.
Commander in Chief, Far East. _See_ MacArthur, Gen Douglas
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. _See_ Radford, Adm Arthur W.
Commander Naval Forces, Far East. _See_ Joy, VAdm C. Turner
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. _See_ Shepherd, LtGen
Lemuel C., Jr.
Commanding General, Eighth Army. _See_ Walker, Gen Walton H., USA
Commanding General, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. _See_ Craig,
BrigGen Edward A.
Commanding General, 25th Division. _See_ Kean, MajGen W. B.
Commanding Officer, 5th Marines. _See_ Murray, LtCol R. L.
Commanding Officer, VMO-6. _See_ Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J.
Commando parties, 47
Communications:
HF net, 142
radio vans, 88
SCR-300 radios, 106, 109, 224, 236
TAD net, 142
TAO net, 142
TAR net, 142
VHF net, 142
Communism, 9, 13, 14
Communists, 13, 17, 62
army, 13
doctrine, 3
Empire, 8
Cottrell, TSgt Johnnie C., 137
Counselman, 2dLt John D., 136
Counterattack, enemy, 12–13 Aug 50, 154 _map_
Cowling, 2dLt David R., 146
Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 49, 52, 55, 55_n_, 56, 56_n_, 57, 58, 60,
60_n_, 62, 62_n_, 63–66, 68, 70, 87, 88, 88_n_, 89–95, 99–101,
105, 111, 111_n_, 112, 112_n_, 120_n_, 123, 125, 128, 128_n_,
129, 129_n_, 131, 135, 135_n_, 136, 140, 144, 147, 147_n_,
148, 148_n_, 150, 152, 156, 158 _pic._, 159 _pic._, 173, 174,
177, 178, 178_n_, 179, 181, 186_n_, 194, 196, 207, 207_n_,
210–212, 212_n_, 213, 213_n_, 215, 216, 216_n_, 217, 217_n_,
219, 227_n_, 229, 236–238, 241, 244
Crowson, SSgt T. Albert, 181, 182, 190
Cushman, BrigGen Thomas H., 49, 52, 55, 56, 60, 62, 65, 87, 89, 95,
140, 159 _pic._
Czar Nicholas II, 3, 9
Czar, Russian, 7
Czechoslovakia, 10, 38
D-Day, Sachon Offensive, 100, 126
D-Day, Inchon Landing, 210, 211
Dairen, 4
Dallin, David J., 9_n_, 12_n_
Daly, Col John, USA, 151
Dean, MajGen William F., USA, 45, 46, 67
DeFazio, T/Sgt Ernest L., 158 _pic._
Delafield, Wisconsin, 52
Dennis, S/Sgt Saweren J., 225
Department of State, U. S., 14, 37
Deputy Commander, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. _See_ Cushman,
BrigGen Thomas H.
Dickerson, T/Sgt Sidney S., 181, 182, 189
Downs, CWO Willard C., 238
Doyle, RAdm James H., USN, 24, 53
Duncan, 2dLt Edward F., 132
Duncan, T/Sgt David N., 225
Eddy, 2dLt Rodger E., 184
El Toro, California, 50, 51, 53, 55
Emmelman, 2dLt Edward T., 113, 115
Empress Augusta Bay, 52
England. _See_ Great Britain
English, Capt Gearl M., 50, 63, 92
Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 52, 210
Estonia, 10
Eubanks, 1stLt Fred F., Jr., 198
Europe, 8, 9, 12, 41
Far East, 1, 3, 4, 6–9, 13, 22, 39, 40, 43, 45, 48, 49
Far East Command:
General Headquarters, Tokyo, 41, 56, 60, 62, 64
Military Intelligence Section, GS, Allied Translator and
Interpreter Section, 16_n_, 17_n_, 19_n_, 21_n_, 22_n_, 26_n_,
27_n_, 28_n_, 30_n_, 33_n_, 39_n_, 130_n_
Fegan, Capt Joseph C., Jr., 104, 104_n_, 119, 120_n_, 120–122, 129,
135, 135_n_, 136, 137, 151, 155, 201, 201_n_, 203, 204
Fenton, Capt Francis I., Jr., 189_n_, 190, 195, 196, 196_n_, 198, 219,
220, 222, 224, 229, 231, 231_n_, 233, 233_n_, 234–236
Field, 2dLt Paul R., 193
Finger Ridge, 175–177, 193, 196, 203, 206, 234, 236
Finn, Capt John, Jr., 113–116
Florida, 42
Formosa, 4, 14, 41
Forney, Col Edward H., 211
_Fort Marion_ (LSD), USS, 53, 63
Fox, Capt George C., 190_n_, 192, 192_n_, 195_n_, 196, 196_n_, 197,
198, 200, 201, 217_n_, 220, 222, 224
France, 4
Freeman, Col Paul L., USA, 243
French Revolution, 7
Fukuoka, Japan, 65
Fullerton, TSgt C. R., 192_n_, 193
Gall, Maj Walter, 117, 117_n_, 129
Garvin, BrigGen Crump, USA, 66, 87
Gay, MajGen Hobart R., USA, 46
Geer, Andrew, 51_n_, 54_n_
General Headquarters (GHQ). _See_ Far East Command
