Advance to Kosong
_Heavy NKPA Resistance--Assault on Hill 255--Confusion at Tosan
Junction--Brigade Artillery in Support--Encounter With Japanese
Maps--Ambush at Taedabok Pass--The Seizure of Kosong_
While 2/5 and the 1st Platoon of Company G were fighting the enemy
and weather on 7 August, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett’s 3d Battalion
sat out an ominous calm at Chindong-ni. From their positions on Hills
253 and 99, Captain Fegan and Lieutenant Bohn periodically called for
supporting fires to check enemy movement in the northern approaches to
the village.
At 1015 Second Lieutenant Lawrence W. Hetrick and his 3d Platoon,
Company A Engineers, completed the laying of the first Marine
minefield, located across the Haman road a half mile above
Chindong-ni.[217]
[217] Annex How.
Lieutenant Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion reached the village in the
afternoon of the 7th and relieved Company G’s two platoons on Hill
99. Bohn took his company back across the valley and deployed on the
lower slopes of 255 facing the Haman road. These positions were hit by
close-in sniper fire during the night of 7–8 August, and at dawn the
Marine infantrymen were startled to discover four NK soldiers emplaced
less than 100 yards away in the valley. Both the enemy position and its
occupants were quickly destroyed.[218]
[218] _Ibid._; and Bohn, 17 Apr 50.
Shortly after daybreak on 8 August--while Cahill was being relieved on
Yaban-san--the Marines of Company H noted a column of troops climbing
Hill 255 from the direction of the Haman road. Believing the newcomers
to be ROK soldiers, Fegan’s men watched as the long file reached the
high peak beyond the plateau forward of the Marine positions. When the
group set up facing Company H, Fegan became skeptical enough to alert
his riflemen and machinegunners. His precautions were timely, for the
visitors immediately opened fire on the Marines.[219]
[219] Fegan, 17 Apr 54.
This surprise attack had a critical effect on the Task Force Kean
sector. In possession of the high ground above 3/5, the North Koreans
were able to block the Masan-Chindong-ni stretch of the MSR, leaving
most of the American ground forces out on a limb for supply and
reinforcement purposes. Thus when the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry,
advanced from Masan to relieve both 3/5 and 2/5 on their respective
hills, it was driven off the fire-swept road north of Chindong-ni.[220]
[220] Brig SAR, basic rpt; and Craig, 12 Jan 54.
Upon being informed of the enemy’s presence, Taplett ordered Company
H to attack and destroy the Communist position. Fegan called his two
platoon leaders[221] while the Marine infantrymen in the line exchanged
shots with the enemy across the plateau. After a quick briefing,
Second Lieutenant John O. Williams led his 1st Platoon to the long
tableland.[222]
[221] The 2d Platoon was still in position east of the MSR.
[222] Fegan, 17 Apr 54.
Echeloned to the right, the skirmish line pushed aggressively over
the open area, firing on the enemy as it moved forward. The platoon
closed to within 30 yards of the Communist-held peak, but showers of
hand grenades and continuous machinegun fire pinned down the attackers.
Fegan sent a message forward, directing Williams to work around the
enemy’s left flank. Although one fire team succeeded in reaching the
rocks below the NK positions, the flanking maneuver failed.
_Heavy NKPA Resistance_
The 3d Platoon had taken several casualties. Marines still in the
open area were unable to advance, while those who had attempted the
envelopment could only cling to the steep slopes above the MSR. When
some of this group were struck by enemy fire, the impact sent them
rolling helplessly down the sharp incline.
Convinced that Williams could not carry the peak, Fegan ordered him
to pull his platoon back toward the line of departure and reorganize.
While the withdrawal was in progress, the company commander ordered the
3d Platoon to pass through the 1st and continue the attack. There was
no response to the order.[223]
[223] _Ibid._
Fegan realized that the men were momentarily unnerved after witnessing
the failure of the first attack. The company commander, therefore,
assumed control and personally led the 3rd Platoon forward on the
plateau. Halfway across the open area, the new skirmish line passed
through Williams’ outfit as it was reforming.
