Prelude to Battle
_Reconnaissance by Jeep--Brigade Air Lands--Landing of Ground
Force--Bedlam on Pusan Water Front--The Brigade at Changwon--The Pusan
Perimeter--Brigade Air Strikes First--Planning the Sachon-Chinju
Offensive_
After the advance party reached Pusan, General Craig established a
temporary command post in the headquarters building of General Garvin’s
Base Command. Then the Marine officers plunged into the final phase
of planning and preparation for the Brigade, although they were still
handicapped by the undisclosed secret of the convoy’s arrival date.
Staff gears were meshing smoothly by this time, with solutions being
ground out for one problem after another.
On the night of 30 July, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart and other staff
officers were discussing whether MAG-33 would be able to get its planes
airborne in time to support the Brigade in its initial combat. Acting
on a hunch, Stewart picked up a telephone in the slim hope of placing a
call through to Japan. The long shot paid off. After some wrangling by
startled operators, he managed to contact Itami Air Force Base and talk
to Colonel Kenneth H. Weir, Cushman’s chief of staff.
Stewart briefed the Marine aviator on the latest developments,
emphasizing that the Brigade would undoubtedly get into the fight
soon after arrival. He asked Weir to send the Air Support Section and
helicopters to Korea by LST as quickly as possible after unloading in
Japan.[126]
[126] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
Craig received a radio message that same night from FMFPac, informing
him that the replacements for the Brigade would not be sent directly to
Pusan, as requested. They were to be assembled at Camp Pendleton for
travel with the 1st Marine Division, and this meant a delay which could
be critical. Craig immediately insisted that the reinforcements be
sent to Pusan to replace Brigade battle losses and form the third rifle
companies.[127] The Marine leader’s determination in this instance
proved to be a blessing a few weeks later.
[127] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
_Reconnaissance by Jeep_
On the morning of 31 July, Craig and Stewart set out by jeep to
reconnoiter the rear areas of the crumbling southwestern sector. Kean’s
25th Division, having just replaced the 24th in line, was now blocking
the threatened western approaches to Pusan. Since all indications
pointed to the Brigade’s commitment in this area, Craig wanted to walk
and ride over the terrain he had previously scouted from the air.[128]
[128] _Ibid._
He returned to Pusan just in time to receive a telephone call from
Colonel Landrum of Eighth Army Headquarters. The chief of staff told
him of General Walker’s intention to attach the Army’s 5th Regimental
Combat Team, newly arrived from Hawaii, to the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade. With two regiments under his command, Craig would be assigned
a vital area of responsibility along the Nam River, near its confluence
with the Naktong north of Masan.[129] Unfortunately, the Brigade
reached Korea 1 day too late. When the 5th RCT debarked at Pusan on 1
August, it was earmarked for the 25th Division and placed in Eighth
Army reserve.[130]
[129] _Ibid._
[130] MCBS, II-A-7.
Also debarking on the 1st was the Army’s skeletonized 2d Division. This
unit cleared Pusan and hurried to the hard-pressed Taegu area where it
also passed into Eighth Army reserve.[131]
[131] Hq EUSAK Op Dir, 3 Jul 50.
During the last hours before the Brigade’s arrival, Lieutenant Colonel
Chidester was diligently engaged in the task--or art--of procurement.
It has already been explained why the Marine ground force would debark
for combat with little more than what its troops could carry on
their backs. In order to offset partially the deficiencies, the G-4
successfully negotiated with Army authorities for 50 cargo trucks,
several jeeps, some radio vans, and various other items of equipment.
Officers of the Pusan Base Command reacted to all of Chidester’s
requests with as much generosity as their meager stocks of materiel
would allow.[132]
[132] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
Not until the morning of 2 August did General Craig learn that Task
Group 53.7 was scheduled to dock at Pusan that very evening. The
last-minute disclosure relieved him of considerable anxiety, but he was
still disturbed for want of specific orders concerning departure of the
Brigade from Pusan. His instructions from General Walker were to debark
the ground force immediately and have it prepared to move forward by
0600 the following morning. The same orders advised him that a specific
destination “would be given later.”[133]
[133] _Ibid._
“Later” did not come soon enough for the Marine commander. As the
long column of ships steamed into Pusan Harbor in the early evening,
he still did not know where he would lead his Brigade the next
morning.[134]
[134] _Ibid._
_Brigade Air Lands_
When Task Group 53.7 entered Far Eastern waters, the ships transporting
the forward echelon of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing veered toward
Japan, while the others continued to Korea. The Brigade’s air arm
arrived at Kobe late in the afternoon of 31 July.
