Fight on Two Fronts
_The Kosong Turkey Shoot--The Changchon Ambush--Marines Ordered
to New Sector--Attack of 3/5 to the Rear--Enemy Dawn Attack at
Changchon--Breaking Off Action_
Marine air and artillery had a field day on 11 August 1950 that the
rifle companies will never forget. The occasion was known as “the
Kosong Turkey Shoot,” and it was a victory won entirely by supporting
arms.
It happened just as 3/5 was about to enter Kosong. As a preliminary,
1/11 was called upon just before noon for preparatory fires. Shells
from the 105’s landed in the town, sending up geysers of rubble in the
bright sunlight. Then, suddenly, the Marine artillery flushed out a
column of enemy vehicles making a frantic dash for safety.
This flight explains the light resistance which the Marine infantry met
in Kosong. But the enemy could hardly have chosen a less propitious
moment, for he had merely escaped from the frying pan into the fire.
Overhead, to his sorrow, was a division of VMF-323 planes from the
_Badoeng Strait_, which the forward TACP had sent on a search and
attack mission just beyond the town.[259] Major Lund and his pilots
were thus presented with a fabulous target of opportunity--an estimated
100 vehicles of the NKPA 83d Motorcycle Regiment, including jeeps,
motorcycles and troop-carrying trucks.[260]
[259] VMF-323 SAR, 3 Aug-6 Sep 50.
[260] Estimates as to the number of vehicles vary widely.
Apparently no exact count was ever made.
_The Kosong Turkey Shoot_
The Corsairs came screaming down in low-level strafing runs the
entire length of the column for the purpose of bringing it to a halt.
Vehicles crashed into one another or piled up in the ditch while enemy
troops scrambled out for cover. The Soviet-made jeeps and motorcycles
were now sitting ducks for F4U’s which worked over individual targets
with rocket or 20-mm. fire. After the Marine planes had set about 40
vehicles on fire, they were relieved by another flight of VMF-323
machines and Air Force F-51’s which added the finishing touches to the
picture of destruction.[261]
[261] Ernest Giusti, “Marine Air Over the Pusan Perimeter,”
_Marine Corps Gazette_, 36, No. 5:20–21 (May 52).
Under the circumstances the enemy put up a creditable fight. Lund and
his low-flying pilots encountered fierce small arms and automatic
weapons fire. Two of the four Corsairs in the first flight were badly
damaged and had to try for emergency landings. Lieutenant Doyle Cole
ditched into the bay just as General Craig was making a tour of
inspection by helicopter; and the Brigade commander operated the hoist
which pulled the dripping flier up to safety.
Captain Vivian Moses was not so fortunate. While putting his crippled
plane down in enemy territory, he was thrown unconscious from the
cockpit and drowned in a rice paddy a few minutes before a VMO-6
helicopter arrived. Only the day before, this gallant Marine pilot
had been rescued by helicopter, after being shot down behind the NKPA
lines, and flown back unhurt to his carrier. Despite this experience,
Captain Moses volunteered for duty on 11 August, when he became the
first death casualty of MAG-33.
Several hours later, after securing Kosong and resuming the attack
toward Sachon, the Marine ground forces caught up with the scene of
chaos left by the F4U’s. Among the twisted and charred vehicles were
some that the enemy had abandoned in perfect condition. Tolerant
NCO’s relaxed discipline for a moment while their men tried out the
motorcycles with sidecars and the sleek, black Soviet jeeps, most of
which had gone into the attack practically new. Almost identical in
design to American jeeps, these vehicles were found to be powered by
familiar Ford-type engines--a throwback to United States Lend Lease to
Russia in World War II.
Generals Craig and Cushman surveyed the wreckage from a helicopter
next day. This strike, however, was only one of the more dramatic
examples of the Brigade air-ground team in action. MAG-33 aircraft
were constantly orbiting on station over the front line as the ground
forces advanced. Flown by infantry-trained pilots briefed on the local
ground situation, the Corsairs were available for employment on short
notice. It was a simple and flexible system; and the fact that VMF-214
and VMF-323 were based on the two carriers meant that they could arrive
on station with more fuel and ordnance for strikes as compared to
Japan-based squadrons.[262]
[262] This summary of tactical air operations is derived from
MCBS, I-IV-B, 9–14; Maj George J. King, interv with
author, n. d.
