fortifications, and during that time the enemy could attack on
advantageous terms; 2. The matériel could not be saved; 3. The
abandonment of Monterey would lead the people to declare their
independence and unite with Taylor, enabling him to hold the mountains
so strongly that 50,000 men could not dislodge him; 4. Public opinion
would blame Ampudia and the government; 5. The effect on the morale
of all the troops concerned in the affair would be fatal. His plan was
to attack the Americans in detail on their march; and then, should he
find them too strong for him, retreat with his artillery and infantry,
leaving the cavalry to fight rear-guard actions.
11.14. Apuntes, 54. From =76= the following. To Mejía, May 27. Mejía,
June 19 (two despatches); July 25. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 12.
Ampudia, Sept. 9. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31.
11.15. =307=Roberts, diary, Nov. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 133, 136.
Richmond _Enquirer_, Oct. 20. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Henshaw
narrative. Apuntes, 53-4; =176=Davis to Brown, Sept. 20. Balbontín,
Invasión, 24. =92=Map and plan of defence. Negrete, Invasión, ii,
327 (Ampudia). _Picayune_, Nov. 4. Eyewitness, Complete History, 45.
Numerous maps, published and in MS.
11.16. Apuntes, 53-4. Meade, Letters, i, 138 (evidently in error about
the citadel garrison). _Picayune_, Oct. 21. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov.
20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 216. Henshaw narrative. Robertson, Remins.,
126-8. =69=Mansfield, report. =66=_Id._ to Totten, June 30, 1847.
=147=Chamberlain, diary. Balbontín, Invasión, 43. =76=Comte. gen. N.
León, Sept. 20. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 9. The Americans often spoke of
the citadel as the "Black Fort" or the "Old Colored Gentleman." Its
Mexican name was Fort Independencia, but it must not be confounded with
the redoubt on Independence Hill. It stood about 1000 yards from the
densely-built part of the city.
11.17. =69=Mansfield, report. Balbontín, Invasión, 27, 38, 42. =76=Mejía
to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 424 (Taylor). =364=Worth to ----,
Oct. 2. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy, report). =221=Hill, diary. Henry,
Camp. Sketches, 217.
11.18. From =76=. S. Anna to Ampudia, Aug. 13. Ampudia to Gov.
Tamaulipas, Aug. 23. Relaciones (to Guerra), Sept. 23. Ampudia, Aug. 28.
To Ampudia, Sept. 4. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31.
11.19. _Diario_, July 4; Sept. 21. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 25. Reid,
Scouting Expeds., 120. _Picayune_, Sept. 22. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 326.
N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, Sept. 22. =76=Ampudia, proc., Aug. 31.
=76=Proc. in English, Sept. 15. =76=Circular, Sept. 15.
11.20. _Monitor Repub._, Sept. 18; Oct. 29 (Jáuregui). =13=Bankhead,
no. 155, 1846. Apuntes, 54, 57. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. =76=Nevia to
Ampudia, Aug. 26.
11.21. Tampico _Eco_, Sept. 24. Gov. of Tamaulipas, Aug. 20. Rose,
McCulloch, 73. Mejía to Paredes, July 20. Balbontín, Invasión, 26.
Apuntes, 55-8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 526 (spec. orders 129). And from =76=
the following. Ampudia, Aug. 31; Sept. 2, res., 15, res. _Id._ to
Torrejón, Sept. 1. Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Canales, Aug. 30. _Id._ to
Ampudia, Aug. 30-1. Mejía to comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 17.
Canales said in substance: The spare horses of the enemy cannot be
taken, for they are not turned loose; the roads cannot be broken up, for
they run across stony plains; the woods cannot be fired, for no great
fields of dry grass are near them; the watering places cannot be made
useless, for they are streams coming from the mountains; the wagons and
pack-mules cannot be captured, for my horses are unserviceable.
11.22. Meade, Letters, i, 129. =147=Chamberlain, diary. Giddings,
Sketches, 97. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Aug. 28. Nebel and Kendall,
5. Mayer, Mex. War, 159-61. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. =65=Gen. orders 115.
Smith, Chile con Carne, 94, note. Accounts of the costumes naturally
varied.
11.23. _Picayune_, Oct. 6. Greensborough _Morn. Post_, Apr. 5, 1903.