Within three hours debarkation had been completed and unloading was
in full swing. A waiting LST took on Marine Tactical Air Control
Squadron Two and the ground personnel and equipment of VMO-6. By the
next morning it was steaming toward Pusan, carrying the vital link in
General Craig’s air-ground team. Cushman and Weir were making good
their promises.[135]
[135] Annexes Charlie and Fox to MAG-33 SAR, 5 Jul-6 Sep 50.
Since harbor facilities at Kobe were unsuitable for offloading
aircraft, the _Badoeng Strait_ stood out to sea on 1 August and
catapulted 44 of its Marine fighter planes into the air. The aircraft
sped to the field at Itami, where they were quickly checked by pilots
and crews for their imminent role in combat. On the following day, the
other 26 fighters left the carrier and joined the first group ashore
for maintenance and testing.[136]
[136] Annex Charlie, _ibid._
To achieve maximum mobility and striking power, Marine and Navy
commanders agreed to base VMF’s 214 and 323 aboard aircraft carriers
for initial operations over Korea. After only 1 day of refresher
flights at Itami, the pilots of VMF-214 landed their planes aboard the
U. S. S. _Sicily_. Two days later, on 5 August, Major Arnold Lund led
his VMF-323 back to the _Badoeng Strait_.[137]
[137] VMF-323 SAR, 3 Aug-6 Sep 50.
The squadron of night fighters, VMF(N)-513, was land-based. Having been
assigned to the Fifth Air Force, it would be controlled by the Itazuke
field for night heckler missions over Korea. This unit had time for
only a few night training flights before being committed to combat.[138]
[138] Annex Charlie, _op. cit._
Kobe’s waterfront was the scene of feverish activity around the clock.
The light observation planes and helicopters of VMO-6 were unloaded,
assembled, and--to the amazement of local Japanese--flown from the very
streets of the city to the base at Itami. There they were hurriedly
checked by mechanics and prepared for the short ferry flight to
Korea.[139]
[139] _Ibid._
Headquarters and Service Squadrons of MAG-33 were left with the task of
unloading supplies and equipment from the _Achernar_ and _Anderson_.
Since the three fighter squadrons were farmed out to the carriers and
Air Force, Group headquarters turned its attention to administrative
and maintenance matters. For the next month it would be hard-pressed to
keep the carrier squadrons supplied with spare parts while providing
replacement aircraft for the seaborne units, handling a variety of
airlift requests with its lone transport plane, and making arrangements
for the support of VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke.[140]
[140] _Ibid._
_Landing of Ground Force_
The hapless _Henrico_ finally overtook Task Group 53.7 in the Tsushima
Straits on the morning of 2 August. A few hours later the Marines of
the Brigade got their first glimpse of Korea’s skyline. Seen from a
distance, the wall of forbidding, gray peaks was hardly a welcome
sight to men who had been broiled and toughened on the heights of Camp
Pendleton.
For reasons unknown, neither Colonel Snedeker nor anyone else had
received the operations plan which Craig had sent via Eighth Army
at Taegu. Although every Marine in the convoy realized the gravity
of the situation ashore, there could be no specific preparations by
troop leaders whose only source of information was an occasional news
broadcast.
Having heard nothing from his superiors, Lieutenant Colonel Murray was
thinking in terms of a purely administrative landing. Had he known
what awaited his 5th Marines ashore, he would have had his troops draw
ammunition and rations while still at sea. Throughout the sleepless
night that followed, he had ample time to reflect sourly on the
fortunes of war.[141]
[141] Murray, 15 Feb 54.
Shortly after 1700 on 2 August, the first ship steamed into Pusan
Harbor. As it edged toward the dock, Leathernecks crowding the rail
were greeted by a tinny and slightly tone-deaf rendition of the Marine
Corps Hymn, blared by a South Korean band. Army troops scattered
along the waterfront exchanged the usual barbed courtesies with their
webfooted brethren aboard ship, and old salts smiled while noting that
tradition remained intact.
