The Marine Brigade
_NKPA Gains of First Week--Early United States Decisions--Geography of
Korea--United States Ground Forces in Korea--Requests for United States
Marines--Activation of the Brigade--Brigade Leadership_
At three o’clock in the morning of 25 June 1950 the telephone rang in
the New York suburban home of Trygve Lie, secretary-general of the
United Nations. He was informed that North Korean forces had crossed
the 38th Parallel to invade the Republic of Korea.
The news had just been received by the United States Department of
State directly from Seoul. Ambassador Muccio had emphasized that this
was not one of the large-scale North Korean raids into ROK territory
which had become an old story during the past 2 years. For his report
concluded:
“It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in
which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive
against the Republic of Korea.”[47]
[47] U. S. Dept of State, _Guide to the U. N. in Korea_
(Washington: GPO, 1951).
The implications were disturbing. Every middle-aged American could
recall the failure of the League of Nations to halt Japanese, Italian,
and German aggressions of the 1930’s with moral suasions. Even when
economic sanctions were invoked, the aggressors went their way
defiantly without respect for anything short of armed force. And now
history seemed to be repeating itself with dismaying fidelity as new
aggressors challenged the new union of nations striving to maintain
peace after World War II.
There was even an ominous parallel in the fact that another civil
conflict in another peninsula had been the prelude to Armageddon in the
1930’s. For it might well have been asked if the Korea of 1950 were
destined to become the Spain of a new world war.
The answer of the United Nations was prompt and decisive. At 2 o’clock
in the afternoon on 25 June 1950, a meeting of the Security Council was
called to order at New York. A dispatch had just been received from
UNCOK--the United Nations Commission on Korea--reporting that four
Soviet YAK-type aircraft had destroyed planes and jeeps on an airfield
outside of Seoul. The railway station in the industrial suburb of
Yongdungpo had also been strafed.[48]
[48] _Ibid._
By a unanimous vote of nine member nations (with the U. S. S. R. being
significantly absent and Yugoslavia not voting) the blame for the
aggression was placed squarely upon the North Korean invaders. They
were enjoined to cease hostilities immediately and withdraw from ROK
territory.
The United Nations had no armed might to enforce its decisions. But
the Security Council did not intend to rely merely upon moral suasion
or economic sanctions. At a second meeting, on 27 June, the Council
proclaimed the NKPA attack a breach of world peace and asked member
nations to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the invasion.
For the first time in the war-racked 20th century, a group of nations
banded together for peace had not only condemned an aggression but
appealed to armed force to smite the aggressor. On the same day that
the Security Council passed its historic resolution, the United States
announced that it was giving immediate military aid to the Republic of
Korea.
President Truman, as commander in chief, ordered American naval and
air forces into action. Fifty-two other members of the United Nations
approved the recommendations of the Security Council. Their pledges of
assistance included aircraft, naval vessels, medical supplies, field
ambulances, foodstuffs and strategic materials.
Only 3 of the 56 nations responding to the Council were opposed to the
majority decision. They were the Soviet Union and her two satellites,
Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had been brought into the Communist
orbit by compulsion after World War II.
On 29 June President Truman authorized General MacArthur to send
certain supporting United States ground force units to Korea. An
American naval blockade of the entire Korean coast was ordered, and
Japan-based Air Force planes were given authority to bomb specific
military targets north of the 38th Parallel.
These decisions were upheld by the wholehearted approval of nearly all
Americans, according to contemporary newspapers.[49] Virtually the only
dissenters were such left-wing extremists as the 9,000 who attended
a “Hands off Korea” rally held early in July 1950 under Communist
auspices in New York.[50] Barring such rule-proving exceptions,
Americans had long been smoldering with indignation at Soviet cold-war
tactics. They applauded the resolute stand taken by the United Nations,
and they were proud of their country for its response. Unfortunately,
they did not anticipate that anything more serious than a brief “police
action” would be necessary to settle affairs. Never in their wildest
imaginations had it occurred to them that an Asiatic peasant army might
be more than a match for all the United States ground forces in the Far
East.
[49] _Newsweek_, 10 Jul 50, 17.
[50] _Ibid._, 29.
