(Aug. 31) severe penalties for civil and military officers refusing to
obey orders during the war; (Sept. 3) the free manufacture and sale
of gunpowder; (Sept. 4) a commission to provide lands for American
deserters; (Sept. 10) naturalization to be gained by entering the army
or navy; (Sept. 10) reëstablishment of the Military Normal School at
Chapultepec under the name Military College; (Sept. 11) regulations for
the National Guard. The purpose of offering a pardon to deserters from
the regular army was probably to transfer men from it to the National
Guards (Bankhead, no. 126, Sept. 7).
10.38. The attitude of the best citizens was probably stated by the
_Monitor Republicano_ of Aug. 25: "We will say to Santa Anna: ... if
you recognize your errors, promote the welfare of the country, pursue
a course entirely different from your former policy, and prove by
acts--not words--that your misdeeds were not crimes but errors, then
Mexico will forget the past and reward liberally the citizen conferring
upon her so marked a benefit."
10.39. Thirteen municipalities of Oaxaca contributed a total of 75 pesos.
10.40. Guadalupe Hidalgo, a suburb on the northern side of Mexico,
contained a deeply venerated shrine of the Virgin.
10.41. _The situation and Santa Anna's course._ =47=Conner, July 28;
Aug. 12, 16 (unofficial), 25; Sept. 5, 13, 22; Oct. 4. =73=Bermúdez de
Castro, no. 316, res., Aug. 28; nos. 345-6, Sept. 28. Ramírez, México,
131-5, 137, 145, 149. =52=Black, Aug. 22, 27; Sept. 12, 22, 28; Oct. 8.
Mora, Papeles Ined., 60. =162=Conner to wife, Aug. 29. Heller, Reisen,
195-6. Sierra, Evolution, i, 215. Tributo á la Verdad. =70=Degrees,
Aug. 22, 28. =76=Salas, proclams., Aug. 28; decrees, Sept. 10, 27.
=13=Gutiérrez de Estrada to Palmerston, Mar. 1, 1847. =76=Circular,
Aug. 28 ("infamous" reports that the govt. aims to destroy the army).
=13=Bankhead, nos. 111, 120-2, 126, 128, 136, 140, 142, 1846. Rivera,
Jalapa, iii, 787-9. =166=Campbell to Conner, July 9, 13. =166=Pommarès
to Conner, Aug. 29; Sept. 23. _Amer. Sentinel_, June 15, 1836. _Revue
des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, p. 404. México á través, iv, 577-9,
590, 628. _Diario_, Aug. 27-Sept. 6, 9, 11-20, 23, 25-30. =47=Black to
Conner, Sept. 24. _Eco de Tampico_, Nov. 4 (If S. Anna beats the enemy
he will be the idol of the Mexicans). =76=Circulars, Aug. 17, 22, 28,
31; Sept. 3, 15, 17, 20, 25, 28. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec. García,
Revol. de Ayutla, 15. Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec. =77=Circular,
Sept. 10; Nov. 27. Dublán, Legislación, v, 155-61. _Republicano_, Sept.
15, 29; Nov. 5. =76=To Almonte, Aug. 28. =76=S. Anna, Sept. 7, 13, 14,
21, 24, 25, 26. Apuntes, 67, 115. Tributo á la Verdad. Bustamante,
Nuevo Bernal, ii, 94, 96, 101, 111. =76=Comte. gen. Puebla, Sept. 6.
_Diario_, supplem. to no. 39. =70=Almonte to comte. gen. Méx., Sept.
15. =76=Comte. gen. V. Cr., procl., Oct. 1. _Monitor Repub._, Aug.
25; Sept. 14-15, 18, 25. Ruxton, Advent. (1847), 47, 49. _Imparcial_,
June 18, 1906. =76=Comte. gen. Querétaro, procl., Sept. 29. S. Anna,
Apelación, 20. London _Times_, Oct. 7; Nov. 6. (380) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p.
1046 (Scott).
10.42. (Bulls) =121=Handbill.
