Obong-ni Ridge
_Company B to the Attack--Advance of Company A--Defeat of Enemy
Tanks--End of the First Day--Enemy Counterattack on Ridge--Obong-ni
Ridge Secured--Supporting Arms Clear the Bulge_
Shortly after 1330, while reporting his situation to the battalion
commander, Captain Zimmer was wounded by enemy machinegun fire which
ripped into his OP and caused several other casualties. Crawling to the
company CP on the reverse slope of the spur, he turned his command over
to Lieutenant Hanifin, who went forward. Zimmer then joined the steady
stream of casualties returning through the road cut to the battalion
aid station.[305]
[305] This section is derived from: Brig SAR; Zimmer, 6 May
54; and Maj F. I. Fenton, Jr., ltr to author, 8 May 54
(Fenton, 8 May 54).
On the way, he met Captain Tobin leading Company B forward for the
attack, and paused long enough to warn him about the enemy guns in
Tugok.
Company D, its part in the battle having come to an end, prepared to
withdraw to positions on Observation Hill. The long list of wounded for
17 August included the names of Dickerson and Wirth.[306]
[306] Lt Wirth was actually attached from 1/11.
Newton established his OP near that of Roise on Observation Hill.
The 1st Battalion CP and aid station were set up with those of 2/5
immediately behind the road cut, while farther back Major John W.
Russell placed 1/5’s Weapons Company in position.
_Company B to the Attack_
Tobin deployed his 3d Platoon and machineguns on the forward slopes
of Observation Hill to support Company B’s attack. The 1st and 2d
Platoons, the latter on the left, crossed the rice paddy and at 1500
passed through Company D on the slopes of the objective. Lieutenant
Schryver led his 1st Platoon toward Hill 102 along the same avenue used
by Crowson before him, while Lieutenant Taylor moved the 2d Platoon up
the gully leading to the saddle between 102 and 109.
On Observation Hill Captain Tobin noted the rapidity of the advance and
called his executive officer, Captain Fenton, preparatory to joining
the two assault units. While briefing his assistant at the road bend,
he was felled by a burst of machinegun fire. Fenton directed the
evacuation of the seriously wounded officer, then took command of the
company and joined the attackers on the ridge.
By this time both assault platoons had been pinned down, the 1st about
two-thirds of the way up the slope, the 2d only half that distance. The
latter was taking heavy casualties from Communist guns on Hills 109,
117, and 143, Taylor himself sustaining a mortal wound.
Fenton and his gunnery sergeant, Master Sergeant Edward A. Wright, were
stalled with the 2d Platoon. Since Schryver’s unit was also held up,
the company commander radioed Observation Hill and committed his 3d
Platoon.
Schryver realized that the main obstacle to his advance was the fire
hitting his flank from Tugok, and he requested a fire mission from
1/5’s Weapons Company. As 81-mm. mortar shells rained down on the
village, the 1st Platoon worked westward to the spur above the MSR and
outflanked the NKPA 18th Regiment. A quick assault carried Hill 102 at
1710.
With Schryver’s men driving down from the south and Company B’s
machineguns pouring fire on peaks 117 and 143, the 2d Platoon barreled
its way up the draw and seized Hill 109 at 1725.
_Advance of Company A_
Leaving the line of departure from the southern reaches of Observation
Hill, the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A crossed the rice paddy while
Marine air and artillery savagely blasted the forward and reverse
slopes of the objective. The two assault units, each with a machinegun
section attached, passed through Company E at 1500 and scrambled up the
scarred hillside.[307]
[307] This section is derived from: Annex How; Maj J. R.
Stevens and Capt G. C. Fox, interv with author, 24 Feb
54 (Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54); and 1st Lt Francis
W. Muetzel, USMC Ret., interv with author, 5–6 Jan 54
(Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54).
Sweeney’s battle-worn company withdrew, carrying its dead and wounded
back to Observation Hill. The list of casualties included Lieutenant
Arkadis, wounded while spearheading the unit’s advance.
As Company A’s assault wave passed the halfway point of ascent, it met
only sniping fire from the crest and forward slopes of Obong-ni Ridge.