_NKPA Gains of First Week_
It was by no means a contemptible army, judged even by Western military
standards, which ripped through ROK defenses after crossing the 38th
Parallel. The major effort was the two-pronged attack on Seoul,
conducted with precision by the 1st NKPA Infantry Division, advancing
through Kaesong and Munsan while the 4th and 3d united south of the
frontier with elements of the 105th Armored to proceed by way of the
Yonchon-Uijongbu and Pochon-Uijongbu corridors.
On the right the 6th Infantry Division made short work of overrunning
the isolated Ongjin Peninsula and thrusting eastward toward Kaesong.
On the left the offensive was covered by the drive of the 2d and 12th
Infantry Divisions on Chunchon while the 5th made rapid gains along the
east coast.
In this area the North Koreans initiated the first amphibious
operations of the war with four Soviet-manufactured torpedo boats.
Built entirely of aluminum, of about 16 gross tons displacement when
fully loaded, these craft measured slightly over 19 meters in length
and were powered by two 10-Cylinder engines rated at 850 horsepower
each. With a crew of 8 men, a cruising speed of 20 to 25 knots and a
range of 15 hours, the boats carried 2 torpedoes and were armed with a
12.7-mm. heavy machinegun and 2 submachineguns.[51]
[51] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Forces_, _op. cit._, 45–6.
During the first 5 days of the invasion, the 4 torpedo boats escorted
convoys which transported NKPA troops down the east coast for
unopposed landings as far south as Samchok. But on 2 July 1950 the
tiny North Korean “navy” was almost literally blown out of the water
when it encountered UN Task Group 96.5 off Chuminjin while escorting
10 converted trawlers. With more bravery than discretion, the small
North Korean craft accepted battle with the American light cruiser
_Juneau_ and two British warships, the light cruiser _Jamaica_ and the
frigate _Black Swan_. Evidently the enemy hoped to score with a few
torpedoes at the cost of a suicidal effort, but the U. N. guns sank
2 of the aluminum craft and drove a third to the beach, where it was
soon destroyed along with 7 of the convoy vessels. The North Koreans
were credited with “great gallantry” in the British dispatch after the
fourth torpedo boat escaped.[52] But it was the last naval effort of
any consequence by an enemy strangled in the net of the UN blockade.
[52] Capt Walter Karig, USN, _Battle Report: The War in Korea_
(New York: Rinehart, 1952), 58–59.
On land the NKPA columns advanced almost at will during the first
4 days. Nearly a hundred tanks and as many planes were employed by
the two main columns advancing on Seoul, and on 27 June 1950 the ROK
seat of government was removed to Taejon while Far East Air Force
planes were evacuating United States citizens. ROK fugitives, winding
southward in an endless stream of humanity, choked every road and
multiplied the difficulties of the defense. To add to their misery, one
of the bridges across the river Han was blown prematurely when masses
of Koreans were crossing.
The fall of Seoul on the 28th ended the first stage of the offensive
as the NKPA forces halted for regrouping. Chunchon had surrendered in
east-central Korea, so that the invaders held a ragged line stretching
from Chumunjin on the east coast through Chunchon, Kapyong and Seoul to
the port of Inchon on the west coast.
The beaten and in some instances shattered ROK forces were meanwhile
falling back through Suwon in the hope of establishing new positions of
defense.
_Early United States Decisions_
A strategy of delaying actions was the only course open to General
MacArthur for the time being. One of his first decisions led to the
establishment on 27 June of the GHQ Advanced Command Group at Suwon
under the command of Brigadier General John H. Church, USA. This group
had as its primary mission the reorganization of the demoralized ROK
forces, which were already reporting thousands of men missing in
action. Secondary missions were to keep Tokyo informed as to military
developments and expedite the delivery of supplies. As early as 27
June, 119 tons of emergency supplies had been sent to Korea by air, and
an additional 5,600 tons were being loaded on ships in Japan.[53]
[53] U. S. MilAcad, _op. cit._, 7–8.
American naval and air forces lost no time at getting into action after
President Truman’s authorization. United States Naval Forces in the Far
East, under the command of Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, had as their
principal element the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur
D. Struble. Its tactical organization, Task Force 77, immediately
clamped down a blockade on the Korean coast after wiping out enemy
naval opposition. Other warships of the Seventh Fleet were meanwhile
blockading Formosa to guard against the possibility of Chinese
Communist intervention by means of an attack on the last Nationalist
stronghold.
