The Advance Party
_Conference With CINCFE--The Washington Scene--The Advance Party in
Japan--Voyage of the Brigade--The Advance Party in Korea--Crisis of the
Eighth Army_
As the ships of the Brigade vanished over the horizon, Generals Craig
and Cushman rushed to complete final administrative details at their
respective West Coast bases. Then, in the early morning of 16 July,
the advance party, consisting of the two commanders and parts of their
staffs, boarded a transport plane at the Marine Corps Air Station, El
Toro, and began the long journey westward.
The first stop was Pearl Harbor, T. H., island “Pentagon” of America’s
vast defensive network in the Pacific. On arrival, Craig and Cushman
immediately reported to General Shepherd. In company with him, the
two visitors called briefly on Admiral Radford. Later, Shepherd, his
staff, and the advance party met at Fleet Marine Force Headquarters
for a conference on the problems incident to the Marine commitment in
combat.[75]
[75] LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 25 Jan 54 (Craig, 25
Jan 54).
The Brigade commander painted a vivid picture of his provisional
fighting force, stressing both its potential and its handicaps. He
repeatedly emphasized the necessity for the addition of a third rifle
company to each infantry battalion. With equal fervor he spoke of the
need for two more 105-mm. howitzers in each battery of his artillery
battalion. He told how the Brigade had been forced to leave behind
much of its motor transport because of limited shipping space, and he
requested that replacement vehicles be provided as soon as possible.
His presentation was not falling on deaf ears; for combat-wise
officers knew only too well how such shortages would restrict the
maneuverability, firepower, and mobility of the Brigade. Finally,
Craig repeated his earlier request that steps be taken immediately
to provide for monthly replacement drafts of 800 men. If the
peace-strength Marine unit were committed to combat in the near future,
he said, it could ill afford to watch its already thin ranks dwindle
indefinitely.[76]
[76] Col J. L. Stewart interv with authors, 15 Jan 54
(Stewart, 15 Jan 54).
Leaving behind a maze of support and reinforcement problems for FMFPac
Headquarters, the Brigade advance party boarded its plane and set out
for Japan. On 19 July the big aircraft discharged its passengers at
the Haneda Airport, near Tokyo. General Craig immediately reported to
his naval superior, Admiral Joy. Later the Brigade commander, General
Cushman, and the other officers of the advance party, assembled at
General Headquarters, Far East, where they would get their first
glimpse of the war through the eyes of the United States Army.
They conferred first with Major General Edward A. Almond, USA, and
Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, USA. The former was Chief of Staff
to General MacArthur, while the latter served as G-3 on the staff.
After Almond and Wright had received a report on the organization and
capabilities of the Brigade air-ground team, they ushered the two
Marine generals into the office of MacArthur.[77]
[77] _Ibid._; and Col K. H. Weir ltr to CMC, 16 Apr 54 (Weir,
16 Apr 54).
_Conference With CINCFE_
The commander in chief greeted his visitors cordially and expressed
his pleasure at having Marines in his command again. He commented
briefly on the excellence of the 1st Marine Division and certain
Marine air units which had served under him during World War II. The
general smiled as he mentioned a rumor to the effect that he had been
prejudiced against Marines during the Pacific War. Sweeping aside this
tale as being unfounded, he said that he had always held the greatest
admiration for the Corps and would welcome its units to his command any
time.[78]
[78] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
Following this reception, MacArthur meticulously briefed Craig
and Cushman on the critical situation in Korea, where the war was
already entering its fourth week. The commander in chief disclosed
his tentative plans for commitment of the Marines: he would hold
the Brigade in Japan as a force in readiness until an entire Marine
division could be assembled. If he could have this division by
September, he intended to launch an amphibious assault against the port
of Inchon on the west coast. Striking deep in the Communist rear, he
would sever the long lines of communications linking North Korean bases
to the Communist invaders at the front. Thus isolated, the latter would
quickly wither, and Walker’s Eighth Army could smash out of the Pusan
Perimeter.[79]
[79] _Ibid._; and Brig SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50, basic rpt.