Overall control of tactical air operations in Korea was exercised
by the Fifth Air Force. Marine aviation units, as components of an
integrated Fleet Marine Force, operated in support of the Brigade as
their highest priority, and in support of other UN forces as a lower
priority. After checking in with Fifth AF TACC at the Joint Operations
Center (JOC), Marine aviation units came under Marine operational
control when supporting Brigade ground forces. When providing tactical
air support for other UN forces, Marine air units operated under the
Air Force-Army system for tactical air support.
The Brigade control organization included 3 battalion TACP’s and 1
regimental TACP, each consisting of an officer and 6 enlisted men,
and each equipped with a radio jeep, portable radios and remoting
equipment. MAG-33 provided a Brigade control agency consisting of the
Air Support Section of MTACS-2. Other Brigade units associated with
control of aircraft were:
(1) The Air Section of the Brigade Staff, consisting of the Brigade
Air officer and six enlisted men responsible for planning as well as
tactical control and coordination of supporting aircraft;
(2) The Brigade observation section, consisting of the tactical air
observer, three gunnery observers, and the OY and rotary-wing aircraft
of VMO-6.
Carrier-based Marine aviation units maintained a TAC and one or more
flights of aircraft on station during daylight hours. Night heckler
and intruder missions of VMF(N)-513 from Itazuke reported to the Fifth
AF TACC and were routed by that agency to the Air Support Section
(MTACS-2) with the Brigade. During the early Brigade operations,
with the Air Force TACC located at Taegu, delays of incoming flights
reporting to JOC were caused by overloaded communications nets. An
improvement resulted when such flights by-passed JOC and reported
directly to the Air Support Section of Brigade. And when JOC moved
back to Pusan, improved communications resulted in incoming flights
reporting first to JOC again.
The Brigade control agency (Air Support Section) made use of the
following communications for the control of tactical air operations:
(1) TAR net connecting battalion TACP’s, the regimental TACP, and the
Air Support Section, and monitored by the Brigade Air Section. This was
an HF net.
(2) TAD net connecting above-named agencies as well as TAC flights of
support aircraft and on occasion the TAO. This was a VHF net of four
frequencies used to brief and control aircraft reporting for support
missions.
(3) TAO net connecting observation aircraft, the Brigade CP (Air
Section) and the Air Support Section. This was an HF net.
(4) An administrative (HF) net connecting the Air Support Section and
the carriers _Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_.
The workings of the control organization of the Brigade air-ground team
in the Pusan Perimeter have been described as follows in the survey of
the Marine Corps Board Study:
“Battalion TACP’s made requests for air support missions direct by
TAR net to the Air Support Section. The regimental TACP and Brigade
Air Section monitored this net. The Brigade control agency having
received a request for a mission, contacted the TAC and the Flight
Leader (FL) of the aircraft orbiting on station awaiting a mission.
The TAC and the FL were then directed to the vicinity of the TACP
from whom the request had originated.
“The TACP controlled the execution of the mission in accordance with
the wishes of the battalion commander. The TACP gave the location of
the target to the TAC. The latter designated the target to the FL and
his flight of supporting aircraft. The unit being supported marked
its front lines. The TAC directed the attacking aircraft in making
attacks on the target. His directions related to the technique of
attacking specific targets with aircraft. Control of the attack was
exercised by the ground unit being supported.
“In many instances the TAC or the TAO would locate targets not yet
located by ground units. This was often done in response to a request
from ground units. Both the TAC and TAO located targets beyond the
vision of ground units, and both were capable of, and did, designate
these targets to flights of supporting aircraft and directed attacks
on such targets, when requested to do so by ground units. Conditions
favored delegating control to forward TACP’s beyond convenient VHF
range between them and the Brigade (Air Support Section). Brigade
attack formations frequently consisted of battalions in column.
The forward battalion was free to employ air support at a moment’s
notice.”
This was the situation on the afternoon of 11 August 1950 as the 3d
Battalion of the 5th Marines attacked toward Sachon, followed by 2/5
in trace. Overhead a flight of VMF-323 Corsairs orbited on station,
and OY observers reported the enemy to be pulling back rapidly toward
Sachon.
How Company led the Marine attack, with lead tanks employing
reconnaissance by fire. At 1800, after the column had covered several
miles, a lone enemy machinegun in a valley on the left held up the
advance by wounding three Marines. By the time the tanks silenced the
weapon with .50-caliber fire, it was decided to halt. Taplett deployed
his battalion on two hills north of the road, and the infantrymen
settled down for a quiet night.