But any delusions that the enemy had quit were soon shattered when the
summit suddenly came alive with Communist machineguns.
Intense fire poured down on the attackers, and Marines pitched forward
to roll limply down the hillside. First Lieutenant Robert C. Sebilian,
leading the 1st Platoon up the draw between Hills 109 and 117, ignored
the storm of steel and urged his men forward. Standing fully exposed
while pointing out enemy positions to his NCO’s, the young officer
was struck by an explosive bullet which shattered his leg. Technical
Sergeant Orval F. McMullen took command and resolutely pressed the
attack.
The 1st Platoon reached the saddle above the draw just as Company B was
taking Hill 109. When McMullen tried to advance southward to 117, he
and his men were pinned down by a solid sheet of Communist fire.
On the left, North Korean guns had already cut Second Lieutenant Thomas
H. Johnston’s 2d Platoon in half. The pint-sized platoon leader proved
to be a giant in courage. He pushed doggedly up the draw between Hills
117 and 143, but casualties bled his skirmish line white and finally
brought it to a stop.
Marines watching the battle from Observation Hill saw Company A’s
attack bog down, despite the ceaseless pounding of Hills 117 and 143 by
Brigade supporting arms. Startled, the observers noted a lone figure
who bolted forward from the 2d Platoon’s draw and stubbornly scrambled
up the hill. It was Johnston attempting a single-handed assault on the
core of enemy resistance.
The astonished onlookers saw him reach the saddle north of Hill 143.
That he survived to this point was remarkable enough, yet he continued
to push forward. Then, at the base of the blazing peak, the little
figure sagged to the ground and lay motionless.
Technical Sergeant Frank J. Lawson immediately took over the platoon,
displaying outstanding leadership in his attempt to continue the
attack. Communist guns and grenades prevailed, however, and again the
line of infantrymen stalled. The 2d Platoon now consisted of a squad.
Captain Stevens radioed Lieutenant Colonel Newton from his OP and
requested permission to commit his 3d Platoon, then deployed on
Observation Hill as battalion reserve. The request granted, First
Lieutenant George C. Fox led the platoon forward into the rice paddy
just as a heavy mortar barrage fell in the area. One of Fox’s men was
killed outright.
Moving quickly to Obong-ni Ridge and ascending the slope, the 3d
Platoon was joined by Lawson and the remnants of Johnston’s outfit.
The skirmish line passed the critical halfway point, and again enemy
machineguns and grenades opened up.
Twice Fox attempted to develop an assault, failing both times to
get his platoon through the curtain of fire above the gully. While
Technical Sergeant Stanley G. Millar was reorganizing the skirmish
line, the platoon leader and Private First Class Benjamin C. Simpson of
the 2d Platoon made an attempt to reach Johnston.
The pair climbed to a point above the gully from which Simpson could
see the fallen officer. Assured now that Johnston was dead, and unable
to recover the body because of interlocking machinegun fire across the
area, Fox and the rifleman slid down the draw to the 3d Platoon lines.
By this time Stevens had moved to the base of Obong-ni Ridge, but he
had lost radio contact with the three units high on the hillside. He
could see the combined 2d and 3d Platoons; but the 1st was out of
sight, leaving the company commander unaware of a limited success that
could have been exploited.
_Defeat of Enemy Tanks_
Shortly after 2/5’s jump-off on 17 August, the M-26’s of the 3d
Platoon, Able Company Tanks, moved forward of the road cut and
supported the advance by 90-mm. and machinegun fire. The Marine armor,
led by Second Lieutenant Granville G. Sweet, concentrated on heavy
NKPA weapons along the crest of Objective One and knocked out at least
12 antitank guns and several automatic weapons. In return, 1 M-26
withstood 3 direct hits by enemy mortars, and the 4 vehicles combined
were struck by a total of 23 antitank projectiles. Neither tanks
nor crews were bothered appreciably, and only one man was slightly
wounded.[308]
[308] This section is derived from: Annex How; Stevens and
Fox, 24 Feb 54; Capt Almarion S. Bailey, interv with
author, 17 Dec 53; T/Sgt C. R. Fullerton, ltr to Opns
Research Office, Johns Hopkins University (cover ltr:
OIC RS Cleveland, ser. 527–53, 31 Dec 53).