The Marines of the 3d Platoon responded with confidence to Fegan’s
leadership. They crossed the tableland in a wedge formation with 1
squad at the apex and the other 2 slightly withheld. Air strikes and
artillery preparations had little effect against the rocky crag beyond
the plateau, so that the final assault was fought to a finish with
small arms and grenades.[224]
[224] _Ibid._; and Annex How.
Staff Sergeant John I. Wheatley, one of the prime movers, fell wounded
along with several of his men. Sergeant Edward F. Barrett, shot in the
elbow and hip, lay helpless, exposed to enemy fire, until Captain Fegan
carried him back to safety.
The 3d Platoon gained the rocky summit and worked its way through the
NKPA position, a foxhole at a time, while the enemy resisted to the
death. Corporal Melvin James[225] hit the Red Korean left flank with
his squad and drove deep into the enemy position. The NKPA right flank
was rolled up by a vigorous assault sparked by Technical Sergeant Ray
Morgan and Private First Class Donald Terrio[226] as each knocked out a
Communist machinegun and its crew.
[225] James was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for
this action.
[226] Morgan and Terrio received Silver Star medals.
Having wiped out the main enemy position, the 3d Platoon advanced
northward about 200 yards to a gulf where the high ground fell
away abruptly. Beyond this depression rose the highest step of the
ridgeline’s rugged staircase: Hill 255 with a height of mote than 800
feet above the MSR. The three squads held up here to await further
orders.
How Company’s fight up to this time had cost the Marines 6 dead and 32
wounded.[227]
[227] Annex How.
_Assault on Hill 255_
A column of NKPA reinforcements bound for Hill 255 was spotted during
the action by Company G from its positions facing the Haman road. The
enemy platoon struck out across the valley from the high ground north
of Hill 99, then attempted to ascend 255 via the same route used by
comrades at dawn.
The Marines of Company G and their supporting arms cut loose with a
hurricane of fire. And after scattering in panic, the enemy survivors
scuttled back to their starting point.[228]
[228] Bohn, 17 Apr 54.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray, upon being informed of the progress made
by How Company, directed Taplett to halt the attack and dig in for
the night. While Fegan’s men were carrying out this order under NKPA
artillery and mortar fire, MAG-33 and the Marine artillery roared
into action. The saddle north of How Company’s lines was pounded so
mercilessly that the enemy pulled back from Fegan’s immediate front.
Throughout the night of 8–9 August, 1/11 and 3/5’s mortar platoon
dropped a steel curtain across the battalion front, with the result
that no enemy activity was noted.[229]
[229] Annex How.
The systematic reduction of enemy positions on Hill 255 the next
morning was a triumph of supporting arms. Marine artillery shells led
off at 0825, followed by Marine air which worked the enemy over with
the first close-support payload of napalm recorded so far in the Korean
conflict. And four minutes before Company H launched its final attack
on the hill, airborne TAC reported the objective neutralized.[230]
[230] _Ibid._
Fegan’s men scaled the peak against negligible opposition. Two
knocked-out machineguns and a few enemy dead were all that remained at
the summit.[231]
[231] Fegan, 17 Apr 54.
The plan for eliminating the threat to the MSR called for a Marine
advance along Hill 255 to grid line 1350. North of this boundary, the
ridge would be cleared by Army troops approaching from Masan.
Company H sighted soldiers of the 24th Infantry at 1125 as they moved
southward to the grid line, and the long ridge was considered secure.
It had been no light price, however, that 3/5 paid to open the MSR.
Casualties on Hill 255 totalled 16 dead and 36 wounded, and since
nearly all had been taken by Company H, Fegan’s outfit was reduced by
25 percent.[232]
[232] Annex How.
_Confusion at Tosan Junction_
On the whole, Task Force Kean’s scheduled drive on Chinju and Sachon
had not met with much success during the first 48 hours. The only
advance was made on the right, where the 35th Infantry seized its first
objective and inflicted an estimated 350 casualties on the enemy.[233]
[233] Annexes 1 and 3 to 25th InfDiv War Diary, Book VIII.
In his capacity as provisional commander of all units along the
Masan-Chinju axis, General Craig was directing the Army operations at
the front and in the rear areas of the Task Force sector. Thus on 8
August he ordered the 5th RCT to continue its attack and take Tosan, so
that his Marines could make progress on the road to Sachon.