When MacArthur concluded, he and Craig discussed the organization of
the Brigade. The Marine general emphasized that his command was an
air-ground team; and though few in numbers, the Brigade had a powerful
potential if its air arm remained integral. MacArthur assured him that
the Marine combination would remain intact, unless some emergency
dictated otherwise.
Craig next mentioned that the infantry and artillery units of the
Brigade were at peace strength. MacArthur was surprised to learn that
each battalion had just 2 rifle companies, and each battery only 4 guns
instead of 6. He was even more surprised to find that each of the 6
infantry companies had 50 men less than the number called for in Marine
war tables. The Army leader had been aware of certain shortages when he
sent a message to the Pentagon on 10 July, requesting the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to authorize expansion of the Brigade to a full war-strength
division.[80] He believed at the time, however, that the Brigade itself
would be formed on a wartime basis. Now, confronted with reality, he
ordered his chief of staff to prepare another dispatch to the Joint
Chiefs, asking that the Brigade be expanded to full war strength and
reiterating his request for an entire division.[81]
[80] CINCFE disp to JCS, 10 Jul 50.
[81] CINCFE disp to JCS, 19 Jul 50.
MacArthur concluded the conference by informing Craig that the Marine
fighting team would remain in Japan under operational control of Joy’s
headquarters. This was good news to the Brigade commander. Being
attached to the Naval command meant that his Marines would be free
to train and otherwise prepare for their future amphibious mission;
whereas an assignment to the Eighth Army’s rear echelon might have
entailed time-consuming occupational and administrative duties.[82]
[82] Brig SAR, _loc. cit._
_The Washington Scene_
Although the solution to Marine Corps problems had seemed simple enough
in MacArthur’s office, it was quite another story on the other side
of the world in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had rendered
no decision on the general’s 10 July request for a Marine division.
Nevertheless, General Cates ordered his staff to draw up detailed plans
for expansion so that immediate action could be taken if authorization
were forthcoming. As a result, Plans Able and Baker were prepared,
the one designed to augment the Brigade to war strength, the other to
explore the requirements for creating a full division. To cover these
possibilities together with the Corps’ other irrevocable commitments
throughout the world, Marine planners were drawn more and more toward
a single basic conclusion--if President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff granted MacArthur’s request, the Marine Corps Reserve would have
to be mobilized at once.
When the Joint Chiefs received the message which MacArthur had dictated
in General Craig’s presence, they requested an estimate from the Marine
Corps on how long it would take to form a war-strength division.
General Cates summed up his case: the Marine Corps, numbering only
74,279 officers and men,[83] was committed on a global basis. There
was a brigade on its way to Korea, a peace-strength division on the
Atlantic Coast,[84] and a battalion landing team permanently assigned
to the Mediterranean Fleet. There were detachments of Marines assigned
for domestic security, shipboard duty, and overseas security. Moreover,
in order to carry out any expansion program on a sound basis, it would
be necessary to maintain cadres of experienced personnel in various
training centers. The Commandant’s presentation made it clear that any
immediate expansion would, as proved by simple arithmetic, be dependent
upon mobilization of the Reserve.
[83] Figure as of 30 Jun 1950.
[84] The 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N. C.
Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to President Truman
that the Organized Marine Corps Reserve be called to active duty.
That same morning, 19 July, Admiral Sherman notified General Cates
of this decision. The Commandant lost no time at ordering his staff
to alert all Reserve units. His grounds for haste were well founded;
for in the afternoon a presidential proclamation announced that the
“citizen-Marines” would be mobilized. The following day Cates called
CNO and submitted Plans Able and Baker, the proposed procedures for
building both the Brigade and 1st Marine Division to war strength.
In the meantime JCS had notified MacArthur that his request could not
be granted until late fall “without unacceptable weakening [of] the
Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.”[85] When the U. N. commander received
this message, he countered immediately with the reply:
“... Most urgently request reconsideration of decision with reference
to First Marine Division. It is an absolutely vital development
to accomplish a decisive stroke and if not made available will
necessitate a much more costly and longer operational effort both in
blood and expense.
