[Illustration: (Map of Korea, indicating battle fronts in July, 1950.)]
[Illustration: THE PUSAN PERIMETER
AUG.-SEP. 1950
GENERAL DISPOSITION OF 8TH ARMY & NORTH KOREAN FORCES]
U. S. MARINE OPERATIONS IN KOREA
1950–1953
VOLUME I
_The Pusan Perimeter_
by
LYNN MONTROSS
and
CAPTAIN NICHOLAS A. CANZONA, USMC
[Illustration]
Historical Branch, G-3
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C., 1954
Foreword
An ability to furnish skilled forces to meet emergency situations on
short notice has long been a hallmark of the Marine Corps. When the
call came for such a force to be dispatched to Korea on 2 July 1950,
the Corps was handicapped by the strictures of a peacetime economy.
Nevertheless, a composite brigade consisting of a regiment and an air
group was made available within a week’s time.
With a reputation built largely on amphibious warfare, Marines of the
1st Brigade were called upon to prove their versatility in sustained
ground action. On three separate occasions within the embattled
Perimeter--south toward Sachon and twice along the Naktong River--these
Marine units hurled the weight of their assault force at the enemy. All
three attacks were successful, and at no point did Marines give ground
except as ordered. The quality of their performance in the difficult
days of the Pusan Perimeter fighting made them a valuable member of the
United Nations team and earned new laurels for their Corps.
[Illustration: (Signature)]
LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, JR.,
_General, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commandant of the Marine Corps_.
Preface
This is the first volume of a planned series dealing with United States
Marine Operations in Korea during the period 2 August 1950 to 27
July 1953. Volume I is designed to give the military student and the
casual reader an accurate and detailed account of the operations in
which Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade and Marine Air Group 33
participated during the fighting in the Pusan Perimeter, from the date
of their landing on 2 August until their withdrawal on 13 September
1950, in preparation for the Inchon landing.
Since this is primarily a Marine Corps story, the activities of other
services during this period are not described in detail except to
present a proper background to the overall account.
Many officers and men who participated in this campaign have
contributed to the preparation of the book by answering inquiries,
submitting to interviews, and commenting on the preliminary manuscript.
Their assistance has been invaluable. Special acknowledgment is also
extended to the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, Pacific Section, and particularly Lieutenant Colonel Roy E.
Appleman, USA, for enemy intelligence material; to the Marine Corps
Board Study: _An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on
the Course of the Korean War_ for its interpretations and conclusions;
and to _Life Magazine_ for courtesy shown in permitting use of Korean
photographs made by Mr. David D. Duncan. Maps included herein were
prepared by the Reproduction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,
Va. United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps photographs have also
been used to illustrate this monograph.
[Illustration: (Signature)]
T. A. WORNHAM,
_Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps_.
_Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3._
Contents
_Page_
I Korea, Doorstep of Strategy 1
The Korean Question--The Russo-Japanese War--Korea as a
Japanese Colony--The Partition of Korea--Red Victory in
China--Civil Strife in Korea
II Red Aggression in Korea 19
Units of the NKPA--NKPA Command and Leadership--The NKPA
Infantry Division--NKPA Air and Armor--NKPA Officer
Procurement Conscription--The NKPA Order of Battle
III The Marine Brigade 37
NKPA Gains of First Week--Early U. S. Decisions--Geography
of Korea--U. S. Ground Forces in Korea--Requests for
U. S. Marines--Activation of the Brigade
IV The Advance Party 55
Conference with CINCFE--The Washington Scene--The Advance
Party in Japan--Voyage of the Brigade--The Advance Party
in Korea--Crisis of the Eighth Army
V Prelude to Battle 87
Reconnaissance by Jeep--Brigade Air Lands--Landing of
Ground Force--Bedlam on Pusan Water Front--The Brigade
at Changwon--The Pusan Perimeter--Brigade Air Strikes
First--Planning the Sachon-Chinju Offensive
VI Action on Hill 342 103
First Platoon Fight--The Perimeter on Hill 342--Call for
Artillery Fires--Task Force Kean Stalled--General Craig
Assumes Control--Enemy Attack at Dawn
VII Advance to Kosong 119
Heavy NKPA Resistance--Assault on Hill 255--Confusion at
Tosan Junction--Brigade Artillery in Support--Encounter
with Japanese Maps--Ambush at Taedabok Pass--The
Seizure of Kosong
VIII Fight on Two Fronts 139
The Kosong Turkey Shoot--The Changchon Ambush--Marines
Ordered to New Sector--Attack of 3/5 to the Rear--Enemy
Dawn Attack at Changchon--Breaking Off Action
IX Battle of the Naktong 173
Task Force Hill Organized--Planning the Next Operation--
Reconnaissance of Terrain--Air and Artillery Preparation
--Company D on Objective--Attack of Company E
X Obong-ni Ridge 189
Company B to the Attack--Advance of Company A--Defeat of
Enemy Tanks--End of the First Day--Enemy Counterattack
on Ridge--Obong-ni Ridge Secured--Supporting Arms Clear
the Bulge
XI Second Naktong 207
The Famous Bean Patch--Planning for Inchon Landing--
Return to the Naktong Bulge--All-Out NKPA Offensive--The
Marines Jump Off--Progress of Brigade Attack--Assault
on Hill 117
XII Mission Completed 227
Collapse of the 9th NKPA Division--Attacks of 5
September--Two Marine Tanks Killed--The Brigade’s
Final Action--Brigade Embarkation at Pusan--Results
of Brigade Operations--Summaries and Conclusions
_Appendixes_
A Glossary of Military Terms 245
B Command and Staff List 247
C Citations and Commendations 253
Bibliography 257
Index 261
Illustrations
_Photographs_
Sixteen-page sections of photographs follow pages 70 and 156.