After preparatory fires, the Army regiment again pushed forward toward
its immediate objective. Enemy resistance was much heavier than on
the day before; nevertheless, some gains were made from the starting
point near the village of Singi. The attack was also slowed by the
narrow MSR carrying the entire traffic load for the Task Force. Heavy
fighting above the road on Hills 255 and 342 added to the congestion
and confusion on the vital artery.
Lieutenant Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, had been
ordered to move forward from Chindong-ni at 0600, 8 August, with
the mission of attacking along the south fork of the Tosan junction
preparatory to seizing a regimental objective which would be designated
later.[234]
[234] Annex How; Brig Op Plan 5-50; and Col G. R. Newton, ltr
to author, 3 Jan 54 (Newton, 3 Jan 54).
Leaving its positions on Hill 99 at the assigned time, the battalion
was stalled immediately at the bridges on the MSR below. The road was
still clogged with soldiers and Army vehicles, making it impossible for
the Marine unit to proceed.[235]
[235] LtCol M. R. Olson, interv with author, 30 Dec 53 (Olson,
30 Dec 53).
General Craig, who was in the vicinity, told Newton to hold up until
the situation at the front became clarified. Company B, commanded by
Captain John L. Tobin, was ordered back up on the hill it had just
descended; and the battalion waited, three miles from its line of
departure.[236]
[236] Col G. R. Newton, ltr to author, 19 Jan 54 (Newton, 19
Jan 54).
Finally the word came to move up. While 1/5 worked its way along
the crowded road, Newton walked ahead and reached the CP of the 1st
Battalion, 5th RCT, located on a hillside between Singi and Oryong.
There he learned that the Army unit’s companies were already on the
high ground all around the junction and that the rice paddies between
the battalion CP and these companies were full of North Koreans. The
Army commander considered his subordinate units cut off.[237]
[237] Newton, 3 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53.
Shortly afterwards, at about 1400, the head of 1/5’s column reached
Newton and again came to a halt, a mile and a half from its line of
departure.
Arriving on the scene at this time was a dispirited Army staff
sergeant, dripping with mud and water. He said that he had just
returned from Hill 308, south of the road junction, where his unit was
heavily engaged with the enemy. And he added that Communist machineguns
covering the wide rice paddy between 308 and the MSR had forced him to
crawl almost the whole distance.[238]
[238] Olson, 30 Dec 53.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray, while driving from Chindong-ni to the
front, was stopped on the road by Major General Kean himself. The 25th
Division commander directed the Marine officer to arrange for a night
relief of the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT. Kean stated that he would inform
Brigade headquarters of this change in plans as soon as possible.[239]
[239] Col R. L. Murray, ltr to author, 7 Jan 54 (Murray, 7 Jan
54).
It had become a question as to whether Task Force Kean or the NKPA 6th
Division controlled Tosan. Newton radioed the 5th Marines commander and
asked for enlightenment. Murray, having just finished his conversation
with General Kean, ordered the battalion commander to postpone the
jumpoff until nightfall.[240]
[240] Newton, 3 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53.
After withdrawing to the outskirts of Sangnyong-ni, 1/5 went into an
assembly area beneath the western spur of Hill 342. There the battalion
commander received specific orders to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th
RCT, on positions southwest of Tosan at midnight, 8 August, and secure
the troublesome road junction once and for all.[241]
[241] Annex How; Brig Op Plan 6-50; and Newton, 3 Jan 54.
Newton was to have his battalion at the Army CP no later than 2300,
when it would be furnished guides to lead the way across the broad rice
paddy to Hill 308. As it proved, the Marine unit actually reached the
designated rendezvous at 2200. But even though an hour early, Newton
discovered that the soldiers on 308 were already withdrawing. Moreover,
no guides had been provided.[242]
[242] Newton, 3 Jan 54 and 19 Jan 54; and Olson, 30 Dec 53.