After the 1st Battalion had passed through 2/5, a section of tanks
moved forward on the road and blasted several North Korean positions
in Tugok. When Company B seized the northern tip of the objective,
Sweet led all his vehicles back to the tank CP, 1,000 yards east of
Observation Hill.
At 2000, while still refueling and replenishing ammunition stocks, the
tankmen learned that four enemy T-34’s were approaching the Brigade
lines on the MSR. The Marine armor was clanking toward the front within
a matter of seconds. About 300 yards from the road cut, the tankmen had
to jump from their vehicles to remove trucks blocking the MSR. Then,
approaching the narrow defile, Sweet ordered his 1st Section to load
with 90-mm. armor-piercing shells.
Company B, consolidating its positions on Hills 102 and 109, had first
noticed the four NKPA tanks and a column of infantry moving toward its
lines at 2000. Corsairs of MAG-33 screamed down immediately, destroying
the fourth armored vehicle and dispersing the Red riflemen. The first
three tanks came on alone, passed Finger and Obong-ni Ridges, and
approached the road bend at Hill 125.
Preparing a reception for the T-34’s were the 1st 75-mm. Recoilless Gun
Platoon on Observation Hill, and the rocket section of 1/5’s antitank
assault platoon on Hill 125. As the first enemy tank reached the bend,
it took a hit in the right track from a 3.5″ rocket. Shooting wildly,
the black hulk continued until its left track and front armor were
blasted by Second Lieutenant Paul R. Fields’ 75’s. The enemy vehicle
burst into flame as it wobbled around the curve and came face to face
with Technical Sergeant Cecil R. Fullerton’s M-26.
Still aimlessly firing its 85-mm. rifle and machinegun, the T-34 took
two quick hits from the Marine tank’s 90-mm. gun and exploded. One
North Korean got out of the burning vehicle but was cut down instantly
by rifle fire. He crawled beneath the blazing wreckage and died.
The second T-34 charged toward the bend, taking a 3.5 rocket hit from
Company A’s assault squad. Weaving crazily around the curve, with
its right track damaged, the cripple was struck in the gas tank by a
rocket from 1/5’s assault section before meeting the fury of Field’s
recoilless rifles. It lurched to a stop off the road behind the first
tank, and the 85-mm. gun fired across the valley into the blue yonder.
By this time a second M-26 had squeezed next to that of Fullerton on
the narrow firing line, and the two Marine tanks blasted the T-34
with six 90-mm. shells. Miraculously, the Communist vehicle kept on
shooting, although its fire was directionless. Marine armor poured in
seven more rounds, which ripped through the turret and exploded the
hull.
Before the kill, one Red tankman opened the turret hatch in an effort
to escape. A 2.36″ white phosphorus round, fired by a 1st Battalion
rocket man, struck the open lid and richocheted into the turret. The
enemy soldier was knocked back into the tank as the interior turned
into a furnace.
The third T-34 raced around the road bend to a stop behind the blazing
hulks of the first two. Marine tanks, recoilless rifles, and rockets
ripped into it with a thundering salvo. The enemy tank shuddered, then
erupted in a violent explosion and died.
Thus the Brigade shattered the myth of the T-34 in five flaming
minutes. Not only Corsairs and M-26’s, but also every antitank weapon
organic to Marine infantry had scored an assist in defeating the
Communist armor.
_End of the First Day_
Throughout 17 August the evacuation of dead and wounded had been
a major concern of every Marine, from fire team leaders up to the
Brigade commander. Men risked their lives dragging casualties off the
blazing slopes of Obong-ni Ridge to relative safety at the base. Litter
bearers plodded back and forth across the fire-swept rice paddy, and a
steady stream of wounded passed through the 1st and 2d Battalion aid
stations behind the road cut. Medical officers of the two battalions,
Lieutenants (jg) Bentley G. Nelson and Chester L. Klein, worked
tirelessly with their corpsmen.