=349=Patridge to Miss W., July 21, 1847. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec., 1907,
316-7. _Spirit of the Times_, Oct. 14. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 183-6,
244. =364=Worth to S., Sept. 16. McCall, Letters, 470. Reid, Scouting
Expeds., 128. =190=Ewing, diary, Nov. 18. Robertson, Remins., 123-4.
Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 57. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 421-2 (Taylor).
One small mountain in this region had a bare side composed of
crystallized sulphate of lime. Here, as generally, the author draws upon
his own observations of Mexican scenery. There were a number of defiles
between Cerralvo and Monterey and a great deal of rough, bushy country,
where the Mexicans could have made Taylor no little trouble. In all
probability he could have been delayed five to seven days. See _Monitor_
_Repub._, Oct. 20, _remitido_.
11.24. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 57,
59. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 277. Robertson, Remins.,
125-6. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 119-20. Apuntes, 54, 58. Wilhelm, Eighth
Inf., ii, 288. =76=Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. Reid, Scouting
Expeds., 142. _Picayune_, Oct. 6. Rose, McCulloch, 100. _Niles_, Oct.
17, p. 103. =244=Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
189-91.
Wilhelm, who wrote the history of Worth's old regt. and had the use
of Worth's papers, states that, after arriving at Marín, Taylor was
"firm" in the opinion that he would meet with no serious resistance at
Monterey. Certainly he then estimated Ampudia's regulars at only about
3000 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 422).
11.25. =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 15, 1847. _Id._, Letter to
Gaines. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 178. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey,
46. Robertson, Remins., 124. Henshaw narrative. French, Two Wars, 67.
Apuntes, 58. Chávez, July 29, 1848. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 19. _Monitor
Repub._, Oct. 20. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 190-2.
Taylor's =61=field return, Sept. 21 (the first of two numbers
represents officers): Hdqtrs. and staff, 22; 23. Webster's battery
(24-lb. howitzers), 3; 24. 1st Div. Hdqtrs. and staff, 3; 10. Ridgely's
batt., 3; 75. 2 Drags. (4 Cos.), 10; 228. Bragg's batt., 2; 64. 3 Inf.
(6 Cos.), 18; 284. 4 Inf. (6 Cos.), 16; 287. Shiver's Co., 3; 55. 1
Inf. (4 Cos.), 12; 179. Balt. and Wash. Battal. (6 Cos.), 20; 314. 2D
DIV. (see below), 93; 1558. FIELD DIV. (see below), 148; 1781. TEX.
DIV. Hdqtrs. and staff, 5 offs. 1st Regt. (10 Cos.), 32; 376. 2d Regt.
(10 Cos.), 35; 527. Surgeons, 5. Sick, 3; 143. 2D DIV. (Sept. 17).
Staffs, 5. _1st brig._: Duncan's batt., 68; Artill. Battal., 532; 8
Inf., 331. _2d brig._: Mackall's batt., 70; 5 Inf., 280; 7 Inf., 282;
Blanchard's Co., 83. (These figures include 88 com. offs.) Sick, 7;
45. 5 Inf., 7 Inf. and 8 Inf. had 6 Cos. each. Art. Battal. had 9 Cos.
FIELD DIV. (Sept. 20). Staff, 12. Artill., 37. Ky. (10 Cos.), 482;
Ohio (10 Cos.), 524; Miss. (8 Cos.), 452; Tenn. (10 Cos.), 459. (These
figures include 139 com. offs.) Sick, 1; 42. Grand totals (Sept. 21),
425; 5795 = 6220.
Taylor's formal report counted the officers twice. Ripley made the same
mistake (War with Mexico, i, 199). The 24-lb. howitzers appear to have
been classed as heavy field guns (=69=memo., ordnance office, June 15).
XII. MONTEREY
12.1. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Feb. 1, 1847. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76,
83 (Taylor). Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., ii, 289. =76=Comte. gen. N. León,
Sept. 20. Stevens, Campaigns, 22. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 192. Nebel and
Kendall, 5, 6. Apuntes, 58.
12.2. Apuntes, 59. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 (Berra). Nebel and
Kendall, 6. _Nat. Intelligencer_, Nov. 20. J. Davis in _Cong. Globe_,
31, 1, app., 1034-41. _Picayune_, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. =221=Hill, diary.
