Red Aggression in Korea
_Units of North Korean Army--NKPA Command and Leadership--The NKPA
Infantry Division--NKPA Air and Armor--NKPA Officer Procurement and
Conscription--The NKPA Order of Battle_
It was an army of veterans that broke the world’s peace in Korea. There
were thousands of veterans of the Chinese civil war and Manchurian
guerrilla operations. There were even a few scarred warriors who had
served with the Soviet forces in such World War II operations as the
defense of Stalingrad.
Practically all the commissioned and noncommissioned officers were
battle-hardened, and a majority of the rank and file had seen action.
The origins of this army were deeply rooted in Asiatic soil. During
World War II an endless stream of Koreans escaped from Japanese bondage
and found a refuge in Soviet or Chinese territory. Some of them took
to banditry, others were absorbed into the Soviet or Red Chinese armed
forces. These refugees dreamed of a united and independent homeland;
and at Yenan, China, the Chinese Communists encouraged this movement
as early as 1939 by supplying arms to a force known as the Korean
Volunteer Army. During the first month alone the KVA attracted 3,000
recruits, and at the end of the war an advance column marched back to
Korea under a leader named Kim Mu Chong.[21]
[21] FECOM, ATIS, _History of the North Korean Army_, _op.
cit._, 17–28.
Although the heads of the KVA had been thoroughly impregnated with
Communist doctrine at Yenan, they were coldly received by General
Chistyakov and the Russian occupation forces. It was a Soviet puppet
state that the Kremlin wished to see established in Korea, not a
Red-tinted independent Korean government. Communist right-thinking did
not save Kim Mu Chong and his KVA troops from the humiliation of being
stopped at the frontier in September 1945 and disarmed.
The Russian commander piously justified his decision on grounds of
upholding international law. But he offered to return the confiscated
arms if the Korean Reds would retrace their steps and join the CCF
fight against the Nationalists. He promised that after the struggle had
been won, the KVA would be welcomed back to Korea.[22]
[22] _Ibid._
Accepting these terms, Kim Mu Chong marched into Manchuria to aid the
Chinese Reds. His force numbered nearly 20,000 the following spring,
but the KVA lost its identity when the men were mingled with Chinese
and Mongolians in the CCF Northeast Democratic United Army. Most of
the officers and NCO’s of the former KVA were organized into teams to
recruit and train Korean volunteers both in Manchuria and Korea. As
combined military instructors and political commissars, they created
an integrated Communist force out of such oddly assorted material as
peasants, guerrillas and bandits. Used first as security troops and
later welded into a regular army structure, these thousands of Korean
Reds undoubtedly had the principal part in “liberating” Manchuria from
the Chinese Nationalists.
Meanwhile, the Russian occupation forces did not neglect the conversion
of North Korea into a satellite state. One of the first steps was the
establishment of a military academy at Pyongyang in the autumn of 1945.
Founded ostensibly for the training of police, it had as its primary
purpose the instruction of army officers. Graduates of the first and
second classes became teachers when branches of the academy were set
up at Nanam, Sinuiju and Hamhung. These offshoots, known as the Peace
Preservation Officers’ Schools, turned out the cadres which were later
activated as the 1st, 2d and 3d Divisions of the new North Korean
army. For more than 2 years, however, the fiction was maintained that
graduates were to patrol rural areas, protect railroads and guard the
frontier.
_Units of North Korean Army_
Not until 8 February 1948 did the “North Korean People’s Army”
come into official being with the activation of the 1st, 2d and 3d
Infantry Divisions. At that time there were some 30,000 troops and
170,000 trainees in North Korea, according to later United States Army
intelligence estimates.[23]
[23] _Ibid._, 23–24.
The 4th Infantry Division was formed in 1948 from trainees plus a
veteran regiment transferred from the 2d Division. Two new infantry
divisions, the 5th and 6th, were organized the following year when
Korean veterans of the 164th and 166th CCF Divisions returned as units
with their arms and equipment.[24]
[24] _Ibid._, 52–75.