When the _Clymer_ approached its berth, Craig waved a greeting to
Snedeker and shouted, “What battalion is the advance guard?”[142]
[142] BrigGen E. W. Snedeker ltr to CMC, 21 Apr 54.
The chief of staff registered an expression of astonishment.
“Did you get my orders?” Craig called to Murray when the _Pickaway_
slid against the dock.
“No, sir!”[143] replied the CO of the 5th Marines.
[143] Murray, 15 Feb 54.
Craig ordered a conference at 2100 for the Brigade staff, Murray,
battalion commanders, and the leaders of supporting units. When the
officers entered the wardroom of the _Clymer_ at the specified time,
the last ship of Task Group 53.7 was being moored in its berth.
After introductory remarks by the general, his G-2, Lieutenant Colonel
Ellsworth G. Van Orman, launched the briefing with a grim narrative
of the enemy situation. Next came Stewart, who outlined tentative
operations plans. The Brigade would definitely begin moving forward at
0600 the next morning, although a specific destination had yet to be
assigned by the Army. Travel would be by road and rail. The necessary
trains were already awaiting in the Pusan terminal, and the 50 trucks
procured by Chidester were standing by, complete with Army drivers.[144]
[144] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
Craig then summed up his earlier discussions with Walker. The Army
leader had voiced a strong desire to use the Marines in an attack, for
he felt it was high time to strike back at the Red invader. Employment
of the Brigade as an offensive force was a natural conclusion to its
commander, and he told his subordinates how he had won assurances for
the integrity of the air-ground team. This was an encouraging note on
which to close one of the strangest combat briefings in the history of
the Corps. The leaders of over 4,000 Marines rushed from the ship to
alert their units for movement into a critical tactical situation. They
would leave in a few hours, but didn’t know where they were going.[145]
[145] _Ibid._
_Bedlam on Pusan Waterfront_
It is not surprising that the Pusan waterfront turned into a bedlam. As
darkness settled, thousands of Marines poured onto the docks. Cranes
and working parties unloaded vehicles, supplies and equipment, while
a chorus of commands and comments was added to the roar of machinery.
Supply points were set up under searchlights, and long lines of
Marines formed on the docks, in buildings and along streets. Armfuls
of C-rations, machinegun belts, grenades, and bandoleers gave men the
appearance of harried Christmas shoppers caught in a last-minute rush.
The activity and din continued all night. Few men could sleep through
the noise, crowding, and shuffling. Before dawn, new lines began to
form in reverse as groggy Marines filed back aboard ships to get their
last hot meal for many a day.
After the conference aboard the _Clymer_, Brigade headquarters resumed
its efforts to obtain specific information from Taegu. Finally, at
2325, Landrum telephoned Craig and announced Walker’s decision--the
Brigade would go westward to the vicinity of Changwon, where it would
remain for the time being in Eighth Army reserve. Only Walker himself
could order any further move. If some extreme emergency arose and
communications with Eighth Army were lost, the Brigade would then come
under the control of the CG, 25th Infantry Division.[146]
[146] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
The long-awaited message gave added impetus to the unloading
operations. Major William L. Batchelor’s shore party company devoted
one of its principal efforts to the big howitzers and vehicles of 1/11,
while English and his tankmen struggled to get their steel monsters
ashore from the LSD’s. Engineer heavy equipment, mobile maintenance
shops of the Ordnance Detachment, fuel, ammunition, and medical
supplies swung from decks to docks, where waiting Marines rushed them
off to staging areas around the waterfront.
Altogether, 9,400 tons of supplies were unloaded, and the vast majority
were turned over to Army quartermaster authorities in Pusan. Four
officers and 100 men of Major Thomas J. O’Mahoney’s Combat Service
Detachment were designated as the Brigade rear echelon. This group
would remain in the port city to handle logistical and administrative
matters. Supplies were moved into Army warehouses, where they became
part of the common pool shared by all units at the front. This led to
confusion later, when the Brigade requested its own Class II and IV
items, only to discover that they had already been issued to other
outfits. But the Army divisions had already been fighting for a month
in a war which caught the nation unprepared, so that the Pusan Base
Command had no alternative but to issue supplies on the basis of
immediate need, not ownership.[147]
[147] Brig SAR, basic rpt.
