The Battle of the Naktong
_Task Force Hill Organized--Planning the Next Operation--Reconnaissance
of Terrain--Air and Artillery Preparation--Company D on
Objective--Attack of Company E_
The movement of the Brigade to Miryang was completed by rail, LST and
shuttling trucks on 15 August. For the infantry, it meant the first hot
meal in Korea, and the bivouac area seemed a cool, green paradise as
compared to the sun-scorched hills the men had been climbing under fire
this past week. A grove of stately trees provided shade; and thanks to
the frugality of peasants who picked up every twig, the grass and moss
were like a well-swept carpet. There the troops of the Brigade slept
under the stars that night and swam in the nearby Miryang river. It was
a veritable reunion for Leathernecks who swapped tales of experiences
in the recent combats.
Being Marines, they realized of course that this was merely an
interlude between operations. The Brigade had passed under operational
control of the 24th Infantry Division upon arrival in the Miryang area.
And on the 15th General Craig reported to General Church’s CP to be
briefed on the situation in the Naktong Bulge, where the next assault
would be launched.
The ability of the Russians to cross the widest rivers in World War
II, using only determination and field expedients, constantly amazed
_Wehrmacht_ generals with much better equipment.[273] This know-how
seemed to have been passed on to the NKPA, judging by the crossings of
the Han and Kum Rivers early in the Korean conflict. On 6 August 1950,
the Red Koreans gave a repeat performance when they forced a 1,000-man
bridgehead across the Naktong river, thus breaching the last natural
barrier protecting the lifeline from Pusan to Taegu.
[273] U. S. Dept of the Army, _Russian Combat Methods in World
War II_, DA Pamphlet No. 20-230.
The 24th Infantry Division was unsuccessful in its immediate attempts
to dislodge the enemy.[274] Wading through chest-deep water by night,
pulling crude rafts loaded with vehicles, heavy weapons and supplies,
the North Koreans placed an entire reinforced regiment on the east bank
by 8 August. Termite tactics during the next 2 days broadened their
foothold until the Naktong Bulge was overrun by most of the NKPA 4th
Division.
[274] Capt R. A. Gugeler, “Attack Along a Ridgeline,” in
_Combat Actions in Korea_ (Washington; Combat Forces
Press, 1954).
Consisting of the 5th, 16th, and 18th Infantry Regiments and strongly
supported by artillery and armor, the 4th Division was among the
most distinguished of the major Communist units. With the 107th Tank
Regiment attached at the outset of the invasion, it had breezed through
Uijongbu before sharing in the capture of Seoul. On 5 July 1950, the
4th became the first NKPA outfit to tangle with the newly arrived
United States Army forces. Task Force Smith delayed it a few hours near
Osan, despite the Reds’ great advantage in numbers and armor. Later,
after capturing Nonsan and aiding in the reduction of Taejon, the unit
was selected to spearhead the assault over the Naktong.
_Task Force Hill Organized_
In an effort to plug the hole in the Pusan Perimeter, General Walker
attached the 9th Infantry (2d Infantry Division) commanded by Colonel
John G. Hill, to the 24th Division. In turn, General Church placed
Colonel Hill in control of all units in his southern zone and ordered a
counterstroke against the Naktong Bulge.
Task Force Hill attacked on 11 August but lost its momentum in a
confused situation which found the enemy attacking at the same
time. Reinforced to a strength of three infantry regiments, Hill’s
provisional unit again struck out against the bridgehead on 14 and 15
August. After encountering a stone wall of resistance, the task force
was ordered to cease the attack and defend the ground it occupied east
of the enemy pocket.[275]
[275] _Ibid._
This was the situation as outlined to General Craig at the planning
conference, and he was also briefed on the topography of the target
area. The Naktong Bulge west of Yongsan results from a bend in the
river resembling a stubby thumb pointing westward. Bounded on three
sides by the stream, with its inland border formed by a long valley,
the bulge is an isolated terrain feature--a fortress of mountains
topped by Hill 311, the key height.