The United States Far East Air Forces, commanded by Lieutenant General
George E. Stratemeyer, USAF, consisted of eight and a half combat
groups responsible for the defense of Japan, Okinawa, Guam and the
Philippines. Primary missions assigned to the fighter and bomber
squadrons were the elimination of NKPA air opposition and the retarding
of enemy ground forces by means of interdictory air strikes on bases
and supply routes.
_Geography of Korea_
Geography being a first cousin of strategy, maps of Korea were almost
literally worth their weight in diamonds both in Tokyo and at the
Pentagon. For that matter, they were nearly as rare as diamonds, and it
became necessary in many instances to work with outdated Japanese maps.
On the map of Asia the Korean peninsula resembles a thumb dipping down
into the Yellow and Japan seas. For centuries it has been the sore
thumb of Asiatic power politics, so that trouble in Korea resulted in a
twinge being felt in the capitals of Europe. But small as Korea appears
on the map, it is actually about 575 miles in length--a peninsula
resembling Florida in shape but having about the area of Minnesota.
Variations in climate are comparable to the gradient from Maine to
Georgia along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. Extremes
ranging from summer weather of 105° F. to winter temperatures of 40°
below zero have been recorded. A monsoon season of floods is to be
expected in July and August, followed by a period when typhoons are a
possibility. Altogether, it is a climate which can contribute no little
to the difficulties of a mechanized invader.
It would be almost an understatement to say that Korea is mountainous.
Few areas of the earth’s surface are so consistently rugged. Bleak
cliffs seem to thrust themselves dripping out of the sea on the East
Korean littoral. The peaks become higher and more perpendicular as they
march inland, until altitudes of 9,000 feet are reached.
The principal chain of mountains extends from the Yalu in the north
along the east coast to the Pusan area. Just south of the 38th parallel
a spur branches off diagonally to southwest Korea in the region of
Mokpu. The remainder of the peninsula consists largely of smaller
ranges and foothills.
The few broad valleys are found chiefly on the west coast, which has
a good many indentations and estuaries. Here also are most of Korea’s
large rivers, flowing west and south. Of little aid to navigation,
these streams are broad and deep enough to hamper military operations;
and in the monsoon season, floods become a menace.
As if the west coast were paying a penalty for being less mountainous,
mud flats and islands hamper navigation. And here the tides are among
the highest in the world, with an extreme range of about 30 feet
existing at Inchon in contrast to unusually moderate tides along the
east coast.
The west and south are the agricultural areas of Korea. Nothing is
wasted by peasants who till every inch of the lowland flats, rice
paddies, and terraced hills. Due to their back-breaking toil rather
than many natural advantages, Korea was able to export as much as
half of its two food staples, rice and fish, under the Japanese
administration.
The population, estimated at 25,000,000 in 1945, increased both by
immigration and a high birth rate during the next 5 years until as
many as 29,000,000 inhabitants were claimed. Seoul was a capital of a
million and a half residents, and the two leading seaports, Pusan and
Inchon, had not far from a quarter of a million each. Modern office
buildings, factories and street railways were found in combination with
muddy streets and thatched huts on the outskirts.
A standard-gauge rail network, built largely by the Japanese, linked
the principal cities and connected in the north with the Manchurian
railways. The highway system was good for an Asiatic country but
inadequate for the purpose of an invader on wheels and tracks.
Hard-surfaced roads were few and far between, and the ordinary
earth roads were churned into bogs during the monsoon season. Air
transportation was limited to only a few large airfields and emergency
landing facilities.
Altogether, Korea promised to be a tough nut to crack, when it came to
geography, for the officers poring over maps in Tokyo.
_United States Ground Forces in Korea_
The United States ground forces in the Far East comprised the
understrength 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 1st
Cavalry (dismounted) Division of the Eighth United States Army, which
had been stationed in Japan since the end of World War II. These
divisions had only about 70 percent of their personnel, the regiments
being limited to two battalions.
The explanation of these deficiencies goes back to the end of World War
II. Popular clamor for the speedy discharge of the victorious United
States forces had resulted in American military sinews becoming flabby
during the next few years. Strenuous recruiting had been necessary to
maintain the small army of occupation in Japan at part strength, and it
was no secret that many of the men were attracted by the expectation
of travel and light occupation duties. The possibility of battle had
scarcely been anticipated when the invasion began, and combat readiness
left a good deal to be desired. Training on the company level had been
good on the whole, but both officers and men were handicapped by the
lack of maneuvers for units larger than a battalion.