_Maps and Sketches_
_Page_
The Strategic Triangle 2
The Far East 5
Korea 11
NKPA Order of Battle 35
NKPA Invasion, 15 July 1950 44
Japan and Korea 61
Eighth Army, Situation of Late July 69
Brigade Action on the Southwestern Front 102
Chindong-ni Area 107
Sachon Offensive, 8–10 August 1950 130
Sachon Offensive, 10 August 1950 133
Sachon Offensive, 11 August 1950 134
Sachon Offensive--Changchon Ambush 145
Sachon Offensive, Situation 12–14 August 149
Enemy Counterattack, Hill 202 154
First Naktong Counteroffensive 180
First Naktong, Situation 17 August 1950 185
First Naktong, Situation 18 August 1950 199
First Naktong, Seizure of Objective Two 202
First Naktong, Seizure of Objective Three 205
Second Naktong Counteroffensive, 3–5 September 1950 218
Second Naktong, Marine Attacks of 3–4 September 1950 223
Second Naktong, Enemy Counterattack 232
CHAPTER I
Korea, Doorstep of Strategy
_The Historical Background--The Russo-Japanese War--Korea as a Japanese
Colony--The Partition of Korea--Red Victory in China--Civil Strife in
Korea_
It meant little to most Americans on 25 June 1950 to read in their
Sunday newspapers that civil strife had broken out in Korea. They
could hardly have suspected that this remote Asiatic peninsula was to
become the scene of the fourth most costly military effort of American
history, both in blood and money, before the end of the year. Yet the
danger of an explosion had been present ever since the end of World
War II, when the United States and the Soviet Union rushed into the
political vacuum created in Korea by the defeat of Japan.
The Korean question came up officially for the first time at the
Cairo Conference of December 1943. With Soviet Russia not yet being
represented as a belligerent in the Far East, the United States, Great
Britain and China agreed that “in due course Korea shall become free
and independent.”[1]
[1] Quoted in James F. Byrnes, _Speaking Frankly_ (New York:
Harper, 1947), 221.
Any discussion of this issue had to take into consideration Korea’s
status as a Japanese possession since 1910. Government, industry,
commerce, agriculture, transportation--every phase of Korean life
had been administered by Japanese for the benefit of Japan. As
a consequence, the 25,000,000 inhabitants of the peninsula were
woefully lacking in experience to fit them for the responsibilities of
independence.
Syngman Rhee, the elderly Korean patriot, had long been clamoring
for recognition of his Korean government in exile. The United States
hung back because of reluctance to offend Joseph Stalin, the Soviet
dictator, at a time when Russia was a powerful military ally. Moscow
had a strong bargaining point, moreover, in the prospect of giving
military aid to the United States in the fight against Japan. Such
an alliance was particularly desirable from the American viewpoint
early in 1945 because of the losses resulting from Japanese _kamikaze_
tactics. In the belief that active Soviet participation might shorten
the war and save thousands of American lives, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was disposed to compromise with Stalin.
[Illustration: THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE]
The two agreed informally at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 that
Korea should be independent “... and that if a transition period were
necessary, a trusteeship should be established,” according to James F.
Byrnes, United States Secretary of State. He added in his memoirs that
“a desire to help the Koreans develop the skills and experience that
would enable them to maintain their independence was the inspiration
for President Roosevelt’s acquiescence in the trusteeship idea.”[2]
[2] Byrnes, _loc. cit._
The Soviet dictator made a plea at Yalta for historical justice.