It is probable that the leaders of the North Korean state were
committed early in 1950 to the invasion of the Republic of Korea. At
any rate, the training and organization of new units was accelerated
during the spring months. From February to June nine new divisions
were activated--the 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry
Divisions, 10th Mechanized Infantry Division and 105th Armored
Division.[25]
[25] _Ibid._
Two factors combined to hasten the NKPA aggression. It had undoubtedly
become evident to the Kremlin in 1949 that the Republic of Korea could
never be brought into the Communist fold by propaganda, subversion,
incitation of disorders or any other means short of a victorious civil
war. Moreover, a successful war of invasion was equally desirable as a
cure for political discontent at home. Not only was the Agrarian Reform
resented everywhere in North Korea, but taxes had gone up as high as 60
percent of the crops to maintain the top-heavy military structure and
pay for tanks, planes, howitzers and other arms supplied by the Soviet
Union.
Although most of the heavy industries of Korea were located north of
the 38th Parallel, they included no arms plants with the exception of
a small factory capable of turning out submachineguns and ammunition.
North Korea was also able to produce 80 percent of its own POL products
for military purposes and some of the army uniforms. Other supplies,
all the way from the Tokarev semiautomatic pistol (adapted from the
U. S. .45 Colt) to the T-34 tank, were imported from the U. S. S. R.[26]
[26] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Forces_ (InterRpt, Sup No. 1),
17–23.
Most of the weapons were old models of recent manufacture. The heaviest
load came by rail from Siberia through Manchuria via Antung and crossed
the Yalu into Korea at Sinuiju. As many as three freight trains a day
rumbled over the bridge between those cities and continued along the
west coast to Pyongyang. Supplies were also received from Vladivostok
by water to Chongjin or by the east coast rail line to Wonsan.[27]
[27] _Ibid._
It must also be remembered that thousands of Korean veterans of the
Chinese civil war returned with their arms and equipment, including
American-manufactured weapons surrendered by the Nationalists. The NKPA
was second only to the Soviet Army itself in the spring of 1950 as the
best armed and equipped military force of its size in the Far East.
The U. S. S. R. did not limit its aid to arms. Lieutenant General
Vasilev and a group of Soviet military instructors arrived at Pyongyang
in 1949 to train NKPA staff and line officers for offensive warfare.
About 3,000 promising NKPA candidates were sent to Soviet schools that
year for courses in such specialties as artillery, air and tank tactics.
Of the original 14 NKPA divisions, the first 6 were composed largely of
well trained troops. The 12th Division, like the 5th and 6th, consisted
of Korean veterans of the Chinese civil war. Constabulary troops made
up the 8th and 9th, while the 7th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Infantry
Divisions and the 10th Mechanized Infantry Division were formed of
conscripted trainees for the most part.[28]
[28] FECOM, ATIS, _History of the North Korean Army_, _op.
cit._, 52–75.
The picture grows confused in the spring of 1950, with 8 new divisions
being organized in 5 months. Many of the recently drafted men received
only the most sketchy training; and some of the older units were
weakened by drawing off well trained men to stiffen the new outfits.
All accounts agree, however, that the NKPA leaders anticipated an
effort of only a few days, ending with the destruction of the ROK army.
This was not an unreasonable assumption, since a swarm of NKPA spies
had brought back accurate reports of unpreparedness. Not only was the
Republic of Korea weak militarily, but a bad economic situation had
been made worse by increased population due to immigration.
Altogether, Pyongyang could put nearly 100,000 fairly well-trained and
armed troops in the field, with about half of that number in reserve as
replacements, occupation troops or constabulary. But the problem of man
power did not worry Communists who were not squeamish about violations
of international law. For the aggressors planned to make war nourish
war by conscripting both soldiers and laborers in invaded regions of
the Republic of Korea. It was an old Asiatic custom.
_NKPA Command and Leadership_
With few exceptions, the North Korean war leaders proved to be willing
and able instruments of policies formulated in Moscow. Kim Il Sung,
the prime minister and commander in chief, was an imposter named Kim
Sung Chu who made a bid for popular support by taking the name of a
dead Korean resistance hero. As a youth he had fled from Korea and
joined the Communist party in Manchuria. There he distinguished himself
in guerrilla operations against the Japanese. In 1938, after rising to
the stature of a corps commander, he met military reverses and found
a refuge in Soviet territory. Legend has it that he attended a Soviet
military academy and took part in the battle of Stalingrad. However
this may be, he returned to Korea in August 1945 as a 35-year-old
captain in the Soviet army of occupation.[29]
[29] _Ibid._, 90–99. Communist chiefs preferred to work
behind a screen of secrecy and deception, so that it was
difficult to obtain accurate personal data. Not only
did some of the NKPA war leaders have obscure origins,
but they added to the difficulties of biographers by
deliberately falsifying the record for propaganda
purposes. It is to the credit of U.S. Army intelligence
officers that they have managed to piece out this
material from prisoner interrogations and captured enemy
documents.