As the Yongsan road reaches the Bulge from the east, it turns
southwest, winds around Hill 311, and stops at the tip of the “thumb”
where a ferry links it to the road west of the river.
Guarding the eastern approach to the natural fortress are two hills
astride the Yongsan road--Finger Ridge to the north and Hill 207 to the
south. The former is set off on the east by a deep gully containing
the village of Tugok. Eastward from Hill 207 and directly below Tugok
is Obong-ni Ridge--so called because of a village by that name at its
eastern base.
Not only had the NKPA 4th Division overrun the Naktong Bulge; it had
pushed on along the road to Yongsan, seizing Hill 207, Tugok, and both
Finger and Obong-ni Ridges. These latest gains and the Bulge itself
were being consolidated by elements of all three regiments.
Although units were somewhat depleted, at least 6 infantry battalions
occupied the area, supported by 4 mortar companies, over 100
machineguns, and several artillery pieces. There were 4 or more T-34
tanks within the bridgehead, and a signal and engineer company for
overall support. As the spoils of earlier victories, particularly the
one at Taejon, enemy arms were generously augmented by a number of
American carbines and two 105-mm. howitzers.[276]
[276] Brig Op Plan 13-50; Brig Periodic IntelRpts Nos. 12–14;
Annex How.
_Planning the Next Operation_
It was decided by General Church and General Craig at their conference
of 15 August that the entire 24th Division, Reinforced, would assault
the enemy bridgehead at 0800, 17 August, after strong air and artillery
preparations. The 19th and 34th Infantry would converge on the Bulge
from the northeast. In the center, the 9th RCT and the Marine Brigade
would strike frontally astride the MSR, the former on the north of the
road and the latter on the south. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was
to hold blocking positions in the south to protect the left flank of
the Brigade.[277]
[277] _Ibid._; and Brig Op Plan 13-50.
On 15 August, front lines in the center of the zone were on Hill 125
and Observation Hill, both defended by the 9th RCT. A thousand yards
to the rear, the 34th Infantry occupied Cloverleaf Hill and adjacent
high ground. Before the attack, the Brigade was to relieve the 34th on
position so that the Army unit could move to the north for its assigned
mission. Then, at H-hour, the Marines would jump off from Observation
Hill and seize Obong-ni Ridge--Objective One. Simultaneously, the 9th
RCT would drive forward through Tugok and take Finger Ridge, from
which it was to support the Brigade’s advance. The 1st Battalion,
11th Marines, would be under operational control of the 24th Division
artillery commander, and priority for all supporting fires would go to
the Marines.[278]
[278] Brig Op Plan 13-60
During the planning, General Church emphasized that Cloverleaf Hill
must remain occupied and defended until Brigade Objective One was
seized. He considered this hill of utmost importance in blocking the
MSR to the 24th Division CP and Miryang. This collateral responsibility
would tie up a number of Brigade troops and have strong influence on
the tactics used against Obong-ni Ridge.[279]
[279] Craig, 4 Mar 54.
Before the conference closed, Church promised Craig that 145 Army
trucks would be available the next day to transport the Marines
from their Miryang bivouac to an assembly area near the line of
departure.[280]
[280] _Ibid._; and Brig SAR, basic rpt.
At 1900, 15 August, Craig briefed his staff and unit commanders. The
next morning the Brigade commander flew by helicopter to Church’s CP
and received the actual attack order, which was identical with the
planning of the previous day.[281]
[281] Craig, 4 Mar 54.