Genghis Khan, 13
Georgia, 42
Germany, 4, 6, 8–10
Giaquinto, Cpl Raymond, 136
Giusti, Maj Ernest H., 48_n_, 140_n_
Golden Gate Bridge, 64
Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J., 50
Great Britain: 27th Infantry Brigade, 2, 14
Green, A. Wigfall, 34_n_
Grew, Joseph C., 9_n_
Guadalcanal, 53, 109
Guam, Marianas Islands, 42, 52
Gugeler, Capt R. A., USA, 174_n_
_Gunston Hall_ (LSD), USS, 53, 63
Hadong, 67, 98
Haiti, 52
Haman, 104, 119, 121
Hamhung, 20, 31
Han, Lt (NKPA), 17
Han River, 40, 173
Haneda Airport, 56
Hanifin, Capt R. T., Jr., 113_n_, 114–116, 189
Harris, MajGen Field, 159 _pic._
Harvey, Lt(jg) Robert J., USN, 206
Hawaii, 88
Hay, John, U. S. Secretary of State, 6
Helicopters. _See_ Aircraft, American
Henderson, Cpl Virgil W., 224
_Henrico_ (APA), USS, 53, 63, 64, 90
Hetrick, 2dLt Lawrence W., 119, 156
Hickey, Lt(jg) Bernard L., USN, 194, 219
Hideyoshi, Japanese war lord, 3
Hill, Col John G., USA, 174, 176–178, 186
Hill:
Hill 88--136, 137
Hill 91--222, 224, 233
Hill 99--104, 106, 110, 111, 119, 121, 123
Hill 102--179, 182, 183, 190, 193, 195, 197, 200
Hill 109--179, 182–184, 190, 191, 193, 195–198, 200
Hill 117--179, 181, 182, 190, 191, 195–198, 200, 220, 221, 222, 224,
225, 227–229
Hill 125--175, 177, 181, 193, 229, 231, 234–237
Hill 190--129
Hill 143--179, 181–184, 190, 191, 195, 201
Hill 147--179, 184, 186, 201
Hill 153--179, 184, 186, 201
Hill 202--147, 153, 155
Hill 207--175, 178, 179, 183, 201, 203, 204, 206
Hill 250--146
Hill 255--103, 104, 110–112, 119, 121–123
Hill 301--146
Hill 308--124, 125, 127, 129
Hill 311--175, 178, 203, 204, 206, 207
Hill 342--104–106, 109–117, 123, 124, 129
Hill 347--108
Cloverleaf, 176–178, 229–231, 233, 236
Observation, 175–178, 181, 184, 189, 190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 229,
231, 233, 234, 236
Red Slash, 179
Hodge, LtGen John R., USA, 10, 14, 15
Hodge, TSgt Paul A., 200
Hongchon, 23
Houghton, Capt Kenneth J., 144, 146
Hungary, 10
Hwachon, 32
Hwayong-ni, 229–231
Iceland, 53
Il-li, 215
Inchon, 17, 40, 42, 56, 98, 210, 211, 237, 238, 241
Ingvolstad, LtCdr Orlando, Jr., USN, 194
Intelligence, U. S.:
Army, 20, 23_n_
Captured NK documents, 17, 29
Japanese maps, 127
POW interrogations, 28, 29, 31
Italy, 8
Itami, Japan, 62, 65, 89
Air Force Base, 60, 87, 89, 90
Itazuke, Japan, 243
Airfield, 90, 141
“Iron Curtain,” 10
Iwo Jima, 51, 52
_Jamaica_, HMS, 40
James, Cpl Melvin, 121, 121_n_
Japan, 1–4, 6–9, 41, 43, 45, 46, 56, 57, 61 _map_, 62, 87,
89, 211, 243
Celestial Empire, 4
Russian WWII declaration of war on, 9
U. S. occupation of, WWII, 9
Japan sea, 41
_Kamikaze_ tactics of, 2
Jaskilka, Capt Samuel, 217, 221, 224
Johnston, 2dLt Thomas H., 191, 192
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 48, 49, 57–60
Joint Operations Center (JOC), 141
Joy, VAdm C. Turner, USN, 41, 48, 49, 53, 56, 57, 70, 211
_Juneau_ (CL), USS, 40, 47
Kaechon, 31
Kaesong, 32, 39
Kanggye, 31
Kang-ni, 227, 229
Kapyong, 40
Karig, Capt Walter, USNR, 40_n_
Kean, MajGen William B., USA, 45, 88, 92, 99, 101, 105, 112,
124, 147, 207
Keiser, MajGen Lawrence B., USA, 212, 213, 215, 229
Kim Il Sung, Red Korean prime minister, 16, 22, 23, 25
Kim Mu Chong, LtGen, NKPA, 19, 20, 25
Kim Sung Chu, 23
Kim Ung, LtGen, NKPA, 24
King, Maj George J., 141_n_
King, Capt George W., 128
Kipling, Rudyard, 6
Kittredge, Capt George E., Jr., 111
Klein, Lt (jg) Chester L., USN, 194
Kobe, Japan, 60, 64, 65, 89, 90, 210
Kochang, 67, 68, 68_n_
Korea, 1–4, 6–8, 10, 11 _map_, 14–17, 19–21, 23, 24, 32, 37, 41–43,
45–47, 51, 53, 56, 58–60, 61 _map_, 62, 63, 65, 70, 87–90, 96,
97, 126, 127, 141, 150, 173, 209, 210, 242, 243
American landing in, 1871, 3
Annexation of by Japan, 1910, 7
Civil War in, 14, 23.