Smith, To Mexico, 73-4. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M.
=147=Chamberlain, diary. Balbontín, Invasión, 25, 36. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p.
102 (Worth).
The Federation 9-pdrs. were classed by the Mexicans as 8-pdrs. The
half-moon battery was designed to come into play after the capture of
the city, annoying the captors and defending the line of retreat to
Saltillo.
12.3. =76=Comte. gen. N. León, Sept. 20. =69=Worth to Bliss, Aug. 28.
=76=Ampudia, Sept. 19, res.
12.4. =221=Hill, diary. =277=Staniford to Pemberton, Sept. 26.
Robertson, Remins., 130. Nebel and Kendall, 6. Chamberlain, diary.
Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). =76=Comte. gen. N. León,
Sept. 20. _Picayune_, Nov. 13. =245=Hays to Henderson, undated.
_Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2. Meade, Letters, i, 133. _Metropol. Mag._, Dec,
1907 (Hamilton). _Spirit of the Times_, Nov. 7. (Worth) Robertson,
Remins., Sept. 20; =185=J. Van Buren, oration; Chase, Polk Admin., 156;
=185=W. to Duncan, Apr. 15; Jacksonville (Ala.) _Republican_, Nov. 25;
Grone, Briefe, 83; Semmes, Service, 282; =327=Sutherland to father, Aug.
--.
A part of Hays's four hundred did not march until a little later. It
seems clear, although neither Taylor nor Worth mentions the fact, that
a party of dragoons accompanied the expedition (Chamberlain, diary;
Haskin, First Artillery, 307). It will be recalled that most of our
"artillery" served as infantry. Blanchard's company was made up of
men who did not wish to leave when most of the Louisiana infantry was
ordered home (p. 205).
Worth's movement was in principle extremely hazardous (Halleck, Mil.
Art, 414). Napoleon (Maxims, p. 24): "Nothing is more rash or more
opposed to the principles of war, than a flank march in the presence
of an army in position, especially when that army occupies heights at
the foot of which you must defile." This maxim seems to fit the case
precisely. Stevens (Campaigns, 28) defended the movement on the ground
that Taylor knew what could be expected of Worth's command and of the
Mexicans; but as Ampudia had shown no conspicuous want of ability and
courage on May 8 and 9, Taylor had no reason to suppose he would act
here as badly as he did. Indeed the struggle at Monterey showed that if
Taylor assumed the Mexicans would not fight, he erred. It was doubtless
realized by Taylor and Worth that the small American army, without siege
artillery or adequate supplies, could escape ruin only through extreme
boldness. Apparently the plan originated with Worth, for he knew more
about the terrain than Taylor did. Wilhelm so states, and the N. Y.
_Sun_ also, the editor of which was close to Worth, gave him that credit
(Aug. 14, 1847). Bragg (=210=to Hammond, May 4, 1848) ascribed the plan
to Taylor; but, as Taylor was the commander-in-chief, this was the
natural presumption.
12.5. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 83 (Taylor). _Picayune_,
Nov. 13. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 29 (Jáuregui), 31 (Berra). =245=Hays to
Henderson, undated. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 152. =218=Henshaw narrative.
Ampudia, Manifiesto. Robertson, Remins., 130-1. =69=Worth to Bliss,
Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M.
12.6. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). _Monitor Repub._, Oct.
29. =76=Vázquez, Sept. 23. Balbontín, Invasión, 27. =69=Worth to Bliss,
Sept. 20, 9:30 P.M. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Robertson, Remins.,
131-2.
12.7. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 83 (Taylor), 102 (Worth). =185=Duncan to Worth,
Sept. 28. Henshaw narrative. Chamberlain, diary. Apuntes, 59. González,
Aguascalientes, 152. =185=Worth to Marcy, July 14, 1847. =69=Worth to
Bliss, Sept. 21, 8:15 A.M.; 3:40 P.M. _Picayune_, Nov. 13, 1846; Feb.