Later on the 16th, Craig drove to the front to reconnoiter the area
marked for the Brigade jump-off. He visited the 9th RCT command
post where Colonel Hill informed him that the Army unit was in good
condition as it stood by for the great attack.[282]
[282] _Ibid._
_Reconnaissance of Terrain_
After Craig’s reconnaissance, Lieutenant Colonel Murray arrived at the
front to discuss the tactical plan with the 9th RCT Commander. Although
Colonel Hill spoke confidently of his outfit’s readiness for the
attack, Murray observed that the ranks of soldiers on Observation Hill
and Hill 125 were dun and the men obviously wearied by the fighting of
the previous 5 days.[283]
[283] 24th InfDiv Op Instr No. 26 for this period showed
the 9th RCT(-) at 47 percent strength and 44 percent
estimated combat efficiency. Morale for the consistently
hard-hit 24th Division was gauged “Fair.”
With this impression in mind, the 5th Marines commander studied the
terrain soon to be his regiment’s battleground. Between Observation
Hill and Obong-ni Ridge, a 300-yard rice paddy was flanked to the north
of the road by the 9th RCT positions on Hill 125. Across the MSR from
the northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge was the congested village of Tugok.
West of the hamlet and northwest of Brigade Objective One was long, low
Finger Ridge, target of Hill’s RCT.[284]
[284] _Ibid._
Murray quickly concluded from the terrain that both regiments should
not attack together and become exposed simultaneously in the low ground
ahead. Since Obong-ni Ridge was closer than the Army objective and
dominated both Tugok and Finger Ridge, Murray suggested that the 5th
Marines jump off alone at 0800, 17 August. If the 9th RCT would support
him by fire from Hill 125, he would cake Obong-ni Ridge and return the
courtesy while the Army unit cleared Tugok and seized its objective.
And though offering his plan on a tactical basis, Murray also took into
consideration the condition and numbers of Hill’s troops.[285]
[285] _Ibid._
The 9th RCT commander agreed, and the responsibility of delivering the
first punch lay with the 5th Marines.[286]
[286] _Ibid._
Time and chance were against the Brigade throughout 16 August and the
following morning. Banking on the use of 145 Army trucks, Craig and
Murray hoped to move quickly on the 16th, in order to have one infantry
battalion take over Observation Hill and the other two available for
the attack on the 17th. Unfortunately, only 43 trucks were actually
provided, with the result that time schedules were thrown off and
troops forced to march long distances the night before the attack.[287]
[287] Brig SAR, basic rpt; Annex How; and Craig, 4 Mar 54.
At 1900, 16 August, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion entrucked
at Miryang and rode to the 5th Marines CP about 3,000 yards behind the
front. Dismounting, 3/5 marched to Cloverleaf Hill and relieved the
34th Infantry on position. Control of the area south of the MSR passed
to Taplett at 0445, 17 August.[288]
[288] Annex How.
The 2d Battalion proceeded on foot to its assembly area near Cloverleaf
Hill at 0130 on the 17th, and Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s men got little
sleep as they prepared for the jump-off a few hours later. Owing to the
shortage of trucks, the 1st Battalion arrived at the forward assembly
area several hours later than planned.[289]
[289] _Ibid._
Overloaded trucks had shuttled Lieutenant Colonel Wood’s artillery
battalion forward on 16 August. Although registration fires were
completed by evening, the haste of the displacement and the doubtful
information at the front left much to be desired from the standpoint of
accuracy.[290]
[290] Annex item to Brig SAR; and Craig, 4 Mar 54.
While Obong-ni Ridge was known to be heavily defended, it was generally
thought that Hill 207--Brigade Objective Two--would be the hard nut to
crack. And the potential of Objective Three, towering Hill 311, was by
no means minimized in preattack estimates.[291] Later events proved
these assumptions to be the reverse of reality, but Marine planners
could do no better with the meager intelligence then available.
[291] Stewart, 15 Jan 54; Murray, 15 Feb 54.
The regimental commander and General Craig concluded that a frontal
assault on Obong-ni Ridge with a column of battalions was the only
answer to the problems posed by the terrain and situation.