“It is essential the Marine Division arrive by 10 September 1950 as
requested. While it would be unwise for me to attempt in this message
to give in detail the planned use of this unit I cannot emphasize
too strongly my belief of the complete urgency of my request. There
can be no demand for its potential use elsewhere that can equal the
urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it.[86]
“Signed MacArthur”
[85] JCS disp to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50.
[86] CINCFE disp to JCS, 21 Jul 50.
On 22 July the gears of mobilization were already enmeshed. Taking this
into account along with the urgency of MacArthur’s last communication,
the Joint Chiefs showed the first signs of relenting in their reply
to Tokyo. This time they informed the Army general that they were
reconsidering his problem, but added that he must advise them of
the proposed employment of the Brigade up to 10 September and the
possibility of adjusting that deadline. The same message carried the
encouraging news that a directive had already been issued to bring both
the Brigade and its air group to full war strength.[87]
[87] JCS msg 86778 to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50.
In answer, MacArthur stated his intention to retain the Brigade in
Japan, unless a more critical situation developed in Korea prior to
10 September. He described his operation planned for mid-September
as an amphibious landing in the rear of the enemy’s lines. This
seaborne attack, he added, would be designed to envelop and destroy
the Communist invader in conjunction with an offensive from the south
by the Eighth Army. The General concluded his message on notes of
conditional optimism and grave warning:
“Although exact date of D-day is partially dependent upon enemy
reaction during month of August, I am convinced that an early
and strong effort behind his front will sever his main lines of
communications and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow.
Any material delay in such an operation may lose this opportunity.
The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a
protracted and expensive campaign to slowly drive the enemy north of
the 38th parallel.”[88]
[88] CINCFE msg C-58473 to JCS, 23 Jul 50.
On 25 July these exchanges came to a climax when the Pentagon directed
the Marine Corps to build its 1st Division to full war strength.
At this point the change of heart among the joint Chiefs of Staff is
pertinent because of its direct effects on the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade. As previously noted, the Pentagon on 22 July approved the
Marine Corps’ plan Able which provided for the expansion of the Brigade
to war strength. General Cates immediately set machinery in motion to
bolster the ranks of that unit. With the approval of Admiral Sherman,
he cut into the rosters of Marine security detachments throughout
the United States and arranged for the personnel thus released to be
channelled to Craig’s command. It was also possible now to implement
an earlier plan relating to casualty replacements for the Brigade. As
far back as 14 July, the Commandant had ordered activation of the First
Replacement Draft, fixing its departure for Korea at 10 August.[89]
Thus Craig could be assured of early reinforcement by more than 800
officers and men if the course of the war necessitated a premature
commitment of his Brigade.
[89] CMC disp to FMFPac, 22 Jul 50.
_The Advance Party in Japan_
Generals Craig and Cushman were meanwhile assigned a large office
in General Headquarters, Tokyo. There they cleared away much
administrative detail which accumulates in the path of every military
operation.
On 20 July the two commanders called on General Stratemeyer. Marine
Air was the focal point of discussion as they again explained the
organization of their fighting team. When they informed Stratemeyer of
MacArthur’s decision to keep the Brigade intact, the air officer gave
them further assurance that MAG-33 would always be available to support
the Marine ground force.[90]
[90] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
Originally, the Army planned to base the Marine ground elements at
Sasebo, Japan, and the air group 400 miles away at Itami Field, near
Kobe. Craig and Cushman realized that the resulting large gap would
give rise to problems in liaison, training, and supply. Hoping to
change such an undesirable arrangement, the Brigade staff carefully
studied the layout of available land and facilities. Armed with the
results of this research, Craig proposed to General Headquarters that
all Marines be based in the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area. After he outlined
the advantages of keeping the Brigade and its supporting aviation close
together, Wright responded encouragingly to the recommendation.[91]
[91] _Ibid._
[Illustration: (Japan and Korea)]
Confident that the suggestion would be favorably considered,
the advance party flew to Itami on 21 July and made a detailed
reconnaissance of debarkation, billeting, and training sites. While
Craig inspected the area and prepared a report, Cushman examined the
air base facilities and established his headquarters according to the
initial plan. The Marine officers then returned to Tokyo 2 days later
to push the request for getting both air and ground forces located in
the same area. To support his proposal, Craig submitted a complete
“floor plan” not only for the Brigade but also for the entire 1st
Marine Division. MacArthur’s staff promptly approved.[92]
[92] _Ibid._; LtGen E. A. Craig ltr to authors, 15 Apr 54
(Craig, 15 Apr 54); Weir, 16 Apr 54; and Brig SAR, _loc.