XI. TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO
11.1. =76=Arista, May 25, 29. =76=To Mejía, May 27. (Monterey)
=169=Taylor to Crittenden, Oct. 9. Apuntes, 50-3. =76=Mejía, June 9,
19; July 2. =76=_Id._, proclam., July 6. The number of officers, each
of whom required baggage and servants, was excessive. Arista eliminated
more than half of them. The cavalry were afoot, and he took steps to
remount them. Contracts were made for mules to draw the cannon, and the
work of putting the artillery in order began. Owing to Mejía's illness,
Requena assumed the actual command in June (Carreño, Jefes, ccii).
11.2. Apuntes, 51, 53. =285=Letter to Paredes, July 13. =285=Segura
to Escudero, June 4. Balbontín, Invasión, 26. =76=Arista, Apr. 24.
=76=Mejía, June 9, 19, 20; July 19, 29; Aug. 19, 21. =76=_Id._ to Baz,
July 29. =76=Ampudia, Aug. 28. =76=Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. =69=Spy to
Taylor, Apr. 5. In addition to their lack of patriotism, the people had
no arms (=76=gov. N. León, May 24).
11.3. =69=Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. =285=Mejía to Paredes, July 20.
And from =76= the following. Mejía, June 14 ("The loss of the immense
territory divided by the Sierra is inevitable"); July 9, 19; Aug. 10,
17, 21. _Id._ to Canales, Aug. 10. Gargollo to second alcalde of S.
Fernando, June 5. S. Fernando ayunt. to gov. of Tamaulipas, June 8.
Canales, June 18. _Id._ to Mejía, June 14; June 14, personal. Gov. of N.
León, June 24.
Mejía reported that the officers at Monterey agreed to make no
pronunciamiento and to obey the established authorities, whoever they
might be; but a spy reported "utter confusion" in the public mind there
(Vinton, _supra_) in consequence of the revolution of August 4, and
Worth heard that a state of things existed which might have been taken
advantage of by Taylor (=69=to Bliss, Aug. 27).
11.4. (Intended) June 24 Taylor wrote: "If the gov. think proper to
entrust me with this command for the purpose of carrying the war into
the enemies country I do not feel authorized to decline the same"
(Letters (Bixby), 18). The context shows that Taylor then knew (p. 17)
that he _was_ to have the command. The orders to that effect had been
issued June 8. In fact the orders of Jan. 13 directed Taylor to assume
the offensive, should Mexico begin hostilities, and his report of Apr.
26 recommended operating beyond the Rio Grande (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 91,
141). All that he did and failed to do must therefore be viewed in the
light of the fact that he knew, or should have known, that he ought
to wage a vigorous and aggressive campaign. (Smuggling) Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 19. The smuggling on this border was a familiar theme in the
Mexican press. =76=Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31 (some Mexicans are led by
self-interest to serve the Americans more faithfully than they would
serve their own country). =76=Mejía (July 19) classed the people of the
border generally as enemies. Taylor seems to have neglected persistently
the duty of obtaining information (_Niles_, Sept. 12, p. 22; _So. Qtrly.
Rev._, Nov., 1850, p. 457). Apparently he tried interrogating Mexicans
here and there, and was disgusted to find their statements disagreed.
What he should have had was, as Scott recommended (Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 327) many carefully selected agents (spies), whose accounts could
have been sifted by comparison. No evidence can be found that he even
attempted to follow this advice, though Worth realized the value of
information, and did something of real utility. Taylor's lack of data
will appear later. Meade, who was in a position to be well-informed,
wrote on Sept. 17 near Marín that the Americans knew no more of the
numbers or defences at Monterey than when they were at Matamoros
(Letters, i, 130). Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 156-60) endeavors to
show that Scott interfered unwarrantably and caused confusion by giving
Taylor instructions on June 12 that were at variance with those given by
Marcy on June 8 (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 323, 325). But (1) Marcy knew of and
endorsed Scott's "interference" (_ibid._, p. 328); and (2) there was no
practical variance. Marcy and Scott agreed that Taylor was to advance.
Scott said Taylor would make the high road toward the capital one of his
lines, which was (as Scott said) a matter "of course." Marcy said it had
not been decided whether he should advance _to_ the capital.