The Marine battalion continued westward through Singi and stopped on
the MSR about a half-mile short of Tosan. Here a narrow dike branched
south from the road, and the soldiers were returning along this trail
from Hill 308 to the MSR. Since the footpath was pointed out as
Newton’s route of approach, he had little choice but to wait until the
Army troops made the crossing. This was accomplished shortly after
midnight, and the column of Marines was left alone in the night on
unfamiliar ground reported to be crawling with enemy.[243]
[243] _Ibid._
The promised guides reported for duty at this time. They turned out
to be two South Korean civilians. Without further ado, the advance on
Sachon was launched when a long single file of skeptical Marines fell
in behind two unknown natives whose loyalty had to be accepted on faith.
Following the 1,200-yard trail in the darkness was time-consuming as
well as nerve-chilling. A misstep on the narrow, slippery dike usually
meant a spill into the muck and filth of the paddy for some hapless
infantryman. Not only would he delay all those behind, but he would
not be as fragrant as a rose in the nostrils of his comrades when he
regained the dike.
Finally the head of the file reached the base of Hill 308, having
encountered not a single enemy on the way. As more and more men
threaded their way in from the paddy, tactical integrity was slowly
regained. Dawn of 9 August was already breaking when the rear of the
column completed the crossing.[244]
[244] Olson, 30 Dec 53.
Daybreak brought a radio message from Murray, directing 1/5 to continue
the attack to the southwest immediately and seize Hill 308. With
Tobin’s company leading, the battalion ascended the northern slopes
in a long column. The climb took the Marines more than 1,000 feet
upward and 2,000 yards to the south. Before the summit was reached, the
relentless sun and terrain had taken its toll of Newton’s infantrymen.
Fortunately, enemy resistance amounted to mere sniping; and by noon, 9
August, the massive terrain feature belonged to the Brigade.[245]
[245] _Ibid._
At 1700 that afternoon Craig’s operational control of all troops in the
area came to a close. At the end of the 54-hour period of the Marine
general’s overall command, the road junction had been cleared, and both
Army and Marine columns were making progress toward the objective.
_Brigade Artillery in Support_
Nearly all the infantry actions of the first 3 days owed a good deal
to the support of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Consisting of three
4-gun batteries, Lieutenant Colonel Ransom M. Wood’s outfit had
relieved the 8th Field Artillery Battalion at Chindong-ni on the eve
of D-day. Since the terrain afforded no suitable alternate areas, the
Marine gunners moved into the positions vacated by the Army artillery,
partly in the village and partly on the outskirts.
A total of 87 rounds were fired that first night in support of the 5th
Marines, with the FO’s reporting good results. Before long, however,
enemy counterbattery fires searched out friendly positions in the
village. Early the next morning a Marine battery took a direct hit from
an NKPA 122-mm. shell. Two men were killed and 8 wounded by a blast
which destroyed a 105-mm. howitzer. Thus, reversing the usual rule, the
artillery suffered heavier casualties than the infantry at the jumpoff
of the Brigade attack.[246]
[246] Annex Item to Brig SAR.
The gunners needed no further admonitions to dig foxholes, gunpits and
ammunition pits. During the confused fighting around Chindong-ni, it
was not unusual to have one battery laid on an azimuth generally east,
another west, and a third to the north.
“I think that this is one of the most important lessons we learned in
fighting infiltrating troops,” commented Wood; “artillery must be able
and always prepared to fire in any direction on a moment’s notice.”[247]
[247] LtCol Ransom M. Wood, “Artillery Support for the Brigade
in Korea,” _Marine Corps Gazette_, 35, No. 6:16–17 (Jun
51).
From 7 to 9 August, with the battalion displacing forward as the
infantry advanced, 89 missions and 1,892 rounds were fired. Targets
consisted largely of enemy mortar positions. The terrain offered some
knotty problems in firing close support missions, due to steep slopes;
but the OY’s of VMO-6 did a good job of spotting.
Fifty ROK policemen were attached to 1/11 at this time to be used as
security troops. Wearing bright green uniforms and rubber shoes upon
arrival, they became the responsibility of the battalion to feed,
equip and train in marksmanship, sanitation and ammunition handling.
The rice-eating Koreans turned up their noses at American food for
a few days, but soon they could compete with any chow-hounds in the
outfit.[248]
[248] _Ibid._
Another difficulty was experienced in convincing the newcomers that
NKPA prisoners were to be brought in alive. Many personal scores
remained to be paid off in war-torn Korea, but eventually the ROK’s
learned to control their hatred for the invaders.