_See also_ Republic of Korea and North Korean Peoples Democratic
Republic
Conflict in, historical background, 3
Japanese possession, 1
North. _See_ People’s Democratic Republic of
Partition of, 10
People’s Army. _See_ People’s Democratic Republic of
People’s Democratic Republic of, 12, 14, 16, 16_n_, 19, 20, 21, 34,
36, 114–116, 120, 123, 135, 136, 174, 183, 193, 200, 201, 203,
217, 220, 224, 228, 231, 234, 235, 239
Agrarian Reform, 16, 21
People’s Army, 19, 20, 22, 23_n_, 67, 98, 104, 108, 128, 135, 173,
200, 203, 212, 244
Air Force, 29
armament, 21
Aviation Section of Pyongyang Military Academy, organization
of, 29
Casualties, 239
Commander in Chief. _See_ Kim Il Sung
conscription program of, 31
Decoration “Hero of the Korean Democratic People’s Republic”, 25;
“Order of the National Flag, 1st Class”, 25
Deputy Commander in Chief. _See_ Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA
Division Headquarters, organization of, 26
First Amphibious Operation in Korea, 39
Front Headquarters, organization of, 26
infantry division, organization of, 27
invasion of South Korea, 32, 37, 44 _map_
Order of Battle in, 35 _map_
organization of, 26
rifle regiment, organization of, 27
rifle company, organization of, 27
rifle platoon, organization of, 27
spies, 22
strength of, 213
training of, 22, 31, 32
Units:
I Corps, 25
II Corps, 25
III Corps, 25
105th Armored Division, 21, 29, 32, 39, 97
1st Infantry Division, 20, 25, 32, 39
2d Infantry Division, 20, 21, 32, 39, 215
3d Infantry Division, 20, 30, 32, 39
4th Infantry Division, 21, 32, 39, 174, 175, 186, 196, 203,
214, 228, 240
5th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 39
6th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 39, 96–98, 100, 106, 108,
112, 117, 124, 147, 153, 239
7th Infantry Division, 21, 22
8th Infantry Division, 21, 22
9th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 214, 216, 219, 227
10th Infantry Division, 215
12th Infantry Division, 21, 22
13th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 33
14th Infantry Division, 21, 22
15th Infantry Division, 21, 22, 32, 33, 39
10th Mechanized Infantry Division, 21, 22
849th Anti-tank Regiment, 29
5th Infantry Regiment, 174
6th Infantry Regiment, 96
13th Infantry Regiment, 96, 117
14th Infantry Regiment, 96
15th Infantry Regiment, 96, 117
16th Infantry Regiment, 174
18th Infantry Regiment, 174, 182, 190, 203
206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, 29, 30
107th Medium Tank Regiment, 29, 174
109th Medium Tank Regiment, 29
203d Medium Tank Regiment, 29
83d Motorcycle Regiment, 96–98, 139, 147, 239
308th Armored Battalion, 29
Aviation Society, 28
Labor Party of, 25
Minister of National Defense. _See_ Choe Yong Gun, Marshal, NKPA.
Navy, 40
People’s Assembly at Pyongyang, 15
People’s Committee, 12
Prime Minister. _See_ Kim Il Sung
Supreme People’s Council, 16, 24
population of, 42
Republic of, 15, 16, 16_n_, 21–23, 26, 33, 34, 36–38, 47, 62, 67, 214
American Military Government of, 15
army, 16, 33, 34, 40, 45
Army units:
Capital Division, 34, 214
1st Infantry Division, 34, 214
2d Infantry Division, 34
3d Infantry Division, 34, 36, 214
5th Infantry Division, 34, 36
6th Infantry Division, 34, 214
7th Infantry Division, 34
8th Infantry Division, 34, 214
17th Regiment, 34
Interim Legislature of, 15
invasion of, 17, _map_ front endpaper
National Assembly of, 15, 16
Navy units: 1st Korean Marine Regiment, 238
Security Force, 15
Russian Occupation of, 1945, 10, 19, 20
South. _See_ Republic of
Terrain, 42
trusteeship of, 2, 14, 15
United States occupation of, 10, 16
Volunteer Army, 19, 20, 23
Kosong, 100, 131, 132, 135–137, 139, 140, 143, 148, 156, 244
Kosong Turkey Shoot, 139, 146
Kremlin, 19, 21, 23
Krulak, Col Victor H., 49, 53
Kumchon, 67, 68
Kum River, 46, 96, 97, 173
Kumwan, 68_n_
Kunsan, 96, 97, 238
Kurtz, SSgt Charles F., Jr., 135
Kwangju, 36, 97
Kyoto, 60
Landrum, Col Eugene M., USA, 65, 68, 88, 92
Latham, Henry J., 159 _pic._
Latvia, 10
Lawson, TSgt Frank J., 197
League of Nations, 37
Lee Hwal, Col, NKPA, 28
Lenin, Nickolai, 13
Lennon, 2dLt Thomas P., 206
Liaotung Peninsula, 4, 7, 8
Russian 25-year lease of, 6
Lischeid, LtCol Walter E., 98
Lischeski, TSgt F. J., 144_n_, 147
“Long March”, 25
Lueddeke, Lt Gustave F., 101
Lund, Maj Arnold A., 90, 139, 140
MacArthur, Gen of the Army Douglas, 9, 33, 38, 40, 45, 48, 49, 53,
56–60, 62, 210, 211, 239, 240
McMullen, TSgt Orval F., 191, 195, 200, 220, 222
McNeely, Maj Morgan J., 113, 132, 135
Macy, Sgt Jack, 110
Main Supply Route (MSR):
enemy, 47
Marine, 94, 104, 106, 111, 112, 115, 117, 120, 120_n_, 122–124, 129,
135, 136, 143, 151, 156, 175, 177–179, 181, 182, 190, 193,
195, 196, 203, 216–222, 224, 225, 227–229, 231–236
Manchukuo, 8. _See also_ Manchuria.