11.5. Polk, Diary, Sept. 5, 1846; Mar. 20, 1847. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 545
(Jesup). =76=Gov. Tamaulipas, Aug. 5 (Taylor obtained 1000 mules through
the alcalde of Reynosa). Upton, Military Policy, 215 (not known at
Washington that wagons could be used). Taylor, Letter to Gaines. Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 559, 565-6 (Jesup). Smith, Remins., 13-15. Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 177-8. =61=Worth to alcalde, Aug. 24. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
164. N. Y. _Commerc. Advertiser_, Mar. 29, 1847. May 21 Taylor wrote
that the means of transportation might be pack-mules "chiefly" (Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 300). (Taylor's plans not known) Sen. 1; 30, 1, 546 (Jesup).
(Complained) =169=Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1; =61=to adj. gen., Sept.
10; Letter to Gaines; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 557.
Wagons (drawn usually by eight mules) were more convenient, where they
could be used, than pack-mules; but Santa Anna showed, six months later,
that with no such wagons 24-pound cannon and an army three times as
large as Taylor proposed to take could be moved about twice the distance
from Camargo to Monterey by a route that passed through, not a populated
region like that where Taylor was, but a virtual desert. Taylor not only
knew that Arista had depended upon mules, but captured that general's
entire outfit. It was easy to obtain large numbers of mules through the
alcaldes. Experience proved that unbroken mules could be made fit for
the work in three days (Smith, Remins., 18). The first call for wagons
(May 18) proceeded from a quartermaster at Pt. Isabel, who called for
seventy. There is no evidence that Taylor prompted this requisition,
and it was wholly inadequate for his professed needs. His indifference
about such matters was illustrated by Col. Cross, at the time his chief
quartermaster, who said, "With respect to the means of transportation to
be provided, or other preparations in my branch of the service, I have
never received a line of instructions or any order whatever from Gen.
Taylor" (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 650). It was his duty to call seasonably for
the desired number of wagons, and he did not do it.
When the department found that wagons were wanted, it displayed much
energy in having them purchased or built (Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 546-764).
In fact, on an intimation from Scott (May 15), it ordered 200 to be
constructed at Philadelphia as soon as they could be thoroughly made,
and eleven days later sent an agent to Cincinnati for 300 more. Later
the field of operations extended as far as Boston. But much time was
required to find suitable lumber and skilled workmen, build the wagons
properly, and transport them to Mexico. None reached the front in time
for the fall campaign; and indeed, after they arrived, pack-mules
continued to be used (Whiting: Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 688). Taylor complained
particularly (Bixby collection, 185) because 100-150 wagons intended for
him went to Wool, whose expedition will be described in chap. xiii; but
Wool was under Taylor's orders, and the latter neglected to regulate
the matter, while the former was alert and active. Taylor complained
also of lacking mules, harness, pack-saddles, horseshoe nails, etc.;
but, as in the cases of boats and wagons, the fault seems chargeable to
the head of the army. He conceived the absurd idea that the government
was endeavoring to ruin him by crippling his operations, as if success
had not been fully as important for the government as for him. Worth
privately said that any lack of transportation was chargeable to
Taylor, and described the General's complaints as intended to ward off
responsibility in case of failure and augment glory in case of success
(=364=to Capt. S., Sept. 5); and on the maturest consideration this
judgment appears to be substantially correct. For a statement of the
chief clerk, quartermaster's office, Washington, see chap. x, note
13. The practical conclusion is that Taylor, with nearly 300 wagons
and numberless mules at command, was able to move with reasonable
promptness. Jesup, after reaching the scene, contracted for 2000 mules
in one day, and said that Taylor might have collected 10,000 (Ho. 60;
30, 1, p. 567).
One must be extremely cautious about asserting what a general might
have done; but it seems quite clear that Taylor could and should have
organized a systematic spy service that would have given him adequate
information regarding the Mexican army and the defences of Monterey;
have advanced his regulars, about 1000 at least of his best volunteers,
a large supply of provisions, at least six 18-pounders, entrenching
tools, etc. to Camargo in June; have had at least 3000 mules collected
there by August 1; have placed, say, 2000 regulars and 1000 volunteers
at Cerralvo by Aug. 15, and gathered the large stocks of subsistence
available in that district; and have reached Monterey with 9000 men,
heavy guns and ample supplies by Sept. 15. Or Taylor might have gone
to Saltillo _via_ Monclova. The distance would have been considerably
greater, but the Mexicans would have had to abandon Monterey and
Rinconada Pass, and Taylor and Wool would have been able to coöperate.