17, 1847. Meade, Letters, i, 133. Wash. _Union_, Nov. 20. =252=Mackall
to father, Sept. 27. N. Y. _Sun_, Oct. 14. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 17,
31; Nov. 15. =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. Haskin, First Artillery,
309. =180=C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. =277=Staniford to
Pemberton, Sept. 26. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201. Prieto, Memorias, 205.
Reid, Scouting Expeds., 157-9.
McCulloch, being in advance, did not receive the order to take post
behind the fence, and hence fought in the road.
12.8. _The operations on Federation Ridge._ =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept.
21, 3:40 P.M. Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102 (Worth). =245=Hays to
Henderson, undated. =180=C. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 30. =277=P.
F. Smith to _Id._, Sept. 27. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31 (Berra).
=252=Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 201-3. Nebel
and Kendall, 6-7. _Hist. Mag._, Mar., 1874, p. 138. Wash. _Union_, Nov.
12, 20. Chamberlain, diary and recolls. =278=Niehenke, statement. Meade,
Letters, i, 134. _Picayune_, Oct. 4; Nov. 13. Henshaw narrative. Reid,
Scouting Expeds., 162-6. Hill, diary.
Meade (Letters, i, 88) wrote: Worth "has the great misfortune of being
most rash and impetuous, and of constantly doing things which cooler
reflection causes him to repent. This infirmity, in my opinion, renders
him unfit to command, but on the field of battle, under another, his
gallantry and bravery are well known and most conspicuous." U. S. Grant
(Mems., i, 123) said: Worth "was nervous, impatient and restless on the
march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him."
Miles set out about forty-five minutes later than C. F. Smith. On
reaching the ridge he sent off detachments in order to divert attention
from Smith. Still restless, Worth sent Col. Hays and more Texans to the
ridge, but these did not arrive in time to do anything of consequence.
Gen. Smith's attack upon El Soldado, made on his own responsibility,
had a very important bearing upon the movement against Independence
Hill and the Bishop's Palace. Hitchcock said Gen. Smith not only aided
Worth materially but saved his reputation (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). The
summit and El Soldado continued to be held by the Americans. Scott and
Blanchard (who was under Scott's orders) were recalled from No. 3 to
El Soldado the next morning to coöperate in the attack on the Palace.
According to some Americans three guns were captured. This mistake
probably arose because one piece was used by the Americans at the summit
and then moved to El Soldado. According to the Mexicans there seem to
have been only 175 of them on the ridge. On both sides the loss of men
on Federation Ridge was insignificant. Worth had 15 or 20 killed and
wounded. Some thought the summit of Federation Ridge not less than 800
feet high. As the Monterey plans are unavoidably based to a large
extent upon sketches and estimates, it has not been thought best to give
a scale of miles.
12.9. _The capture of Independence Hill._ Ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 102
(Worth). Ampudia, Manifiesto. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 22, 8:30 A.M.,
5 P.M. French, Two Wars, 64-5. =147=Chamberlain, diary. =148=_Id._,
recolls. Balbontín, Invasión, 38-9. Apuntes, 61-2. =190=Ewing, diary.
=218=Henshaw narrative; =221=Hill, diary. _Picayune_, Nov. 13.
=252=Mackall to father, Sept. 27. Meade, Letters, i, 135-6. Wash.
_Union_, Nov. 20. _Diario_, Sept. 30. _Monitor Repub._, Oct. 31
(Berra). =245=Hays to Henderson, undated. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 205.
Nebel and Kendall, 6. =185=Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. Reid, Scouting
Expeds., 183-5. Ampudia to the People. Some officers thought the hill
nearly 600 feet high, Ampudia tardily ordered reinforcements to the
hill, but they did not arrive. Worth's loss, Sept. 22, was only about a
dozen killed and wounded.
12.10. _Taylor's and Ampudia's operations, Sept. 20-3_; _Worth's,
Sept. 23_. Ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 76-109 (reports of Taylor and officers).
Ho. 17; 30, 1 (reports of officers). =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct.
9, 1846; Jan. 26, 1847. =190=Ewing, diary. =218=Henshaw narrative.