Manchuria, 4, 7–10, 13, 20, 21, 23, 24, 31. _See also_ Manchukuo.
puppet state in, 8
Russia in (World War II), 9
Mao Tse-tung, 12, 14, 25
Marines, U. S., 3, 47, 52, 53, 56–58, 62–65, 70, 90, 92, 105, 106,
108, 113, 116, 119, 123, 125, 128, 129, 157 _pic._, 176, 182,
183, 240, 244
Air, 60, 62, 70, 98, 122, 132, 134, 186, 190, 207, 229, 240
Air crews, 168 _pic._
Air-ground team, 57, 68, 89, 91, 99, 238, 239, 244
Air Support Section, 87, 99
Equipment, 51
Expansion program, 58
Ground forces, 53, 54, 60, 62, 65, 70, 88, 93, 95, 98, 108, 140;
landing of, 90
request for, 47
Units:
Air
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 48, 89
2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 48
Marine Air Group-33, 49, 53, 60, 64, 68, 87, 90, 116, 122, 136,
140, 141, 181, 186, 187, 193, 203, 204, 221, 233, 242, 243
VMF-214, 89, 98, 141, 243
VMF-323, 89, 90, 98, 139–143
VMF(N)-513, 90, 141, 230, 230_n_, 243
VMO-6, 50, 66, 70, 89, 90, 95, 101, 110, 126, 140, 141, 194, 208,
209, 222, 224, 233, 243
Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two (MTACS-2), 89, 95, 141, 142
Marine Helicopter Squadron (Experimental) One (HMX-1), 50
Ground,
Fleet Marine Force, 48, 141
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, 48, 59
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 48, 55, 56, 63, 87
V Amphibious Corps, 52
1st Marine Division, 48, 52, 56, 58, 59, 60, 87, 210, 211, 213, 216
2d Marine Division, 48
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 49, 50, 52–60, 62–65, 68, 70, 87–93,
96, 98–101, 103, 105, 108, 111, 112, 124–126, 129, 136, 141,
148, 152, 155, 173, 175, 176, 178, 186, 194, 207–209, 211,
212, 219, 222, 229, 234, 235, 237–244;
Action on Southwestern Front, 7–13 Aug 50, 102 _map_;
activation of, 49;
Advance Party, 56, 61, 65, 70;
air component, number of personnel, 51;
air-ground team, 56, 140, 141;
departure of, 54, 55;
expansion of, 60;
ground forces, number of personnel, 51;
ground elements, 64, 141;
mobilization of, 59;
Observation Section, organization of, 141;
rear echelon, 93
1st Marine Regiment, 210
5th Marine Regiment, 49–52, 91, 94, 105, 126, 177–179, 194, 195,
209–211, 213, 216, 217, 221, 236;
CO. _See_ Murray, LtCol Raymond L.;
organization of, 49;
4.2-inch Mortar Company, 105;
Anti-Tank Company, 103, 193, 221
1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 63, 93, 94, 111, 119, 123–125, 127–129,
144, 147, 148, 152, 178, 179, 187, 189, 194, 196, 197, 206,
216, 217, 219, 221, 224, 225, 227–231, 233, 235–237;
CO. _See_ Newton, LtCol George R.
Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 127, 129, 190–193, 195–198,
146, 155, 200, 201, 203, 219–225, 227, 229–231, 236, 237
Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 123, 127, 129, 144, 146, 147,
153, 155, 189–193, 195, 197, 198, 200, 219–222, 225, 227,
229–231, 234–237
Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 127, 189, 190, 193
Anti-tank assault platoon, 193
2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 94, 110, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 129,
131, 132, 142, 148, 152, 178, 179, 181–184, 186, 187, 189,
192, 194, 196, 200, 206, 216, 217, 221, 222, 224, 227;
CO, _see_ Roise, LtCol H. S.
Company D, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 112–117, 131, 132, 181–184,
189, 190, 217, 221, 224, 227, 228
Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 111, 113, 114, 116, 181, 183,
184, 186, 190, 217, 221, 224, 227
Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 117
3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 94, 103–106, 110, 111, 119, 120, 122,
129, 132, 135–137, 139, 142, 144, 148, 150–152, 177–179, 196,
206, 216, 227, 229, 231, 233, 236, 237;
CO. _See_ Taplett, LtCol Robert D.
