fort as "in a good state of defense," one side was still open, and the
drawbridge and interior defences had not been begun (=66=Mansfield to
Totten, June 23; diary in _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 3); and not before
the night of the third was the position considered by its defenders
even comparatively secure. The fort had six bastion fronts, which made a
perimeter of 800 yards, a strongly designed wall of earth 9½ feet high
from the natural ground, a parapet 15 feet thick, a ditch about 8 feet
deep and from 15 to 22 feet wide, a gate and a drawbridge (mostly from
=66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23). For about 4 feet from the base the
inside of the wall was fortified with a sort of basket work of willow
twigs. The magazine was made of pork barrels filled with sand, seven
tiers thick and four tiers high, with a timber roof covered with 10
or 12 feet of sand. The fort was a "child of circumstance," admitted
Engineer Mansfield (=66=_supra_), and in addition to the faults of
position already mentioned, the ground was irregular and the defence was
made difficult by the extent of the walls, for as considerable portions
were allowed to remain covered with thick chaparral (=66=Mansfield,
_supra_), its area was evidently too large for the 500 men which it
had been intended to cover; but it was after all a strong work, and in
comparison with it Mansfield regarded the Mexican forts as "trifling"
(=66=to Totten, May 4). Near the end of April the four 18-pounders
were removed from the battery to a bastion of the fort looking toward
Matamoras, where they were protected with merlons faced with sand-bags,
and so attack as well as defence was provided for; but there were only
150 rounds of ammunition for each of these guns. For this note: Henshaw
narrative and papers; =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 23; May 4; June 23;
=65=Taylor, gen. orders 39, 45, 53; Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, May 6;
_Journal of U. S. Artil._, July, 1892, p. 293; Taylor in _Autograph_,
May-June, 1912; _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 3; Robinson, Organization,
ii, 49; _Niles_, June 13, p. 230; McCall, Letters, 441, 443; (300
wagons) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 651 (Cross).
8.18. Sen. 388; 29, 1, pp. 31, 35 (Hawkins); 35 (Arista); 36
(Mansfield). Fry and Conrad, Taylor, 109. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175.
Apuntes, 37-8. Henshaw narrative and papers. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288,
296 (Taylor); 293 (Brown). Campaña contra. _Picayune_, May 19, 21; Aug.
28. =69=Diary captured with Arista's papers. =69=Ampudia to Arista, May
5-6. =69=Canales to Arista, May 5, 7. México á través, iv, 561. (Losses)
Ho. 24; 31, 1. =66=Mansfield to Totten, May 4; June 23. =13=Giffard
to Pakenham, May 28. =76=Ampudia to Arista, May 11. =76=Mejía, May
4, 14. =76=Mier y Terán to Mejía, May 3, 4, 5, 7; to Requena, May 4.
=76=Testimony given at the court-martial of Arista. =76=Arista, May
7. =76=_Id._ to Ampudia, May 5. =76=Mejía to Arista, May 3. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, Sept. 3. =76=Requena to Arista, May 5. N. Orl. _Commerc.
Bulletin_, May 18. =364=Worth to S., July 25. Johnson, Thomas, 23.
=76=Canales, May 5. =76=Diary, Apr. 30-May 6.
REMARKS. May 6 the fort was summoned, with an intimation that no
quarter would be given, should the garrison hold out longer (Henshaw).
Brown was mortally wounded by a bomb-shell. He was succeeded by Captain
Hawkins. In all one man was killed; nine officers and men wounded (Ho.
24; 31, 1). An attempt was made to burn Matamoros, but the balls could
not be heated sufficiently (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 293). Perhaps a general
more farseeing than Taylor would have provided a furnace. Ampudia
had about 830 men at first and later drew others from the city. When
Arista called him to Palo Alto on May 8, a small force remained behind
to continue the siege. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 140) says that
Arista should have reduced the fort. But Arista judged rightly that,
if he should defeat Taylor, the fort would have to fall, and therefore
it would be unwise to risk heavy losses; and probably he did not wish
Ampudia to have the glory of capturing it.
8.19. =13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13; to Pakenham, May 28.
=118=Berlandier to Arista, undated draft. Sen. I; 29, 2, p. 46 (Marcy,
report). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3.