Shortages in equipment were equally serious. There were not enough
mortars, recoilless rifles and other weapons even if there had been
enough maintenance parts and trained maintenance technicians. Most of
the arms, moreover, consisted of worn World War II equipment which
had seen its best days. Finally, the divisional armored units had
been provided with light M-24 tanks, instead of the heavier machines
normally employed, because of the weak bridges in Japan.[54]
[54] U. S. MilAcad, _loc. cit._
It was, in brief, an unprepared and ill-equipped little army of
occupation which represented the first line of United States defense in
the Far East.
[Illustration: NKPA INVASION
15 JULY 1950]
On 2 July the advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division, commanded
by Major General William F. Dean, were flown from Japan to Korea. Two
days later, on the American national holiday, the first contact of the
United States ground forces with the enemy was made near Osan, about 8
miles south of Suwon.
The American force consisted of 2 infantry companies, a battery of
artillery, two 4.2″ mortar platoons, a platoon of 75-mm. recoilless
rifles, and six 2.36″ rocket-launcher teams. Named Task Force Smith
after its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith,
the first United States contingent collided on the morning of 5 July
with a whole NKPA division supported by 30 T-34 tanks. Despite the
odds against it, Task Force Smith put up a good delaying fight of 4 or
5 hours before pulling out with the loss of all equipment save small
arms.[55]
[55] 24th InfDiv, Supporting Documents, 24 Jul-16 Aug 50, 6–7.
On 7 July, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a
unified command in Korea, and President Truman named General MacArthur
as commander in chief. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, who had
been one of Patton’s best officers in World War II, was appointed
commander of the Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK) on 12 July,
and 4 days later he assumed control of all ROK ground forces.
The ROK army, as might be supposed, was badly battered and much in need
of reorganization. At the end of the first week of invasion, the ROK
missing in action had reached a total of about 34,000. Whole battalions
had been scattered like chaff, yet it speaks well for the spirit of the
troops that most of the missing eventually returned to their units.[56]
The odds against them had made it a hopeless fight, but these Korean
soldiers would give a good account of themselves when they had better
training and equipment.
[56] Appleman, _op. cit._
The United States forces were finding it hard sledding, for that
matter. The remaining units of the 24th Infantry Division were in
action by 7 July, having arrived by sea from Japan. They were followed
by the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William B.
Kean, which completed the movement to Korea on 14 July.
These first outweighed United States forces had no choice except to
trade space for time in a series of delaying actions. Although the
units had to be employed piecemeal at first, they slowed up the
main thrust of the enemy--the advance of three NKPA divisions, well
supported by armor, down the Seoul-Taejon axis.
Seldom in history have American forces ever endured a worse ordeal by
fire. Unprepared morally as well as materially, snatched from soft
occupation duties in Japan, they were suddenly plunged into battle
against heavier battalions. The “Land of the Morning Calm” was to them
a nightmare land of sullen mountains and stinking rice paddies. There
was not even the momentary lift of band music and flag waving for these
occupation troops, and they were not upheld by the discipline which
stiffens the spines of old regulars.
Considering what they were up against, the soldiers of the 24th and
25th have an abiding claim to a salute from their countrymen. They
fought the good fight, even though they could keep militarily solvent
only by withdrawals between delaying actions.
Officers as well as men were expendables in this Thermopylae of
the rice paddies. Because of the large proportion of green troops,
colonels and even generals literally led some of the counterattacks
in the 18th-century manner. Colonel Robert R. Martin, commanding the
34th Infantry of the 24th Division, fell in the thick of the fighting
while rallying his troops. General Dean stayed with his forward units,
personally firing one of the new 3.5″ bazookas until the enemy broke
through. He was reported missing for months, but turned up later as
the highest ranking United States military prisoner of the conflict in
Korea.
American light tanks could not cope with the enemy’s T-34’s; and even
when the first few medium tanks arrived, they were equipped only with
75-mm. guns against the heavier NKPA armament. Not until the third week
of ground force operations, moreover, did the United States artillery
units receive 155-mm. howitzers to supplement their 105’s.
There was nothing that the ground forces could do but withdraw toward
the line of the river Kum. Here a stand was made by 24th Division units
at Taejon, an important communications center. But the enemy managed to
establish bridgeheads, and the fall of the town on 20 July marked the
end of the first phase.