cit._
On the 25th the advance party again set out for Itami, this time to
prepare for the arrival of the Brigade. Their plane was a scant 20
minutes out of Tokyo when an urgent message from General Headquarters
directed their return to that city at once. The big aircraft roared
back to the field, and a few minutes later the Marines were driving
through the Japanese capital.
At headquarters, Wright summed up the most recent reports from the
front. The American forward wall was crumbling under continuous
hammering. A wide envelopment had just netted the whole southwestern
tip of the peninsula for the Communists, who were now pressing in on
Pusan from the west as well as north. Lacking sufficient troops to
defend its broad frontage, the Eighth Army was falling back. If the Red
tide continued unabated, there was imminent danger of losing Pusan, the
one remaining major port in American hands. Should this coastal city
fall, South Korea would be lost.
Wright told Craig that all available troops had to be thrown into the
line to meet this threat. Therefore, General MacArthur had diverted
the seaborne Brigade from Japan to Korea, where it would join General
Walker’s beleaguered forces.[93]
[93] Stewart, 15 Jan 54; and Brig SAR, _loc. cit._
Obviously, the Marines were not far from a fight.
_Voyage of the Brigade_
At sea the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was unaware of the decisions
and difficulties developing on higher levels. Nevertheless, that
tactical organization was having enough trouble of its own. On 12
July, Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, and the 1st Amphibious Tractor
Company departed San Diego on board the LSD’s _Fort Marion_ and
_Gunston Hall_. Designated Task Unit 53.7.3, the twin amphibious
ships sailed 2 days before the rest of the Brigade and were scheduled
to join the main convoy, Task Group 53.7, before crossing 160° east
longitude.[94]
[94] Brig SAR, _loc. cit._
At noon on 13 July, the well deck of the _Fort Marion_ accidentally
flooded, the water rising to a height of 5 feet among the Brigade’s
M-26 tanks. An hour passed before the ship’s pumps could drain the
compartment, and briny water damaged 14 of the new armored vehicles,
300 90-mm. projectiles (then in critical supply), and 5,000 rounds of
.30-caliber ammunition.
When news of the flood damage reached Brigade headquarters, then still
at San Diego, the message was rushed to Craig. He immediately sent a
dispatch to Captain English, authorizing him to jettison the ruined
ammunition. He added that replacement armor would be requisitioned from
the Barstow depot without delay. Craig then contacted the supply base
and was promised that 14 M-26’s would be commissioned and on their way
to San Diego within 24 hours. The Brigade commander was preparing to
request additional shipping for the vehicles when messages from the
_Fort Marion_ reported that 12 tanks could be restored to operating
condition at sea. The remaining two would require new parts and 72
hours of repair work upon debarkation.[95]
[95] _Ibid._; and Craig, 15 Apr 54.
As already noted, the Marines were placing heavy reliance on their
armor, confident that it was a match for the enemy’s Russian-built T-34
tank in Korea. Consequently, Craig’s staff reacted to the flood reports
with concern. Headquarters FMFPac was asked to include four M-26’s in
its first resupply shipment to the Brigade; arrangements were made for
new parts to be flown to the port of debarkation, and ammunition to
replace that damaged in the flood was loaded on board the larger convoy.