South Korean descriptions of Kim Il Sung as an uneducated ruffian were
doubtless prejudiced, but certainly he was a ruthless guerrilla leader
who showed an uncommon aptitude for politics. His rise in the new North
Korean state was spectacular, for in September 1948 he became the first
prime minister. The following year he went to Moscow for conferences at
the Kremlin, and nine days after the outbreak of civil war in Korea he
was appointed commander in chief of the invading army while retaining
his position as prime minister.
In contrast to this rough diamond, Marshal Choe Yong Gun cut a reserved
and dignified figure as deputy commander in chief and minister of
national defense. Born in Hongchon, Korea, at the turn of the century,
he had the equivalent of a high school education. In 1925 he went to
China and is believed to have attended the Whampoa Military Academy at
Nanking and the Yenan Military School. At Yenan, after being converted
to communism, he became a political instructor and later served in the
8th Route Army. Choe was commander of the Korean Volunteer Army in 1941
and fought against the Japanese in Manchuria. Returning to Korea in
1945, he commanded the Cadre Training Center until 1948, when he was
named the first commander in chief.
Even Choe’s enemies in South Korea credited him with a high order of
intellectual capacity and moral courage. Despite his Communist party
membership, he opposed the invasion of the Republic of Korea. He was
cool, moreover, toward Lieutenant General Vasilev and the other Soviet
advisers who reached Pyongyang in 1949 to prepare the Korean armed
forces for an offensive war. This attitude probably explains why he
was sidetracked in March 1950, when Vasilev took charge of the combat
training and re-equipment program. Although Choe was not on good terms
with Kim Il Sung at this time, he was regarded as a superior strategist
and administrator. And after being bypassed temporarily, he continued
to be respected as a leader by the North Korean army and peasantry.
Nam Il stood out as the most cosmopolitan and polished of the North
Korean war leaders. Born in 1911, he was Kim Il Sung’s schoolmate in
Manchuria and the two remained lifelong friends. As a young man, Nam Il
made his way across the U. S. S. R. to Smolensk and attended college
and a military academy. He entered the Soviet army at the outbreak of
World War II and is said to have participated along with Kim Il Sung in
the Stalingrad defense.
Both of them returned to Korea with the rank of captain in the Soviet
army of occupation, and both entered upon successful Communist
political careers. In 1948 Nam Il was elected to the Supreme People’s
Council and became vice-minister of education in charge of military
instruction. The most Russianized of the North Korean leaders, he took
pains to cultivate the good will of the Soviet advisers. Speaking
English, Russian, and Chinese as well as Korean, he held an advantage
over his North Korean rivals in such contacts. He also made a better
appearance, being tall for an Oriental and always well turned out in a
meticulously pressed uniform and gleaming boots.
A major general without an active field command at the outbreak of war,
he was rapidly advanced to the rank of lieutenant general and chief of
staff. His stern demeanor, while seated stiffly in his black Chrysler
driven by a uniformed chauffeur, soon became one of the most impressive
sights of Pyongyang. But his talents remained more political than
military, and he never won the respect which the army accorded to Choe
Yong Gun.
Among the corps commanders, there was none more able than Lieutenant
General Kim Ung. About 40 years old at the outbreak of war, he had
graduated from the Kumchon Commercial School in Korea and the Whampoa
Military Academy in China. As an officer of the 8th Route Army, he
won a reputation for daring in 1939 by tossing hand grenades into
a conference of Japanese generals at Peiping and escaping after
inflicting numerous casualties. Returning to Korea in 1946, he started
as a regimental commander and made a relatively slow rise because of
his CCF background. But after lining up with the Soviet faction in the
army, he was promoted to the command of the 1st Division in 1948 and of
I Corps during the invasion.
The rapid ascent of Lieutenant General Yu Kyong Su to the command of
III Corps would indicate that promotion was sometimes due to political
influence. A graduate of a Red Army tank school in 1938 at the age of
33, Yu served throughout World War II as a company grade officer in a
Soviet tank unit. After his return to Korea, he married Kim Il Sung’s
sister and shot up from the command of an NK tank regiment in 1948 to
the rank of corps commander late in 1950. During the first few weeks of
the invasion, he was awarded the highest NKPA decoration, the “Hero of
the Korean Democratic People’s Republic,” with a concurrent award, the
“Order of the National Flag, 1st Class.”