Company G, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 104, 106, 111, 112, 114, 119,
121, 122, 132, 135, 136, 151, 201, 203, 204, 206, 227, 228,
230, 231, 233
Company H, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 104, 111, 119–122, 135–137,
143, 151, 201, 203, 204, 206, 228, 230, 231
Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, 230
7th Marine Regiment, 210
9th Marine Regiment, 52
1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 51, 92, 103, 116, 122, 125, 126, 136,
139, 152, 176, 182, 187, 203, 208, 212, 222, 227, 228, 233
Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, 51, 103, 119, 128, 156, 195, 201,
219, 225, 227
Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, 50, 63, 187, 192, 193, 203,
204, 222, 234
Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 51
1st Amphibious Tractor Company, 63
Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, 143
Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, 143
Brigade Reconnaissance Company Detachment, 105, 131, 144, 227
Brigade Medical Section, 143
Combat Service Detachment, 92
Brigade Air Section, 110
Malaria and Epidemic Control Unit, 194
First Replacement Draft, activation of, 60
Marine Corps, U. S., 48, 50, 52, 56–58, 60, 92, 144, 147, 151, 153.
_See also_ Marines, U. S.
Air Station, El Toro, California. _See_ El Toro, California
Hymn, 91
Organized Reserve, mobilization of, 58
Schools. _See_ Quantico, Virginia
Supply Depot, Barstow, California, 51, 63
Martin, Col Robert R., USA, 46
Marx, Karl, 13
Masan, 66, 70, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 103, 104, 120, 122, 123,
143, 148, 207
Matthews, Francis P., 48
Medical Aid Stations, 194
Mediterranean, 210_n_
Mediterranean Fleet. _See_ Navy, U. S., 6th Fleet
Mesanjin, 31
Michaelis, Col John H., USA, 105, 106
Millar, TSgt Stanley G., 192
Miryang, 152, 173, 176, 177, 194, 211, 212;
River, 173
Mokpo, 97, 98
Mokpu, 42, 97
Mongolia, 8, 10
Mongols, 10, 20
Montross, Lynn J., 50_n_, 54_n_
Morgan, TSgt Ray, 121
Moscow, 1, 9, 10, 12, 13, 22, 23, 26;
Conference, 1945, 141
Moses, Captain Vivian, 140
Muccio, Ambassador John J., 15, 33, 34, 37
Muetzel, 2dLt Francis W., 158 _pic._, 190_n_, 196_n_, 198, 217, 220,
222, 224, 233_n_, 236, 237
Mukden, 7;
Battle of, 7, 13
Munsan, 39
Murray, LtCol Raymond L., 51–53, 63, 65, 65_n_, 70, 90, 91, 91_n_,
101, 111, 112, 122, 124, 124_n_, 125, 127, 127_n_, 128,
128_n_, 129, 131, 132, 135, 143, 148_n_, 152, 176, 177–179,
186, 186_n_, 187, 196, 201, 213, 216, 217, 227, 229, 230, 233
Myong-ni, 216, 217, 221, 224, 228
Naktong, 96, 174, 214, 215, 237, 239, 240, 241;
Bulge, 150, 173, 174, 175, 180, 185 _map_, 203, 206, 212, 213,
215, 240, 241, 243;
River, 47, 66–68, 88, 150, 172 _pic._, 203, 207, 215, 231, 240
First Battle of, 17–19 Aug 50, 173–206, 199 _map_, 202 _map_,
205 _map_;
1st Provisional Marine Brigade Objective One, 129, 176–179,
192, 195, 198;
Objective Two, 178, 201, 203, 204;
Objective Three, 178, 179, 204, 206
Second Battle of, 3–6 Sep 50, 207-235, 218 _map_, 223 _map_,
232 _map_;
1st Provisional Marine Brigade Objective One, 217, 220,
221, 227, 229;
Objective Two, 222
Nam Il, LtGen, NKPA, 24, 25
Nam River, 88
Namwon, 97
Nanking, 23
Nanam, 20, 31
Naval Blockade:
United Nations, 40;
U. S., of Formosa, 41;
of Korean Coast, 41
Naval Forces in the Far East, 41
Naval Supply Depot, Oakland, California, 64
Naval Support, U. S., 47
Navy, U. S.:
