Revolución, 16. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 262-9. Ampudia, Manifiesto.
Apuntes, 64. =13=Pakenham, no. 122, 1846. Balbontín, Invasión, 50-2. Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 348 (Ampudia), 348 (Taylor), 349 (terms). =76=Ampudia,
Sept. 29. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Oct. 26; Nov. 7. Wash. _Union_, Jan.
18 (Ampudia); Feb. 18, 1847. _Niles_, Nov. 28, p. 197. _Epoca_, Feb.
9, 1847 (Ampudia). _Observador Zacatecano_, Dec. 27, 1846, supplement
(Requena). _Diario_, Oct. 2 (Ampudia). _Republicano_, May 28, 1847.
Worth's cannon were prevented by a fog from opening fire early Thursday
morning. Worth's =364=reasons, as explained privately to a friend, for
giving liberal terms were: (1) Owing to the feelings of the Texans and
resentment occasioned by the American losses in the battle, an assault
would have been attended with the slaughter of many women; (2) The
numbers and the position of the Mexicans rendered them formidable;
(3) "Neither myself nor many others had the slightest confidence in
the _intelligence that directed_" the American operations; (4) Our
government wanted peace. The Mexicans were allowed twenty-one rounds for
their battery.
The principal excuses alleged by Ampudia for surrendering were the
failure to injure the Americans on their march, the lack of the Fourth
Brigade, a want of funds, provisions and artillery ammunition, the
inefficiency and cowardice of a part of his army, the hostility of
the superior officers, and their failure to support him. According to
a Mexican letter from S. Luis Potosí dated October 3, 1846, the loss
of the city was attributed wholly to his cowardice. A number of his
chief officers appear to have been no more courageous than he, but the
decision did not rest with them. Perhaps he thought it necessary to save
the one veteran army of Mexico, but a successful or even heroic defence
of Monterey would have probably been more beneficial to his cause.
There were provisions enough and a large stock of ammunition; but we
are not sure that his supply of artillery ammunition was adequate. The
commission consisted of Worth, Henderson, J. Davis, Requena, Ortega,
Llano. The Mexicans actually carried away three 12-pounders and three
8-pounders (Requena). The British minister at Washington reported: The
armistice seems to be "in direct opposition to the rule laid down in
Mr. Buchanan's letter to Commodore Conner of the 27th July" [Sen. 107;
29, 2, p. 3], by which it was determined that no armistice should be
agreed to until a treaty of peace should have been actually concluded
(=13=Pakenham, no. 122, Oct. 16, 1846). San Fernando de Presas was east
of Linares near the Gulf. See note 12.
12.12. Polk, Diary, Oct. 11, 12. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 79 (Taylor), 106
(Worth). (Instructions) Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 333, 355 (Marcy).
Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 62.
=364=Worth to S., Oct. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 138. Taylor, Letter to
Gaines. _Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2 (Peyton). =139=W. B. to D. Campbell,
Nov. 2. Robertson, Remins., 157. =13=Pakenham, no. 127, 1846 (Taylor's
ammunition would not have lasted many hours longer). _Cong. Globe_, 29,
2, p. 316 (Clayton).
Worth: Twiggs's division and the volunteers "were taken into action
without order, direction, support, or command; in fact murdered"
(=364=to S., Oct. 2). Col. Campbell: Taylor showed little generalship
in the handling of my regiment; took too great a risk in coming to
Monterey without more transportation (=139=to D. Campbell, Sept. 28;
Nov. 9). Capt. Cheatham (Campbell's regiment): "I consider, that old
Taylor committed one of the greatest blunders that ever a General was
guilty of, in coming here to attack one of the strongest fortified towns
in Mexico, with nothing in the world but small Artillery, for open
field fighting" (=50=to son, Oct. 6). _Id._: "We were rushed headlong
into the fight and our Generals did not know where we were going"
(=150=to sister, Oct. 16). Capt. Henry (Garland's brigade): "I look
upon the exposure of the field artillery in the streets as perfectly
useless" (_Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7). Capt. Backus (Garland's
brigade): The Third and Fourth Infantry were "entirely inadequate to
the duty required" of them; "this hazardous and useless enterprize"
(_Hist. Mag._, x, 212). Baltimore Captain: Sept. 21 I was under first
one general and then another till I and my men "became completely worn
out" (_Picayune_, Nov. 7). Engineer Stevens: The eastern attack was
marked by rash and headlong movements; the mortar, instead of being
sent to Worth, should have been placed in Tenería redoubt; Taylor
should not have withdrawn his troops on Wednesday, etc. (Campaigns,
27). Officer: Garland's charge a fatal mistake (Balt. _Sun_, Nov. 6).