_Encounter With Japanese Maps_
As the men of 1/5 were consolidating their hilltop and searching
for water to relieve heat prostration cases, Murray radioed Newton
to withdraw his unit to the road below and continue the attack to
Paedun-ni. The regimental commander was determined to speed up the
advance to the south, since intelligence had reported no enemy on the
high ground south of Hill 308.[249]
[249] Murray, 7 Jan 54.
With almost half of Companies A and B stricken by heat sickness, Newton
had no choice but to leave them in position on the high ground for
the time being. He descended the hill to form a tactical column with
Headquarters and Weapons Companies and an attached platoon of tanks.
Reaching the low ground northwest of Hill 308, the battalion commander
discovered that his Japanese maps, as usual, bore only a slight
resemblance to the actual ground.
During the early weeks in Korea, the map situation was a thorn in the
side of every tactical commander. Not only were maps of local areas
extremely scarce, but the few available were of early Japanese vintage,
almost consistently at variance with the terrain. Grid systems were
confusing, villages misnamed and misplaced, and roads either not
illustrated at all or else plotted inaccurately. Lack of contouring
left the conformation and extent of ridges entirely to the imagination
of the map reader. These shortcomings were a constant source of
concern; for troop leaders often were misled, even to the extent of
getting completely lost.
On the ground itself, there is an intersection called Oso-ri some 600
yards south of the Tosan junction. The routes leading both south and
west from this crossroads go to Paedun-ni. An unimproved road, the
southward passage is more rugged, while the other, being good by Korean
standards, follows a smoother course through the town of Taesil-li.
Newton’s map showed only the latter improved road, so he formed his
column and headed it toward Taesil-li, a thousand yards west of the
intersection.[250] Murray’s map showed both roads, but in this case
the southern route was erroneously drawn in as the better road. It was
thus Murray’s intention that 1/5 use this avenue of approach. And since
he had spoken of it as the “improved” road, Newton was misled into
choosing the route to Taesil-li.[251]
[250] Newton, 3 Jan 53.
[251] _Ibid._; and Murray, 7 Jan 54.
The quickly formed column of tanks and infantry had gone only a few
hundred yards when the point stopped at a stretch of road littered with
land mines. A call went out for a demolitions team. From his CP near
Chindong-ni, Captain George W. King dispatched his 1st Platoon, Able
Company Engineers. Arriving at the scene, the Marine troubleshooters
discovered the obstacles to be merely American antitank mines,
apparently spilled on the road from an Army vehicle.
About this time. Lieutenant Colonel Murray arrived at Oso-ri and
informed 1/5’s commander that he was on the wrong road. Newton reasoned
that his unit was following the correct route. After comparing the
conflicting maps, the regimental commander studied the terrain and
directed Newton to pull his column back and take the road to the south.
Then Murray returned to Sangnyong-ni, climbed into an observation
plane, and was flown over the route to confirm his decision.[252]
[252] Murray, 7 Jan 54.
There was no small amount of confusion as the long column of tanks,
infantrymen, and engineers pulled back along the narrow road to the
intersection. And it was unfortunate for 1/5 that General Craig reached
the area while the milling was at its worst. Unaware of what had taken
place earlier, the Brigade commander did not refer to the delay and
congestion in the most soothing terms.[253]
[253] Craig, 12 Jan 54.
While the column was being reformed on the southern road, villagers
from Taesil-li informed the Marines that a badly wounded American was
lying in the hamlet. Craig’s jeep driver sped to the clump of thatched
huts and returned with a soldier who was more dead than alive, having
been left behind by retreating NKPA forces. The man was rushed to the
rear for medical attention, while Craig stayed forward to supervise the
attack.[254]
[254] _Ibid._; and Newton, 19 Jan 54.
The long file of Marines and tanks began moving southward along the
winding road below Hill 308. Newton had notified his company commanders
of the change, so that they could meet him by descending the western
slope of the high ground.