Although Czar Nicholas II had been execrated as a tyrant and warmonger
in Communist doctrine, Stalin demanded that the “wrongs” resulting from
the Russo-Japanese War be righted 40 years later. The price of Soviet
military aid against Japan, in short, was the restoration of Russian
territory in the Far East that had been lost in the defeat of 1905.
_The Historical Background_
It was inevitable that the fate of Korea would be involved in any
such readjustment. Korea is one of those tragic areas of the earth’s
surface which are destined in all ages to be a doorstep of strategy.
As the focal point of the China-Russia-Japan triangle, the peninsula
offers each of these powers a threshold for aggression against either
of the other two. Possession of Korea has been for centuries an aim of
aspiring conquerors in the Far East, and all three rival nations have
had a turn.
China was first. From ancient times down to the last quarter of the
19th century, the Chinese Empire held a loose suzerainty acknowledged
by the Koreans. Japan won a brief foothold in the 16th century under
the great war lord Hideyoshi, only to learn the painful lesson that
control of the sea is requisite to a seaborne invasion of a peninsula.
Naval victories by the Koreans cut Hideyoshi’s line of communications,
and he withdrew after frightful devastations which left an enduring
tradition of fear and hate. Both Japan and Korea then entered upon
a period of self-imposed isolation lasting until their political
hibernation was rudely interrupted by Western nations clamoring for
trade.
The United States took the lead in inaugurating a new era in the Far
East. Commodore Perry and his American warships opened up Japan to
commerce in 1853. Several persuasive bombardments of coastal cities by
American, British and French naval guns were required to end Japan’s
seclusion; and in 1871 an American squadron was sent to Korea after
the destruction of an American merchant ship and massacre of its crew.
United States Marines and bluejackets stormed Korean river forts
defended by cannon. All objectives were taken and heavy casualties
inflicted, but it remained for Japan to open up the “Hermit Kingdom” to
trade 4 years later with the threat of war.
Russia had not been a disinterested bystander during this era of
cannon-ball diplomacy. Her participation in Far Eastern affairs dated
back to the 17th century and had once extended to the North American
mainland. The sale of Alaska to the United States in 1867 indicated a
renunciation of this phase of expansion, but Russia had no intention of
abandoning her ambitions in the Far East. Shortly after Japan compelled
Korea to sign a treaty of amity, the Russians offered to train Korean
officers and lend military aid to the faction-ridden kingdom.
At this point China took a hand. Suspecting that the two rival nations
were dabbling in Korean affairs for purposes of their own, the
Celestial Empire attempted to restore her suzerainty.
This policy was bound to lead to a collision. Western nations were not
surprised when Japan and China resorted to arms, but few observers
expected the supposed dwarf to beat the giant with ease. Japan’s well
led army, equipped with the best modern weapons, landed at Chemulpo
(Inchon) and captured the Chinese fortress at Pyongyang in northwest
Korea. Sweeping across the Yalu into Manchuria, the invaders overran
the strategic Liaotung Peninsula, taking Port Arthur and Dairen.
It was all over in a few months. When the Empire proper was threatened
with invasion, the Chinese government sued for peace in 1895.
The Japanese terms were more than severe, they were humiliating. They
included: (1) a large indemnity; (2) the cession “in perpetuity” of the
Liaotung Peninsula as well as Formosa and the Pescadores group; and (3)
Chinese recognition of what the Japanese were pleased to call “Korean
independence.”
But the victors had overdone it. Russia, Germany, and France formed
the Triple Intervention which compelled Japan to relinquish the
Liaotung Peninsula. The three European powers preferred that this
strategic bastion remain in the possession of China, which was ripe for
despoiling at the convenience of the Western nations.
Russia now assumed the role of a friend binding China’s wounds. The
secret treaty of alliance signed by the two empires in 1896 was aimed
like a pistol at Japan. In return for promises of support in the event
of further Japanese aggressions, China gave Russia the right to extend
the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok across Chinese territory in
Manchuria.
The precept was not lost upon other European nations. England, Germany,
and France also established spheres of influence in China after
forcing the government to lease territory or grant special privileges.
And Russia added to former gains by a 25-year lease of the Liaotung
Peninsula.
[Illustration: THE FAR EAST]
China’s Boxer Rebellion of 1900 interrupted the march of events, but
two treaties in 1902 indicated that Japan and Russia would soon be at
each other’s throats. Japan acquired an ally in England, as a result of
that nation’s alarms over Muscovite designs, so that the neutrality of
European powers was practically assured. Russia and China drew closer
meanwhile with a new treaty of alliance. The stage was set for a fight
to the finish in the Far East.