Both Santa Anna and Mejía feared he would adopt this plan. In reply to
all this it may be said that on pp. 198-9 the author mentioned without
disapproval Scott's plan to begin the campaign about Sept. 25. But the
two cases were not parallel. Taylor was already in the "hot mud" and
needed to bestir himself; and he planned but a small movement, whereas
Scott, not yet in touch with the conditions, planned a large and
decisive one, which probably would not have advanced _via_ Monterey.
11.6. (Knew) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46, 51, 177; N. Y. _Herald_, July
25; _Niles_, July 18, p. 309; Scott, Mems., ii, 391-2; _Cong. Globe_,
29, 2, app., 125 (Ingersoll). A resolution was introduced in Congress
asking the reason for the inactivity of the army (_Niles_, July 18, p.
309). One newspaper called Taylor "Gen. Delay." (Sustain) Taylor, Letter
to Gaines. (Consequences) Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 46. (Suspected)
Taylor, _ibid._, 13, 20. (Resistance) Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 1
("I hope to be in possession of Monterey and Saltillo, as soon as our
legs can carry us there"); Bliss, Aug. 14, in Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 411
(Taylor "anticipates no serious difficulty in reaching and occupying
Saltillo"); =135=Taylor to Butler, Aug. 26; _Hist. Mag._, x, 207-8
(Backus); =180=Pillow to wife, Aug. 16 (Taylor says he does not think
we shall have to fire another gun in all northern Mexico). Robertson,
Remins., 125.
It has been said that Taylor knew of Polk's negotiations with Santa
Anna, and therefore had good reason to expect no resistance. But this
was a matter for his government to act upon, and the government had
said nothing of that kind to him. As we shall see, Scott, although
negotiating himself later with Santa Anna, did not relax his military
activity in the least. This was the only proper course for a general
in the field under orders to press the war. =185=Aug. 5 Worth ordered
Duncan to make a thorough examination of the routes. Aug. 8 Duncan
reported that the Mexicans were said to be fortifying Monterey. Sept.
3 Taylor wrote (Bixby coll., 51): "The country ... shall not be
disappointed; even if it should turn out to be a disaster." One does
not readily see how Taylor could have supposed that the government
wished to be, or was likely to be, supported by an admittedly inadequate
expedition.
11.7. =61=Ordnance bureau, memo., June 15. See pp. 148, 164, 177. Benet,
Ordnance Reports, 1880, ii, 158. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 329, 417 (Taylor).
For S. Anna's task see note 5 and chap. xix. =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb.
15. =61=Ridgely to adj. gen., Aug. 2. (Bayonet) Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
178.
11.8. Robertson, Remins., 118. =69=Vinton to Worth, Aug. 19. =69=Wolf
to Bliss, Aug. 10. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. =65=Taylor, gen. orders
98-9, 105, 108, 110. =76=Canales to Mejía, Aug. 20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp.
411-2, 417 (Taylor), 534 (spec. orders 119). =76=Aldrete to Mejía, Aug.
30. _Picayune_, Aug. 25. Meade, Letters, i, 123. _Niles_, Sept. 5, p. 2.
=69=P. F. Smith, memoir, Oct. 14. Rowles, Allen, 93. U. S. Military maps
(War College, Washington). Duncan and also Hays explored the routes.
The army was organized as follows: REGULARS (mostly). A battery of
two 24-pound howitzers and a 10-inch mortar (100 men) from the First
Artillery. _First Division_ (Brig. Gen. Twiggs). Cavalry: Second
Dragoons. Ridgely's battery. Third Brigade (Lieut. Col. Garland):
Bragg's battery, Third and Fourth Infantry, Capt. Shiver's volunteer
company. Fourth Brigade (Lieut. Col. Wilson): First Infantry,
Washington and Baltimore battalion. _Second Division_ (Brevet Brig.
Gen. Worth). First Brigade (Lieut. Col. Staniford): Duncan's battery,
Artillery Battalion, Eighth Infantry. Second Brigade ([G]Brig. Gen. P.