The Brigade was prepared to travel light. Not only the bulk of supplies
but also all personal baggage was left behind in Pusan, to be stored
and safeguarded by the rear echelon. When dawn broke on 3 August, each
Marine carried only his pack, weapon, ammunition, and rations.[148]
[148] Annex Queen, _ibid._
_The Brigade at Changwon_
Despite the tumult of the sleepless night at Pusan, Lieutenant Colonel
George R. Newton’s 1st Battalion set out for Changwon shortly after
0600 on 3 August. As advance guard for the Brigade, it made the 40-mile
trip in Marine and Army trucks, reaching a point 1 mile west of the
town at 1400. There the battalion took up defensive positions astride
the Changwon-Masan road in order to cover the arrival of the remainder
of the Brigade.[149]
[149] Annex How.
Although he had orders to bivouac at Changwon, General Craig decided to
deploy the Brigade defensively to the west of the town. This decision
was prompted by the enemy situation west of Masan, which was a scant 6½
miles from Changwon. Then, too, the Marine commander saw the layover as
a final opportunity to check the field discipline of the Brigade.[150]
[150] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
Between 0630 and 0700, the main body of the Marine ground force moved
out of Pusan by road and rail. Vehicles over 2½ tons, all heavy
equipment, and the M-26 tanks were transported on flatcars.
The roads were narrow and bumpy, and the churning wheels of the
trucks threw up clouds of stifling dust that hung in the air and
painted Marines and equipment a ghostly gray. Aboard the primitive
trains, which frequently jolted to stops for no apparent reason, men
tried vainly to fit themselves to miniature wooden seats constructed
in perfect right angles. And always, the troops inhaled that
characteristic odor drifting in from well-fertilized rice paddies.
By 1600, all combat and support elements of the Brigade, with
the exception of one tank platoon, had arrived in the Changwon
area. Southwest of the city the 1st Battalion was relieved of its
responsibility on the left side of the Changwon-Masan road, when 3/5
occupied the high ground in that area. Newton was then able to extend
his right flank farther along the towering ridge north of the road.[151]
[151] Annex How.
South of the MSR, a wide rice paddy stretched between 3/5’s positions
and the town. Almost in the center of this low ground was a hill
commanding a good all-around view of the entire area. It was on this
dominating height that Lieutenant Colonel Harold S. Roise deployed
his 2d Battalion. Behind Roise, General Craig established his CP in a
small basin among hills in the immediate vicinity of Changwon. Close-in
protection for his headquarters was provided by the engineer company
and various headquarters units. Throughout the interior of the bivouac
area were tank platoons and the batteries of Lieutenant Colonel Wood’s
artillery battalion.
As night settled on 3 August, an army of phantoms invaded the Brigade
perimeter and drove to the very fringe of Craig’s CP. The reaction of
green troops was typical of men new to combat. Shortly after 2200, a
rifle shot cracked. Many Brigade Marines had never heard a weapon fired
in combat, so they concluded that likely targets were present in the
perimeter area. As nerve-taut men stared fixedly into the blackness,
forms that had been harmless bushes and rocks took on the guise of
Communist infiltrators.
The first shot was soon followed by others. Toward midnight, the firing
developed into a continuous crackle, particularly in the immediate
vicinity of the Brigade CP. Palpitating hearts pounded even more
strenuously when two Marine machineguns began chattering in positions
occupied by Brigade headquarters troops.
Anxiety also spread to the foxholes of the 5th Marines. In 2/5’s area
one man was shot. The 1st Battalion suffered 2 casualties, 1 resulting
from mistaken identity during challenging, the other inflicted when a
weapon discharged accidentally.[152]
[152] _Ibid._
The commotion finally died down around 0300, after cursing NCO’s
convinced the military novices that they had been firing at delusions
of their own overwrought imaginations.
Although such a reaction is not uncommon among untried troops, this
realization was no balm to a wrathful Brigade commander at dawn on
4 August. Craig called in leaders of the most obvious offenders and
severely reprimanded them. He made it known in no uncertain terms that
such conduct would not be tolerated again; and from that time on, every
man in the Brigade took him at his word.