Possession of the Philippine Islands had given the United States a new
interest in Far Eastern affairs since the Spanish-American War of 1898.
John Hay, Secretary of State, realized that the American “open door”
policy was imperiled by the situation in Asia.[3] But he admitted in
April 1903 that nothing short of the threat of armed force could have
checked Russia’s encroachments.
[3] Pauline Tompkins, _American-Russian Relations in the Far
East_ (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 21.
_The Russo-Japanese War_
A candid comparison would reveal a striking similarity between the
aggressions of Czarist Russia in the early 1900’s and those of Soviet
Russia half a century later. The expression “cold war” was not current
in 1903, but the account of Russia’s threats, seizures and violated
agreements has a dismally familiar aspect to the modern reader. Rudyard
Kipling paid a bitter tribute at the turn of the century to these
techniques of the Russian Bear in his lines:
When he stands up like a tired man, tottering near and near;
When he stands up as pleading, in wavering, man-brute guise,
When he veils the hate and cunning of his little swinish eyes;
When he shows as seeking quarter, with paws like hands in prayer,
That is the time of peril--the time of the Truce of the Bear!
Following the Sino-Japanese War, the truce between Russia and Japan in
“independent” Korea was broken by both nations whenever a favorable
opportunity arose. Both of them intrigued constantly at Seoul. For
a time, indeed, the Korean government was directed from the Russian
legation with the backing of Russian troops.
Twice, in 1896 and 1898, Russia and Japan signed agreements reaffirming
Korea’s independence and promising anew to withdraw their forces.
These pacts were promptly violated by both contestants for power, but
Japan prepared more realistically for the forthcoming struggle. On
a February night in 1904, without the formality of a declaration of
war, a Japanese squadron attacked the Russian warships anchored at
Port Arthur. This surprise blow was followed shortly by the landing
of Japanese troops at Chemulpo. They advanced to the frontier and
defeated the Russians in the battle of the Yalu--a victory that has
been compared with the battle of Valmy in the French Revolution as a
landmark of history.
Certainly the West was made aware that an Oriental nation had risen
to the stature of a world power for the first time in modern history.
The value of Korea as a strategic springboard was demonstrated when
Japanese land and sea forces isolated the fortresses on the Liaotung
Peninsula. Port Arthur fell after a bloody siege of 6 months. Next, the
Japanese invaders of Manchuria defeated an army of 350,000 Russians and
inflicted 150,000 casualties in the four-week battle of Mukden. This
was the decisive clash on land; and in the one-sided naval battle of
Tsushima, Admiral Togo annihilated the Baltic fleet which the Czar had
ordered on the long voyage to the Pacific.
The end came abruptly in the summer of 1905. In the Treaty of
Portsmouth, signed on 5 September, Russia ceded the southern part of
Sakhalin Island to the victors while recognizing their “paramount”
interests in Korea. All rights in the Liaotung Peninsula went to Japan
as well as important concessions in Manchuria. Not much was left
to Russia in the Far East except a precarious foothold in northern
Manchuria.
_Korea as a Japanese Colony_
For 5 years Japan kept up a pretense of a protectorate in Korea. Then,
in 1910, came outright annexation.
Europe’s “balanced antagonisms” soon flared up in World War I, leaving
Japan free to exploit Korea as a colony. Western observers might
have noted such evidences of modernization as new docks, railroads,
factories and highways. But they were administered by Japanese
overseers as Koreans sank to the level of coolies without a voice in
the government.
Although Japan joined the fight against the Central Powers in World
War I, her military efforts were made against allies as well as
enemies. Using Korea as a beachhead, she attempted to enlarge her
empire on the Asiatic mainland at the expense of Russia, then in the
throes of revolution. Three years after the Armistice, a Japanese army
still occupied the Vladivostok area; but the United States took such a
firm diplomatic stand that Tokyo backed down.
This retreat was only a postponement. During the next decade Japan
set up a strategic shield to the east and south by fortifying the
mandated islands of the Pacific, awarded to her after the war. Treaties
and agreements were violated whenever convenient, and in 1931 she
turned westward again to satisfy her appetite for Russian and Chinese
territory.
The time was well chosen. With the Western nations in the depths of an
industrial depression, Japan began a series of aggressions against the
Chinese in Manchuria. The gains were consolidated in a puppet state
known as Manchukuo, comprising a fertile and populous area as large
as California. China was unable to offer much resistance, and Soviet
Russia could not risk a major war in the Far East. Even so, some of
the Soviet border clashes with the Japanese in time of “peace” were
actually battles fought with tanks and planes.