Officer: The eastern attack very injudicious (_Nat. Intelligencer_,
Nov. 20). Lieut. Hamilton (West Pointer): The officers who fell at
the east end were "a sacrifice to the blind folly and ignorance of
our general-in-chief" (_Metrop. Mag._, Dec., 1907, p. 321). C. M.
Wilcox, who arrived at Monterey not long after the battle: "Harsh and
unfavorable criticism" of the operations at the east end was "universal"
there (Mex. War, 120). Robertson: The lack of a siege train was due
to Taylor's misunderstanding the intentions of the enemy; the cannon
could easily have been transported (Remins., 129, 160). Smith: Only
Ampudia's personal unfitness saved Taylor from deserved ruin (Remins.,
18). Monterey letter, Oct. 11: 6-pounders were sent to batter down
fortifications that 24-pounders would not have affected. Gen. Requena,
probably the best Mexican officer: Worth made the real attack; Taylor
blundered (_Observador Zacatecano_, Dec. 27, supplem.). G. Ferry:
Prudence forbade Taylor, in view of the too evident discouragement of
his army, to press his advantage; by negotiating he changed almost
certain defeat into victory (_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847,
410). An editorial in _Niles' Register_ of July 18, 1846, is curiously
interesting: "Owing to an error in estimating the capacities of the
enemy" Taylor "made a narrow escape from almost utter annihilation"
in May. "One lesson of this kind, we venture to predict, will be a
sufficient admonition to" Taylor.... "He will be cautious to keep his
troops within reach of supplies, and to have at hand the means of
transportation." The editor proved to be mistaken in every point.
One of Taylor's excuses for the terms was consideration for the
non-combatants (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9), and it may have counted
for something; but he had just refused these non-combatants permission
to leave the town (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 78). Another (_ibid._) was the
propinquity of the citadel, and the impossibility of taking it without
a siege of twenty or thirty days or else a large expenditure of life;
but the citadel had not been able to injure the Americans materially
while they were fighting in the town, and could not injure them at
all in Walnut Grove; and, as Taylor admitted that he would hardly be
able to advance for six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), there was no lack of
time. In point of fact, as could easily have been surmised, the citadel
had neither water nor provisions enough to stand a siege (Balbontín,
Invasión, 46).
The gallant defence of the city was another excuse (Ho. 4; 29, 2, p.
79; Bixby coll., 61); but while that is a just reason for doing honor
to a garrison, it is none for relinquishing the substantial fruits of
a dearly bought victory. It would have cost the lives of fifty or one
hundred soldiers, besides the wounded, to take the city by storm, said
Taylor (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9). But this would have been a low
price for the elimination of an army that he said was rated at 7200
besides 2000 irregulars (Bixby coll., 61)--the only army possessed by
Mexico--with its arms, accoutrements, artillery and horses. The moral
effect of such a victory would probably, in the unanimous opinion of
Polk and his Cabinet (Polk, Diary, Oct. 12), have ended the war; and
the desperate fury displayed by Santa Anna when he supposed that such
had been the outcome (=52=Black, Sept. 26; =76=S. Anna, Sept. 29)
tends to support this view. The Mexicans could have escaped, "done
what we might," Taylor urged (_cf._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, 359). But if he
could have captured the city so easily, entrenched as the garrison
were in the strong buildings near the main plaza, he could certainly
have scattered them and captured a large number, had they attempted to
flee with artillery, ammunition and provisions through those narrow
streets commanded by low, flat houses; and indeed no road available for
artillery crossed the mountains except the one (held by Worth) through
Rinconada Pass. Ampudia wrote to his government that even if he could
have cut his way out, his forces would have been dispersed and his
military material captured (Sept. 25). (Taylor seems to have taken no
steps to prevent the Mexicans from escaping during the night of the
twenty-fourth, though their protracting the negotiations until late in
the day might have suggested a design to do this.)
But, suggested Taylor, magnanimous terms were favorable to peace (Bixby
coll., 61). On the other hand the United States had used in vain with
Mexico every method except hostilities; our national authorities had now
instructed him to try vigorous warfare (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 324); and it
was for them to say whether this deliberately adopted policy should--on
a political ground--be abandoned. To meet this obvious view the General
said that a change of régime had occurred at Mexico since the date
of his orders. That was true; but it would be singular indeed if a
political change in the enemy's country--of which nothing definite was
heard except from an enemy notorious for subterfuges--could authorize a
general in the field to violate his instructions. Taylor himself stated
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360) that his "grand motive" in advancing from the
Rio Grande was "to increase the inducements of the Mexican government to
negotiate for peace"--_i.e._ by showing that otherwise it would suffer
the rigors of war; how then could he believe that acting gently and
indulgently would have the desired effect?