On the other hand, the career of former Lieutenant General Kim Mu
Chong, ex-commander of II Corps and ex-chief of artillery, was blasted
by the opposition of Kim Il Sung and Nam Il. A CCF veteran, Mu had
served under Mao Tse-tung on the “Long March” as one of 30 Koreans to
survive the ordeal. He commanded a Chinese artillery brigade and was
rated the best CCF artilleryman. In 1945 he came back to Korea and
conducted a speaking tour stressing the desirability of cooperating
with Red China and omitting any reference to the Soviet Union. This
lapse explains his failure in North Korean politics, but in deference
to his high military reputation he was given command of II Corps in
June 1950. The poor showing made by his units on the central front was
ascribed by Mu to the fact that Kim Il Sung picked him for missions
which could not succeed. Although he did not lack for support in the
army, Mu was relieved of his command and other positions in the late
summer of 1950. Expulsion from the North Korean Labor Party followed
after Kim Il Sung denounced him in a speech for disobedience of orders.
Mu’s downfall was only one chapter in the bitter struggle for power
waged by two opposing tactical schools in the North Korean army from
1948 to 1950. Veterans of CCF campaigns against the Japanese and
Chinese Nationalists upheld a system of large-scale guerrilla warfare
refined into a military science. Approach marches under cover of
darkness, infiltrations, probing night attacks--these were the basic
tactics employed by Mao Tse Tung’s forces for the conquest of China.
Although mobility was the keynote, a rigid tactical system allowed
little latitude of decision to officers below the regimental level.
School solutions were provided for every military problem that could be
foreseen, and many of the North Korean officers had graduated from the
CCF military academy at Yenan.
Another group of officers advocated the tactics learned at Soviet
military schools and in Soviet campaigns of World War II. This system,
of course, made the CCF tactics seem primitive in comparison. For
the Russians placed much more dependence in armor and artillery as
preparation for infantry envelopments. Such tactics called for more
supplies and ammunition than could have been provided by the elementary
CCF logistics.
The CCF veterans seemed to have the upper hand in the North Korean army
early in 1948. But a survey of NKPA officers’ careers during the next 2
years indicates that their opponents triumphed. Thus, at the onset of
civil war, most of the key positions in the army were filled by men who
had hitched their wagons to the red star of Moscow, both militarily and
politically.
This does not mean that CCF tactics had been put aside entirely. On the
contrary, these methods had evolved out of military poverty and were
admirably adapted to an Asiatic peasant army. The North Korean forces,
being compelled to import arms, were never able to afford enough
planes, tanks, and artillery to make the best of the Soviet system. And
it was inevitable that heavy losses of such equipment in combat would
cause a reversion to CCF tactics.
_The NKPA Infantry Division_
No child ever bore a more striking likeness to its parent than did the
NKPA to the Soviet organization of World War II.
The army as a whole came under the overall control of General
Headquarters at Pyongyang, which planned and directed the invasion of
ROK territory. As the troops advanced, a Front Headquarters was set up
to control corps operations. This organization of Soviet origin was the
highest tactical echelon of command. Normally including three or four
corps of several divisions each, it resembled an army group in military
establishments of other nations. Front Headquarters had only a wartime
mission and could be disbanded in time of peace.[30]
[30] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Forces_, _op. cit._, 3–13.
Next to the corps in the chain of command was the infantry division,
the basic tactical formation, modeled after that of the Red Army in
World War II. Of triangular design, numbering some 11,000 men, it was
reported by POW’s to consist of a headquarters, three rifle regiments,
an artillery regiment, a signal battalion, an antitank battalion, a
training battalion, a reconnaissance troop, and such division rear
services as medical, veterinary, transport, and supply units.[31]
[31] _Ibid._
Division Headquarters, with about 120 men, included the commander, a
major general, and officers of the division and special staff. Closely
associated with the CG, and possessing almost as much power and
responsibility, was the division political deputy, usually a senior
colonel, who supervised politico-military activities and reported
any deviations from doctrine. This was a peculiarly Communistic
institution, of course, and it was the duty of the deputy to see that
officers and men of the division remained well indoctrinated.