Coleman, Crittenden, i, 309. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 303-7. =221=Hill,
diary. Numerous reports and letters in =174= and =176=. Smith, Chile
con Carne, 82-97. Thorpe, Our Army at Monterey, 55, 59. Ampudia,
Manifiesto. _Id._ to Fellow-citizens. Robertson, Reminiscences,
136-50. =61=Graham to Polk, April --, 18.7. =61=Quitman to Hamer,
Sept. 28. =69=Capt. Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. Taylor, gen. orders
115. =69=Worth to Bliss, Sept. 23, 11 P.M. =69=Trowbridge to Stewart,
Feb. 8, 1848. French, Two Wars, 62, 64-6. =66=Mansfield to Totten,
Feb. 1, 1847. =69=Backus to Brady, Sept. 22, 1848. =147=Chamberlain,
diary. =148=_Id._, recolls. Balbontín, Invasión, 24, 27-35, 40-3.
Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 72. Apuntes, 53, 60-4. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
419 (Worth), 424 (Taylor). Roberts, diary. _Hist. Mag._, Jan., 1874,
pp. 8-9. _Picayune_, Oct. 23; Nov. 4, 13. Meade, Letters, i, 134-5,
137-8, 163-5. =185=Duncan to Worth, Sept. 28. =242=Kingsbury to
mother, Oct. 14. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 29, 30. Stevens, Camps.,
23-9. =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 371, res., 1846. _Hist. Mag._, x,
207-13, 255-7. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, 136-40. J. Davis: note 2.
_Pennsylvanian_, Nov. 2 (Peyton). Wash. _Union_, Nov. 20, 1846; Mar.
2, 1847. Balt. _Sun_, Nov. 6. _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 15. _Spirit of
the Times_, Nov. 7, 28, 1846; Jan. 9, 1847. =245=Wood to Henderson,
Sept. 24. =245=Hays to _Id._, undated. _Niles_, Nov. 28, p. 201.
=244=Chandler to Lakin, Nov. 23. =175=Russell, to Davis, Sept. 26; Oct.
18. =175=Cooper to Davis, Sept. --. Wilcox, Mex. War, 119. Kenly, Md.
Vol., 77, 107-27, etc. =139=W. B. to D. Campbell, Sept. 28; Nov. 2, 9,
1846; Feb. 19, 1847. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 193-201, 203-4, 206-12,
221. =130=Brichta, Letter. Nebel and Kendall, 7-10. =139=Campbell to
Quitman, Sept. 27; to wife, Oct. 1. =150=Cheatham to son, Oct. 6;
to sister, Oct. 16. =277=P. F. Smith to Pemberton, Sept. 27. Reid,
Scouting Expeds., 108, 152, 170, 173, 190. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 22, 25.
=76=_Id._ to comte. gen. S. L. P., Sept. 28. =76=Head of Ampudia's
medical service, Sept. 24. The author of the verse was C. F. Hoffman.
REMARKS. Taylor's lack of interest in studying the topography and
fortifications is illustrated by the fact that Butler, second in
command, does not seem to have been shown the map drawn by Meade from
information obtained by Worth, though Taylor certainly saw it (Wilhelm,
Eighth Infantry, ii, 283). Butler stated officially that when he
attacked the city he knew nothing about the locality. Capt. Henry said
Garland's charge was made in "utter ignorance" regarding it (Camp.
Sketches, 194). It has been said that Taylor lacked entrenching tools;
but he had tools for building roads, planting the mortar and howitzers,
and erecting new defences at the Tenería redoubt. Stevens (Campaigns,
29) undertook to defend Taylor's operations on Sept. 21 by saying that
the ardor of Garland's men brought them into action before Mansfield's
reconnaissance had been completed; but (1) Garland was virtually
instructed to follow Mansfield's directions and did so, and (2) Oct.
24 Taylor said he would have pursued the same course, had he known all
that he learned later about the situation--_i.e._ Garland executed
Taylor's ideas and wishes (=61=Graham to Polk, Apr. --, [1847]).
Waiting for a fuller reconnaissance, therefore, would have consumed
time without giving any advantage. It follows, too, from this statement
of Taylor's that he would not have excused Mansfield, had Mansfield
instructed Garland not to charge. Taylor did not recommend a brevet for
Garland. This was an implied censure. Capt. G. M. Graham of Garland's
command therefore addressed a letter to Polk, giving a full account of
Garland's proceedings. This letter was presented to Polk by Gen. George
Gibson, who gave the writer "a high character." It may be added, that
it was impossible for Mansfield to make a complete reconnaissance under
the circumstances. He would not have lived to finish it.