The gravel crunchers could thank air and other supporting arms for
an impressive demonstration of power that day. There was even the
suggestion of an amphibious operation in the Brigade advance, for
an LST followed the column and anchored near the fishing village of
Tanghong-ni after the securing of Kosong.
This was LST QO119, a supply ship manned by Team No. 1 of Major William
L. Batchelor’s Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion. Team No. 2 set
up forward dumps along the MSR as the infantry advanced, while No. 3
unloaded supplies and equipment at the Masan railhead. Shore Party
personnel also assisted in salvage operations, which were conducted
mainly at Changwon.[263]
[263] Annex Mike to Brig SAR.
LST QO119 was not only the workhorse of normal Shore Party missions;
it served also as an improvised hospital ship. For the Medical Section
and Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, had an extra responsibility these
sweltering days in caring for victims of heat prostration as well as
the wounded. Thus it may have set some sort of a record when casualties
were evacuated at one time by land, sea and air--motor ambulance, LST
and helicopter.
_The Changchon Ambush_
At sundown on 11 August, as Taplett’s battalion dug in for the night
on the road to Sachon, the enemy seemed to be disorganized if not
actually demoralized. For the first time since the invasion began, a
sustained Eighth Army counterattack had not only stopped the Red Korean
steamroller but sent it into reverse.
With the Marines a day’s march from Sachon, the Army 5th RCT was
running a dead heat on the shorter Chinju route to the north, where
opposition had been light the last 2 days. It might even have appeared
on the evening of the 11th that the combined operation had turned
into a friendly rivalry between two outfits racing toward their final
objective by parallel roads. But any such assumption would have been
premature, as General Craig and his staff well realized. They looked
for further resistance and were not disillusioned. Within the next 48
hours, in fact, Craig’s men were destined to carry out one of the most
astonishing operations in the history of the Marine Corps--simultaneous
BLT attacks in opposite directions on two fronts 25 miles apart.
There was no hint of any such development at 0630 on the morning of 12
August, when the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines passed through the
3d Battalion with a mission of seizing Sachon. If anything, the front
was too quiet to suit veteran NCO’s, who suspected the enemy of being
up to no good. The column moved out behind a 15-man detachment of Recon
Company acting as the point under the command of Captain Kenneth J.
Houghton. Next came Baker Company with the 1st, 2d, and 3d Platoons in
that order. Two Marine tanks were sandwiched in between the 1st and 2d
Platoons, and three more M-26’s brought up the rear of Captain Tobin’s
company, followed by the main body of the battalion.
No opposition awaited the column. This unnatural calm continued for
4½ hours as the Marines advanced about 11 miles. At noon, with Sachon
only 4 miles away, Houghton and the point rounded a bend into the
thatched-hut hamlet of Changchon. The first enemy soldiers of the day
were sighted when two skulking figures took cover. Several Marines
opened fire, and in reply the hills on both sides of the road erupted
into flame.[264]
[264] This section is derived from: Brig SAR, 5th Marines,
1st Bn rpt; Maj John L. Tobin, ltr to author, 26 Apr 54
(Tobin, 26 Apr 54); Maj John R. Stevens, ltr to author,
11 Jan 54; and T/Sgt F. J. Lischeski, ltr to author, 14
Jan 54.
The enemy had obviously planned to allow the entire column to come
within range. But the trap was sprung prematurely as NKPA machineguns
blazed away from the high ground in front and on both flanks. Captain
Tobin immediately sent the 1st Platoon to the aid of the point. First
Lieutenant Hugh C. Schryver led his men forward along the roadside
ditches, and at the cost of three casualties they reinforced the thin
line of Recon troops returning the enemy’s fire.
Next, the company commander ordered First Lieutenant David S. Taylor’s
2d Platoon to move up behind three Marine tanks. The M-26’s were unable
to maneuver off the road because of the danger of bogging down in
rice paddies, but as mobile fortresses they added to Marine fire power.
[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE
CHANGCHON AMBUSH
12 AUGUST 1950]
Tobin’s whole company became more or less pinned down when the 3d
Platoon and headquarters, farther back on the road, received automatic
weapons fire from Hill 250 on the right. Newton immediately requested
the battalion air controller, First Lieutenant James W. Smith, to call
for a strike in this area. This was the only supporting arm available
at the moment, since the mortar and artillery crews were just setting
up their weapons in hastily selected positions.