The NKPA rifle regiment, with a T/O strength of about 2,500 men,
consisted of 3 rifle battalions and supporting artillery. Each of these
battalions, numbering some 650 officers and men, included 3 rifle
companies, a heavy machinegun company, a mortar company, an antitank
gun platoon and an antitank rifle platoon in addition to signal,
medical, and supply platoons.
An NKPA rifle company, which had a T/O strength of about 150 men, was
made up of a headquarters, 3 rifle platoons and a heavy machinegun
section. The rifle platoon had 4 squads and a T/O strength of 45 men.
Squad weapons were said to include a light machinegun, a submachinegun
and Soviet M1891/30 rifles. Two hand grenades were carried by each
rifleman.
An army patterned after the Soviet system was certain to emphasize
artillery, and the NKPA artillery reserve at the outset of the invasion
consisted of 3 regiments--1 attached to GHQ, and 1 to each of the 2
corps operating at that time. But shortages of equipment and logistical
problems made it necessary in actual combat for the NKPA to concentrate
most of its artillery potential within the rifle division.
The organic artillery support of each division included a regiment with
a T/O total of approximately 1,000 men. Two 76-mm. gun battalions, a
122-mm. howitzer battalion and a headquarters company numbered some 250
men each. A battalion consisted of 3 firing batteries with 12 artillery
pieces each, and personnel carried M1938 carbines.
There was also a self-propelled artillery battalion made up of 3 gun
companies, a signal platoon and a rear services section with a total of
16 SU-76 pieces. A lieutenant colonel commanded this unit, which had a
T/O strength of 110 officers and men.
The other major components of the NKPA infantry division were as
follows:
SIGNAL BATTALION.--a wire company, radio company and headquarters
company, making a total of 260 officers and men.
ANTITANK BATTALION.--about 190 officers and men in three 45-mm.
antitank companies and an antitank rifle company.
ENGINEER BATTALION.--T/O of 250 officers and men carrying M1944 rifles
and equipped with picks, shovels, axes, saws and mine detectors.
TRAINING BATTALION.--About 500 officers and men charged with the
responsibility of training NCO’s for the division.
RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY.--an estimated strength of 4 officers and 90
enlisted men equipped with 80 submachineguns, 20 Tokarev pistols, 4
telescopes and 5 pairs of binoculars.
REAR SERVICES.--a medical battalion, a transport company, a veterinary
unit and a supply section. Of the 200 personnel in the medical
battalion, about 60 were women, according to POW testimony. The
transport company, with some 70 men, was composed of 50 2½-ton trucks,
6 or 7 motorcycles and 10 horse-drawn wagons.[32]
[32] _Ibid._
The NKPA infantry division, in short, was a faithful copy of the World
War II Soviet model. But it must be remembered that the foregoing T/O
and T/E statistics represented the ideal more often than the reality.
Owing to the speeding up of preparations in anticipation of an easy
victory, many NKPA units lacked their full quotas of men and equipment
at the outset of the invasion.
_NKPA Air and Armor_
POW interrogations revealed that NKPA military aviation evolved from
the North Korean Aviation Society, founded in 1945 at the Sinuiju
Airfield by Colonel Lee Hwal, a Korean who had served in the Japanese
air force. The organization consisted at first of about 70 students
and 17 pilots who were veterans of Japanese air operations. Equipment
included a few aircraft of Japanese manufacture and several gliders.[33]
[33] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Air Force_ (InterRpt, Sup No.
100), 2–15.
In 1946 the Society was required to transfer its aircraft and
trained personnel to the Aviation Section of the Pyongyang Military
Academy. Soviet-trained Korean officers were placed in positions of
responsibility under the command of Colonel Wang Yun, a former captain
in the Soviet air force who replaced Lee Hwal.
The Aviation Section numbered about 100 officers, 250 enlisted men and
500 students by November 1948. Estimates of aircraft are contradictory,
but one source reported 7 Japanese trainers, 6 Japanese fighters and
a Japanese twin-engine transport. Shortly afterwards the first Soviet
aircraft were received, and the NKPA Air Force was created from the
Aviation Section and moved to the Pyongyang air base.