Two days later the 24th Division, now commanded by General Church, was
relieved south of Taejon by Major General Hobart R. Gay’s 1st Cavalry
(dismounted) Division, which had landed at Pohang-dong on the 18th. And
on 26 July the separate 29th Infantry RCT disembarked at Chinju on the
south coast after a voyage from Okinawa.
The reinforced Eighth Army was still too much outnumbered to vary its
strategy of delaying actions with sustained counterattacks. While the
new American units and the 25th Division fell slowly back toward the
line of the Naktong, the regrouped ROK divisions were assigned sectors
toward the north and east, where a secondary NKPA offensive threatened
Pohang-dong. Meanwhile, the exhausted 24th Division went into Eighth
Army reserve.
The ground forces would doubtless have been in a worse situation if
it had not been for hard-hitting United States naval and air support.
Major General Emmett O’Donnell’s B-29 Superforts of the FEAF Bomber
Command took off from Japanese bases to fly strikes on enemy supply
routes, communications hubs, marshaling yards and other strategic
targets all the way back to the Yalu.
Task Force 77, ranging along the west coast, gave Pyongyang its first
large-scale bombing on 3 July. Gull-winged F4U Corsairs, leading off
from the _Valley Forge_ flight deck with 5-inch rockets, were followed
by AD Skyraiders and new Douglas dive bombers. Bridges and railway
yards were destroyed by raiders who shot down two YAK-type planes in
the air and destroyed two on the ground.
Along the east coast the _Juneau_ and other warships of the
Anglo-American blockading force patrolled the enemy’s MSR, which
followed the shoreline. Salvos from the cruisers, fired at the sheer
cliffs, loosed avalanches of earth and rock to block the highway.
Railways were mined and tunnels dynamited by commando parties landing
from ships’ boats.
The combined U. N. efforts inflicted heavy material and personnel
losses while slowing up the NKPA offensive. But it is a testimonial
to Soviet and Red Korean preparations for aggression that the army of
invasion kept on rolling. There was even some prospect late in July
that the enemy would yet make good his boast of being able to take
Pusan within 2 months in spite of United States intervention.
_Requests for United States Marines_
Upholding their long tradition as America’s force-in-readiness, the
Marines have usually been among the first troops to see action on a
foreign shore. Thus it might have been asked what was holding them back
at a time when Army troops in Korea were hard-pressed.
The answer is that the Marines actually were the first United States
ground forces to get into the fight after completing the long voyage
from the American mainland. There were no Marine units of any size
in the Far East at the outset of the invasion. But not an hour was
lost at the task of assembling an air-ground team at Camp Pendleton,
California, and collecting the shipping.
The spirit of impatience animating the Marine Corps is shown by an
entry on the desk calendar of General Clifton B. Cates under the date
of 26 June 1950. This was the day after the news of the invasion
reached Washington, and the Commandant commented:
“SecNav’s policy meeting called off. Nuts.”[57]
[57] Gen Clifton B. Cates ltr to authors, 7 Apr 54 (Cates, 7
Apr 54).
On the 28th General Cates had his first conference with Admiral Forrest
P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. He noted on his calendar the
next day: “Recommended to CNO and SecNav that FMF be employed.” Two
days later General Cates “attended SecNav’s conference.” And on 3 July
his calendar recorded more history:
“Attended JCS meeting. Orders for employment of FMF approved.”[58]
[58] _Ibid._
The steps leading up to this decision may be traced back to the
conference of 28 June, when Cates gave Sherman a summary of the
strength of the Marine Corps. Along with other branches of the service,
it had taken cuts in appropriations since World War II, so that total
numbers were 74,279 men on active duty--97 percent of authorized
strength. The Fleet Marine Force had a strength of 27,656--11,853 in
FMFPac (1st Marine Division, Reinf., and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing) and
15,803 in FMFLant (2d Marine Division, Reinf., and 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing).[59]
[59] Ernest H. Giusti, _The Mobilization of the Marine Corps
Reserve in the Korean Conflict_ (Washington, HQMC, G-3,
HistSec, 1951), 1–2.
Neither of these understrength divisions, General Cates pointed
out, could raise much more than an RCT of combat-ready troops with
supporting air.
Admiral Sherman asked CinCPacFlt on 1 July how long it would take to
move (_a_) a Marine BLT and (_b_) a Marine RCT from the Pacific Coast.