After the Corsairs worked over Hill 250, Tobin ordered Second
Lieutenant David R. Cowling’s 3d Platoon to attack the high ground.
A rifle platoon and machinegun section had been sent forward from
Able Company by the battalion commander, and Newton gave these
reinforcements the mission of seizing Hill 301, also on the right side
of the road.
As Cowling’s men were crossing the open rice paddy, the Marine tank
guns and mortars added their fires to the air strike. But enough enemy
machineguns survived to catch the 3d Platoon in a crossfire which
forced it to fall back with 1 man killed and 4 wounded. The Able
Company contingent occupied Hill 301 meanwhile without meeting any
resistance.
During the course of these actions, the FAC reported to Newton that
2 of the Corsairs overhead had 5 minutes of time left. The battalion
commander directed that they search for targets of opportunity along
the road leading from Changchon to Sachon. The result was a repetition
on a small scale of the Kosong turkey shoot, for the Marine planes
surprised a little column of enemy vehicles and personnel. After the
Corsairs unloaded their remaining ordnance, the road was strewn with
twisted and burning vehicles.
The 3d Platoon fell back on Hill 301 as Newton ordered Captain John
R. Stevens to secure the nearby high ground on the right side of the
road with the rest of his Able Company troops. This left Hill 250 as
the center of enemy resistance on the right. A total of 113 Marine
mortar rounds were delivered on these positions, followed by a second
air strike. The concentration of fire finally silenced the enemy’s
remaining machineguns, and the Baker Company right flank was secured.
The other two Baker Company platoons and Houghton’s men had their hands
full meanwhile on the left flank. They kept up a brisk fire fight from
the roadside ditches until the Marine artillery took charge of the
situation. One enemy position after another was knocked out in this
quarter as Newton called for three more air strikes. These preparatory
fires enabled the 1st and 2d Platoons to attack on the left after a
laborious crossing of an intervening rice paddy.
The Marines proceeded to clean up the remaining NKPA positions
methodically. A climax was reached when Lieutenant Taylor spotted an
enemy group approaching the crest of Hill 202 from the reverse slope.
He sent Technical Sergeant F. J. Lischeski with a squad to prepare
a welcome. The veteran NCO coolly formed a line along the ridge and
directed his men to wait until the enemy came within 75 feet before
opening fire.
It would be hard to find a more striking example of Marine infantry
firepower. Of the 39 men in the NKPA group, all were killed outright in
a matter of seconds except a single officer. This survivor was so badly
wounded that he died on the way to the regimental CP.
The fight had lasted all afternoon, and darkness fell before Company
B could complete its movement to the high ground on the left side of
the road and set up a perimeter of defense. It was estimated that an
enemy company was operating in the area, covering the retreat of sorely
battered elements of the NKPA 6th Infantry Division and 83d Motorcycle
Regiment.
Marine losses were 3 killed and 13 wounded. After the securing of the
high ground to the right, casualties were evacuated by road on the lee
side of slowly moving tanks which provided shelter from enemy fire on
the left.
_Marines Ordered to New Sector_
The Marines of 1/5 anticipated that the next day’s advance would take
them to Sachon. At midnight on 12 August, however, Lieutenant Colonel
Newton received orders from the regimental commander to form the
battalion on the road at 0630 in preparation for a lift by trucks to
another sector, where the Marines were to reinforce Army units.
While Newton’s men were fighting at Changchon, the Brigade commander
had come up against a most unusual command situation. It began late
on the morning of the 12th, when General Craig received orders from
CG Task Force Kean, directing him to move a reinforced Marine rifle
battalion back to Chindong-ni. General Kean emphasized that the shift
be made without delay. Infiltrating enemy forces had penetrated far
back in the rear to overrun positions of Battery C, 555th (“Triple
Nickel”) Field Artillery Battalion and Headquarters and Able Batteries,
90th Field Artillery Battalion, supporting the 25th Division. The MSR
being endangered, Marine reinforcements were urgently needed for a
counterattack.[265]
[265] This section is derived from: Craig, 18 May 5 and 12 Jan
54; Murray, 14 Jan 54; and Brig SAR, 5th Marines, 1st Bn
and 3d Bn rpts.
At 0800 that morning Craig had set up his CP at Kosong. It was his
custom to keep a terse and factual record of events from day to day,
and the following chronological account is derived from entries in the
Brigade commander’s field notebook:
“1130--Received telephonic orders from CG 25th Div, stating that
enemy was attacking in force across our MSR near Chindong-ni. He
directed that I send one reinforced battalion to rear at once
to give assistance to 24th Infantry engaged in that area and to
recapture artillery pieces.