Misfortune struck again a few hours after Task Group 53.7 steamed from
San Diego on 14 July. The transport _Henrico_ developed a serious
mechanical failure and was declared temporarily unseaworthy. This
ship was carrying Lieutenant Colonel Murray, his regimental staff,
and the entire 1st Battalion Landing Team.[96] After Murray and his
headquarters transferred to the APA _Pickaway_ off San Clemente island,
the _Henrico_ limped back toward California with about one-third of the
Brigade’s fighting force. The vessel docked at the United States Naval
Supply Depot, Oakland, on the 16th. Repairs were started in urgent
haste, since there was no other ship available. For security reasons,
the Marines were forbidden to leave ship except for training on the
dock. On the nights of the 16th and 17th, they sat on deck and gazed
longingly at the beckoning lights of San Francisco. Twice during this
time the _Henrico_ weighed anchor and passed westward under the Golden
Gate bridge; twice it was forced to return for additional repairs.
Finally, on the evening of the 18th, the vessel steamed under the great
bridge for its third attempt. This time it kept going, but it would not
overtake the convoy until the morning of the very day the ships reached
their destination.
[96] 1st Bn, 5th Marines, with supporting units.
During the voyage, strict wartime security measures, including radio
silence, were enforced on all ships. While the North Koreans were
believed to have no warships left afloat, their naval capabilities
remained hidden from the outside world by a blur of question marks. No
one realized more than the commander of Task Group 53.7[97] that it was
much too early to take Soviet Russia for granted.
[97] Capt L. D. Sharp, Jr., USN.
The _Henrico_, now travelling independently, had a spine-chilling
experience during her second night out of Oakland. The ship’s radar
picked up two “unidentified submarines” which appeared to be converging
on the stern of the lone vessel. General Quarters was sounded.
While sailors peered into the darkness from their battle stations,
several hundred Marines joked weakly in the troop compartments below
the waterline. After an anxious hour, the persistent spots on the
electronic screen vanished.
Shipboard life for the Brigade was otherwise uneventful. The troops
took part in physical drills as vigorously as the limited confines
of vessels would allow. Daily classes and conferences emphasized
those subjects most relevant to the news reports trickling back from
the front. Success of North Korean armor stimulated keen interest in
land mines and the new rocket launchers. Press commentaries on the
battleground’s primitive environment made even field sanitation a
serious matter. Since there was no military intelligence available on
the North Korean forces, officers and NCO’s turned to publications on
Russian tactics and weapons.
As previously noted, Sasebo, Japan, was the original destination of
the ships transporting the Brigade’s ground elements. The _Achernar_,
_Anderson_, and _Badoeng Strait_ were bound for Kobe with MAG-33.
When Craig’s proposal for consolidation was approved by General
Headquarters, the entire convoy was ordered to Kobe. Then, on 25 July,
Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, Chief of Staff, received the dispatch
sending the ground force directly to Pusan.
This announcement came as no surprise to the majority of officers
and men. Day by day, news reports had been outlining the course of
the war. The shrinking perimeter of Walker’s army was traced on maps
and sketches throughout every ship. After the Communist “end run” in
southwest Korea, Marines began to wonder if there would be any front at
all by the time they arrived. In the captain’s mess of the _Pickaway_,
senior Marine and naval officers were giving odds that the Brigade
would reach the South Korean port only in time to cover a general
evacuation of the peninsula.[98]
[98] Col R. L. Murray interv with author, 15 Feb 54 (Murray,
15 Feb 54).
_The Advance Party in Korea_
With the Brigade well beyond the halfway point in its Pacific voyage,
Craig and his staff could not afford to waste a minute. At 1700 on 25
July they left Tokyo by plane for Korea. En route they landed at Itami,
where the Brigade commander and Cushman made hurried adjustments to
meet the new situation.[99]
[99] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
Leaving Itami on the 26th, they flew to Fukuoka, Japan. There they
transferred from their 4-engine Marine aircraft to a smaller Air Force
plane which could be accommodated on the primitive landing fields of
Korea. On the last lap of their journey, they reached Taegu at 1400.
Taegu was a dismal place during this crucial phase of the UN delaying
action. Hastily chosen as a headquarters by General Walker, the ancient
town gave the appearance of a remote outpost. Its airstrip was crude.