F. Smith): Taylor's (Mackall's) battery, Fifth and Seventh Infantry,
Blanchard's Louisiana volunteer company. VOLUNTEERS. _Field Division_
(Maj. Gen. Butler). First Brigade (Brig. Gen. Hamer): First Kentucky
and First Ohio regiments. Second Brigade (Brig. Gen. Quitman): First
Tennessee and First Mississippi regiments (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 417).
Each of these four regiments was reduced to a strength of about 500
privates by leaving behind the physically unfit. Sept. 20, the numbers
were respectively (aside from 43 sick) 482, 524, 459, 452; also 37
artillery. _Texas Division_ (Maj. Gen. Henderson) First and Second
regiments of mounted volunteers. These and the First Mississippi
were riflemen. About Aug. 13 a regiment of Texas riflemen commanded
by Albert Sidney Johnston decided (except some who formed a company
under Shiver) to go home. Johnston was soon attached to Butler's staff
as acting inspector general (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 536). "Field Division"
simply meant those volunteers (except Texans) selected to make the
present campaign. It was a temporary and local organization. Sept. 11
Meade (Letters, i, 126) analyzed the army as follows: 8 regiments of
regular infantry (2500); 4 regiments of volunteer infantry (2000);
4 light batteries, each of 4 6-pounders (280); one heavy battery
(100); 2 squadrons of regular cavalry (200); one squadron of volunteer
cavalry (150); 2 regiments of volunteer cavalry (1000); total, 6230
men and 4-500 teamsters, hospital attendants, etc., mostly armed. Aug.
15 a man from Monterey said Taylor should not move against the city
without 12,000 well disciplined men. For the assignment of wagons and
pack-mules to the various corps see Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 501.
[G] Smith was colonel of the Mounted Rifles; but, as he had been
brigadier general of Louisiana volunteers and now commanded a brigade,
he was commonly given the higher title. In August, 1847, he was a
regular brevet brigadier general.
A pack-mule (_mula de carga_) was expected to carry 300 pounds. Not a
little skill was required to load the animal quickly in such a manner
that its burden would be secure and would not chafe; but the Mexican
mule-driver was a master of the art. The subject is rather interesting.
One may consult Inman, Old S. Fe Trail (1897), 56-8; Robertson,
Remins., 269; _Picayune_, Mar. 6, 1847 (Hughes); Robertson, Visit, i,
274; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 279 (Holt); Henshaw narrative. The troops
not taken to Monterey were probably distributed about as follows: at
Camargo, 2100 under Brig. Gens. Pillow and Marshall; at Matamoros, 1100
under Col. Clarke; below that city on the Rio Grande, 4500; at Pt.
Isabel, 120 under Maj. Gardner; in hospitals, 1400. Maj. Gen. Patterson
commanded all these forces.
11.9. Henshaw narrative. Claiborne, Quitman, ii, 306 (Taylor). Taylor,
Letters (Bixby), 56. Robertson, Remins., 119-22. =69=P. F. Smith to
Bliss, Aug. 26. =69=Worth to Bliss, Aug. 25. =148=Chamberlain, recolls.
Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 679 (Whiting). Giddings, Sketches, 108. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 161-77.
11.10. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 54, 56. Robertson, Remins., 122.
Velasco, Geografía, iv, 121. =69=Duncan to Worth, Aug. 8. =69=Worth to
Bliss, Aug. 25. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 419 (Worth), 421 (Taylor). Wilhelm,
Eighth Inf., ii, 281. =76=Arleji to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 154, 177-9. Grant, Mems., i, 107. _Picayune_, Sept. 22; Oct.
6. Meade, Letters, i, 124. Kenly, Md. Vol., 85. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec,
1907, p. 316.
Worth wrote on Sept. 3 that he could have bought 5000 bushels of corn
here (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 420). Taylor stated that he found beef, goats,
sheep and corn in abundance at Cerralvo (=180=Pillow to wife, Sept.
20). These facts bear upon Taylor's complaint that the government's
failure to send wagons caused a shortage of provisions and therefore of
men, especially since the wagons used for the transportation of water
as far as Cerralvo were no longer required for that service (=65=gen.
orders. 115). On learning of the corn Taylor might, so far as concerned
subsistence, have brought on another volunteer brigade. One cannot
see why he did not push some troops on to Cerralvo instead of letting
them die at Camargo. One soldier wrote in his diary that there were
unwholesome swamps at Cerralvo, but the statement appears doubtful.