In the rear, Lieutenant Commander Byron D. Casteel had to commandeer
every ambulance in the area--including 16 Army vehicles--to evacuate
wounded to and from his 5th Marines aid station. So acute was the
shortage of hospital corpsmen that the Brigade’s Malaria and Epidemic
Control Unit was used to reinforce the regimental medical staff. Even
so, the hospital tents were busy for a straight 18 hours.[309]
[309] Annexes Love and Tare to Brig SAR.
The small number of deaths from wounds attested to the speed and
effectiveness of helicopter evacuations; for the pilots of VMO-6 were
ferrying the more serious casualties from the regimental aid station to
the Army’s 8076 Surgical Hospital at Miryang, some 20 miles away.
While medics toiled to save lives, the spiritual needs of casualties
were filled by the inspiring labor of the 5th Marines’ naval chaplains,
Lieutenant Commander Orlando Ingvolstad, Jr., Lieutenant William G.
Tennant, and Lieutenant (jg) Bernard L. Hickey. A familiar figure at
the front, frequently exposed to enemy fire as he administered to
fallen Marines, was Lieutenant Commander Otto E. Sporrer, beloved
chaplain of 1/11.
Two serious obstacles to the various missions behind the front were the
dud-infested area east of Observation Hill and a section of collapsed
MSR in the river bed occupied by the 5th Marines CP. First Lieutenant
Wayne E. Richards and his 2d Platoon, Able Company Engineers, spent
most of 17 August at the tedious task of removing unexploded missiles
from the forward assembly areas. The engineers’ 1st Platoon had to
tear down part of an unoccupied village for material to reinforce the
sinking road over which the jeep ambulances and supply trucks were
struggling.
As the sun dropped behind Obong-ni Ridge, activity on the MSR continued
unabated, although the battle for Objective One had diminished to a
crackle of rifle fire and occasional machinegun bursts.
Company A had been unable to take Hills 117 and 143, still bristling
with enemy automatic weapons. At 2030, shortly after the smashing
victory over North Korean armor, Captain Stevens contacted his 1st
Platoon and learned that it was on the saddle between peaks 109 and
117. Although tied in on the right with Company B, the platoon was
separated by a 100-yard gap from Stevens’ other two platoons on the
slopes to the left.[310]
[310] Annex How; and Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54.
The company commander called Fox, Lawson, and McMullen together near
the base of the ridge to consult them on continuing the attack. All
platoon leaders advised against it, since darkness was falling and
their units needed rest, food, water, and ammunition. Moreover, the
enemy’s bold tank attack had convinced the infantry leaders that a
larger counterstroke by the Communists was imminent, and they wanted
time for preparation.[311]
[311] _Ibid._
Stevens informed Newton of the situation by radio, and the battalion
commander ordered him to discontinue the attack and tie in with
Fenton’s unit for the night. It was already dark when the 2d and 3d
Platoons shifted to the right from their positions below Hills 117 and
143.
Company B had been busily consolidating its high ground since the
seizure of Hills 102 and 109 earlier in the evening. While Fenton’s
machineguns dueled with those of the Reds on 117, his 1st and 2d
Platoons deployed defensively on the forward slopes of the two captured
peaks, and the 3d went into reserve on the reverse slope.[312]
[312] Annex How; and Fenton, 8 May 54.
Company A’s front extended left from the southern part of Hill
109--where the 1st Platoon was linked to Fenton’s unit--to the center
of the saddle toward 117. There the line bent down in an arch, formed
by the 2d Platoon, to the spur below the enemy-held peak. Able
Company’s left was actually perpendicular to the ridgeline, for Fox’s
3d Platoon was deployed up and down Hill 117’s spur.[313]
[313] Brig SAR; and Stevens and Fox, 24 Feb 54.