The fewness of the airmen and soldiers among the handful of transport
and fighter planes served only to emphasize the critical situation of
the UN forces.[100]
[100] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
General Craig reported to General Walker immediately, while the Brigade
G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, met with his Eighth Army
opposite, Colonel William E. Bartlett. Later, Walker’s chief of staff,
Colonel Eugene M. Landrum, assembled all the Marine officers for an
official briefing. He explained that the Brigade had not been earmarked
for any specific mission. The battle situation was too fluid for
firm plans. Information from the field was sketchy and unreliable,
as outnumbered Army forces slowly retreated. From the time of first
contact by American units, the front had been more of a blur than
a distinct line. Landrum concluded by saying that the Brigade must
be prepared to move anywhere after debarkation--and on a moment’s
notice.[101]
[101] _Ibid._
After he and his officers had been assigned rooms in a temporary
barracks, Craig requested permission to reconnoiter the combat
zone.[102] Walker assented, providing his own plane and pilot for
the trip. Accompanied by Stewart and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur A.
Chidester, his G-4, Craig flew first to Pusan, where he checked harbor
facilities, roads, and railways. There he conferred with Brigadier
General Crump Garvin, USA, to initiate preparations for the Brigade’s
arrival.[103]
[102] The _combat zone_ comprises that part of the theater
of operations required for the conduct of war by field
forces. In this case it included all of Korea remaining
in UN hands.
[103] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
Leaving Pusan, the Marine officers flew over Chinhae, which they
discovered to be a suitable base, if necessary, for VMO-6 and the
Brigade’s air support control unit. Cruising westward, they passed
over Masan, then continued toward Chinju. From the latter vicinity,
the enemy’s envelopment was then threatening the western approaches
to Pusan. Veering northward, the reconnaissance party paralleled the
Naktong River. The pilot, who was familiar with the ground, briefed his
passengers along the way. By the time the plane returned to Taegu, the
Marines had a broad picture of the critical areas most likely to become
Brigade battlefields.[104]
[104] _Ibid._
General Craig and his ground officers remained at Taegu 4 days.
Attending daily briefings of the Eighth Army staff, they acquired a
sound knowledge of the tactical situation. At a conference with Major
General Earle E. Partridge and his Fifth Air Force staff,[105] the
Marines were brought up to date on the disposition of aviation and its
policy for supporting UN ground forces.[106]
[105] Hq 5th AF was also located at Taegu.
[106] Craig, 15 Apr 54.
In the fight for time, ground force units in line were frequently
withdrawn and shuttled to plug gaps in the sagging front. Reports from
the battlefield more often were food for the imagination rather than
fact for the planning room. All of this created confusion among Eighth
Army staff officers.[107]
[107] _Ibid._; and Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
In the Taejon area the 24th Infantry Division had lost 770 officers
and men during the single week of 15–22 July. Of these casualties, 61
were known dead, 203 wounded, and 506 missing in action.[108] Among
the missing was General Dean, and the wounded included a regimental
commanding officer, a regimental executive officer, and a battalion
commander.[109]
[108] 24th InfDiv Periodic Personnel Rpt No. 2, 15–22 Jul 50.
[109] _Ibid._
Following this ordeal, the 24th had been relieved by the recently
arrived 1st Cavalry Division, which went into line alongside the 25th
Division in the Kumchon area. ROK divisions held to the north and east,
where NKPA forces were driving toward Pohang-dong.
The shape of strategic things to come was indicated late in July when
two NKPA divisions completed a much publicized “end run” past the open
UN left flank to the southwest tip of the peninsula, then wheeled
eastward for a drive on Pusan.
General Walker reacted promptly to the danger by recalling the 24th
Division from Eighth Army reserve and moving it southward from Kumchon
to block the enemy near Hadong. With the recently landed 29th Infantry
attached, the division totalled only 13,351 officers and men.[110]
Its front extended from the southern coast near Hadong to the town of
Kochang, 40 miles north.[111] In addition to manning this mountainous
line, the 24th had troops in action at Pohang-dong, more than 100 miles
away on the east coast. There some of its units fought as Task Force
Perry, under direct control of Eighth Army headquarters.[112]
[110] _Ibid._, No. 3, 29 Jul 50. Actually, as the report
itself states, this figure is a meaningless statistic,
and exceeds the _real_ total by several hundred. It
was the practice not to subtract missing-in-action
casualties until 30 days after losses were reported.