Admiral Radford replied the next day that he could load the BLT in 4
days and sail in 6; and that he could load the RCT in 6 days and sail
in 10.[60]
[60] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 1 Jul 50; and CinCPacFlt disp to
CNO, 2 Jul 50.
Next, a dispatch from CNO to Admiral C. Turner Joy announced that a
Marine RCT could be made available if General MacArthur desired it.
COMNAVFE called personally on the general, who had just returned from
a depressing inspection of the invasion front. Not only did CINCFE
accept immediately, but he showed unusual enthusiasm in expressing his
appreciation.[61]
[61] Marine Corps Board, _An Evaluation of the Influence of
Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War_ (4
Aug-15 Dec 50) (MCBS) I-B-1, I-B-2.
Sunday 2 July was the date of the message from General MacArthur
requesting the immediate dispatch of a Marine RCT with supporting air
to the Far East. CNO acted that same day. With the concurrence of JCS
and the President, he ordered Admiral Radford to move a Marine RCT with
appropriate air to the Far East for employment by General MacArthur.[62]
[62] CINCFE disp to CNO, 2 Jul 50; CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 2
Jul 50; and JCS disp to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50.
Later, when General Cates asked CNO how the historical decision had
been accomplished, Admiral Sherman replied cryptically in baseball
language, “From Cates to Sherman, to Joy, to MacArthur, to JCS!”[63]
[63] Cates, 7 Apr 54.
_Activation of the Brigade_
Even at this early date there was talk both in Washington and Tokyo of
forming an entire Marine division after mobilizing the Reserve. For the
present, however, it sufficed to organize the RCT requested by General
MacArthur. There could be little doubt that the assignment would be
given to an air-ground team built around the two main West Coast units,
the 5th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33. They were activated along
with supporting units on 7 July as the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade,
commanded by Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, senior officer at Camp
Pendleton. The air component, consisting of three squadrons of MAG-33,
was placed under the command of Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman,
who was named deputy commander of the Brigade.
Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of
FMFPac, and a G-3 staff officer, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, had been
ordered on 4 July to proceed immediately to Tokyo and confer with
General MacArthur. Before leaving, Shepherd found time to recommend
formation of third platoons for rifle companies of the 5th Marines, and
CNO gave his approval the following day.[64]
[64] CNO disp to CinCPacFlt, 5 Jul 50.
Unfortunately, there was not enough time to add third rifle companies
to the battalions of the 5th Marines which had been training with two
companies on a peacetime basis. Camp Pendleton and its neighboring
Marine Air Station, El Toro, hummed with day and night activity as the
Brigade prepared to sail in a week. Weapons and clothing had to be
issued, immunization shots given, and insurance and pay allotments made
out. Meanwhile, telegrams were sent to summon Marines from posts and
stations all over the United States.
Among these Marines were the first helicopter pilots of the United
States Armed Forces to be formed into a unit for overseas combat
service. Large-scale production of rotary-wing aircraft had come too
late to have any effect on the tactics of World War II, though a few
Sikorsky machines had been used experimentally both in the European and
Pacific theaters toward the end of the conflict. But it remained for
the United States Marine Corps to take the lead in working out combat
techniques and procedures after organizing an experimental squadron,
HMX-1, at Quantico in 1947.
Seven pilots, 30 enlisted men and 4 HO3S-1 Sikorsky 2-place helicopters
were detached from HMX-1 on 8 July 1950 for service with the Brigade.
Upon arrival at El Toro, these elements were combined with 8 fixed-wing
aircraft pilots, 33 enlisted men and 8 OY planes to form the Brigade’s
air observation squadron, VMO-6.
This is an example of how units were assembled at Pendleton and El
Toro. Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, appointed commanding officer
of VMO-6 on 3 July, had orders to ready his squadron for shipment
overseas by the 11th. Thus he had just 48 hours, after the arrival of
the Quantico contingent, in which to weld the elements of his outfit
together. Among his other problems, Gottschalk had to grapple with the
fact that there were not enough OY’s in good condition at El Toro. He
found a solution by taking eight of these light observation planes
overseas with a view to cannibalizing four of them for parts when the
need arose.[65]
[65] Lynn Montross, _Cavalry of the Sky_ (New York: Harper,
1954), Chapter VII. This book is devoted entirely to the
operations of the U. S. Marine helicopter units organized
from 1947 to 1953 for service both in the United States
and overseas.