The final phase of development came in January 1950 with the expansion
of the air regiment into a division under the command of Wang Yun,
promoted to major general. Strength of the unit in April 1950 was
estimated at about 1,675 officers and men, including 364 officers, 76
pilots, 875 enlisted men, and 360 cadets. The receipt of more Soviet
planes at this time brought the number of aircraft up to 178, including
78 YAK-7B fighters, 30 PO-2 primary and YAK-18 advanced trainers, and
70 Il-10 ground attack bombers.
Captured documents indicate that the aviation training program was
speeded up along with other NKPA activities during the last few months
before the invasion. In June 1950 each pilot was required to fly 40
training missions and attend 40 hours of lectures. As preparations for
the invasion neared completion, a forward displacement of tactical
aircraft was put into effect.[34]
[34] _Ibid._
The North Korean armored division, a copy of its Soviet counterpart,
had only about half of the overall strength. Thus the NKPA 105th
Armored Division, comprising some 6,000 officers and men, included 3
medium tank regiments, the 107th, 109th, and 203d, with 40 tanks each.
Organic supporting units were the 206th Mechanized Infantry Regiment
and the 308th Armored Battalion equipped with self-propelled 76-mm.
guns. POW reports also mentioned reconnaissance, engineer, signal,
ordnance and medical battalions and a mixed unit identified as the
849th Antitank Regiment, attached to the division after the invasion
started.[35]
[35] FECOM, ATIS, _Enemy Forces_, _op. cit._, 27–32.
All reports indicate that the division was split in combat, with each
tank regiment being assigned to an infantry division. Even the training
of the regiments had been conducted separately, and there is no
evidence of prewar maneuvers on the division level.
Each tank regiment had an estimated T/O strength of about 600 officers
and men. The three medium tank battalions were supported by a
regimental submachinegun company, a supply and maintenance company and
a headquarters section in addition to engineer, signal, reconnaissance,
and medical platoons. Forty T-34/85 medium tanks were divided into 13
for each battalion and 1 for the headquarters section, which also rated
a CAZ/67 jeep.
Responsibility for the indoctrination of the regiment rested with a
political section headed by a lieutenant colonel. As assistants he had
2 officers and 3 sergeants.
An NKPA tank battalion included a headquarters section and three 25-man
companies. A company contained three platoons, each of which was
assigned a medium tank. The standard crew consisted of the commander,
usually a senior lieutenant, the driver and assistant driver, the
gunner in charge of the 85-mm. rifle, and the assistant gunner
operating the 7.62-mm. machinegun. The usual ammunition load was 55
85-mm. shells and 2,000 rounds of machinegun ammunition.
Not much was known about the 206th Mechanized infantry Regiment, but
it was believed to consist of three motorized infantry battalions,
a 76-mm. howitzer battalion, a 45-mm. antitank battalion, a 120-mm.
mortar battalion, a signal company, and an NCO training company.[36]
[36] _Ibid._
_NKPA Officer Procurement and Conscription_
Officer procurement problems were solved in large part by the fact
that thousands of North Koreans had seen combat service with the CCF
forces. Many of these veterans were qualified as junior officers or
NCO’s without further training. Remaining vacancies for company-grade
officers were filled by officer candidate schools or the commissioning
of qualified NCO’s.
The West Point of the NKPA, located at Pyongyang, turned out an
estimated 4,000 junior officers from the time of its activation in 1946
to the beginning of the invasion. Courses normally ranged in length
from 6 to 10 months, but were abbreviated to 3 months during the autumn
of 1949 in anticipation of the invasion. After hostilities began, the
need for replacement officers became so urgent that one entire class at
the Pyongyang academy was commissioned wholesale on 10 July 1950 and
sent to the front after 20 days of instruction.[37]
[37] FECOM, ATIS, _North Korean Forces_, _op. cit._, 35–42.
Three Soviet officers, a colonel and two lieutenant colonels,
reportedly acted as advisers to a faculty composed of NKPA majors. The
five departments of the Academy were devoted to infantry, artillery,
engineering, signaling, and quartermasters’ duties.
A second military academy at Pyongyang specialized in subjects
which Communists termed “cultural.” So much importance was attached
to political indoctrination that graduates of this school were
commissioned as senior lieutenants and given unusual authority in their
units. Although a 2-year Russian language course was offered, most of
the candidates took the standard 9-month term.
Branches of the Pyongyang military academy were established as officer
candidate schools in Hamhung, Chinnampo, Chorwon, Mesanjin, Kaechon
and Kanggye. Applicants were required to have an acceptable political
background and a 6-year minimum of schooling, though the last was
sometimes waived.