About a mile south of the confusing intersection, the point of 1/5’s
column rounded a sharp curve. It was greeted by a lone North Korean
machinegun hidden in a native hut at the center of the bend. While
a Marine brigadier watched with professional satisfaction, a team
of infantrymen with a rocket launcher closed on the hut and quickly
destroyed the enemy position.
It was late afternoon as the column resumed its march to the south.
Covering several hundred more yards without incident, it reached the
top of a 400-foot pass where the road knifed between Hills 308 and 190.
There Newton was joined by Companies A and B from Objective One.[255]
The 1st Battalion was ordered to hold up and take defensive positions
astride the pass.
[255] Olson, 30 Dec 53.
Thus, the drive toward Sachon had finally taken shape, and the Brigade
was entering its own zone of responsibility. As darkness fell on
9 August, 1/5 was in position 2 miles south of the Tosan line of
departure, and General Craig had already set in motion plans for a
night attack.
_Ambush at Taedabok Pass_
On 9 August the Brigade commander was convinced that the absence of
resistance in 1/5’s path indicated unpreparedness on the part of the
enemy. To exploit the advantage, he ordered Murray to execute a night
attack and capture Paedun-ni before daylight, 10 August.[256]
[256] Brig Op Plan 7-50.
At 1600 on 9 August, the Brigade was relieved of mopping up duties in
the Chindong-ni area, leaving 2/5 immediately available to the 5th
Marines commander. The 3d Battalion was delayed overnight by several
hours of security duty until Army units could take over.[257]
[257] This section is derived from: Annex How; Craig, 12 Jan
54; Zimmer, 18 Feb 54; Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr 54; and
Gall, 9 Feb 54.
Lieutenant Colonel Roise’s battalion, having been relieved on Hill
342, entrucked at Sangnyong-ni in the evening and reached its assembly
area near Hill 308 at 2100. Two hours later the unit marched southward
on the new MSR to make the night attack on Paedun-ni. Passing through
1/5’s lines at 0115, 10 August, the weary Marines pressed on toward
their target against no resistance.
The point of the column included three M-26’s of First Lieutenant
William D. Pomeroy’s tank platoon. At 0500, with the advance elements
only a short distance from Paedun-ni, the lead tank crashed through
a concrete bridge. The badly damaged vehicle proved to be wedged
immovably between the two abutments.
The second tank, while attempting to negotiate a narrow bypass next to
the bridge, threw a track in the center of the stream and stalled the
long column behind. Two hours elapsed before the advance could be
resumed. South Korean laborers constructed a bypass for light vehicles
next to the bridge, and an engineer tractor-dozer arrived to build a
detour for heavy trucks and tanks.
[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE
SITUATION MAP FOR 8–10 AUG. ’50]
Reaching Paedun-ni at 0800, 2/5 reconnoitered the town and found it
clear of enemy. By 0930 the battalion column was reformed and pounding
the dusty road south.
Murray decided to shuttle troops by truck from Paedun-ni to Kosong,
since the 8-mile stretch was believed to be free of enemy. The heavier
vehicles being tied up at the collapsed bridge, some delay resulted in
motorizing the first increment of 2/5.
General Craig arrived on the scene by helicopter in mid-morning. Not
satisfied with the progress of the advance, he ordered Murray and Roise
to march on Kosong with “all speed.” When the infantry column was a
short distance out of Paedun-ni, the 5th Marines commander managed to
get five 2½-ton trucks forward to help transport the first serial to
the target.
A motorized column was formed of 4 lead jeeps carrying a Reconnaissance
Company detachment, followed by part of Company D aboard 6 more jeeps
and the 5 trucks. Owing to the shortage of vehicles, Captain Zimmer’s
first echelon included only the 1st and 2d Platoons, the 60-mm.
mortars, an assault squad, and one machinegun section.
Lacking either air or artillery support, the column rolled southward
with orders to occupy Kosong and coordinate a defense of the city with
its mayor. The remainder of 2/5 continued on foot until more vehicles
could be provided.
The road makes a sharp turn 2½ miles southwest of Paedun-ni to climb
through Taedabok Pass, a defile about 1,000 yards long. Just beyond,
at the village of Pugok, a sharp turn to the left skirts the base of a
large hill overlooking the entire length of the pass.