Finally, and upon this aspect of the matter Taylor laid great stress
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 360), Ampudia stated that his government was now
favorable to peace. But Ampudia transmitted no official proposition,
could present no evidence; and it is impossible to believe that a
shrewd American like Taylor can have taken this argument seriously.
Taylor seems to have had no respect for the Mexicans, and therefore had
no confidence in them; and what he must have heard about Ampudia was
calculated to make him distrust that man peculiarly. Besides, Scott's
letters of June 12 and 15 had intimated (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 326, 328)
that he was not to grant even a short armistice unless met with a
definite formal offer of the Mexicans to treat; and on July 27 Marcy
instructed Taylor to pursue, under similar circumstances, the course
recommended at that time to Conner (Sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3)--_i.e._
not to grant an armistice even should the Mexican government consent
to negotiate (=256=to Taylor confid.). If a knowledge of Mackenzie's
negotiations with Santa Anna was enough to justify Taylor for violating
such instructions, he should not have attacked Monterey. Moreover,
he did not consider the government of Mexico stable enough to treat
with (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9). Taylor defended the armistice on
the ground also that he needed time to bring up cannon, ammunition
and provisions (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 9); but had he captured or
dispersed the Mexican army he would have had time, cannon, ammunition
and provisions enough. Col. Davis and Taylor also argued that the
explosion of the cathedral by an American shell would have caused great
loss of life (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but if Taylor knew the cathedral
was liable to explode, this was a reason for pressing unconditional
surrender upon Ampudia, since the Mexicans would have been the principal
sufferers.
All the arguments put forth in Taylor's despatches to the government
were formally pronounced unsatisfactory by Polk and the Cabinet (Polk,
Diary, Oct. 12), since the terms made it possible for a Mexican army,
which Taylor said he could have beaten completely without severe loss,
to reorganize and make another stand. The simple facts were that, in
order to escape from the blame due to his inefficiency, Taylor advanced
from Camargo with an inadequate expedition, and, when the result
convicted him of bad judgment, endeavored to excuse himself without
letting the truth be known.
A particularly imprudent point in the terms was that they did not
require the Mexicans to retire well beyond Rinconada Pass. It was
left possible for them to fortify the pass, which was supposed to be
impregnable or almost so, and thus make an advance from Monterey to
Saltillo costly, if not impracticable. Taylor's course in this matter
was not due to an expectation that Wool's column (chap. xiii) would
render Rinconada Pass untenable, for he wrote on Oct. 15 that it formed
"no element" in his calculations (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 351). There was
another singular oversight. Taylor argued in favor of the armistice
that it bound the hands of the Mexicans during the time needed by him
for preparations to advance (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 359); but in fact,
since either government could disallow the armistice and the Mexican
authorities were within easy reach, its terms bound him for six weeks
but bound them for only, say, a fortnight or, as he admitted (Bixby
coll., 62), twenty days. Scott said privately--and one can easily
believe him--that only Taylor's popularity saved him from removal at
this time (=169=to Crittenden, Oct. 19).
When Monterey yielded, according to Taylor, his provisions were
sufficient for "not more" than ten days; but Worth had written privately
on Sept. 16 (four days after the advance from Cerralvo began) that
the army had provisions then for only about ten days (=364=to S.).
According to the Washington correspondent of the Boston _Atlas_ (Feb. 8,
1847) Clayton stated in the Senate, February 3, 1847, that Taylor had
provisions for but three days when Monterey fell. A letter, probably
from Gen. P. F. Smith, said that the provisions would have lasted only
through Sept. 26, and that during the engagement Taylor had to send to
Cerralvo for supplies, of which a sufficient quantity could scarcely
have arrived in time (_Littell's Living Age_, no. 141, p. 191). Col.
Davis stated later that the hope of supplies, when Monterey yielded,
rested on the return of the mule-teams already despatched north for this
purpose (=73=Address). Col. Campbell wrote privately that on the morning
of Sept. 21 Taylor's supply of ammunition was very limited and the
supply of provisions still more so (=139=to D. C, Nov. 2).
The loss of men that Taylor admitted was 488 killed and wounded (later
487: Ho. 24; 31,1), but it must have been considerably more. Lieut.
Hill said in his diary that the losses would never be revealed; but
the inaccuracy of the official statement is evident. A writer quoted
in _Niles_, Nov. 7, 1846, p. 148, said it was "generally supposed" at
Washington that Taylor might have lost more than 1000. A South Carolina
officer, who must have had many opportunities to talk with men who had
been at Monterey, gave the loss as about 950 (Cowan, Cond. Hist., 7).