A command and staff school at Pyongyang offered advanced tactical
and administrative courses at the battalion and regimental level to
selected officers. At the other extreme, NCO schools were located at
Sadong, Sinuiju, Sinchon and Nanam. Tactical instruction was given
at the platoon and squad level with emphasis on weapons courses. NCO
training was accelerated in preparation for hostilities, and 4,000
veterans of CCF service in Manchuria completed 2-month courses at the
Sadong school alone in the spring of 1950.
Technical training in aircraft, artillery, tank and engineering
specialties was offered in schools for junior officers as well as
enlisted men. But it appears that most of the officers above the
company level received their instruction in Soviet schools.[38]
[38] _Ibid._
Conscription, according to POW accounts, was introduced as early as
1948. In the rural districts each _myon_ (a political subdivision
smaller than a county but comprising several villages) was given its
quota of recruits to be furnished between the ages of 18 and 35. The
village chiefs then assembled all the men in this age group and made
their decisions on an arbitrary basis. Selectees had little or no hope
of appeal, but were assured that provision would be made for their
families during the 3-year term of service.[39]
[39] _Ibid._, 29–31.
The system was much the same in North Korean cities, which were divided
into sections for conscription purposes. Sometimes the leaders in
urban areas called for volunteers. If the response was lacking in
enthusiasm, men were singled out and requested to “volunteer.” This
method was invariably successful, since a man who refused could be
deprived of employment.
The conscription program was speeded up along with other preparations
as invasion plans neared completion. About 12,000 men were inducted
from March through May 1950 and given 6 weeks of basic training at such
camps as the No. 2 People’s Training Center at Sinuiju.
In some communities the men eligible for military service were
requested to attend a meeting. Upon arrival, they were taken in trucks
to a training center and compelled to enlist.
Harsh as such methods might seem, they were gentle as compared to the
forced conscription of ROK civilians after the invasion got underway.
Both men and women in captured cities were crowded into school
buildings, given political indoctrination and forced to learn Communist
songs. After a week of this curriculum, the men were inducted both as
combat recruits and laborers. And though the women were told that their
service would be limited to duty as nurses or clerks, some of them were
coerced into carrying out reconnaissance or espionage missions.[40]
[40] _Ibid._
_The NKPA Order of Battle_
The transition from a cold war to a shooting war in Korea should not
have surprised anyone familiar with the events of the past 2 years. For
several hours, indeed, there was a reasonable doubt on the historic
morning of 25 June 1950 whether an undeclared war had begun or merely
another large-scale NKPA raid across the frontier.
But this time it was the real thing. Commencing at 0400, 7 infantry
divisions and an armored division swept across the 38th Parallel, with
2 infantry divisions in reserve. From right to left, the NKPA order of
battle was as follows:
The 6th Infantry Division along the west coast, sealing off the Ongjin
Peninsula and moving on Kaesong; the 1st Infantry Division advancing on
Kaesong and Seoul; the 4th and 3d Infantry Divisions and 105th Armored
Division attacking in west-central Korea and converging on Seoul; the
2d and 15th Infantry Divisions driving toward the Hwachon-Chunchon
axis in east-central Korea; and the 5th Infantry Division taking the
route along the east coast. Following close behind were the two reserve
infantry divisions, the 13th and 15th.[41]
[41] FECOM, ATIS, _History of the North Korean Army_, 25–27.
There was no question as to the outcome in the minds of observers who
knew the composition of the ROK army. The very name was misleading, for
it might more accurately have been described as a large constabulary in
process of being converted into an army. Given another year of training
and added arms and equipment, the Republic of Korea would perhaps have
built up an adequate defense establishment. But the enemy took good
care to strike while this development was still at the blueprint stage.
In June 1949, at the conclusion of the occupation, the United
States forces turned over arms and equipment to the value of about
$110,000,000. These supplies included 100,000 small arms (rifles,
pistols and machineguns) and 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition; more than
4,900 vehicles of all types; about 2,000 2.36″ rocket launchers and
40,000 rounds of ammunition; and a large number of 105-mm. howitzers,
37-mm. and 57-mm. antitank guns, and 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars,
together with 700,000 rounds of ammunition for those weapons. Twenty
training planes (L4 and L5 types) were transferred as well as 79 light
naval craft suitable for patrolling the coast.[42]
[42] U. S. Military Academy, Dept of Mil Art and Eng (U. S.