The remainder of the stay at Changwon was relatively calm. On one
occasion a group of seven unidentified persons was spotted atop a
mountain overlooking the Brigade area. Closer scrutiny disclosed that
the individuals had radios and were carefully observing all activity
within the Marine perimeter. A platoon of infantry was dispatched to
destroy what was apparently an enemy observation post; but by the
time the rifleman scaled the height, both intruders and radios had
disappeared.
The climb caused a number of heat prostration cases within the platoon,
for Korean terrain and heat were giving Marines their first bitter
taste of a crippling combination. Brigade helicopters, flown to Pusan
on 2 August, set a combat precedent by delivering rations and water to
the infantrymen on the mountain, and by evacuating the more severe heat
casualties.[153]
[153] Brig SAR, basic rpt.
While Craig’s ground force spent its time patrolling and training
around Changwon, VMO-6 and the Air Support Section (MTACS-2) were
readying themselves. Accompanying the 4 HO3S helicopters in the flight
to Pusan from Japan on 2 August were 4 of VMO-6’s OY-2 observation
planes. The other 4 light aircraft remained in Japan, to be used as
spares. On 4 August the LST which had been dispatched by Cushman and
Weir also arrived at the South Korean port. While two helicopters flew
to Changwon to operate from Craig’s CP, the others, together with the
rest of VMO-6 and the Air Support Section, moved to the airfield at
Chinhae. By 5 August, MTACS-2 had established communications with the
_Sicily_ and _Badoeng Strait_ and was ready for business.
_The Pusan Perimeter_
The big picture, militarily speaking, was outlined in somber colors
during the first few days of August 1950. Only the southeast corner of
Korea was left to the Eighth Army and its battered ROK allies. Space
had been traded for time until there remained in effect merely a UN
beachhead about 90 miles long and 60 wide.
Unremitting enemy pressure throughout July had pushed the UN forces
back to positions stretching raggedly from Pohang-dong on the east
coast to Masan on the south coast by way of Taegu in the center. The
logistical lifeline extended from Pusan to Taegu both by road and rail,
and some 300,000 tons of supplies were moved in July by the Pusan
Logistical Command.
The vital seaport had to be held if the UN forces were to retain a
foothold in the peninsula, and the enemy was already threatening both
Pohang-dong and Masan, each within 50 miles. Only by courtesy could the
irregular chain of UN positions have been called a line. Gaps were the
rule rather than exception, and an entire enemy corps might have driven
through the mountainous area between Andong and Yongdok without meeting
serious opposition. Nor was this the only spot where the dangerously
stretched UN forces had to depend on the terrain for support. Yet the
time had come to make a stand, and this final UN beachhead has gone
down in history by the name of the Pusan Perimeter.
From Taegu in the center to the eastern coast, five depleted ROK
divisions were arrayed during the first week in August. East of the
Naktong, from the Taegu-Waegwan area southward, the 1st Cavalry and the
24th Infantry Division held defensive positions. This left the southern
sector to the 25th Division, reinforced by the Army 5th RCT and the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade.
The principal enemy units pressing toward Masan and Pusan in the
southern sector were identified as the NKPA 6th Infantry Division and
the 83d Motorcycle Regiment. Composed entirely of Chinese civil war
veterans in July 1949, the 6th Division had at that time been the 166th
Division, 56th CCF Army, which later entered Korea as a completely
equipped unit. Its three infantry regiments, the 13th, 14th, and 15th,
were distinguished throughout the invasion for a high esprit de corps.
After capturing Yongdungpo, an industrial suburb of Seoul, the 6th had
pushed southward and won fresh honors by forcing the river Kum and
taking Kunsan by storm.[154]
[154] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean 6th Infantry Division_
(InterRpt, Sup No. 100), 33–6.
On the eve of the Kunsan operation, according to a captured enemy
document, troops of the 6th were informed that they were facing a
United States Army regiment. “Since this unit is planning to advance to
the north, it is our mission to envelop and annihilate it.... We are
fully prepared and confident of success in this operation.”[155]
[155] _Ibid._
A numerical superiority as well as good combat discipline enabled
the initial assault waves to cross the Kum in pneumatic floats and
establish a bridgehead before noon on 16 July 1950. Half of the town
of Kunsan was occupied before nightfall, and the United States and ROK
defenders withdrew under cover of darkness.