In 1937 came the Japanese invasion of China proper. Germany and Italy
were launching aggressions of the same stamp in Europe and Africa, and
the world was to know little stability until all three totalitarian
states had been crushed in World War II.
Soviet Russia had a grim struggle for survival while resisting the full
tide of Nazi invasion. But at the time of the Yalta Conference, Stalin
was in a position to ask a stiff price for military aid in the Pacific.
The United States agreed that the Port Arthur area and southern
Sakhalin should be returned to Russia to redress the “wrongs” of 1905.
Concessions were also made in Manchuria and outer Mongolia.
Stalin, for his part, consented to sign a treaty of friendship with
Nationalist China as an ally of the United States. Later events made
it evident that he had no intention of keeping his pledges. On the
contrary, Soviet policy already visioned a Communist empire in the Far
East which would include China as well as Korea.
The Yalta Agreement was stridently criticized in the United States
after Stalin’s duplicity became apparent. But the War Department took a
realistic view as early as the spring of 1945:
“The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at
Yalta are generally matters which are within the military power of
Russia to obtain regardless of United States military action short of
war.... The Russians can, if they choose, await the time when United
States efforts will have practically completed the destruction of
Japanese military power and can then seize the objectives they desire
at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by
their entry into the war at an early date.”[4]
[4] U. S. War Dept memo for Acting Sec of State, 21 May 45,
quoted in Joseph C. Grew, _Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic
Record of Forty Years_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952),
2:1457–1458.
This was precisely what happened. Moscow waited to declare war
until 8 August 1945--6 days before the imminent collapse of Japan.
Soviet forces fought only a few actions in Siberia with a Japanese
army stripped of planes for home defense. As a consequence, Russian
propagandists found it hard to paint a convincing picture of “the
heroic deeds of our brave Far Eastern warriors.”[5] Obviously they had
met little resistance while overrunning Manchuria and northern Korea to
accept the surrender of nearly 600,000 Japanese troops, including 148
generals. These prisoners were sent to Siberia for years of servitude;
and the “conquerors” despoiled Manchuria of heavy machinery, turbines,
dynamos and rolling stock.[6]
[5] David J. Dallin, _Soviet Russia and the Far East_ (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 213.
[6] _Ibid._, 214, 244. Such seizures were in violation of
international law, of course, and Soviet Russia had
pledged the prompt repatriation of Japanese prisoners at
the Potsdam Conference in July 1945.
The value of this booty has been estimated at a billion dollars, and
the forced labor of Japanese war prisoners during the next 5 years
was worth at least another billion. Not satisfied with these spoils,
Moscow also demanded a share in the occupation of Japan. This design
was balked by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, supreme Allied
commander, who made it plain that he needed no such assistance.[7]
[7] _Ibid._, 214, 239.
Even after the guns fell silent, there was no peace. One enemy had been
exchanged for another, since Soviet Russia took advantage of war-weary
allies to follow in the footsteps of Germany and Japan. There was the
same familiar pattern of encroachment both in Europe and the Far East.
There were the same violations of treaties, the same unfriendly acts
falling just short of hostilities. The cold war had begun.
Oppression at home and aggression abroad--this had been the policy
of Russia’s czars, and it became the policy of Russia’s dictators.
Despotism had been replaced by Communism, but there was little
difference. Communism proved to be an old tyranny presented as a
new ideology, and Joseph Stalin succeeded where Nicholas II failed.
Circumstances were kinder to Stalin, and he gobbled up territory in
Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany, Hungary,
Rumania, Mongolia and Manchuria.
Never before had one man ruled so much of the earth’s surface. Yet
there was something neurotic and fear-ridden about the Kremlin’s
outlook which success could not cure. It has long been a historical
theory that this psychosis may be traced back to Russia’s bondage in
the Middle Ages under the Mongols and Tartars. At any rate, victory
and enormous spoils did not give Moscow a sense of security in 1945.
Buffer state was piled upon buffer state, and thousands of World War II
prisoners were enslaved behind the “iron curtain” to build new Soviet
military installations.
_The Partition of Korea_
The importance of Korea in the Soviet scheme of things was indicated by
the haste with which Russian troops crossed the frontier on 12 August
1945, three days after the declaration of war. They were the vanguard
of an army numbering a quarter of a million men led by General Ivan
Chistyakov, a hero of the battle of Stalingrad.
The surrender terms called for a joint American and Soviet occupation,
with the 38th parallel serving as a temporary line of demarcation. Not
until 8 September, however, did Lieutenant General John R. Hodge reach
southern Korea with the first American troops.