Kendall, editor of the New Orleans _Picayune_, who was on the ground,
wrote that about 300 (including wounded men finished by the Mexicans)
were killed or mortally wounded, Haile, a trustworthy correspondent of
the same paper, expressed the same opinion. A letter in _Niles_, Oct.
17, 1846, p. 104 gives nearly the same figures. A Tennessee captain
reported the number of killed as 200. To look at the matter more in
detail, Meade (Letters, i, 165) wrote that Garland lost some 265 killed
and wounded. Butler admitted his own division lost about 250. A. S.
Johnston (Johnston, Johnston, 138) wrote that its loss was "perhaps
many more" than that. Bliss admitted that it lost 225, killed, wounded
and missing, on Sept. 21 alone (McCall, Letters, 461). Worth's loss
seems to have been about 70. The Texas division lost not less than 27
(Ho. 24; 31, 1). Here we get at least 612. But Garland did not have the
Fourth Infantry (303 officers and men), which Bliss stated was "almost
destroyed" (McCall, Letters, 461). This must mean a loss (killed and
wounded) of at least one half; yet the official return was 36 (Ho. 24;
31, 1).
Taylor began the fighting with nearly 250 sick, and after three such
days of excitement, fatigue and hardship, this number was probably
quite 400. The guard at the camp--one company from each infantry
regiment--probably amounted to at least 300, and, as some Mexican
cavalry were looking for a chance to strike there, could not safely be
reduced. A considerable number of men were needed to hold the captured
forts, escort supplies of provisions and ammunition and perform other
special services. If we call Taylor's loss 800, deduct 350 for the sick
and allow 400 for guards and others detached on duty, we have about 4650
tired and considerably demoralized men (many of them horse and many
without bayonets) as perhaps available for an assault.
The simple fact that Taylor himself believed he could not, in less
than about six weeks (Bixby coll., 62), be in a condition to resume
his advance, indicated what his situation now was. Finally, it should
be mentioned, he entertained still the false idea of strategy shown at
Matamoros. He only cared to get Monterey, he said, for he could beat
the Mexicans at any time (Coleman, Crittenden, 309). The fact that it
would cost the lives of soldiers to beat the Mexicans did not appear to
signify.
12.13. =147=Chamberlain, diary. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 82 (Taylor), 106
(Worth). =169=Scott to Crittenden, Oct. 19. _Delta_, Feb. 14, 1847.
=169=Peyton to Crittenden, Oct. 2. Grant, Mems., i, 117-8. Welles
papers. Griffis, Perry, 218. Smith, Chile con Carne, 97. Lane,
Adventures, 42. _Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7. (Hardly) Ripley, War,
268-9. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 28.
As Welles remarked, the people took delight in thinking and talking
about the details of the fight. The capture of Monterey had no strategic
bearing on the aim of the war (Scott, Mems., ii, 412). The demonstration
of our fighting ability (which, however, had already been proved) had a
moral value; but one may well question whether this was not fully offset
by the blundering of Taylor and other officers, our losses and the terms
granted to Ampudia. Many of superior intelligence in the United States
criticised Taylor sharply.
XIII. SALTILLO, PARRAS, TAMPICO
13.1. Probably he did not include Wool's troops. A Mexican reported
that on Oct. 14 Taylor had not over 4000 in camp near Monterey, 600
regulars in that city and 1080 men in the hospitals there, and that 600
volunteers, who had arrived Oct. 15, marched with 400 from the camp to
other points. According to Gen. Patterson, commanding, there were in
the Camargo region, Oct. 8, about 7000 effectives, but by Oct. 31 these
numbered only 5700, viz., Second Dragoons, 150; Second Infantry and
Mounted Rifles, 500; Kentucky horse, 450; Tennessee horse, 450; Second
Kentucky, 400; Second Ohio, 500; First Indiana, 550; Second Indiana,
600; Third Indiana, 650; Second Tennessee, 350; Alabama, 400; Third
Illinois, 370; Fourth Illinois, 330. The Mounted Rifles were classed as
cavalry, but had no horses. Nov. 10 the sick at Camargo numbered 1400
or 1500, said a letter. Below Camargo there were troops now at Reynosa,
Matamoros, Camp Belknap, mouth of the river, Point Isabel and Brazos
Island. Nov. 2 Capt. W. S. Henry, a very good regular officer, doubted
whether Taylor had more than 10,000 effectives (Camp. Sketches, 239).
The returns showed only 13,000, he said.