Also, casualty reports from far-flung subordinate units
were received irregularly, and some of these undoubtedly
were not available when this tally was made.
[111] 24th InfDiv Op Instr, 24–28 Jul 50.
[112] Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 29 Jul 50.
The 24th Division and 29th Infantry had no more than deployed when they
found themselves plunged into a confused 5-day fight. Although they
sold ground as dearly as possible, the Army units were compelled to
give up Hadong and fall back toward Chinju.[113]
[113] 24th InfDiv Op Instr, 24–28 Jul 50.
As the threat to Pusan grew more serious, the Eighth Army commander
shifted units. In order to protect the approaches from Chinju to Pusan,
he pulled the 25th Infantry Division back across the river Naktong near
Waegwan and moved it from the northern to the southern front in 48
hours. The next day saw the 1st Cavalry withdrawing across the Naktong
in the Waegwan area and blowing the bridges.
After being relieved in the south by the 25th Division, the 24th joined
the 1st Cavalry withdrawal to hastily organized defensive positions
east of the Naktong. ROK divisions continued to defend the northeast
approaches, while the 25th Division stood guard to block any enemy move
toward Chinju.[114]
[114] Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 29 Jul 50.
At this juncture General Craig became increasingly concerned about
prospects of maintaining the Brigade’s integrity as a Marine air-ground
team. He and his staff were aware that elements of the 29th Infantry
had been rushed from their ships directly into combat in the Chinju
area, and some units were badly mauled. Craig took occasion, therefore,
to remind Army leaders once more of the Marine tactical concept of the
indivisible air-ground team.[115]
[115] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
MAG-33, said Craig, would have to unload its planes and prepare them
for action; and the control squadron would need an interval to set up
co-ordinated tactical air support.[116]
[116] _Ibid._; and Craig, 15 Apr 54.
_Crisis of Eighth Army_
As July drew to an end, the situation both on the northern and
southwestern fronts was developing into a crisis. Hourly it grew
apparent that the Eighth Army’s perimeter would have to shrink even
more, so that defenses could assume some depth in sensitive areas.
Landrum indicated for the first time that the Brigade was being
considered primarily for a mission on the left flank.[117] Guided by
this possibility, Craig and his staff officers devoted a day to drawing
up a flexible operation plan. The purpose of this directive was to
advise the Brigade’s subordinate commanders of possible commitment in
the Chinju, Kochang, or Kumchon areas, in that order of probability.
Also included were detailed instructions for movement to forward
assembly areas, broad missions for supporting units, security measures
to be taken, and a general outline of the situation ashore.[118]
[117] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
[118] Brig Op Plan No. 3-50, 31 Jul 50; Craig, 25 Jan 54. The
“Kochan” and “Kumwan” referred to in the operations plan
are actually Kochang and Kumchon. The odd assortment
of maps available in the early days of the war offered
a variety of spelling along with far more serious
inaccuracies.
[Illustration: 8th ARMY SITUATION
LATE JULY 1950]
The advance party extracted from the plan a fragmentary warning order
suitable for radio transmission. This message was delivered to Eighth
Army headquarters with a request that it be sent immediately to the
Brigade at sea.[119] Now Craig assumed that Snedeker and Murray would
have a reasonable impression of the situation awaiting them.[120]
[119] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
[120] _Ibid._
At an Army briefing on the 29th, the Marines learned that the UN
left flank was collapsing. An air of uneasiness pervaded Taegu, and
Eighth Army headquarters began preparations for displacement to Pusan.
Craig was told that the Brigade definitely would be committed in
the southwest, unless a more critical situation suddenly sprang up
elsewhere. Again the Army officers added that the Marine unit actually
must be prepared to move in any direction on short notice.[121]
[121] Craig, 25 Jan 54 and 17 Apr 54.