“1200--Proceeded by helicopter to CP 5th Marines to give necessary
instructions. Made two landings en route to gather trucks for
troop lift.
“1300--The reinforced 3d Bn., 5th Marines, now on way to Chindong-ni
area.
“1330--Sent my G-3, LtCol Stewart, and LtCol Taplett, CO of 3/5, by
helicopter to bridge indicated by CG 25th Div. to reconnoiter and
formulate plans prior to arrival of battalion. Marines to operate
directly under 25th Division for this action.
“1400--We are out on a limb with only two battalions left and Sachon
still to take. Went to leading elements to check. They were
engaged in a heavy fire fight at an attempted ambush position.
Air brought to bear and helped, plus artillery. Enemy positions
taken by 1/5, which dug in on high ground while 2/5 was disposed
to protect rest of Brigade column.
“1730--Returned to Brigade CP at Kosong and received orders to
proceed via helicopter to Masan to confer with CG 25th Division.
“1815--On flight to Masan I detoured to Chindong-ni area to make sure
by air observation that 3/5 had arrived and apparently was not
having any trouble.
“1830--Arrived Masan and was directed by General Kean to commence a
tactical withdrawal from Sachon.
“1945--Returned by helicopter to my Kosong CP in early darkness and
issued necessary orders.”
The preparations for withdrawal lowered the spirits of Marines who
believed that they had broken the back of enemy resistance in the
Sachon area. This reaction may even be noted in the first paragraph of
the Brigade withdrawal order:
“1. GENERAL SITUATION. Following Brigade rapid advance from
Chindong-ni to Sachon in which this Brigade attacked, overcame,
and pursued the enemy, the 25th Infantry Division has directed the
withdrawal of this Brigade in order to hold a defensive position and
mop up enemy resistance in the zone of action of elements of the 25th
Division.”
[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE
SITUATION MAP FOR 12–14 AUG. ’50]
It would later be known that the basic reason for the Brigade
withdrawal was a decision by the Eighth Army command and staff. The
enemy had crossed the river Naktong, the last natural barrier of the
Pusan Perimeter, and this emergency had caused the Marines to be pulled
back in readiness for a counterattack in the Naktong bulge.
_Attack of 3/5 to the Rear_
The foregoing chronology makes it evident that General Craig could
never have handled this situation in an afternoon without helicopter
transportation. Jeeps could not have reached so many destinations over
narrow, twisting roads choked with traffic; and fixed-wing planes,
even the adaptable OY’s, could not have landed wherever the Brigade
commander willed. Marine helicopters set a good many precedents in
Korea, and the events of 12 August 1950 established the usefulness of
these versatile machines for command and staff flights.
Early that afternoon, as Craig had directed, Stewart and Taplett flew
back to the Chindong-ni area for reconnaissance and planning prior
to the arrival of 3/5. The Brigade commander had been able to give
them very little initial information. About 2,000 to 2,500 enemy had
infiltrated to the vicinity, according to Army estimates. The two
Marine officers were instructed to fly to a bridge over a dry stream
bed, where they would be met and briefed by a 25th Division liaison
officer awaiting them in a jeep with a red air panel on the hood.[266]
[266] This section is derived from LtCol Robert D. Taplett’s
detailed statement to Marine Corps Evaluation Board,
n. d.
Stewart and Taplett found the bridge, though no jeep was in sight.
After landing in the stream bed, they discovered a camouflaged Army
light tank; but the officers of the armored company could not offer any
enlightenment.
A number of wire lines lay in the roadside ditch, and the Marine
officers checked them, one by one. At length, by a process of trial
and error, they found a line leading to the 25th Division CP and
talked to the G-3. He instructed them to “look the situation over”
and decide upon a course of action to eliminate enemy activity in the
area and provide security for the remaining artillery unit--a battery
of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion which had been attached to the
555th. Then the Marine officers were to report to General Barth, ADC
of the 25th Division, upon his arrival in the area to take the overall
command.