The first jeep of the reconnaissance detachment was almost abreast of
Pugok at 1500 when NKPA machineguns opened up from the big hill at the
bend. Enemy automatic weapons on the high ground above the pass raked
the vehicles filled with Dog Company men.
As the Marines were taking cover in roadside ditches, a Communist
antitank gun opened fire from the large hill and hit one of the jeeps.
The reconnaissance troops gradually withdrew from their exposed
positions and fell back on Zimmer’s group. After sizing up the
situation, the Company D commander ordered his 1st Platoon to seize
the high ground on the right side of the road about midway through the
pass. No resistance was met, so that the Marines set up their weapons
quickly and returned the Communist fire. Meanwhile the 2d Platoon
moved up on the right after clearing small enemy groups from the high
ground on both sides of the road at the entrance to the defile.
Zimmer had spotted the location of the enemy’s antitank gun, and Marine
60-mm. fire put an end to this nuisance. The effort used up all the
mortar ammunition, and the Company D commander decided to wait in
position for Brigade supporting arms. Two tanks arrived at 1630, and
their 90-mm. guns drove the enemy into hiding.
While Marine tanks and air were working over the hill, 3/5 reached
Paedun-ni after being relieved of its final security mission in the
Chindong-ni area. Murray ordered Taplett to be prepared to pass through
2/5 and continue the attack.
The 3d Battalion reached the entrance to Taedabok Pass in trucks
shortly after the arrival of the 2d Battalion troops who had followed
their motorized column on foot. Some confusion resulted on the narrow
road after Murray’s arrival while he waited to confer with Taplett.
Unable to find Roise, the two officers climbed the high ground on the
left. From this vantage point they could see Kosong, 5 miles away. The
regimental commander ordered Taplett to pass through 2/5 immediately
and continue the attack.
Company G had already crossed the line of departure and was deploying
to assault the hill at the road bend when Murray located Roise in
Zimmer’s area to the right of the road. The exact location of enemy
positions remained in some doubt. In order to clear up the uncertainty,
Major McNeely volunteered to lead out a patrol. About 1730, therefore,
Roise’s S/3 took off in a jeep with a radio operator and a fire team
from Dog Company.
By this time, Taplett had a fairly accurate picture of the situation in
mind. From his OP on the high ground to the left of the road, he saw
that McNeely was headed for danger. The 3/5 commander radioed Bohn to
stop the jeep, but it was too late. McNeely and his men vanished from
sight around the bend where the road skirted the large hill, and the
Marines heard a furious clatter of machinegun and small arms fire.
The fate of the patrol remained in doubt as Company G moved out to the
attack, with First Lieutenant Jack Westerman’s platoon in the lead.
Communist fire held up the advance, but Bohn sent Second Lieutenant
Edward F. Duncan’s platoon on a sweeping envelopment to the right which
outflanked the enemy and drove him from the high ground. Westerman was
then able to reach the crest with his platoon. From this position he
could see McNeely’s bullet-riddled jeep, but that officer and his five
men were stretched out motionless on the ground beneath and behind the
vehicle.
[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE
10 AUG. 1950
SHOWING PAEDUN-NI & TAEDABOK PASS]
[Illustration: SACHON OFFENSIVE
11 AUG. 1950
SHOWING KOSONG]
At great risk, Westerman made a dash to the jeep and brought back
McNeely, mortally wounded. Enemy fire prevented further rescues, but
it was ascertained that 3 men had been killed outright and 2 severely
wounded. These survivors could only continue to take cover behind the
wrecked vehicle until 3/5 troops advanced.
When Company G jumped off again, the men were held up by two concealed
machineguns at the far end of the road bend. Taplett committed How
Company on the left side of the MSR, and Fegan seized the hill opposite
Bohn’s position. It was almost dark before the Marines could silence
the 2 enemy machineguns around the bend, and at 2015 Murray ordered 3/5
to secure for the night and defend the 2 hills already occupied. On
the premise that the enemy had prepared an ambush for rescue parties
approaching the wrecked jeep, it was decided to wait until morning to
bring back the wounded men.