To complete the Brigade front, Headquarters Company of 1/5 was to have
extended across the rice paddy from Observation Hill and tied in with
Company A’s left flank. Due to the casualties and workload of the
headquarters troops, this connection was never made, with the result
that Fox’s platoon remained dangling.[314]
[314] _Ibid._
When General Craig returned to his CP near Yongsan on the night of
17 August, he was not unduly concerned about the tactical situation.
Although the Brigade had been thinned by heavy casualties, Murray’s
disposition in depth across a narrow front gave the Marines the
advantages of concentrated strength and firepower. If the enemy
attempted his usual night envelopment, both 2/5 and 3/5 could strike
back from their reserve positions on Observation and Cloverleaf
Hills.[315]
[315] Craig, 17 Mar 54; and Col R. L. Murray, 20 Mar 54.
Across the MSR, the 9th RCT had launched its attack earlier in the
evening, clearing Tugok and seizing Finger Ridge against negligible
resistance. By darkness, the 19th and 34th Regiments were also sitting
on their objectives to the north, leaving the 4th NKPA Division clamped
in a vice. To the southeast, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was
holding its blocking position with no difficulty.[316]
[316] 24th InfDiv Op Instr No. 26.
_Enemy Counterattack on Ridge_
Late on 17 August, when the attack on Obong-ni Ridge ceased, General
Craig sent a message to his subordinate commanders, directing them to
“... consolidate positions for night, account for location of each
individual and be prepared for counterattack; carefully prepare plan
of fires for night to include plans for fires within and in rear of
positions; wire in where possible in front line elements.”[317]
[317] This section is derived from: Annex How; Stevens and
Fox, 24 Feb 54; Muetzel, 5–6 Jan 54; and Fenton, 8 May
54.
Long after nightfall, the weary Marines of both front line companies
were still digging foxholes and organizing their defenses. While this
work continued in spite of sporadic Communist fire from Hill 117, the
South Korean laborers were transporting supplies to the ridgeline or
carrying casualties back to the rear.
Captain Stevens established Company A’s command post at the top of the
draw leading to the saddle between Hills 109 and 117. His 60-mm. mortar
section set up its weapons in the gully itself.
Shortly before 2200, the telltale whine and rattle of mortar shells
cut through the darkness and the men of Able Company crouched in their
holes. The explosions were followed by a shower of fire as white
phosphorus enveloped the center of the company area. Almost every man
in the gully was painfully wounded, leaving Stevens without a mortar
section. The edge of the barrage hit the 3d Platoon’s area, wounding
Fox and several of his men. Two riflemen had to be evacuated, but the
platoon leader and the others applied first aid and remained in the
line.
After this brief flurry the front settled down to an ominous quiet
interrupted only occasionally by North Korean guns to the south.
At 0230 on 18 August, the Marines of Company A heard enemy movement
on Hill 117. Suddenly there was a hail of bullets from Communist
machineguns on the peak, and hand grenades began to roll down into the
Marine positions. A North Korean platoon made a few bounds from the
high ground and landed almost literally on top of Stevens’ depleted 2d
Platoon.
Simultaneously, Company B’s position on Hill 109 was struck hard
by two platoons advancing up the draw to the west. Heedless of
illuminating shells fired by 1/5’s 81-mm. mortars, the enemy assaulted
methodically by alternately throwing small groups of grenadiers and
submachinegunners against Marine positions. The NKPA infantrymen were
covered by a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire pouring down from
Hill 117.
An enemy squad emerged from the gully west of the saddle between peaks
102 and 109, attempting to divert strength from Fenton’s main defensive
effort to the south. Failing in this effort, the group fell back to
fire harassing shots.
Company A’s 2d Platoon slugged it out with three times its own numbers
for a full half hour. This stand was due largely to the courage and
leadership of Lawson, who stuck to his guns and refused evacuation,
though wounded three times. About 0300, with Marines on the right
devoting more attention to the heavier attack against Hill 109, the
exhausted survivors of the 2d Platoon were overrun and the Brigade line
penetrated.
For some unknown reason, enemy troops did not pour down the eastern
slopes after the breakthrough. Only one squad drove through, and it
split Company A in half by invading Stevens’ CP, directly behind the 2d
Platoon’s lines. The company commander and his headquarters were slowly
forced down the draw by the methodical grenade and submachinegun fire
from above.
The remainder of the North Korean platoon which had hit Company A
remained on the crest for a joint effort with the larger force striking
Hill 109. Stevens’ 1st Platoon, with its left flank now exposed on the
saddle, gradually fell back and curled around the southern face of 109.