Ever since the jump-off of 7 August, the operations of Task Force
Kean had been distinguished for informality. Oral orders were the
rule rather than exception, with unusual latitude of decision being
permitted to officers in the field. After their telephone conversation,
Stewart and Taplett made a helicopter reconnaissance of the area,
followed by a flight back over the MSR to locate 3/5. Upon their
return, they encountered Colonel John Daly, USA, CO of the 555th Field
Artillery Battalion. Battery C of that unit, he informed them, had
been surprised the night before, along with two batteries of the 90th,
and completely overrun about 3,000 yards up the stream bed. They were
destroyed as a fighting force, though scattered survivors and wounded
men remained in the area. Daly briefed the Marine officers as to the
location of enemy forces; and they decided to seize two key ridges
commanding the MSR, which ran parallel to the stream bed. The troops of
3/5 were just then piling out of the trucks at the debarkation point,
and Taplett ordered them to attack without waiting for Barth, since it
would soon be dark.
These Marines, contrary to standing operating procedure, had turned
their backs on the roar of battle at Changchon early that afternoon
and ridden away in the opposite direction. Then, to complete the
mystery, they traveled 25 miles to the rear to assault a ridge which
was supposedly secured. How Company jumped off with George following
in trace. Colonel Daly provided a 15-minute artillery preparation,
though he had no orders, and Taplett’s FAC managed to summon a flight
of Corsairs with partial loads aboard, including napalm. No one had
any idea of the enemy’s strength, and after receiving some fire from
the ridge, Captain Fegan picked the locations for an air strike. How
Company moved in rapidly afterwards against such light resistance that
the Marines seized the first position without a single casualty. Only
one casualty was inflicted upon the enemy, who apparently had put up a
rearguard fight while withdrawing.
At 1900, when General Barth arrived, he asked when the Marine battalion
would be ready to attack. Taplett replied that he already had one
company on the first objective, and the 25th Division ADC congratulated
the Marines on their promptness. He approved Taplett’s course of action
and gave his sanction for the seizure of the rest of the dominating
high ground the following morning.
Again the Marines received the most cordial cooperation from the Army.
General Barth ordered several light tanks and three M-44 armored
personnel carriers to support the attack at 0700 on 13 August. The same
Army artillery battery was assigned to the operation, and Battery C
of the 11th Marines took part after arriving the night before. As it
proved, the infantry needed little assistance to seize the remaining
objectives against negligible resistance. By 1000 the Marine rifle
companies were in full possession of the two commanding ridgelines. No
casualties were suffered or inflicted.
Despite the lack of opposition, the enemy had not pulled out of the
area. When Lieutenant Colonel Murray made a helicopter flight to drop
a message to survivors of the 555th, his helicopter was ambushed in
a defile by NKPA marksmen concealed on both sides. Only the pilot’s
skillful maneuvering got them out safely, and they were unable to
complete their mission.
A plan for the Marines to advance to the west across the valley floor
while the Army 5th RCT attacked rearward to meet them was considered
by the 25th Division. Taplett’s battalion would have been accompanied
by 2/5, then on the way to the Chindong-ni area. But this scheme of
maneuver was canceled, and the 2d Battalion of the 5th RCT relieved 3/5
on 14 August. By that time, as will be related later, other elements
of the Brigade were on the way to an assembly area at Miryang in
preparation for an operation in another sector.
At least the attack by 3/5 enabled elements of the 25th Division to
rescue survivors of the artillery batteries who straggled back. Both
Taplett and Stewart believed that enemy numbers in the area had been
much smaller than the original Army estimate of 2,000 to 2,500 men. The
3/5 commander wanted to complete his mission by attacking to recover
the howitzers and other lost equipment while the opportunity still
existed. But he was unable to accomplish this aim because of orders for
Brigade withdrawal, and the artillery pieces were never recaptured.
Air strikes were called to destroy them after the relief of the Marine
battalion, and the area itself was abandoned a few days later when 25th
Division units fell back before renewed NKPA attacks.
_Enemy Dawn Attack at Changchon_
On the other Marine front, 25 miles distant, 1/5 had a return
engagement before dawn on 13 August with the enemy in the Changchon
area. Company commanders had received orders the night before to alert
their units at 0400 for the withdrawal. General Craig’s Op Order 10-50
was a complete and well planned field order, despite the need for
haste; but the enemy interrupted with a surprise attack launched from
concealed positions occupied under cover of darkness.[267]
[267] Craig, 12 Jan 54.
Baker Company’s defense setup for the night on Hill 202 consisted of
the 3d, 1st, and 2d Platoons tied in from left to right in that order.