_The Seizure of Kosong_
The night passed quietly except for scattered rifle fire along the 3d
Battalion’s 700-yard front. To carry out General Craig’s orders for
11 August, the two rifle companies prepared to continue the attack on
Kosong at first light.[258]
[258] This section is derived from: Annex How; Craig, 12 Jan
54; Fegan and Bohn, 17 Apr 54 (with comments by LtCol
R. D. Taplett).
The enemy had different plans. At the crack of dawn a small force of
North Koreans emerged from the fog and charged recklessly into Company
G’s front. There was a furious hand-to-hand clash as the attackers
converged on Bohn’s OP in the center of the line. The company commander
directed the defense amid grenade explosions, one of which drove a
fragment into his shoulder. At his side Staff Sergeant Charles F.
Kurtz, Jr., called down effective 60-mm. mortar fire on the Reds while
throwing grenades and ducking submachinegun bursts.
The melee ended after a half hour with Company G driving the battered
remnants of the NKPA platoon back down the hill Despite his wound, Bohn
stayed with his company and reorganized it for the attack on Kosong.
He also had the satisfaction of overseeing the evacuation of the two
wounded survivors of McNeely’s ill-fated patrol.
At 0800, the Brigade moved out in a route column, with 3/5 as the
advance guard and Company G in the role of advance party. Bohn’s point
consisted of Second Lieutenant John D. Counselman’s 3d Platoon, whose
leading element, under Corporal Raymond Giaquinto, was on the MSR with
flank guards slightly withheld on each side.
The Brigade column moved swiftly. About a mile beyond the line of
departure, Giaquinto braked his roadbound unit in the face of doubtful
ground ahead. Simultaneously, the flank guards surged forward and
wrapped around the suspected area. Then Giaquinto’s force raced
down the road, and the 3 prongs of the point converged on an enemy
machinegun emplacement, killing the 5 occupants before they could fire
a shot.
With Bohn calling the shots and Giaquinto setting the pace, the point
swept aside three more enemy positions along the route. The effective
combination of limited frontal attacks and envelopments brought the
head of the column to the bridge north of Kosong at 1000. Here Company
H passed through on the road and pushed into the town.
Using 1 rifle platoon and 2 tanks, Fegan easily cleared northern Kosong
of light resistance. Then he gradually wheeled his force to the right,
tracing the road to Sachon. His other two platoons continued southward
with the mission of seizing a high hill below Sunam-dong.
General Craig reached Kosong by jeep just as Taplett was setting up his
CP in a schoolyard north of the town. A small group of enemy snipers
suddenly opened up from positions in and around the schoolhouse, and
the Brigade commander observed sniper teams of 3/5’s headquarters
spring into action and destroy the North Koreans.
Shortly after Fegan entered Kosong, Bohn swung his company to the
southwest from above the town, drove through the western suburbs and
launched an attack against Hill 88 below the Sachon road. Approaching
the hill, Company G sustained a few casualties while eliminating a
stubborn Communist pocket in the low ground on its right flank.
MAG-33 preceded the attack on Hill 88 with a thundering air strike
on 100 enemy entrenched along the crest. This attack coupled with a
thorough shelling by 1/11, shattered the Reds’ will to fight, and
Company G found only evidence of a hasty flight when it reached the
summit at 1330.
General Craig ordered Taplett to cancel all further missions around
the captured town and attack toward Sachon immediately. Company G was
quickly recalled from Hill 88; the high ground above Sunam-dong was
ignored, and Fegan assembled his unit at the western edge of Kosong
preparatory to leading the attack.
Just as Company H was reforming, a jeep ambulance driven by Corpsman
William H. Anderson raced into the area to pick up casualties from
Bohn’s earlier skirmish below Hill 88. Passing through Fegan’s troops,
the vehicle failed to make the turn southward and sped toward Sachon.
Two enemy antitank guns lying in wait west of Kosong blasted the jeep
as it rounded a bend, killing Anderson and spilling two passengers out
of the wrecked vehicle.
Fegan led two M-26 tanks to the bend, and Technical Sergeant Johnnie C.
Cottrell quickly destroyed the North Korean position. Three rounds from
his 90-mm. gun wiped out the last NKPA opposition in the area, and the
3d Battalion moved out for the drive on Sachon.