By that time the Russians had gone through their usual routine, and the
machinery taken from northern Korea was estimated at 30 to 40 percent
of the industrial potential. Looting by Soviet troops went unpunished,
and regular supplies of food for the huge army were demanded from an
impoverished people just freed of the Japanese yoke.[8]
[8] _Ibid._, 285.
The Russians had a tremendous advantage over United States occupation
forces. Since World War I more than a million Koreans had found a
refuge from Japanese bondage on Russian or Chinese soil. Thousands of
men had been indoctrinated with Communist principles and given military
training to aid the Chinese Reds fighting the Japanese invaders of
China. Thus in 1945 the Russians could count on the efforts of Korean
revolutionists to establish Communist rule in their homeland behind a
façade of democracy.
[Illustration: KOREA]
The United States forces, on the contrary, did not even have enough
interpreters. They impressed the Koreans at first as being alien
occupation troops setting up a military government. Meanwhile, the
Russians had installed an interim civil government at Pyongyang. Korean
Reds filled the key positions, and Stalin’s portraits and the hammer
and sickle emblem were seen at political rallies.
Koreans of all persuasions opposed the division of their country into
two zones on either side of the 38th parallel. The Reds at Pyongyang
contrived to lay the blame on the Americans. They made a further appeal
to Koreans on both sides of the boundary by announcing a land reform
in the northern zone. Ever since 1905 a Japanese landlord had been the
hated symbol of oppression. Pyongyang won a great propaganda victory,
therefore, by announcing the confiscation of all large estates, Korean
as well as Japanese, and the division of the land among the peasantry.
The bait was so tempting that the hook did not become apparent until
too late. Then the beneficiaries of the Agrarian Reform discovered that
they could neither sell nor rent the land, nor could they use it as
security for loans. If anyone ceased to work his holding, it reverted
to the People’s Committee, which allocated it to some other family.
The State retained possession, in short, and the peasant remained as
much of a serf as ever. Worse yet, the taxes disguised as “production
quotas” eventually amounted to 60 percent of the total crop, which was
more than the Japanese had extorted.[9]
[9] Robert T. Oliver, _Why War Came to Korea_ (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1950), 149.
This is a sample of the methods used to reduce North Korea to a police
state, just as similar states were being organized in occupied lands
of Europe by local Reds doing the bidding of Moscow. In the Soviet
zone of Korea all banks, factories and industries of any consequence
were nationalized by the so-called People’s Committee.[10] Military
training for offensive warfare was given to men armed with captured
Japanese weapons. Pressure was put upon these recruits to “volunteer”
for combat service with the Chinese Reds waging a civil war against the
Nationalists.[11]
[10] Dallin, _op. cit._, 291.
[11] Oliver, _op. cit._, 5.
_Red Victory in China_
Moscow was secretly backing the Communists led by Mao Tse-tung in
their efforts to wrest China from the Nationalist government of
Chiang Kai-shek. Such activities, of course, were in violation of the
treaty of friendship and alliance with Nationalist China which Stalin
had signed on 14 August 1945. But agreements were never allowed to
interfere with Soviet ambitions, and Moscow aimed to create in Asia a
bulwark of Communist puppet states extending from the Arctic to the
tropics.
Asiatic soil was peculiarly suited to the growth of such institutions.
Although Communism derived originally from the theories of a German
revolutionist, Karl Marx, it was adapted by Lenin and Stalin to the
political climate of Asia. Human lives and liberties have always
been held cheaply in the East, and absolutism has been the rule in
government. Communism, as it developed in Russia after the revolution
of 1917, would probably have been better understood by Genghis Khan
than Marx. For it is significant that no Western nation has ever
embraced this political faith voluntarily, even though it has attracted
a minority of radicals and malcontents in nearly every country.
Asia was ripe for change after World War II. In spite of Japan’s
defeat, that nation had made a good deal of progress with its “Asia for
the Asiatics” propaganda. The Far East seethed with unrest in 1946, and
Communism spread ominously through a China weakened by three decades of
invasion, revolution and civil war.
While Nationalists and Communist armies contended for the ancient
empire, an undeclared war went on in the background. This was the cold
war between the United States and Soviet Russia as they supplied arms
and munitions to the opposing forces. Russia also supplied troops and
laborers. For it has been estimated that no less than 250,000 North
Korean Reds were induced to serve in various capacities with the
Chinese Communists in Manchuria.[12] There the soldiers completed their
military training in actual combat, with veteran Chinese officers as
instructors.
[12] GHQ, FECOM, MilIntelSec, GS, Allied Translator
and Interpreter Sec (FECOM, ATIS), _Enemy Forces_
(Interrogation Reports [InterRpt], Sup No. 4), 16.