The action began at 0450 with enemy automatic weapons fire. Marine
60-mm. mortar illuminating shells revealed an NKPA infiltration on the
right in the area of the 2d Platoon.
This effort soon proved to be a diversionary attack for the purpose
of masking the main blow. At 0455 3 enemy flares went up, 2 red and 1
green. They were the signal for an assault on the left flank at the
other end of the Baker Company position. The enemy, as a wounded Marine
NCO put it afterwards, was “right on top of the 3d Platoon in a few
seconds” with grenades and burp guns.[268]
[268] Tobin, of 26 Apr 54.
This was one of the occasions when the Marines were painfully reminded
that the NKPA 6th Division had been made up originally of veterans of
the Chinese civil war, conditioned by experience for the rigors of
night fighting. Marine security had not been at fault, yet the enemy
had managed to creep forward in uncanny silence to positions within
grenade-throwing distance.
In an instant the Marine position was overrun, with the machinegun
section being wiped out except for two men. Communication troubles
added to the confusion. Platoon radios had been rendered inoperative
by mud and water while crossing rice paddies, and telephone wires were
believed to have been cut. Two runners were killed during Tobin’s
efforts to maintain contact with the hard-pressed troops on the left
flank. A third runner got through with orders for the remnants of the
platoon to fall back within the perimeter of the adjacent 1st Platoon.
The troubles of Baker Company were compounded at this stage when the
enemy turned two of the Marines’ own machineguns against them.
During the next hour the fight became a slugging match. When the first
gray light of dawn permitted some visibility, Baker Company 3.5″ rocket
launchers knocked out the two Marine machineguns being fired by the
enemy. The left flank was holding well when the 60-mm. mortars ran
out of ammunition. To make matters worse, the artillery FO’s radio
took destructive hits from machinegun fire just as the enemy changed
the direction of his attack. Now his main effort was being channeled
up the draw between the 1st and 2d Platoons for the obvious purpose
of splitting the company and beating it in detail. The attackers had
been bled white by casualties, however, and Tobin’s men had little
difficulty in beating off the new assault.
[Illustration: ENEMY COUNTERATTACK:
HILL 202
NIGHT OF 12–13 AUG. 1950]
_Breaking Off Action_
Battalion orders were received through Able Company to disengage at
0630 and pull down from the high ground to the trucking point at
Newton’s CP. Tobin was now depending on Company A radios for 4.2″ and
81-mm. mortar support which slowed up enemy efforts. As his first move
toward breaking off action, he ordered his 3d and 1st Platoons to
withdraw into the perimeter of the 2d.[269]
[269] _Ibid._
By this time the enemy had fallen back toward the lower levels of Hill
202. Small arms fire had slackened but the Marines still received
mortar bursts.
Tobin ordered his executive officer, Captain Francis I. Fenton, to take
the wounded across the rice paddies to the road with the 3d Platoon
and Headquarters troops. The company commander remained on the hill to
cover this movement with the other two platoons. After Fenton got well
underway, Tobin ordered the 2d Platoon down to the road. Then, a squad
at a time, the remaining Marines disengaged; and the Baker Company
commander came off Hill 202 with the last squad at 0815. The entire
movement had been accomplished with precision, and a final air strike
kept the enemy quiet at the climax.
Considering the fury of the fighting on Hill 202, a Marine casualty
list of 12 KIA, 18 WIA, and 8 MIA was not as large as might have been
expected. The idea of men missing in action is always disturbing to
Marine officers, but it was considered a moral certainty that the
eight casualties of this type were killed when the enemy overran the
machinegun section on the Baker Company left flank.[270] Before leaving
Hill 202, Captain Tobin asked permission to lead an attack for the
purpose of recovering the bodies. He believed that he could retake
the lost ground in an hour, but his request could not be granted at a
time when the battalion was belated in carrying out Brigade withdrawal
orders.[271]
[270] Seven of these casualties were transferred from the MIA
to the KIA column in September 1950 after the recovery
of their bodies, following enemy withdrawal from the
area. The eighth continued to be listed as MIA until
November 1953, when the man was assumed to be dead.
[271] _Ibid._
It fell to the engineers and armor to cover the rear after the infantry
pulled out. Midway between Sachon and Kosong, the MSR is joined by
a road from Samchonpo, a minor seaport on the tip of the peninsula.