The Fourth Infantry, having been detached to cover the battery, was not
in Garland's charge. The mortar does not seem to have been effective on
Sept. 21 (Giddings, Sketches, 202); had it been so, it would not have
been put out of commission for a considerable time by being sent to
Worth, who does not seem to have asked for it. It appears to have been
used by Taylor only twenty minutes, which suggests that its inefficiency
was speedily discovered. Had the cause been merely the lack of a
platform (Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 206), it could have been removed.
There was timber enough at Walnut Grove. The statements regarding the
number of guns in Tenería redoubt cannot be wholly reconciled. This may
arise from the fact that not all the pieces could be used. The statement
in the text seems to be safe.
The author feels some scepticism about the doings of Backus. No
unanimity prevailed then about him. He is rather too precise in his own
statement. He says (_Historical Magazine_, x, 255) that the distance
from the building he occupied to the tannery was found to be 117-3/4
yards. One can hardly understand how so exact a measurement can have
been made in such a locality. The distance from his position to Tenería
redoubt was considerably more than this. Henry estimated it at 130 yards
(Campaign Sketches, 195). Muskets were not reliable at this distance.
His claims were not accepted by all at the time. Still, many believed
that he contributed materially to the capture of the redoubt. After the
capture of this redoubt Col. Davis undertook to storm El Diablo, but
was recalled. There was a sharp clash between Taylor and Butler in the
course of the operations, Sept. 21. Taylor should, of course, have kept
out of the street fighting (Griepenkerl, Applied Tactics, 187). There
was sufficient demand for head work at that time to absorb his full
attention. It was stated that after the repulse of the Americans, Sept.
21, Mejía asked to have both infantry and cavalry charge them. Had this
been done the results might have been very serious.
The American artillery when in the town was handled as cautiously as
possible. For example, a gun would be loaded and leveled behind a
corner, drawn out by ropes, fired, and drawn back by the ropes (French,
Two Wars, 66). Yet even in a case of this kind four out of the five
gunners were killed. Taylor does not mention the presence of the Fourth
Infantry, Sept. 23, but U. S. Grant does (Mems., i, 115-6); and as he
belonged to that corps, it seems hardly possible that he was mistaken.
It had been so much reduced the day before, that perhaps Taylor did not
think it worth mention. According to Taylor's report the reason for
withdrawing his men from the city on the afternoon of Sept. 23 was to
prepare for a general assault. But considerable time would have been
necessary to do this in concert with Worth, and it is hard to see why
they were withdrawn under fire when they were doing good work in safety,
and night was not far distant. Apparently the best way to arrange for
such concerted operations would have been to leave these troops where
they were, and open a line of communication through the northern part of
the city (Ripley, _op. cit._, i, 264). The rumors that Mexican forces
were approaching by the Saltillo road were correct, but Ampudia sent
them an order to retire. They were not strong enough to accomplish
anything.
When Worth attacked the city, Sept. 23, his right-hand column, headed by
Texan riflemen, dismounted, under Col. Hays, took the Calle de Monterey;
the left-hand column, headed by similar troops under Lieut. Col. Walker,
took the Calle de Itúrbide. Besides the Texans and the field batteries,
the Seventh and Eighth Infantry and the Artillery Battalion joined in
the attack. The detachment that had been sent up the Saltillo road was
recalled and acted as a reserve. The American shells thrown during the
night of Sept. 23 seem to have injured nothing except Ampudia's courage.
Purísima Bridge was about 2300 feet from the cathedral.
It is probably true that Taylor's operations at the eastern end of the
town and the disregard of life exhibited by his troops tended to dismay
Ampudia. But Taylor had no reason to suppose that operations so badly
planned, so ineffective and so costly would have that effect; they were
wasteful; and they demoralized his own men. The Mexicans fought in most
cases with a courage and tenacity deserving of high praise (Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 209). So far as one can see, nothing saved Taylor from a
disaster that would have meant the ruin of his army but the poltroonery
of one man, Ampudia; and as we have remarked, he had no reason to expect
that. The head of Ampudia's medical service reported, Sept. 24, that
only sixty privates had been seriously wounded.