By 1948 there was no longer much doubt about the outcome in China. In
the battles of Tsinan, Changchun and Mukden, the Nationalists lost
33 divisions, totaling more than 320,000 men, in killed, wounded
and missing. Losses of equipment included 250,000 rifles and vast
quantities of other arms and equipment. During the four and a half
months following the fall of Tsinan in September 1948, the Nationalist
losses were estimated at a million men and 400,000 rifles. Even
planes of United States manufacture were captured by the Reds, who
also acquired a cruiser that the British had transferred to the
Nationalists.[13]
[13] U. S. Dept of State, _United States Relations With China_
(Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office [GPO],
1949), 357.
“The unfortunate but inescapable fact,” concluded the United States
State Department in 1949, “is that the ominous result of the civil war
in China was beyond the control of the Government of the United States.
Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable
limits of those capabilities could have changed that result; nothing
that was left undone by this country could have contributed to it. It
was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country
tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within
China, if only a decision by default.”[14]
[14] _Ibid._, xvi.
As a result, Mao Tse-tung’s forces could claim a sweeping victory by
the end of 1949. Only the island of Formosa was left to Chiang Kai-shek
and his battered remnants. Meanwhile, it grew increasingly plain that
Korea was destined to be the scene of the next great tug-of-war between
Communism and the free nations.
_Civil Strife in Korea_
Not only had the Russians made the 38th Parallel a political boundary
in Korea; they had also resisted all American attempts at unification.
This meant that economic recovery was badly handicapped. For the mines,
heavy industries and hydroelectric plants were located in the north,
while the south had most of the agriculture. Products once exchanged
with mutual benefit now had to be imported from abroad.
Trusteeship was hotly resented by all Koreans, even though few of them
had gained administrative or technical experience under the Japanese.
This prejudice was exploited by Soviet propagandists who denounced
the “undemocratic” American policy of bringing in administrators,
technicians and educators. As a consequence, the United States
military government made a poor showing at first in comparison to the
puppet government of Communist-trained Koreans installed at Pyongyang
by Russians pulling the strings behind the scenes. Anti-American
propaganda won converts to the south as well as north of the 38th
Parallel, with General Hodge being accused of maintaining a harsh
military rule.
At the Moscow Conference of 1945 the Soviet Union had agreed
with the United States that the whole of Korea was to be given a
democratic government after passing through the trusteeship phase. A
Soviet-American Joint Commission was to meet and make recommendations
for this purpose; but as early as 1946 it became evident that the
Soviet representatives had been instructed to sabotage any attempt to
create a united Korea with its own government.
After the failure of the first year’s efforts, Hodge ordered the
establishment of an Interim Legislature at Seoul as the counterpart
of the People’s Assembly at Pyongyang. Of the 90 seats, half were to
be filled by popular vote and the remaining 45 by Korean appointees
of the Military Government. The election was a triumph for the
American-educated Dr. Syngman Rhee and the rightists. Hodge tried to
give the other South Korean factions a voice by appointing moderates
and liberals, but the Interim Legislature had no solution for the
discontent in Korea as the economic situation went from bad to worse in
spite of American aid.
Although the Americans on the Joint Commission did their best, they
were blocked by all manner of Soviet-contrived delays and obstacles.
Finally, in 1947, the United States submitted the question to the
United Nations. After long discussion, the General Assembly resolved
that all the people of Korea be given an opportunity in the spring of
1948 to elect a national assembly for the entire country.
A commission representing nine member nations was appointed to visit
Korea and supervise the voting. But the Russians not only refused
to participate in the election; they went so far as to bar the
commissioners from entering North Korea.
The new National Assembly elected in May 1948 by South Korea had the
task of forming a government. On 17 July the first constitution in
40 years of Korean history was approved by the deputies, who elected
Syngman Rhee to a 4-year term as president.
It was an eventful summer south of the 38th Parallel. The Republic
of Korea came into being on 15 August, and on that day the American
military government ended. John J. Muccio was appointed by President
Truman to represent the United States in Korea with the rank of
ambassador. Plans were made to withdraw the 50,000 United States
occupation troops during the next 8 months, leaving only 500 officers
and men as military instructors for the training of a Republic of Korea
security force.
In the northern zone the Communists organized demonstrations against
the United Nations Commission. Strikes and disorders were fomented
south of the 38th Parallel, and 200,000 North Koreans marched in
protest at Pyongyang.