Since the Brigade commander had been specifically charged with the
security of the MSR, it was necessary that 3/5 remain in position on
Cloverleaf Hill until Objective One was taken. Taplett’s battalion had
a second responsibility in guarding the Brigade’s left (south) flank,
because Craig considered the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, too far out
to provide the required close-in protection.[292]
[292] Craig, 4 Mar 54.
The Brigade commander, unaware of Murray’s arrangement with Colonel
Hill, could not have envisioned an approach to the enemy’s left through
the 9th RCT zone. He expected the Army unit to advance side by side
with the Brigade and give supporting fire as directed by General
Church. On the other hand, an envelopment of the enemy’s right seemed
out of the question. Using the southern approach to Obong-ni Ridge
would have created a gap of several thousands yards in the center of
the critical area, and the low, barren marshland to the left would have
impeded the movement of tanks and the employment of the 5th Marines’
integral supporting arms.[293]
[293] _Ibid._
Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s reasoning closely paralleled that of his
superior. He did not visualize an envelopment from the north because
he expected a comparable effect from supporting fire by the 9th RCT.
An attempt to flank the North Korean right would have placed the
attacking unit far from the power consolidated along the MSR. The enemy
situation in the hills and swamps to the south was unknown, and the
Marine regimental commander did not relish the thought of one or two
of his battalions becoming isolated in that remote area. Then too, the
southern peaks on Obong-ni Ridge were considerably higher and more
rugged than those nearer the MSR. So it seemed logical to Murray to
retain depth and strength by striking frontally, quickly gaining a
foothold on the lower, northern reaches of the ridge, then exploiting
the penetration rapidly and vigorously.[294]
[294] Murray, 15 Feb 54.
When asked about his tactical plan by General Craig, he stated that
the 5th Marines would attack in a column of battalions, 2/5 seizing
Objective One, 1/5 passing through to take Hill 207, and 3/5 completing
the reduction of the bulge by following with an assault on Objective
Three.[295]
[295] _Ibid._; and Annex How.
The Brigade commander voiced his concurrence, and the plan was put in
motion.[296]
[296] Murray, 15 Feb 54.
_Air and Artillery Preparation_
Obong-ni Ridge sprawled across the Marine front like some huge
prehistoric reptile. Its blunt head overlooked the MSR below Tugok, and
the elongated body stretched to the southeast more than 2,000 yards
before losing its identity in a complex of swamps and irregular hill
formations. The high, narrow spine was marked by a series of peaks,
beginning with Hill 102 at the neck, followed by 109, 117, 143, 147,
and 153. There were still other peaks to the southeast, but so small
and irregular as to be almost indistinguishable.
A procession of steep spurs, separated from one another by pronounced
gullies, ran down from the numbered peaks to the rice paddies far
below. At the top of a gully extending down from the saddle between
Hills 109 and 117 was a fault caused by erosion of the red clay and
shale. Gaping like an ugly wound, the raw blemish inspired one of the
ridge’s first names--“Red Slash Hill.” It was also dubbed “No Name
Ridge” by some of the newspaper correspondents.
[Illustration: 1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE
1st PROVISIONAL MARINE BRIGADE ATTACHED TO 24th INF DIV.
SHOWING MARINE & ARMY ATTACKS & N.K. POSITIONS, COUNTERATTACK, &
WITHDRAWALS]
Marine air and artillery were to pound the ridge on 17 August from 0725
to H-hour, 0800, after which MAG-33 would strafe the hill to cover the
advancing infantrymen.[297] Brigade artillery fired its preparation as
planned; but due either to the hasty registration of the previous day
or to error on the part of observers, the shelling was not effective
against the enemy on Objective One. It was so inacurrate, in fact, that
many officers of 2/5 thought there had been no preparation at all.[298]
To make matters worse, air attacks scheduled to begin at 0725 did not
materialize until 0740; and the 18 Corsairs assigned to the job had
time for only one strike before H-hour.[299]
[297] Brig Op Plan 13-50.