13.2. It was stated, Dec. 1, that fully 120 had deserted. (Priests)
Henry, Camp. Sketches, 240; Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. The Mexican
government went so far as to pay the expense of sending a British
subject named Sinnott to the north for the express purpose of seducing
Taylor's Irish (Roman Catholic) soldiers (=76=Sinnott, Oct. 12;
=76=Guerra to Santa Anna, Dec. 5; =76=to Hacienda, Dec. 2; =76=S. Anna,
Jan. 1, 1847).
13.3. =61=July 21, 1846, Patterson wrote to the war department that he
was born in Ireland and entered the army as a first lieutenant in 1813.
He was then hardly more than a boy. Apparently he did not see much
service. Later he became rather active in the Philadelphia militia.
13.4. Taylor protested twice, and demanded that his subordinates should
be compelled "to keep in their proper places." Due retribution soon
followed. He sent an order to Col. Baker, one of Patterson's officers,
upon which that general demanded sharply that correspondence with his
subordinates should go by the usual channel (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 381,
384). Nov. 5 Taylor wrote a long and studied letter to Gen. Gaines,
defending himself and attacking the administration, and this was
published in the N. Y. _Herald_, Jan. 24, 1847. Evidently it was not a
mere bit of friendly correspondence. To many it seemed to be the opening
gun of a Presidential campaign, and certainty it was improper, for the
writer presented information and opinions about the American military
operations, and said that success would be worth little to the United
States--a view evidently calculated to discourage the Americans and
stimulate the enemy. Taylor was neatly punished for this imprudence by
a public revival of paragraph 650 of the army regulations of March 1,
1825, which forbade private letters or reports from officers regarding
military operations. Doubtless Polk was to a large extent right in
believing that Taylor was now in the hands of political tutors, and he
regarded him as "a vindictive and ignorant political partisan." See
Marcy to Taylor, Jan. 27, 1847, and reply (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 391, 809);
=108=Marcy to Bancroft, April 28; =256=_Id._ to Wetmore, Apr. 25; adj.
gen., gen. orders 3, 1847; Polk, Diary, Jan. 25-7; Phila. _Pub. Ledger_,
Jan. 26-7; Ho. 37; 30, 1.
13.5. A pleasanter outcome of the correspondence was the release of
seven American and a number of Mexican prisoners.
13.6. _Preliminary incidents._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 424 (Wool); 341,
344, 355, 367, 369, 391 (Marcy); 472-3 (Jones); 635 (Jesup); 325, 1270
(Scott); 682 (Whiting); 386, 439, 442 (S. Anna); 350-1, 358, 361, 381,
424, 437-40, 444, 526, 809 (Taylor); 384 (Patterson). =69=Patterson to
Marcy, Oct. 8; to Bliss, Oct. 8, 31; Nov. 23. Meade, Letters, i, 145-6,
152. _Morning News_, New London, Conn., Dec. 10. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
240. =307=Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. =69=Wool to Bliss, Nov. 2. =69=Riley
to Bliss, Dec. 14, 1846. _Niles_, Jan. 9, 1847, p. 290. =65=Patterson,
orders 1, 6, Sept. 5, 29. =169=Scott to Taylor, Sept. 26. =169=Taylor
to Crittenden, Jan. 26, 1847. Sen. 32; 31, 1 (Hughes). Wash. _Union_,
Sept. 26. Polk, Diary, May 14; Sept. 19-22, 24, 26; Oct. 12, 13, 20;
Nov. 21. =69=Patterson to Marcy, Oct. 8. =234=A. Johnson to ----, Dec.
2. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 273-4. Marcy, report in Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 45.
Eyewitness, Complete Hist., 48. =205=Graham, mem. book. _Diario_, Nov.
14, 29; Dec. 15. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 178. =65=_Id._, gen. orders,
no. 139, Nov. 8. =69=González, Sept. --. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 346,
354, 356. Also the following from =76=: Comte. gen. Oaxaca, Dec. 3.
Circular, Nov. 28. S. Anna to Taylor, Dec. 17. S. Anna, Nov. 28; Dec.
12. Sinnott, Oct. 12. Ordóñez to Worth, Nov. 12; to P. F. Smith, Nov.
20, Worth to Ordóñez, Nov. 12. Smith to O., Nov. 20. Ampudia, Oct. 4. J.
F. Rada, Oct. 17. Parrodi, Sept. 16. Worth to alcalde, Nov. 5. On the
origin of the proposed Tamaulipas expedition see chap. xxvii, note 4.
13.7. Lieut. Mackall's battery, the Seventh Infantry, and one company of
the Artillery Battalion were left at Monterey under P. F. Smith.