Sixth Fleet, U. S., 58, 210_n_
Seventh Fleet, U. S., 41, 211
Task Force 77, 47
Task Group 53.7, 63, 64, 89–91
Task Group 96.5, 40
PhibGroup One, 211
Amphibious Planning Group 1, 53
Task Unit 53.7.3, 63
Nazi invasion of Russia, 8
Nelson, Lt(jg) Bentley G., USN, 194
_Newsweek_, 39_n_
Newton, LtCol George R., 93, 94, 119, 123, 123_n_, 124, 124_n_, 125,
127, 128, 129, 146, 147, 155, 187, 189, 191, 195, 198, 200,
201, 217, 217_n_, 219, 221, 222, 224, 225
_New York Times_, 16_n_
No Name Ridge, 179, 180
Nonsan, 174
Oakley, 2dLt Arthur A., 113–115
Obong-ni, 183, 184
Obong-ni Ridge, 162 _pic._, 175–179, 181, 185 _map_, 187, 191–196, 199
_map_, 200–203, 206, 231, 233, 234, 236
Obregon, PFC Eugene A., 161 _pic._
O’Donnell, MajGen Emmett, USAF, 47
Offensive, Sachon, 145 _map_, 148 _map_
Okinawa, 41, 46, 51
Oliver, Robert T., 12_n_
Olson, Maj Merlin R., 236, 237;
LtCol, 123_n_, 124_n_, 125_n_, 129_n_, 217_n_, 233_n_
O’Mahoney, Maj Thomas J., 92
Ongjin Peninsula, 17, 32, 39
“Open Door” Policy, 6
Osaka, 60
Osan, 45, 74
Oso-ri, 127, 128
Pacific Ocean, 7, 8
Paedun-ni, 100, 127, 129, 131, 132, 149 _map_
Pang, MajGen, NKPA, 97
Partridge, MajGen Earle E., USAF, 66, 70
Patton, Gen George S., USA, 45
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 55
Peiping, 24
Peleliu, 210
Pendleton, Camp Joseph H., California, 48–51, 51_n_, 52, 53, 87, 90
Pentagon, 41, 57, 59, 60
Perry, Commodore Matthew C., 3
Pescadores Group, 4
Peters, SSgt Carl W., 168 _pic._
Philippine Islands, 6, 41
_Pickaway_ (APA), USS, 53, 63, 65, 91
Plan Able, 58, 60
Plan Baker, 58
Pochon, 39
Pohang-dong, 46, 47, 67, 96
Poland, 10, 38
“Police Action”, 39
Pomeroy, 1stLt William D., 129, 204, 234, 235
Port Arthur, 4, 7
Potsdam Conference, July 1947, 9_n_
Pugok, 131
Pusan, 18, 42, 47, 62, 65–67, 70, 87–89, 92, 93, 95–97, 99, 141, 173,
208–211, 213, 214, 236–241
Harbor, 89, 91
Perimeter, 57, 96, 142, 150, 174, 210, 211, 213, 214, 236, 237,
239–242, 244. _See_ map inside back cover
Terminal, 91
University, 237
Pyongyang, 4, 12, 14–16, 16_n_, 20–24, 26, 29, 34, 47, 214
Military Academy, 28, 30, 31
Quantico, Virginia, 50, 52
Radford, Adm Arthur W., USN, 48, 49
Reeves, MSgt Harold, 116
Regimental Combat Team (RCT). _See_ Army units, Marine units
Reid, 2dLt Wallace J., 113, 115
Reinburg, Maj Joseph H., 230
Rhodes, 1stLt Nye G., 158 _pic._
Richards, 1stLt Wayne E., 195
Robinson, SSgt Robert, 108
Roise, LtCol Harold S., 94, 110, 111, 111_n_, 112–114, 116, 129, 131,
132, 178, 181, 189, 216, 217, 219, 221, 222
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 2, 3
Rumania, 10
Russell, Maj John W., 189
Russia, 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 13, 140;
Czarist, 6;
Nazi invasion of, 8.
_See also_ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Baltic Fleet, 7
Russian-Japanese Border Clashes, 8
Russian revolution of 1917, 8, 13
Russo-Japanese War, 3, 6
Sachon, 98, 100, 122, 125, 129, 136, 140, 142–144, 146–148, 156, 239
Sachon Offensive, 130 _map_, 133 _map_, 134 _map_
Sachon Offensive Situation Map, 149
Sadong, 31
Saint Johns Military Academy, 52
Saipan, 53
Sakhalin Island, 7, 8
Samchok, 40
Samchonpo, 156
San Clemente Island, 63
San Diego, California, 53, 63, 210
Sangnyong-ni, 112, 113, 124, 128, 129
Sasebo, Japan, 60, 64
Schryver, 1stLt Hugh C., 144, 190
Scott, Hugh D., Jr., 159 _pic._
Sebilian, 1stLt Robert C., 191
Secretary of the Navy. _See_ Matthews, Francis P.