(Bridge, plank, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 101-2. Apuntes, 46. =69=Sanders
to Taylor, May 10 ("the scows and flats of the Quarter-Masters Dept.
would give us the means of crossing the river at once"). _Niles_, May
30, p. 202. N. Orl. _Commerc. Bulletin_, May 18. _Nat. Intell._, May
18. =165=Conner to Bancroft, May 28; to Aulick, May 18. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 132. =166=Wilson to Conner, May 15. =166=Bliss to Wilson,
May 14. Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1161-2 (Conner). Parkers Recolls., 56.
(Steamers) Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 522; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 115 (the _Neva_
at Matamoros May 24); _Niles_, May 30, p. 203; =166=Munroe to Conner,
May 9; N. Y. _Herald_, June 11. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 59. Ho. 60;
30, 1, pp. 297, 300 (Taylor). Wash. _Union_, May 18, 30; June 17. N.
Y. _Herald_, June 10. =364=Worth to S., June 1. =166=Wilson to Conner,
May 15. =166=Bliss to Munroe, May 9. =166=Sanders to Bliss, May 16.
=166=Bliss to Wilson, May 14. Giddings, Camp., 36.
There was additional help at hand. =69=May 10 Captain Sanders, the
engineer officer at Point Isabel, conferred with Conner about crossing
the river, and Conner said he was "perfectly ready and willing to go
into the river and proceed up as far as Burita," where he would place
all his men and boats at Taylor's disposal. (In fact Conner did assist
in the Burrita expedition actually executed.) This was reported to
Taylor at once. Matamoros had no defences except toward the river.
8.20. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 297 (Taylor); 1206 (Arista). Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 3. Campaña contra. =69=Arista to Taylor, May 10. =76=Parrodi,
May 22. =76=Plana mayor diary. =13=Giffard to Pakenham, May 28.
=61=Spanish letter to Taylor, undated. =285=Ampudia to Paredes, May 14.
=76=Arista, May 13, 16. (Duty) Jomini, Précis, i, 475; Wagner, Strategy,
45; Henderson, Science of War, 42. Apuntes, 47. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
107. =76=Testimony at court-martial of Arista. Fallo Definitivo (Arista
was entirely exonerated, and at a later day he became President).
8.21. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 298 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3.
Apuntes, 47-51. Campaña contra. =76=Arista, May 16, 18, 29; June 4.
=76=Prefect of No. Tamaulipas to gov., May 29. =76=Plana mayor diary.
=285=Torrejón to Paredes, June 3. =76=To Arista, May 27; June 9.
=76=Parrodi, May 22-3, 31. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 219. =76=Testimony
at the court-martial of Arista. =76=Ampudia, Sept. 9. =224=Bliss to
Hitchcock, June 7. Fallo Definitivo. Meade, Letters, i, 85, 95. =76=Gen.
orders, June 15, 1848. Arista had a choice between two routes--one
through a settled region, the other through a desert--and for strategic
reasons chose the latter.
8.22. =65=Taylor, gen. orders, 59-61, 78-9, 83. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 297,
300-1 (Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 3, 175. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf.,
i, 425-6. Reid, Scouting Expeds., 43. =66=Mansfield to Totten, June 23.
=370=Taylor to ... June 18. Henshaw papers. Smith, To Mexico, 52-4.
=76=Parrodi, May 31. Murray, Reality, 75. =69=Garland to ... May 24.
Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106-9, 113. Meade, Letters i, 88. As Roa Bárcena
says (Recuerdos, 40), the Americans were physically stronger than the
Mexicans, had better arms, cannon, artillery horses, and ammunition,
plenty of food, ample and well-served ambulances, were quicker and more
forceful in their movements, and were more obedient; and the officers
had more confidence in one another. They were also cooler and more
intelligent, and had greater reserves of will-power, and the men felt
more confidence in their superiors.
8.23. Meade, Letters, i, 98, 101. _Metrop. Mag._, Dec, 1907 (Hamilton,
July 29, 1846). =139=Campbell to Martin, July 29; (nine tenths) to D.
Campbell, Aug. 9. Polk, Diary, Apr. 1, 1847. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock,
June 13. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 283. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7.
Schouler, U. S., v, 248. Weed, Autobiography, 571-2. Albany _Evening
Journal_, June 18. Scott, Mems., ii, 389.