There was not enough time in most instances for weapons familiarization
training. Company A of the 1st Tank Battalion had been accustomed
to the M4A3 Medium tank with either the 75-mm. gun or the 105-mm.
howitzer. Activated on 7 July for service with the Brigade, the unit
was equipped with M-26 “Pershing” tanks and 90-mm. guns. Captain Gearl
M. English, the commanding officer, managed to snatch 1 day in which
to take his men to the range with 2 of the new machines. Each gunner
and loader was limited to 2 rounds, and the 90-mm. guns were never
fired again until they were taken into combat in Korea.[66]
[66] 1st Tank Bn Special Action Report (SAR), 7 Jul-29 Aug 50,
in 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Brig) SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep
50.
Support battalions were cut down to company size, generally speaking,
for service with the Brigade. Thus Company A of the 1st Motor Transport
Battalion numbered 6 officers and 107 men; and Company A of the 1st
Engineer Battalion (reinf.) totaled 8 officers and 209 men.
The largest unit of the ground forces, of course, was the 5th Marines
with 113 officers and 2,068 men commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Raymond
L. Murray. Next came the 1st Battalion (reinf.) of the 11th Marines,
numbering 37 officers and 455 men under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Ransom H. Wood.
Altogether, according to a report of 9 July 1950, the Brigade ground
forces reached a total of 266 officers and 4,503 men.[67]
[67] CinCPacFlt disp to CINCFE, 9 Jul 50.
On this same date, the Brigade’s air component amounted to 192 officers
and 1,358 men. The principal units were as follows:
VMF-214 29 officers, 157 men, 24 F4U4B aircraft.
VMF-323 29 officers, 157 men, 24 F4U4B aircraft.
VMF(N)-513 15 officers, 98 men, 12 F4U5N aircraft.
VMO-6 15 officers, 63 men, 8 OY and 4 HO3S-1 aircraft.[68]
[68] _Ibid._
Adding the ground force and air figures gives a grand total of
6,319--458 officers and 5,861 men--on 9 July 1950. Before sailing,
however, the activation of third rifle platoons and the last-minute
attachment of supporting troops brought the strength of the Brigade and
its air components up to 6,534.
Most of the equipment came from the great Marine supply depot at
Barstow in the California desert. Here were acres of “mothballed”
trucks, jeeps, DUKW’s and amphibian tractors dating back to World War
II. It has been aptly remarked, in fact, that “there were more veterans
of Iwo and Okinawa among the vehicles than there were among the men who
would drive them.”[69]
[69] Andrew Geer, _The New Breed_ (New York: Harper, 1952),
2–7. This book about U. S. Marine operations of 1950 in
Korea contains an excellent account of the mounting out
of the Brigade from Camp Pendleton.
Rail and highway facilities were taxed to the limit by the endless
caravan of equipment moving from Barstow to Pendleton and El Toro
after being hastily reconditioned and tested. Not all the arms were
of World War II vintage, however, and the Marines of the Brigade were
among the first American troops to be issued the new 3.5″ rocket
launcher.
_Brigade Leadership_
It appeared to be a scene of mad confusion at Pendleton as Marines
arrived hourly by train, bus, and plane. But the situation was kept
well in hand by General Craig, who had seen many other departures
for battle during his 33 years in the Corps. Born in Connecticut and
educated at the St. Johns Military Academy, Delafield, Wis., he was
commissioned a Marine second lieutenant in 1917 at the age of 21.
Throughout the next 3 decades he served with distinction both as a line
and staff officer, and both as student and instructor at the Marine
Corps Schools.
During World War II he was executive and later commanding officer of
the 9th Marine Regiment, which he led in the landing at Empress Augusta
Bay on Bougainville and the recapture of Guam in the Marianas. Awarded
the Bronze Star and Navy Cross for gallantry in these operations, Craig
became operations officer of the V Amphibious Corps in time to help
plan the Iwo Jima operation. After the war he returned to Guam for 2
years in 1947 to command the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Fleet
Marine Force, before becoming ADC to Major General Graves B. Erskine,
CG 1st Marine Division, in 1949.