Seoul, 6, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 46, 96, 98, 174
attack on, 39
fall of, 40
Russian legation at, 6
strafing of, 17
University, 208, 214
Shepherd, LtGen Lemuel C., Jr., 49, 53, 55, 158 _pic._
Sharp, Capt L. D., Jr., 64_n_
Sherman, Adm Forrest P., USN, 48, 49, 58, 60
Sherman, Gen William T., USA, 54
Shinka, 2dLt M. J., 181_n_, 182, 183
Ships:
American: LST Q0119, 143
Enemy: Torpedo Boat, 39
Siban-ni, 98
Siberia, 9, 21
_Silcily_ (CVE), USS, 90, 95, 98, 142
Simpson, PFC Benjamin C., 192
Sinchon, 31
Singi, 123, 124
“Sino-Japanese War”, 4, 6
Sinuiju, 20, 21, 31, 32
Sinuiju Airfield, 28
Skelt, 1stLt Ernest P., 238
Smith, LtCol Charles B., USA, 45
Smith, 1stLt H. J., 221, 224
Smith, 1stLt James W., 146
Smith, MajGen Oliver P., 159 _pic._, 210, 211
Smolensk, 24
Snedeker, Col Edward W., 65, 70, 90, 91, 219
Snyder, 1stLt Joris J., 230
Soviet Russia, _See_ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Spain, 37
Spanish-American War, 1898, 6
Spotter, LtComdr Otto E., USN, 195, 219
Stalin, Joseph, 1–3, 8, 9, 13
Stalingrad, Battle of, 10, 19, 23, 24
Stephens, Cpl Raymond E., 224
Stevens, Capt John R., 191, 192, 192_n_, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 217,
219, 220, 222, 224;
Maj., 144_n_, 146, 190_n_, 196_n_, 233_n_
Stewart, Maj Frank R., Jr., 213, 214_n_
Stewart, Col J. L., 55, 56_n_, 62_n_, 65, 65_n_, 66, 66_n_, 68_n_, 70,
70_n_, 87, 87_n_, 88, 91, 91_n_, 99, 100, 100_n_, 101, 148,
150, 151, 178_n_, 208, 216, 217, 219, 237_n_, 244
Strategic triangle. _See_ China-Russia-Japan triangle
Strategy, Communist:
“end run,” 65, 67
United Nations: delaying action, 40, 45, 46, 65
Stratemeyer, LtGen George E., USAF, 41, 60
Struble, VAdm Arthur D., USN, 41, 211
Summers, PFC Ralph J., 161 _pic._
Sunam-dong, 136
Sunchon, 97
Suwon, 40, 41, 45
Sweeney, 1stLt William E., 113, 114, 181_n_, 184, 191
Sweet, 2dLt Granville G., 192, 193, 222
Syngman, Dr. Rhee, 1, 15, 33, 158 _pic._, 209
Syngman, Madame Rhee, 209
Tactical Air Control Center, U. S. Air Force (TACC), 141
Tactical Air Control Party, 110, 139
Tactics:
NKPA, 25
air, 22
artillery, 22
tank, 22
Soviet cold-war, 39
Taedabok Pass, 131, 132
Taegu, 36, 65, 66, 70, 88, 90, 92, 96, 98, 141, 173, 213, 240, 241
Taejon, 36, 40, 46, 67, 174, 175
Taepyong-ni, 110, 113, 114
Taesil-li, 127, 128, 149 _map_
Tanghong-ni, 143
Taplett, LtCol Robert D., 103–105, 105_n_, 110, 111, 119, 122, 132,
135, 135_n_, 136, 143, 148, 150–152, 177, 178, 201, 201_n_,
204, 206, 216, 227_n_, 228, 230, 233, 233_n_, 236
Tarawa, 53
Tartars, 10
Taylor, 1stLt David S., 147, 190
Tennant, Lt William G., USN, 194
Terrio, PFC Donald, 121, 121_n_
Thirty-eighth Parallel, 10, 12, 14–17, 21, 32, 37–39, 42, 59
Tobin, Cape John L., 123, 125, 144, 146, 153, 155, 189, 190
Togo, Adm, Japanese, 7
Tokkong-ni, 113, 117
Tokyo, 41, 43, 49, 56, 59, 60, 62, 65, 210, 211, 213, 216
Tompkins, Pauline, 6_n_
Tosan, 100, 103, 111, 112, 123, 124, 129, 149 _map_
Transportation:
motor transport, 55
American:
cargo trucks, 88
jeeps, 131, 140
M-44 armored personnel carriers, 151
motorcycles, 140
2½-ton trucks, 131
Army trucks, 93, 177
Marine truck, 166 _pic._
enemy, 139, 140
motorcycles, 139, 140, 158 _pic._
Trans-Siberian Railroad, 4
Treaties:
Japan-England, treaty of alliance, 1902, 6
Japan-Korea, treaty of amity, 1887, 4
Portsmouth, treaty of, 5 September 1905, 7
Russia-China treaty of alliance, 1896, 4
Russia-China, treaty of alliance, 1902, 6
Russia-Japan, 1896, 7
Russia-Japan, 1898, 7
Russia-Nationalist China treaty of friendship, 8, 13
Triple Intervention (Russia-Germany-France), 4
Truce of the Bear, 6
Truman, President Harry S., 15, 38, 41, 45, 49, 58
Trygve Lie (U. N. Secretary-General), 37
Tsinan:
battle of, 13
fall of, 13
Tsushima:
battle of, 7
Straits, 90
Tugok, 175–177, 179, 182, 186, 189, 190, 193, 196, 234, 236
Uffelman, 1stLt Paul R., 184
Uijongbu, 39, 194
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 14,
22, 25, 38, 64
American Joint Commission, 15
army, 22
army of occupation, 24
Nationalist China treaty of friendship and alliance, 1945, 13
withdrawal of occupation troops in Korea, 16
United Nations, 15, 16, 34, 37–39, 214
Commander. _See_ MacArthur, Gen Douglas
Commission on Korea, 15, 38
Ground Forces, 66
forces, 96, 141, 228, 241, 243
General Assembly, 15
Naval blockade, 40
Security Council, 38, 45, 240
United States, 1, 3, 8, 13–15, 33, 34, 38, 40, 42, 50, 60