Although Company B’s left front held firm against the two-platoon
assault, a few Reds slipped by the Marine foxholes and charged into
Fenton’s CP on Hill 109. Rocket gunners, mortarmen and clerks responded
to the challenge and quickly eliminated the attackers.
When Fenton became aware that the saddle south of Hill 109 had been
taken, he tightened his left flank by drawing it in to his 3d Platoon’s
reverse slope positions. This portion of his defense now took the shape
of a football, and successfully withstood pressure from the south.
By 0400 Stevens had temporarily lost control of Company A, although
the situation looked worse than it actually was. While the company
commander stabilized his center near the bottom of the draw, his
executive officer, First Lieutenant Fred F. Eubanks, Jr., made
single-handed forays up the gully. He was eventually aided in his
private war by the company’s machinegun officer, Second Lieutenant
Francis W. Muetzel. After the breakthrough, the latter had been wounded
and left for dead in his foxhole behind the 2d Platoon. Upon regaining
consciousness, he made his way down the draw, fighting it out with
enemy soldiers until he reached the Marine lines. Company A’s 3d
Platoon along the spur below Hill 117 enjoyed a seemingly illogical
immunity during the counterattack. Although isolated after the
penetration and deployed ideally from the enemy’s point of view, Fox’s
men had only occasional brushes with Red infantrymen who displayed a
remarkable lack of interest. After the platoon leader learned of the
situation on his right, he redeployed into an elongated perimeter which
included a few survivors of the 2d Platoon.
[Illustration: 1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE
SITUATION 18 AUG.--OBJ. 1 (OBONG-NI)]
Lieutenant Colonel Newton, when notified of Company A’s withdrawal on
the left front, called down such a tremendous volume of artillery fire
on enemy approaches that 1/11 asked him to conserve a few shells for
the Brigade attack scheduled for 0700. The battalion commander replied
that the Brigade would be fighting to retake Objective One at 0700 if
his beleaguered companies did not get maximum supporting fire. While
the artillerymen continued to pound Obong-ni Ridge, Newton’s 81-mm.
mortars, strengthened by 2/5’s entire stock of ammunition, added to
the hot metal thrown at the enemy. It can only be conjectured why the
NKPA thrust against the Brigade lines never developed above the company
level, but Newton’s generosity with high explosives probably did not
encourage Communist aspirations.
_Obong-ni Ridge Secured_
By dawn of 18 August, the North Korean attackers had spent their
strength, leaving Company B in undisputed control of Hills 102 and 109.
As if in frustration, enemy machineguns on 117 spat angrily at the
Marines while the few surviving Red infantrymen withdrew to their lines.
Stevens prepared at first light to complete the unfinished business
of the previous day. Thanks to the heroism of his wounded gunnery
sergeant, Technical Sergeant Paul A. Hodge, the company commander had
regained contact with Fox before dawn and was able to prepare for an
attack. At 0700, after moving forward to the 3d Platoon’s area and
clearing with Newton, he ordered Fox to continue the attack and seize
Hill 117.
The platoon leader shouted to his men who arose as a body to begin the
ascent. When a lone Red machinegun broke the silence on 117, Stevens
spotted the weapon immediately and called for an air strike. Within
seconds a Marine fighter plane glided over the 3d Platoon and dropped a
500-pound bomb squarely on the enemy position. The response from Marine
air had been so prompt that every one of the attackers was knocked off
his feet and one of Fox’s automatic riflemen was killed.
While the echoes of the shattering explosion were still reverberating
through the morning haze, the thin skirmish line of Marines scrambled
up the slope and carried Hill 117. McMullen’s 1st Platoon drove in from
109, and the North Koreans fled in panic from the crest and reverse
slope positions. A full company of Reds raced down the western slope,
with Stevens’ riflemen and machinegunners firing from the crest to rip
into the enemy groups.
Capitalizing on a psychological advantage, Company A wheeled southward
to sweep the crest. Fox, using a skirmish line of only 20 men,
assaulted Hill 143 and took the peak against light resistance. A
quick call to Newton brought Stevens immediate permission for maximum
exploitation.