MilAcad), _Operations in Korea_ (West Point, 1953), 4–5.
It is noteworthy that this list was limited to light arms for a
constabulary of about 50,000 men. Tanks, military aircraft and medium
or heavy artillery were significantly lacking.
At the request of the ROK government, a Korean Military Advisory
Group remained in South Korea after the conclusion of the American
occupation. Composed of 500 United States Army officers and enlisted
men, the KMAG took on the task of directing the training of a ROK
constabulary. The group was under the control of Ambassador Muccio,
since General MacArthur’s responsibility for the defense had ended
along with the occupation.[43]
[43] _Ibid._
After the NKPA invasion, the United States was severely criticized
in some quarters for failing to provide the Republic of Korea with
arms and training equal to those of the enemy. American reluctance
was due in some measure to indiscreet declarations by that fiery old
Korean patriot, Syngman Rhee. The ROK president, 74 years old at the
outbreak of civil war, did not shrink from advocating the unification
of Korea by armed force. On 20 February 1949 he predicted that his
troops “could defeat North Korea within 2 weeks” if the U. S. S. R. did
not interfere. Eight months later, on 7 October, his confidence had
increased to the point where he was “sure that we could take Pyongyang
in 3 days.”[44]
[44] A. Wigfall Green, _Epic of Korea_ (Washington: Public
Affairs Press, 1950), 125–26.
Such remarks placed the United States in an uncomfortable position. If
aid to the Republic of Korea were to include tanks, military aircraft
and training for offensive warfare, Americans would be open to the
charge of inciting civil strife. Communist propagandists would scream
that accusation in any event, of course, but there would be grounds
for the suspicion of other members of the United Nations. Ambassador
Muccio made sure, therefore, that United States assistance did not
extend beyond the legitimate needs of ROK frontier defense and internal
security.
The triangular ROK infantry division was modeled after the United
States unit but numbered about 9,500 troops. Eight divisions and a
regiment had been organized and partially trained by June 1950. They
were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions and the
17th Regiment.[45] Only 4 of these divisions, the 1st, 2d, 6th, and
7th, had their full complement of 3 regiments. All the others had 2
except the 5th, which had 2 and a battalion.[46]
[45] The absence of a 4th Division is explained by an old
Korean superstition. Because the symbol for that number
resembled the ancient symbol for death, it was regarded
as unlucky. Apparently the North Koreans managed to
overcome this superstition, however, in numbering their
units.
[46] LtCol Roy E. Appleman, USA, ms. history of UN operations
in Korea, Jul–Nov 50.
ROK military strength was estimated at 98,808 troops by the KMAG in
June 1950. About 65,000 of them had been given unit training for
combat. They were fairly proficient in the employment of small arms and
mortars, but their instruction had not included defense against tanks.
Command and staff work were still at a rudimentary stage, and both
officers and NCO’s needed seasoning.
The ROK Army of June 1950 had made good progress, in short, when it
is considered that most of its components had been activated within
the past year. But it was no match for the Red Korean columns which
attacked at dawn on 25 June 1950. The ROK order of battle, if such it
could be called, consisted of a regiment and four infantry divisions
ranged from left to right across the peninsula--the 17th Regiment and
the 1st, 7th, 6th, and 8th Divisions. The remaining divisions were
dispersed for purposes of internal security: the Capital at Seoul; the
2d at Chongju and Taejon; the 3d at Taegu; and the 5th at Kwangju.
[Illustration: NKPA ORDER OF BATTLE 25 JUNE 1950]
The ROK frontier forces were not well disposed for defense in depth.
Taken by surprise, they put up an ineffectual resistance despite brave
fights here and there against odds. On other occasions the sight of an
enemy tank or armored car was enough to scatter ROK riflemen, and the
progress of the invading columns resembled an occupation rather than an
attack.
Before sundown on the day of invasion it appeared that NKPA leaders
had not erred in allowing a timetable of 10 days for overrunning the
Republic of Korea. The question now was whether the conflict could
be confined to that Asiatic peninsula. Communist aggressions were
no novelty, to be sure, either in Asia or Europe. But in the past
there had always been some show of peaceable intentions, however
hypocritical, or some shadow of legality. This was the first time that
a Soviet puppet nation had been permitted to go as far as open warfare.
Matters had come to a showdown, and it could only be interpreted as a
challenge issued by Communism to the free nations of the world.