In order to block this approach to the Brigade’s southern flank,
General Craig ordered the engineers to mine the road. First Lieutenant
Nicholas A. Canzona was assigned to the task with a detachment of his
1st Platoon of Able Company, 1st Engineer Battalion. After laying an
extensive field, this officer discovered to his embarrassment that he
had erred in arming nearly half of the mines with wrong fuses, so that
they were harmless. Apparently the moral effect was enough, however, to
keep the enemy at a distance.
Lieutenant Hetrick’s 3d Platoon of the engineer company brought up the
Brigade rear on the morning of 13 August to crater roads, lay antitank
minefields and destroy bridges and culverts. Personnel left behind for
such missions had the privilege of riding the rearmost tank to catch up
with the column.[272] Thus the withdrawal proceeded systematically and
was completed without enemy interference.
[272] Annex Jig to Brig SAR.
[Illustration: _The Iron Cavalry--Brigade infantry and tank supporting
each other during advance of Marines to Sachon (Life Magazine Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Guests of the Brigade--Above, Lieutenant General
Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. (center) is shown captured NKPA motorcycle
by Brigadier General Craig (left) and First Lieutenant N. G. Rhodes
(right); below, left to right, General Craig introduces ROK President
Syngman Rhee to Second Lieutenant F. W. Muetzel and Technical Sergeant
E. L. DeFazio, both wounded three times (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Chiefs--Above, left to right, Major General
Field Harris, CG of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing; Major General Oliver
P. Smith, CG of the 1st Marine Division, and Brigadier General Thomas
J. Cushman, commanding MAG-33, meet at a conference in Tokyo; and,
below, left to right, Congressman Hugh D. Scott, Jr., of Pennsylvania
and Henry J. Latham, New York are shown captured gun by Brigadier
General Edward A. Craig while visiting the Naktong front (Marine Corps
Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Naktong Fights--Above, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A.
Chidester, Brigade G-4, watches while tank 90-mm. gun fires across
Observation Hill to knock out enemy machinegun on Obong-ni Ridge; and,
below, Marine infantry advancing in second battle of the Naktong as
Marine air and artillery hit the enemy up ahead (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Fight for a Foothold--Above, Marines advancing in first
battle of the Naktong pass casualties on way to the rear; and, below,
Private First Class Eugene A. Obregon (left) of Los Angeles and Private
First Class Ralph J. Summers, of Tehama, Calif., in a Marine machinegun
position (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Graveyard of Enemy Tanks--Three dead T-34’s at the bend
where the road skirts Hill 125, with Obong-ni Ridge looming up ahead.
Bodies of three Marines show in the foreground (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Naktong Casualties--Above, wounded Marine, with right
leg bandaged, passes M-26 tank on his way to the rear; and, below,
a stretcher casualty being evacuated through rice paddy, with South
Korean laborer bringing up the rear (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Burning Enemy Tank--Marines advancing past Hill 117
(background) along MSR west of Yongsan are giving a wide berth to
the dying T-34 in anticipation of exploding ammunition (Marine Corps
Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Combat Leadership--Marine platoon leader calls for
another rush on enemy hill position in second battle of the Naktong
(Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Interlude at the Bean Patch--Above, Marine truck column
on way to Masan area after first battle of the Naktong; and, below,
Brigade riflemen renew their acquaintance with hot food at the Bean
Patch (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _The Quick and the Dead--Marine tank, advancing along
MSR at second Naktong, passes burning hull of enemy T-34 (Life Magazine
Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Readying for a Strike--Effectiveness of Marine air
attacks depends not only on Corsair pilots but also on crewmen such as
Staff Sergeant Carl W. Peters (left) and Sergeant Melvin R. Bataway, of
VMF-214, shown while arming rockets on the flight deck of the U. S. S.
_Sicily_ in preparation for a strike in Korea (U. S. Navy Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Enemy Mortar Fire--Marines hit the deck as NKPA mortar
fire reaches out for them while advancing in the second battle of the
Naktong (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Between Attacks--Above, tired Marines take a short
break during first battle of Naktong, with body of NKPA soldier in
foreground; and, below, Marine walking wounded are helped back to the
rear (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Supporting Arms--Above, headquarters officers keep
careful tab on Marine advances in order to co-ordinate fires of
supporting weapons; and, below, the 105-mm. howitzers of 1/11 cleaned
up, packed and ready for embarkation at Pusan (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Objective Secured--Marine patrol moves out from Hill
311, overlooking the river Naktong, after Brigade troops take their
final objective in the first battle of the Naktong (Marine Corps
Photo)._]