The white hair and slender, erect figure of the dynamic Brigade
commander would soon become a familiar sight to every platoon leader
at the front. His assistant, General Cushman, was born in St. Louis,
Mo. in 1895 and attended the University of Washington. Enlisting in the
Marine Corps shortly after the outbreak of World War I, he completed
flight training and was designated a naval aviator. Subsequent tours
of aviation duty in Haiti, Nicaragua, and Guam were varied with
assignments as instructor at Pensacola and administrative officer with
BuAer in Washington. Cushman was a wing commander in World War II and
was awarded a Bronze Star and Legion of Merit while serving in that
capacity and later as chief of staff to the CG of Marine Aircraft
Wings, Pacific. After the war he became commander of the Marine Corps
Air Bases and CG of Aircraft, FMFPac.
Lieutenant Colonel Murray, CO of the 5th Marines, was born in Los
Angeles in 1913. He graduated from Texas A. and M. College in 1935
and was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant. After prewar service
in China and Iceland, he became a troop leader in three of the
hardest-fought Marine operations of World War II--Guadalcanal, Tarawa,
and Saipan. Awarded the Navy Cross, two Silver Stars, and the Purple
Heart medal, Murray made a name for heroism that was noteworthy even in
Marine circles.
This was no light achievement, for both CMC and CG FMFPac--General
Cates and General Shepherd--had distinguished themselves as Marine
combat leaders. Both were wounded in Marine operations of World War I,
and both won later honors during Caribbean actions of the Marine Corps.
On 11 July, as Brigade preparations for sailing neared a climax,
General Shepherd sent the first report of his visit to Korea. He and
Colonel Krulak had held conferences with General MacArthur, Admiral Joy
and Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, commanding Amphibious Planning Group
1. The commander in chief, said Shepherd, already envisioned a great
amphibious operation with a complete Marine division and air components
as his landing force. Not only was he “enthusiastic,” about the
employment of Marines, but he believed in the necessity for employing
them as an air-ground team.[70]
[70] CG FMFPac memo for record, “Visit to Far East Command,”
11 Jul 50.
MacArthur was “not sanguine” about the situation in Korea. He felt that
the nature of enemy resistance, combined with the rugged terrain and
the possibilities of Soviet or Red Chinese intervention, threatened to
protract operations. Thus he favored a Marine amphibious landing far
in the enemy’s rear to cut off and destroy the North Korean columns of
invasion.[71]
[71] _Ibid._
General Shepherd’s report made it seem likely, just before the Brigade
sailed, that its units would probably be absorbed soon into a Marine
division with an amphibious mission. For the present, however, it was
enough to start the movement from Pendleton and El Toro to San Diego,
where the convoy awaited. MAG-33 had orders to embark in the transports
_Anderson_ and _Achernar_ and the carrier (CVE-116) _Badoeng Strait_.
The ground forces would make the voyage in the LSD’s _Fort Marion_ and
_Gunston Hall_, the AKA’s _Alshain_ and _Whiteside_, and the APA’s
_Pickaway_, _Clymer_ and _Henrico_.[72]
[72] For the Brigade’s task organization in detail, with
names of commanding officers and strength of units, see
Appendix B.
General Cates was on hand at the docks from 12 to 14 July when the
Brigade sailed. His long cigarette holders were famous, and no second
lieutenant in the Corps could throw a more military salute. As he eyed
the ground forces filing past, the Commandant could only have felt
that Marine traditions would be upheld. A good many of the PFC’s, it
is true, were too young to have seen action in World War II, though
nearly all had been well grounded in fundamentals. Perhaps at the front
they might become victims at first of their own over-anxiety. But
they would doubtless grin sheepishly about it afterwards and become
combat-hardened in a short time.
A glance at the NCO’s, the platoon leaders and company commanders
of the Brigade could only have brought a gleam of pride to the
Commandant’s battlewise eye. With few exceptions, they were veterans of
World War II who could be relied upon to get the best out of their men.
And it may be that the Commandant was reminded of the remark attributed
to General William T. Sherman during the Civil War:
“We have good corporals and sergeants and some good lieutenants and
captains, and those are far more important than good generals.”[73]
[73] Quoted in Lynn Montross, _War Through the Ages_ (New
York: Harper, 1946), 609.
Nobody could give a more smooth and eloquent talk than General Cates
before a Washington audience. But when it came to saying farewell to
the Brigade troops, he addressed them in the language of Marines.
“You boys clean this up in a couple of months,” said the Commandant,
“or I’ll be over to see you!”[74]
[74] Geer, _op. cit._, 6.