Worth's command remained at this point nearly three weeks and was still
in excellent health. If there were swamps, the camps could no doubt have
been pitched on ground above them, for a fine stream came from a gorge
in the mountain.
11.11. Balbontín, Invasión, 10-24. Apuntes, 54. Negrete, Invasión, ii,
304-5. =93=Memoranda. Memoria de ... Guerra, Dec., 1846. And from =76=
the following. To Ramírez, Aug. 17. Comte. gen. S. L. P., Aug. 15,
28; Sept. 2, 16. Ramírez, Aug. 17. Galindo, Aug. 24. Mejía, Aug. 17,
19. Romero, Aug. 24. To Ampudia, Aug. 17. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 2,
3, 9. Ponce de León, Sept. 19, 22. _Id._ to Ampudia, Sept. 15. Mejía
to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Returns, Sept. 10, 11. Pacheco, Aug. 25. Ampudia
reported that the First Brigade made about forty-eight miles one day.
This statement, were it not supported by similar facts, would not be
believed. The Fourth Brigade marched for Monterey, but did not arrive.
It was very poorly equipped. It reached S. L. Potosí Aug. 29, was halted
there to maintain order, and did not leave until Sept. 22.
Ampudia organized his infantry as four brigades under Gen. Ramírez, Gen.
Mejía, Col. Uraga, and Col. Mendoza, and his cavalry as two brigades
under Gens. Torrejón and Romero, the former commanding by right of
seniority all the mounted troops. The name of the señorita might excite
suspicion, but there were others who bore it.
The Mexican archives give very few complete, properly attested returns,
but we have one here, and it seems worth while to summarize it in
order to show the fragmentary character of the Mexican armies. The
attached numbers are the rank and file. Staff; a section of engineers;
do. of Plana Mayor; do. of surgeons, 10; sappers, 118; artillery, 211.
Infantry: Second Ligero regt., 220; Third do., 512; Fourth do., 397;
First Line regt., 186; Third do., 345; Fourth do., 187; detachments of
Sixth and Eighth do., 89; Seventh do., 129; Activo Battalion (First)
of Mexico, 136; Do. of Morelia, 77; Do. of S. L. Potosí, 340; Do. of
Querétaro, 340; Do. of Aguascalientes, 383; Auxiliary battalion of
Monterey, 349. Cavalry: Ligero, 80; First Line, 93; Third do., 140;
Eighth do., 99; Jalisco Lancers, 146; Activo of Guanajuato, 132; Do.
of S. L. Potosí, 123; Auxiliary Squadron of Béjar, 68; First Permanent
Co. of Tamaulipas, 41; Second do., 9; Permanent Co. of Lampazos, 23;
Do. of Béjar, 22; Do. of La Bahía, 1; First Activo Co. of N. León, 56;
Defensores [militia] of N. León, 625. Total, 5836. This was duly signed
by Ampudia and J. G. Conde. A party of deserters (mostly Irish) from the
American army, which served at Monterey, was presumably included in the
above return. They became the nucleus of the "San Patricio" corps.
11.12. From =76= the following. To Ampudia, Aug. 20, 23, 24, 28 (four
despatches), 31. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 26. S. Anna, Sept. 29. Aug.
24 Ampudia was told to have Mejía suspend his retreat, unless Taylor
had advanced in full force. Aug. 28 he was ordered to destroy the
fortifications and retire, leaving a strong body of cavalry to screen
Monterey and observe the Americans until the latter should arrive within
a few leagues of the town. Aug. 31 Ampudia's decision to hold the city
was endorsed. Evidently the minister of war did not agree with Santa
Anna, and on finding an excuse disregarded the latter's advice. The
comandante general was especially anxious to have the Americans attacked
during their march. He described the garrison as enthusiastic.
11.13. From =76=Mejía to Ampudia, Aug. 31. Comte. gen. N. León, Aug. 26.
Ampudia to Mejía, Aug. 24, 26. Ampudia, Aug. 26; Sept. 9. To Ampudia,
Aug. 31.