Larnard, an excellent officer, wrote to Hitchcock that Taylor did not
give an order to the artillery on May 8 nor a material order to any
one, and that he was no more responsible for winning the two battles
than a rock rolling down a hill for crushing what is before it. This
was intended, no doubt, to be taken with a grain of salt. The editor of
_Niles' Register_ said: Owing to an error in estimating the capacities
of the enemy, the army under Gen. Taylor made a narrow escape from
almost utter annihilation (July 18, p. 309); and, considering the ardor
of the Mexicans as well as the embarrassment caused by the American
wagons, one must believe that had the General carried out the plan
which he seems to have formed, the results would have been unfortunate.
See Semmes, Service, 70. Meade (Letters, i, 99) remarked that Taylor's
neglect of precautions probably helped induce the Mexicans to fight.
This was not true, for Arista's orders were express; but, even had it
been so, one could not excuse a general for really (not seemingly,
as a ruse) neglecting precautions and preparations demanded by the
circumstances. "Boldness is the acme of wisdom" in war, the German
general staff has said (Donat, Russo-Japanese War, 255); but the
distinction between boldness and rashness is real and vital. No doubt
graduates of West Point felt a prejudice against men of antecedents like
Taylor's, but they showed in the course of the war a willingness to
recognize merit. The popular enthusiasm over Taylor's "victories" was
the greater because he had been supposed to be in extreme peril.
8.24. =52=J. Parrott, June 4. Bankhead, nos. 71, 90, 1846. =285=Vega to
Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=Tornel to Arista, May 27. The London _Times_, Feb.
24, 1847, quoted the _Journal des Débats_ as saying in effect that the
Mexican War prevented the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico. Paredes
had no doubt been encouraged by the reports of Mejía regarding the state
of things at Corpus Christi, and very likely these reports helped decide
him to reject Slidell.
IX. THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS
9.1. Our policy did not permit us to accept a European arbitrator, and
an arbitrator from Central or South America would not have been thought
impartial.
9.2. Polk's Message was based upon the view that the left bank of the
Rio Grande belonged to the United States (p. 139), and this was said
by some to be inconsistent with the idea (involved in the resolutions
annexing Texas and in Slidell's mission) that the boundary was an
open question. But Polk's language amounted only to an assertion of
the American claim; and a claim, however just, may be a subject of
negotiation. His expression (taken from the Washington _Union_ of May
9), "shed American blood upon the American soil," though denounced as
a falsehood, was merely another assertion of the same claim, and was
entirely in accord with the language of Madison, Jefferson, Monroe,
Pinckney, and J. Q. Adams. A claimant, convinced that his cause is just,
declares roundly, "This is mine," even though aware that his contention
is disputed. A more conservative statement would have been: Mexico has
invaded a region that I hold to be ours, and shed American blood on what
I regard as American soil; but Polk seems to have felt no doubts, and in
a trumpet-call to arms qualifications would have appeared out of place.
9.3. Benton, however, reported the House bill, which did not divide the
subject.
9.4. _Incidents preceding and attending the passage of the war bill_
(_May 13_). Richardson, Messages, iv, 388-92, 437-43. Benton, View,
ii, 679. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5, 8, 9-13, 1846.
=260=Extracts from _National Intelligencer_. =315=Winthrop to Schouler,
Mar. 20, 1848. Webster, Writings, iv, 138. =260=Winthrop, The Mex.
War Bill. =210=Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. =354=Welles papers.
Proceedings of Senate and House in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p. 257, and
May 11-13; app., 912; Feb. 24, 1847 (Calhoun). Boston _Courier_, May
14. Boston _Atlas_, May 15. N. Y. _Tribune_, Dec. 9, 1847. Calhoun to
A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29, 1846: Jameson, C. Corresp., 690,
692. Benton, Abr. Debates, xvi, 99. =345=Dix to Van Buren, May 16,
1846. Wash. _Union_, May 15, 1846; Jan. 2, 1848. Greeley, Am. Conflict,
i, 187. Foster, Am. Diplom., 315. Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 203.
_Nat. Intelligencer_, Dec. 27, 1847. Winthrop, Speeches, i, 573. _Pub.
Ledger_, Dec. 4, 1846. =132=Buchanan, memo. Certain incidents (_Cong.