The 3d Platoon attacked Hill 147 vigorously, and though a few Red
soldiers fought to the bitter end, the majority again chose to flee.
The high ground was taken easily.
As the Marines moved over the crest of 147, they saw 150 enemy troops
in formation halfway down the western slope. The withdrawal commenced
in an orderly column of fours but the formation broke down quickly
under Marine fire and turned into a routed mob.
Fox turned his attention to Hill 153, Obong-ni’s crowning peak,
reasoning that it would be the logical place for the enemy’s last-ditch
stand. But it was the same old story when the 3d Platoon rushed to
the summit--abandoned weapons and equipment, a few scattered dead,
and blasted foxholes. There was a variation, however, when a supposed
clump of scrub pines arose from the reverse slope and rushed downward
in headlong flight. The Leathernecks were reminded of Birnham Wood in
Shakespeare’s _Macbeth_ as the camouflaged North Koreans disappeared
with the agility of mountain goats before Marine marksmen could score
more than a few hits.
While the 1st and 2d Platoons consolidated the central peaks, the 3d
combed the southern reaches below Hill 153 without incident. The 1st
Platoon, Able Company Engineers, patrolled the swampland south of the
ridge and secured Fox’s left flank with a minefield extending from the
southern crest to the valley below and eastward across the swamp. By
midafternoon all of Obong-ni Ridge belonged to the Brigade.
_Supporting Arms Clear the Bulge_
At midnight, 17 August, Lieutenant Colonel Murray had issued 3/5 a
warning order for continuing the attack on the 18th. Shortly after
dawn, Taplett and his two company commanders, Fegan and Bohn, visually
reconnoitered Hill 207--Objective Two--from vantage points north and
south of the MSR. Then, while the battalion commander set up his OP on
the northern part of Obong-ni Ridge, Companies G and H advanced to an
assembly area at the base of the Ridge.[318]
[318] This section is derived from: Annexes Easy and How to
Brig SAR; Taplett, 20 Apr 54; and Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr
54.
Taplett called down heavy artillery, air, and mortar preparations on
Objective Two. Occasionally he shifted fires to blast large groups of
enemy fleeing to Hill 207 from Company A’s advance on Obong-ni Ridge.
[Illustration: 1st NAKTONG COUNTERATTACK
SEIZURE OF OBJ. 2--18 AUG.]
Directly south of Finger Ridge, two large spurs form the northern
approach to Hill 207. Company H emerged into the open at 1000 from the
MSR between Obong-ni and Finger Ridges and attacked up the eastern
spur. Following Fegan’s unit was Company G, which veered to the right
and advanced up the western spur. The two infantry units slowly
ascended, separated by a deep gully, while the 3d Platoon of Able
Company tanks fired overhead and to the flanks from its positions in
the valley.
When Fegan’s unit was halfway up the eastern spur, the Marine tankmen
saw a platoon of North Koreans attempting to flank the attackers.
Machinegun and 90-mm. fire from the M-26’s killed or dispersed the Reds
at a range of 300 yards.
As Lieutenant Williams worked How Company’s 1st Platoon close enough
for an assault of the summit, several NKPA soldiers rose from their
holes and threw down hand grenades. The Marines hit the deck until
the missiles exploded, then bounded up and rushed the crest. Unnerved
by Williams’ perfect timing, most of the North Koreans fled southward
along the ridge. The remainder died in their positions during a brief
but bitter fight.
Moving up on Fegan’s right, Bohn’s men pushed over the western half
of the objective, finding only a handful of enemy who were quickly
destroyed. Company G’s assault completed the seizure of Objective Two
at 1237.
During the last minutes of the fight on Hill 207, the entire Naktong
Bulge suddenly swarmed with panic-stricken remnants of the 4th NKPA
Division. What had been a retreat of small forces now became a
widespread rout. Enemy troops poured down from Objective Two, some
scurrying up the slopes of Hill 311 across the MSR, others making for
the Naktong River.