[298] Annexes How and Item to Brig SAR; Maj A. M. Zimmer,
ltr to author, 6 May 54 (Zimmer, 6 May 54); and W. E.
Sweeney, ltr to author, 22 May 54 (Sweeney, 22 May 54).
[299] Annexes Easy and How to Brig SAR; and Brig Op Plan 13-50.
The two rifle companies of the 2d Battalion jumped off abreast at 0800.
On the right was Captain Zimmer’s Company D, emerging into the open
from the road cut between Hill 125 and Observation Hill.[300]
[300] Co D Action is derived from: Annex How; Zimmer, 6 May
54; and Capt M. J. Shinka, ltr to author, 7 Jun 54.
Zimmer ordered the 2d Platoon into reserve on the southern spur of Hill
125 and established his OP there. The 3d Platoon, commanded by Second
Lieutenant Michael J. Shinka, stepped from the road bend below the spur
into the rice paddy. Advancing behind this unit were the 1st Platoon
and a rocket section, the latter stopping in positions along the road
bend to protect the MSR.
Halfway across the rice paddy, Staff Sergeant T. Albert Crowson led his
1st Platoon to the right from behind the 3d, and both units approached
the base of the ridge on line. On Shinka’s left was the 2d Platoon
of Company E. An eerie silence pervaded the front while the assault
platoons crossed the wide open area unmolested.
Providing covering fire from its positions on Hill 125, Technical
Sergeant Sidney S. Dickerson’s 2d Platoon was hit by long-range
machinegun bursts from Hills 117 and 143 on Obong-ni. Company D’s first
two casualties were taken.
_Company D on Objective_
While General Craig watched from the road cut, and Lieutenant Colonel
Roise from his OP on Observation Hill, Company D’s assault platoons
began to ascend the objective. Gradually turning its back on the
village of Tugok, Crowson’s unit traced the draw on the right of the
spur leading to Hill 102, while Shinka led his 3d Platoon up the
gully on the left. The infantrymen were almost halfway up the slope
when a battalion of the NKPA 18th Regiment opened fire with dozens of
machineguns.
Despite the hail of lead, Shinka and Crowson edged their units upwards.
The fire from Hills 117 and 143 finally became so intense, however,
that the 3d Platoon was momentarily unable to emerge from its gully.
Almost simultaneously, enemy machineguns poured it into the 1st
Platoon, pinning that unit down and inflicting heavy casualties.
Again pushing upward despite mounting casualties, the 3d Platoon
attempted to assault Hill 109 about 1000. Communist automatic weapons
and a shower of hand grenades from the crest sent the thin skirmish
line of Marines reeling back down the barren slope.
As the 3d Platoon came under increasing machinegun and mortar fire from
Hills 117 and 143, Zimmer decided to commit his reserve. Realizing the
apparent futility of pressing the attack up the 3d Platoon’s gully, he
ordered Dickerson to attempt an assault through the draw in which the
1st Platoon was pinned down.
The 2d Platoon crossed the rice paddy, following the route used earlier
by the 3d. Reaching the draw in which the latter was regrouping after
its abortive assault, Dickerson led his men over Hill 102’s spur,
attempting to gain the avenue of approach being used by Crowson’s unit.
In the process he came under heavy automatic weapons fire from both
flanks--Hills 117 and 143 on the left, and the hillside north of Tugok
across the MSR.
At this time the company commander spotted North Korean positions above
the village and realized why his pinned-down 1st Platoon was taking
so many casualties. From their vantage point in the 9th RCT zone, the
Communists were firing on the flank and rear of the Marines along the
northwest approaches of Objective One.
Zimmer requested that 2/5 lay supporting fires on Tugok. When he got
no response, his forward observer, Lieutenant Wirth, transferred the
mission to 1/11. But the 105’s had scarcely begun firing when they were
cut off because the impact area was in the 9th RCT’s zone. The company
commander turned his own 60-mm. mortars on the enemy machineguns, only
to discover that the target lay beyond effective range.