There was an air of urgency about such attempts to prevent the election
in South Korea. The exposure of the Agrarian Reform as a fraud had
hurt the Communists, and the disinterested spirit of the United States
occupation was gaining recognition throughout Korea in spite of
initial blunders. Pyongyang could not afford to let South Korea take
the lead in forming a government, and July 1948 dated the creation
of a Communist state known as the People’s Democratic Republic of
Korea. After adopting a constitution modeled after that of Communist
Bulgaria, the Supreme People’s Council claimed to represent all Korea.
In justification it was charged that “American imperialists carried out
a ruinous separate election and organized a so-called National Assembly
with the support of a traitor minority and with the savage oppression
of the majority of the Korean people.”[15]
[15] _New York Times_, 12 Jul 48, quoted in Redvers Opie et
al., _The Search for Peace Settlements_ (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1951), 311.
The Russians announced in December 1948 that they were withdrawing
all occupation troops. It was no secret, however, that they would
leave behind them an NK army that far surpassed the ROK military
establishment.[16] Kim Il Sung, the Red Korean prime minister, referred
to it pointedly as a “superior army” in an address at Pyongyang.
[16] ROK, of course, denotes the Republic of Korea, and NK
(North Korea) is the abbreviation usually applied to the
self-styled People’s Democratic Republic of Korea at
Pyongyang. Both sets of initials are used more often as
adjectives than nouns. See the Glossary in Appendix A for
definitions of other symbols and military terms found in
text.
“We must strengthen and improve it,” he declared. “Officers and men
must establish iron discipline and must be proficient in the military
and in combat techniques.”[17]
[17] FECOM, ATIS, _History of the North Korean Army_, 23.
Numbers at the end of 1948 were estimated at 60,000 regulars in
addition to constabulary, railroad guards, and trainees. These troops
were equipped by the Russians with captured Japanese weapons, and
Russian arms were shipped into northern Korea to meet the needs of an
expanding army.[18]
[18] _Ibid._
It was a military force of an entirely different character that
American officers organized on the other side of the 38th Parallel. The
new ROK army was strictly a defensive force, trained and equipped to
maintain internal security and guard the border and seacoast. Neither
tanks nor military planes were provided by the Americans, who leaned
backward to avoid any suspicion of creating an instrument for offensive
internecine warfare.
Raids by Red Korean troops across the border became a frequent
occurrence throughout 1949. One of these forays, supported by
artillery, was a large-scale NK thrust into the Ongjin Peninsula. Heavy
fighting resulted before the invaders were driven back into their own
territory.
Having failed to prevent the formation of a democratic Korean
government--the only government in Korea recognized by the United
Nations--the Reds at Pyongyang were making every effort to wreck it.
Since 80 percent of the ROK electric power originated north of the
frontier, they were able to retard economic recovery by cutting off
the current at intervals. There was no other unfriendly act in the
Communist bagful of tricks that Pyongyang neglected to employ while its
radio stations blared forth a propaganda of hatred.
Early in 1950 the situation grew more tense daily as thousands of
veterans returned to North Korea after serving in the Communist armies
which overran China. When Radio Pyongyang began making appeals for
peace that spring, it should have become obvious to practiced observers
of Communist techniques that preparations were afoot for war. On 10
June 1950 the Pyongyang government announced a new plan for unification
and peace after branding the top ROK officials as “traitors.” The
motive behind this proposal was apparently the usual Communist attempt
to divide an enemy on the eve of an aggression. For the long-planned
blow fell at 0400 (Korean time) on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950.
Russian-made tanks spearheaded the advance of the NK ground forces
across the 38th Parallel, and Russian-made planes strafed Seoul and
other strategic centers.
Captured NK documents offer proof that the invaders had already set the
machinery of aggression in motion while making their plea for peace.
This evidence included the written report of instructions given by one
Lieutenant Han to a group of picked men on an intelligence mission. On
1 June 1950 they were to proceed by power boat to an island off Inchon,
where confederates would help them make their way to the mainland.
“Our mission,” explained Han, “is to gather intelligence information
concerning South Korean forces and routes of advance ahead of our
troops. We will perform this task by contacting our comrades who are
scattered throughout the length and breadth of South Korea.”[19]
[19] FECOM, ATIS, _Documentary Evidence of North Korean
Aggression_ (InterRpt, Sup No. 2), 65.
The lieutenant explained that the forthcoming attack on South Korea was
to be the first step toward the “liberation” of the people of Asia.
And his concluding remarks leave no doubt as to the complete confidence
with which the Korean Communists began the venture:
“Within 2 months from the date of attack, Pusan should have fallen
and South Korea will be again united with the North. The timetable
for this operation of 2 months’ duration was determined by the
possibility of United States forces intervening in the conflict. If
this were not so, it would take our forces only 10 days to overrun
South Korea.”[20]
[20] _Ibid._