Air, artillery, and mortars were now offered a profusion of targets by
an enemy who ordinarily did not reveal himself during daylight hours.
MAG-33 plastered the suspected CP of the 18th NKPA Regiment on a peak
south of 207, shattering communications equipment and weapons. Other
Marine planes alternated strafing runs with 1/11’s continual artillery
barrages along the river banks, where enemy troops were gathering by
the hundreds.
Victory turned into slaughter when the Brigade supporting arms
concentrated on the masses of Communists plunging into the river. All
artillery having been turned loose on the river crossings, Taplett used
his mortars, machineguns, and the supporting tanks to cut down targets
in the valley and on Hills 207 and 311. He requested permission to
attack the latter immediately, but was told to remain on Objective Two
while the Brigade gave all of its attention to the astounding situation
at the river.
At 1530 Companies G and H descended Hill 207. They were met at the
bottom by First Lieutenant Pomeroy’s 1st Platoon of tanks and escorted
across the valley to the base of Hill 311--Objective Three. In advance
of the infantrymen, MAG-33 scorched the high ground with napalm while
artillery, mortars, and 75-mm. recoilless rifles worked over the slopes.
Again Fegan and Bohn moved up companion spurs which converged on their
target, the 1,000-foot height. Progress was good until Company H came
within 200 yards of the crest. Then a volley of rifle fire from the
summit and forward slopes forced the Marines to the ground. Although
confronted by only a platoon, Fegan was at a disadvantage. Scrub
growth not only concealed the Communist riflemen, but also prevented
the use of Company H’s machineguns. Maneuver to the right or left was
impossible, since the steep draws on either side were well covered
by camouflaged enemy positions. Several Marines who tried to advance
frontally were cut down by rifle fire.
The enemy platoon’s defense was not based on the usual machinegun
fire and grenade throwing. With calm, business-like efficiency, NKPA
riflemen kept Company H pinned to the ground, finally wounding Fegan
himself as the officer attempted to regain the initiative. After his
evacuation, the attack bogged down completely.
At 1730, Company G had reached the southern portion of the long,
narrow crest by brushing aside light resistance. Turning its attention
northward, the company entered into a small-arms duel with the
Communist force opposing Fegan’s unit. When supporting arms failed to
dislodge the enemy rifleman, Bohn enveloped the troublesome pocket by
sending Cahill’s 1st Platoon around to the left (west).
The young platoon leader completed the maneuver just before nightfall
and overran the Reds on the northern half of the summit. But the enemy
on the forward slopes facing Company H suddenly showed fight. The 1st
Platoon, pushed rearward a short distance by the surprise resistance,
slugged it out at close quarters.
With darkness closing in and the platoon so far beyond Marines lines,
Bohn ordered it to withdraw. Cahill, wounded himself, reported on his
return that the platoon had suffered 10 casualties, including 2 killed.
[Illustration: 1_st_ NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE
SEIZURE OF OBJ. 3–18 AUG.]
Taplett ordered the two companies to deploy defensively in their
present positions. Thus, during the quiet night of 18–19 August,
Companies G and H faced the enemy pocket at right angles to each other.
Earlier on the 18th Lieutenant (jg) Robert J. Harvey, 3d Battalion
surgeon, had the unpleasant task of examining an abandoned Army aid
station under the bridge near the tip of Finger Ridge. The improvised
hospital had been overrun during Army reverses a week before; and
about 30 dead found by the Marines bore mute evidence of the enemy’s
brutality in dealing with captured wounded and medical personnel.
At 0610 on the morning of 19 August, 3/5’s 81-mm. mortars prepared the
way for the final drive on Objective Three. Following close in the wake
of the mortar bursts, Second Lieutenant Thomas P. Lennon led Company H
through evacuated enemy positions. He reached the northern part of Hill
311 without meeting any opposition.
This last Brigade objective was secured at 0645, leaving 1/5 atop
Obong-ni Ridge, 2/5 on Hill 207 to which it had displaced on the 18th,
and 3/5 in possession of the dominating height of the Naktong Bulge.
The reduction of the enemy bridgehead cost the Marines 66 dead, 1
missing in action, and 278 wounded.