Zimmer had more success with supporting arms when the enemy posed
another threat. Practically all the machinegun fire had been coming
from the north and south of Hills 102 and 109, while the enemy on these
summits relied on rifles and vast numbers of hand grenades. Then,
apparently shaken by the 3d Platoon’s tenacity, the Communists tried
to wheel a heavy machinegun into position on the saddle between the
northernmost peaks. Twice the mounted weapon was hauled up, and twice
pulled back under heavy Marine fire. By this time Zimmer had requested
battalion to use a 75-mm. recoilless rifle on the target. When the
persistent North Koreans wheeled the machinegun onto the saddle a third
time, one round from a Marine 75 obliterated gun and crew.
With only 15 men left in his platoon, Shinka prepared for a second
assault on Hill 109. Following an air strike at 1100, the Marines
stormed the high ground and overran enemy positions on the crest.
Only a squad of North Koreans could show similar determination on the
reverse slope, but the enemy’s small-scale counterattack was stopped
cold by Company D’s riflemen.
One of the few Marines who reached Obong-ni’s summit during 2/5’s
attack and lived to tell the story, Shinka later related the events
following his seizure of Hill 109:
“Fire from Hill 143 was gaining in intensity, and they had
observation over our position. Fire was also coming from the hill to
our front [Hill 207]. I reported the situation to Captain Zimmer. A
short time later phosphorus shells were exploding in Hill 143. This
slowed the fire but it never did stop.
“My resupply of ammo did not arrive. Running short of ammo and
taking casualties, with the shallow enemy slit trenches for cover, I
decided to fall back until some of the fire on my left flank could
be silenced. I gave the word to withdraw and take all wounded and
weapons. About three-quarters of the way down, I had the men set up
where cover was available. I had six men who were able to fight.
“I decided to go forward to find out if we left any of our wounded.
As I crawled along our former position (on the crest of Hill 109), I
came across a wounded Marine between two dead. As I grabbed him under
the arms and pulled him from the foxhole, a bullet shattered my chin.
Blood ran into my throat and I couldn’t breath. I tossed a grenade at
a gook crawling up the slope, didn’t wait for it to explode, turned
and reached under the Marine’s arms and dragged him as far as the
military crest.
“Another bullet hit my right arm, and the force spun me around. I
rolled down the hill for a considerable distance before I could stop
myself.
“I walked into my lines and had a battle dressing tied on my face
and arm, I learned that the ammo was up and that a relief was
contemplated; and then I walked back to 2/5’s aid station where they
placed me on a jeep and took me to regimental aid.”
Lieutenant Shinka was later awarded the Bronze Star for this action.
_Attack of Company E_
At 0800 Lieutenant Sweeney had ordered his 1st and 2d Platoons of Easy
Company into the attack from their line of departure on the southern
portion of Observation Hill. Although the boundary separating the
zones of Companies E and D extended from the left of Hill 109 and down
through the red slash, Sweeney centered his advance on the village of
Obong-ni, directly below Hills 143 and 147.[301]
[301] This section is derived from: Annex How; and Sweeney, 22
May 54.
The leading platoons encountered nothing more than scattered shots
crossing the rice paddy. Before they could gain a foothold on the slope
of the objective, however, heavy fire from the village ripped into the
skirmish line.
In the center, Second Lieutenant Nickolas A. Arkadis led his 1st
Platoon through the hail of bullets and drove through the village to
the slopes of the ridge. On the right the 2d Platoon faltered and lost
its momentum. Then a number of North Korean machineguns poured in
flanking fire from Hills 147 and 153.
Sweeney, from his OP on the southern slope of Observation Hill, tried
to get an artillery mission on the two dominating peaks, but his
forward observer was unable to contact the rear. Nor could the 4.2
mortar observer be located.