Next came the “end run,” with 6th Division units racing toward the
capture of Namwon, Kwangju, Yosu, and Mokpu in the southwest corner
of the peninsula. No opposition awaited except ineffectual delaying
actions by ROK constabulary troops. After mopping up a few small
pockets of resistance, the 6th Division pushed eastward to lead the
North Korean drive toward Pusan.
The capture of Sunchon gave the division an assembly area for the
attack on Chinju. And on 28 July the commander. Major General Pang,
issued a message to his troops:
“Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given to us is the
liberation of Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants
of the enemy. We have liberated Mokpu, Kwangju and Yosu and have
thereby accelerated the liberation of all Korea. However, the
liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle to cut off the
windpipe of the enemy. Comrades, this glorious task has fallen to our
division! Men of the 6th Division, let us annihilate the enemy and
distinguish ourselves!”[156]
[156] _Ibid._
Up to that time the division’s total casualties had been remarkably
few. Only 400 killed and wounded were reported from 25 June until after
the capture of Kunsan, and the 6th had met scarcely any opposition
since that action. It was just prior to the assault on Chinju,
moreover, that the 83d Motorcycle Regiment was attached to reinforce
the drive toward Pusan.
This unit had been part of the 105th Armored Division until June
1950, when it was given a separate existence. Equipment consisted
of motorcycles with sidecars and jeeps of Soviet manufacture. Fixed
machineguns on both types of vehicles were operated by the crews in
addition to submachineguns. Not much is known about the numbers of
the 83d at this time, but it had experienced little combat since the
beginning of the invasion.[157]
[157] _Ibid._, _Enemy Forces_, _op. cit._, 36–7.
During the advance on Chinju the NKPA column ran into elements of the
United States 24th Infantry Division and was stopped by machinegun fire
at Hadong. All three regiments of the 6th Division had to be committed
before this halfway point could be secured, and the 83d Motorcycle
Regiment was blooded in the attack. More hard fighting awaited on the
road to Chinju, but the two NKPA outfits battled their way into the
town on or about 30 July 1950.
_Brigade Air Strikes First_
These North Korean units were destined to become the opponents of the
Brigade a few days later. Before the Marine ground forces could get
into action, however, the air components struck the first blow.
When Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid’s VMF-214 landed on board
the _Sicily_ on 3 August, eight of its Corsairs were immediately
refueled and armed. At 1630, the initial Marine offensive action of the
war was launched as the fighter planes roared up from the carrier’s
flight deck. Minutes later their incendiary bombs and rockets were
hitting Red-held Chinju and the village of Sinban-ni. A series of
strafing runs concluded the Marines’ greeting to the North Korean
People’s Army.[158]
[158] VMF-214 SAR, 14 Jul-6 Sep 50.
While the 2 Red bases were erupting in smoke and flame, 2 other pilots
of the squadron flew from the _Sicily_ to Taegu to be briefed on the
broad tactical situation. They returned from their visit with maps and
intelligence material for guidance in future operations.[159]
[159] _Ibid._
The squadron flew 21 sorties on 4 August against enemy bases
controlling the pressure on Eighth Army’s southern flank. Racing in
from the sea, gull-winged Marine planes struck at bridges, railroads,
and troop concentrations in the Chinju and Sachon areas.
On 5 August, the _Sicily_ steamed into the Yellow Sea. Marine planes
descended on Inchon, Seoul, and Mokpo, battering airfields, factories,
warehouses, railroads, bridges, and harbor facilities. The same pattern
of destruction was repeated the following day.[160]
[160] _Ibid._
On 6 August came a thundering bid for fame by VMF-323, as its sleek
Corsairs streaked toward Korea. Operating from the deck of the _Badoeng
Strait_, the squadron flew 30 sorties in deep support forward of Eighth
Army lines. Carrying the mail with 500-pound bombs, 20-mm. cannon and
5-inch rockets, Marine pilots struck at Communist troop concentrations,
vehicles, supply dumps, bridges and railroads.[161]
[161] VMF-323 SAR, _op. cit._
_Planning the Sachon-Chinju Offensive_
As early as 3 August, during the Brigade move from Pusan to Changwon,
General Craig and Lieutenant Colonel Stewart had flown by helicopter to
Masan for a conference of troop commanders. There they joined General
Walker and General Kean at the latter’s 25th Division command post.