With the approval of the Eighth Army, the Brigade commander immediately
sent a message to COMNAVFE requesting that the Marine air group be
made available to support the ground force by 2 August, and that VMO-6
be transported to Korea as quickly as possible.[122] Time was drawing
short.
[122] _Ibid._
On 30 July, General Craig had a final conference with Generals Walker
and Partridge. This time, Walker himself told the Marine leader that
the Brigade would be sent to the southwest; and that the unit, once
committed, would be free to push forward without interference from
Eighth Army.[123] Partridge interjected that his planes would be
available to support Craig’s ground troops if Marine air did not arrive
in time.[124]
[123] _Ibid._
[124] _Ibid._
Immediately after the conference, the Marine officers set out for Pusan
by jeep. While their vehicles bounced southward on the ancient road,
army headquarters in Taegu was sinking to new depths of dejection.
Chinju had just fallen, and the Red column was pounding on toward
Masan.[125]
[125] _Ibid._
[Illustration: _Commandant Says Farewell--General Clifton B. Cates
visits San Diego for embarkation of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade
(Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _All Aboard--Marines of the Brigade waiting to embark at
San Diego for the Far East (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Mountains of Supplies--Hundreds of tons of equipment
ready for loading aboard ships taking Marines to the Far East (Marine
Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Arrival at Pusan--Marines catch their first glimpse of
Korea as the U. S. S. _Pickaway_ docks (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Movement to the Front--Brigade troops preparing to
entrain at Pusan for the Changwon bivouac area (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Visit to the Front--Above, General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur with Ambassador John J. Muccio and Major General Edward M.
Almond, Chief of Staff, GHQ, FEC; and, below, with Lieutenant General
Walton H. Walker, commanding the Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (U. S. Army
Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Air Strikes First--Above, the U. S. S. _Badoeng
Strait_ (CVE 116) nearing Japan with Corsairs on deck; and, below, an
F4U armed with eight rockets and a 500-lb. bomb takes off from the
U. S. S. _Sicily_ (CVE 118) (U. S. Navy Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Korea the Vertical--Marines of the Brigade literally
climb into battle during their first fights in the Chindong-ni area
(Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Marines in Action--Above, Brigade infantry and M-26
tank, advancing under fire, pass body of dead United States soldier on
left; and, below, ambushed Marines are pinned down temporarily by enemy
machinegun fire at Naktong Bulge (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _At the Brigade CP--Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L.
Stewart, Brigade G-3 and Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, with
Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, Brigade chief-of-staff, in background (Life
Magazine Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Combat Leaders of 5th Marines--Front row, Lieutenant
Colonel Raymond L. Murray, regimental commander, and Lieutenant
Colonel L. C. Hays, Jr., Executive Officer; rear, Lieutenant Colonel
H. R. Roise, CO 2d Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel G. R. Newton, CO
1st Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Taplett, CO 3d Battalion
(Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Air in Action--Above, rocket-laden planes of
VMF-214 warming up on the flight deck of the _Sicily_; and, below, a
Corsair takes off for the front in Korea (U. S. Navy Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Marine Mortar Crew--Supporting the infantry advance
with 81-mm. shells are, left to right, Private First Class Jesse W.
Haney, Jr., Bakersfield, Calif.; Private First Class Bennie M. John,
Ardmore, Okla.; Private First Class Richard A. Robey, Houston, Tex.;
and an unidentified Marine in background (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Introducing the Enemy--No prisoner of war appears at
his best, but Marine veterans of the Brigade can attest that some of
the tough well-trained NKPA soldiers put up a good fight in Pusan
Perimeter operations (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _Crest of the Ridge--Two Marine PFC’s, Harold R. Bates
(left) of Los Angeles, and Richard N. Martin, of Elk River, Minn., take
a break after fighting their way to the top of a ridge in the Naktong
Bulge (Marine Corps Photo)._]
[Illustration: _The Flying Windmills--Above, Generals Craig (left)
and Cushman waiting for the pilot to take them aloft in an HO3S-1
helicopter; and, below, a VMO-6 helicopter lands near the artillery
positions of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (Marine Corps Photo)._]