Faced with the necessity of giving his assault elements some
protection, the company commander committed 2d Lieutenant Rodger E.
Eddy’s 3d Platoon, sending it to the spur on the left of the village.
Working its way up the nose which led to Hills 147 and 153, Eddy’s unit
was able to concentrate its fire on the enemy-held peaks and relieve
pressure on the other two platoons.
With enemy fire gradually increasing from new positions on the lower
slopes of the ridge to the south of the village, Sweeney ordered the
mortar section and all of his headquarters personnel into the valley to
block the southern approach through the rice paddy. Leaving this flank
guard in command of his executive officer, First Lieutenant Paul R.
Uffelman, the company commander rushed to the base of the objective.
Every single man in his unit was now committed.
Sweeney found the 2d Platoon leaderless and disorganized. The 1st had
fought its way well up the slope, aided by excellent supporting fire
from 2/5’s 81-mm. mortars. As that dogged group of Marines neared the
crest, it was stopped when a friendly artillery barrage fell short,
searing the skirmish line with white phosphorus.
[Illustration: 1st NAKTONG COUNTEROFFENSIVE
SITUATION 17 AUG.--OBJ. 1 (OBONG-NI RIDGE)]
Late morning found part of the company closing on the crest; but
shortly before 1130, the attackers were ordered to pull back in
preparation for an air strike by MAG-33. The planes came in quickly,
and some of Company E’s men, within 25 yards of the summit, were caught
in the strafing.
During the hammering by the Corsairs, the 3d Platoon slipped back 100
yards, leaving the critical left flank open to enemy-infested peaks 147
and 153. This time the hail of enfilade fire from Communist machineguns
caught the remnant of Easy Company rifleman exposed on the higher
slopes, and the Marine advance crumbled.
By noon on 17 August, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was wobbling. In
4 hours of fighting it had lost 23 dead and 119 wounded, practically
all of the casualties being taken by the 2 rifle companies. Every
officer in the Brigade could lament the lack of a third company in each
battalion; for just when 2/5’s assault needed the added punch of a
reserve unit, the outcome of battle had to rest on the failing strength
of six depleted rifle platoons. The ridge could not be taken.
This was unfortunate, since there was clear evidence that the NKPA 4th
Division was weakening. Although not apparent to the men of Companies D
and E, their repeated attempts to carry the ridge had torn gaps in the
enemy’s defenses. Bodies, weapons and wreckage were strewn along the
entire northern crest.[302]
[302] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr to author. 17 Mar 54 (Craig, 17
Mar 54); Annex Easy to Brig SAR.
Marine air and artillery, having settled down after a fumbling start,
not only blasted the North Korean lines, but also wrought havoc
throughout the entire bridgehead. A large number of enemy mortars
and field pieces were knocked out, troop concentrations cut down or
scattered while trying to reinforce the front lines, and supply points
obliterated. There were definite signs of increasing confusion in the
enemy’s rear.[303]
[303] _Ibid._
General Craig had become alarmed at the lack of activity in the 9th
RCT’s zone, resulting in the enemy being left free to pound the
Brigade’s right flank from the Tugok area. When he inquired concerning
the Army’s supposed failure to advance on schedule, he first learned of
the prebattle agreement reached by Murray and Hill. It was then that he
requested the village be taken under fire.
Deeply concerned himself over the situation on the right, particularly
since no supporting fire at all had been received from the 9th RCT,
Murray tried to contact Hill and request that he commit his regiment.
Unable to get the message through immediately, he was forced to leave
the matter dangling while directing the conduct of the battle.[304]
[304] Murray, 15 Feb 54.
About 1300 the 5th Marines commander ordered the 1st Battalion to pass
through the 2d and seize Obong-ni Ridge. While Newton moved his unit
forward from its assembly area, MAG-33, 1/11 and Able Company tanks
laid down devastating fires on the blackened objective.