Also present was Brigadier General George B. Barth, artillery officer
of the 25th.[162]
[162] Craig, 25 Jan 54.
Craig suggested to the Eighth Army commander that some ROK army
trainees be attached to the Brigade. There were thousands of such
Korean recruits, and a few serving as scouts, interpreters, and
rear-area guards would be of great value to the Marines. Walker agreed
to provide the native troops and arm them as well.[163]
[163] _Ibid._
The Army leader confirmed the previous night’s telephonic orders which
had caused the Brigade’s move to Changwon. After the four generals had
discussed the tactical situation on the southern flank, Walker directed
Craig to have the Brigade prepared for commitment to combat any time
after the evening of 5 August.[164]
[164] _Ibid._
This schedule worked out perfectly from Craig’s point of view. The Air
Support Section at Chinhae had just established communications with the
two carrier-based squadrons. Army-Navy-Marine co-operation thus enabled
the Brigade commander to lead his entire air-ground team into battle.
On 5 August Craig and Stewart flew to Masan for a final meeting
with Walker and Kean. The Eighth Army commander outlined his plans
for the first UN counteroffensive. In forceful terms, he expressed
his dissatisfaction with the course of the war up to that time. He
announced that the strategy of trading space for time had come to an
end, and he did not mince words in referring to past UN defeats. With
firm conviction in the cause, he had ordered all units to stand to the
death. The Eighth Army could not and would not lose more ground or
equipment.[165] Advances had been made by the enemy with such rapidity
that he had extended his supply lines almost to the breaking point,
concluded Walker. The time had come to strike back.[166]
[165] _Ibid._
[166] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
To the 25th Division, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and 5th RCT would
go the honor of launching the counterattack from Chindong-ni, a small
coastal village 8 miles southwest of Masan on the road to Chinju. In
its effort to roll up the southern UN flank, the NKPA 6th Division was
exerting heavy pressure on Chindong-ni from both the west and north.
A few miles west, the irregular coastline takes a sharp turn to the
south to form a stubby peninsula about 25 miles wide and 15 miles long.
Near the western base is the important town of Sachon. About 10 miles
above this western junction of peninsula and coast lies Chinju. Both
Sachon and Chinju were the targets of Walker’s counteroffensive.
Approximately 3½ miles west of Chindong-ni is the tiny thatched-hut
hamlet of Tosan, an unimpressive road junction which could be easily
overlooked. The western fork is merely the continuation of the main
route leading directly to Chinju, some 25 miles distant. The other
fork branches south from Tosan and also goes to Chinju; but it skirts
the coastline of the peninsula just described, passing through the
communication hubs of Paedun-ni, Kosong, and Sachon. Thus, while both
roads lead to Chinju, the southern or peninsular route is 17 miles
longer.
Since it was known that enemy forces were present on the small
peninsula, any UN thrust astride the main road to Chinju would be
exposed to a constant flanking threat from the left. To eliminate this
danger. Walker had decided to send the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade
around the southern route from Tosan to Sachon. After the peninsula was
secured, the 5th RCT would strike out for Chinju along the main road,
while the 35th Infantry of the 25th Division guarded its right flank in
the mountains to the north.[167]
[167] Stewart, 15 Jan 54.
Craig and Stewart opposed this plan, arguing that the Brigade itself
would be exposed to flanking danger on the right, if it made the
initial advance alone.[168]
[168] _Ibid._
After further discussion, it was decided that all three units would
attack simultaneously along the routes already designated. However,
the 5th RCT was given a preparatory mission of uncovering the Tosan
junction before the Brigade began its advance.[169] D-day was scheduled
for 7 August. All participating units were to be part of Task Force
Kean, so named after the 25th Division commanding general who would
exercise overall control.
[169] Annex How; and Brig Op Plan 4-50.
Craig hurried from the conference to alert the Brigade. In a past
military age a general might have sprung into the saddle, but the
Brigade commander had discovered a steed that covered more ground. He
and Stewart climbed into a HO3S-1 helicopter piloted by Lieutenant
Gustave F. Lueddeke of VMO-6, and a few minutes later they landed at
Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s CP to brief him on the forthcoming action.
[Illustration: BRIGADE ACTION ON SOUTHWESTERN FRONT
7–13 AUGUST 1950]