air-ground team, 48, 49
ground forces, 45–47, 120
commitment of, 38
first enemy contact by, 45
Lend Lease, 140
Naval blockade of Korean coast, 41
_Valley Forge_ (CV), USS, 48
Valmy, Battle of, 7
Van Orman, LtCol Ellsworth G., 91
Vasilev, LtGen, Russian, 22, 23
Vladivostok, 4, 21
Occupation of by Japan, 8
Waegwan, 67, 96
Walker, LtGen Walton H., USA, 45, 57, 62, 65–67, 70, 88, 89, 91, 92,
100, 104, 174
Wang Yun, Col, NKPA, 29
Wang Yun, MajGen, NKPA, 29
Washington, D. C., 48, 49, 52, 58
Washington, University of, 52
Weapons:
enemy:
antitank guns, 117, 131, 132, 137, 192, 222
automatic weapons, 131
“burp guns,” 113. _See also_ automatic weapons
hand grenades, 120, 183
howitzers, 122-mm, 207
machineguns, 117, 124, 131, 135, 182–184
machinegun, 7.62-mm., 30
mortar, 111
mortar, 120-mm., 230
rifle, 85-mm., 30, 193, 221
self-propelled guns, 76-mm., 29
semiautomatic pistol, Tokarev, 21
small arms, 140, 155, 216, 224
tanks, Russian-made, 16
tank, T-34, 21, 30, 45, 46, 63, 162 _pic._, 175, 193, 208, 216,
221, 222, 228, 234
United States:
guns, 20-mm., 140
guns, 75-mm., 46
guns, 90-mm., 50, 132, 137, 192, 193, 203, 222
howitzers, 105-mm., 46, 50, 55, 126, 139, 171 _pic._, 182, 240
howitzers, 155-mm., 46
machineguns, .50-caliber, 143
mortars, 60-mm., 114, 116, 131, 135, 153, 182, 197, 236
mortars, 81-mm., 117, 155, 184, 197, 200, 206, 220, 230, 235, 236
mortar, 4.2-inch, 105, 155, 184
rifle, 75-mm. recoilless, 104, 183, 193, 204, 219, 221
rifle, M-1, 238
rockets, air, 168 _pic._
rocket, 2.36″, 194
rocket, 5-inch, 47
rocket launchers, 3.5″, 46, 52, 153
tanks, 143, 157 _pic._, 160 _pic._, 167
tanks, light, 46, 150, 151
tanks, M-24, 43
tanks, M-26 “Pershing,” 50, 63, 93, 129, 137, 144, 163 _pic._,
192, 193, 203, 217, 219, 222, 234, 235
tanks, M4A3 medium, 50
supporting arms, 171 _pic._
Weir, Col Kenneth H., 56_n_, 62_n_, 87, 89, 95
Westerman, 1stLt Jack, 132, 135
Whampoa Military Academy, 23, 24
Wheatley, SSgt John I., 121
White, Sgt Bryan K., 225
_Whiteside_ (AKA), USS, 53
Williams, 2dLt John O., 120, 121, 203
Winter, 2dLt Robert M., 217, 219, 222
Wirth, 2dLt Leroy K., 116, 182, 189
“Wolfhounds.” _See_ 27th Infantry Regiment
Wonsan, 21
Wood, LtCol Ransom H., 51, 94, 126, 178
World War I, 7, 10, 52, 53
Armistice ending, 8
World War II, 1, 8, 10, 13, 19, 24–26, 37, 38, 43, 45, 48, 50–54, 56,
109, 140, 173
Wright, MSgt Edward A., 190
Wright, BrigGen Edwin K., USA, 56, 62, 211
Yaban-san, 105, 112, 117, 119
Yalta:
conference, 2
agreement, 8
Yalu River, 4, 21, 42, 47;
battle of, 7
Yellow Sea, 41, 98
Yenan, 19, 23, 25;
Military School, 23, 25
Yonchon, 39
Yongdok, 96
Yongdungpo, 38, 96
Yongsan, 164 _pic._, 174, 175, 196, 212, 216, 217, 222, 237
Yosu, 97
Young, 2dLt James R., 230
Yugoslavia, 38
Yu Kyong Su, LtGen, NKPA, 25
Zimmer, Capt Andrew M., 116, 116_n_, 117, 117_n_, 129_n_, 131, 132,
181, 181_n_, 182, 183, 189, 189_n_
SET AND PRINTED FOR THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS BY THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955. TEXT SET BY PHOTO
COMPOSITION IN 12-POINT GARAMOND AND PRINTED ON MAX-OPAQUE VELLUM
STOCK BY DEEP-ETCH OFFSET.
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government
Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. - Price $2
[Illustration: (Map of Korea, indicating battle fronts in July, 1950.)]
[Illustration: THE PUSAN PERIMETER
AUG.-SEP. 1950
GENERAL DISPOSITION OF 8TH ARMY & NORTH KOREAN FORCES]
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
unbalanced.
The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
references.
When illustrations had no captions or useful headings that could
be used as captions, Transcriber added them and placed them in
parentheses, usually by copying them from the List of Illustrations on
page ix. Those parenthetical captions will be visible only in versions
of this eBook that do not display the actual illustrations.
The first two maps are identical to the last two maps.
Footnote 265, originally footnote 7 on page 148: “18 May 5” was printed
that way, with an incomplete year.
Footnote 278, originally footnote 6 on page 176: “Plan 13-60” was
printed that way. All other Plans are numbered as “nn-50”, so this may
be a misprint.
Page 245: Transcriber added “BuAer” and “LSD” to the Glossary.
Page 266: “Ground,” an index entry following “Marine Helicopter
Squadron (Experimental)” under “Marines,” did not include a page
reference.