Globe_, 30, 1, app., 231) emphasize the fact that a regular war was
contemplated by Congress. _E.g._ Holmes moved that the war bill should
apply southwest of the Nueces only for the withdrawal or rescue of our
army; voted down by 8--122. See also notes 9 and 10.
9.5. Benton states that Polk relied for peace upon the project of
replacing Paredes with Santa Anna, which will be mentioned later in
this chapter (View, ii, 680). He also charges (_ibid._) that the
administration--particularly Walker--was influenced by a wish to bring
about the payment of American claims and make good certain speculations
in Texas lands; but it was proper that the claims should be paid, and
there is no proof of the second point.
9.6. Benton hesitated, and May 11 Polk counted on his opposition
(Diary). In the debates on the annexation of Texas the Senator had
denied that her territory extended to the Rio Grande (Smith, Annex.
of Texas, 264, note), and he did not approve of Taylor's going there.
Besides, he desired to see the Oregon issue settled before coming to an
issue with Mexico. Possibly Calhoun's anxiety to prevent or defer war
helped to drive Benton to the opposite side (=354=Welles papers; Polk,
Diary, May 3, 11, 1846).
9.7. One may also view the matter at a slightly different angle. It
was possible for Mexico, on learning that General Taylor had advanced
peaceably to the Rio Grande, to say, Very well, he may occupy the
disputed district jointly with us for the present. England and the
United States maintained a peaceable joint occupation of Oregon for
years. Taylor's advancing, therefore, did not _per se_ and necessarily
create a state of war. Now the United States did nothing else that could
fairly be termed aggressive; but Mexico, by attacking American troops
engaged in peaceful reconnoitring, destroyed the state of potential
harmony, and consequently the state of war that ensued existed by
her act. C. J. Ingersoll stated later (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app.,
125) that the language of the preamble was adopted for the purpose of
conciliating, not offending, the Whigs; and one can see that it might
seem likely to be easier for them to accept the war as an accomplished
fact than to vote for a declaration.
9.8. From what is known of Calhoun's designs (Smith, Annex. of Texas,
209-216) this statement seems reasonable, and it is supported by
positive evidence (chap, vi, note 10). =232=Calhoun to ----, Nov. 7,
1846: The triumph of abolitionism at the north would cause disunion, for
the southern people are determined to defend their rights.
9.9. To justify Calhoun's theory the Constitution should have been
made to read: "Congress shall have power to declare war, and without
such a declaration the United States shall never be at war," which
would have been manifestly ridiculous; and the provision in article
i, sect. 10, that a state, when in imminent danger, might begin war,
should have been cancelled. Doubtless for partisan reasons, Webster
(Curtis, Webster, ii, 301) took the same position as Calhoun, saying
that Congress could not "create a fact"--_i.e._ could not state that
war existed before it had declared war. Von Holst on the other hand,
in order to face the tolerably evident certainty that we had a legal
war with Mexico, says (United States, iii, 253) that Congress made
Polk's lie [that war existed] into a fact! Many members of Congress had
too little confidence (Calhoun to Thompson: _Am. Hist. Rev._, i, 314)
in their knowledge of the situation to feel positive as to the full
justice of the American cause, but this did not affect the validity of
their action. Particularly noticeable was the rejection (27 to 97) of
Delano's proposition that nothing in the war bill should be construed as
approving of the President's conduct in taking armed possession of the
intermediate region. Thus a much discussed question was formally raised
and formally decided. =132=King to Buchanan, June 1.
9.10. _Discussion of the proceedings._ (Feeling) =354=Welles papers.
(Assured) Polk, Diary, May 11, 1846. (Congressmen) Meigs, Benton, 360;
Benton, View, ii, 680. _Tribune_, May 15. _Journal of Commerce_, July
1, 1847. Weekly _Herald_, May 16, 1846. (Dissensions) Boston _Atlas_,
May 18, 1846; Jameson, Calh. Corresp., 1038 (Harris); Polk, Diary, Apr.
30; =345=Polk to Van Buren, Jan. 4; Feb. 22, 25, 1845; =345=Wright
to V. B., Jan. 17, 1845; =345=Butler to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; =345=V.
B. to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845; =345=S. T. Van Buren to M. V. B., Mar. 2,
3, 4, 1845; =297=Cave Johnson to Polk, June 13, 1844; and see chap,
xxxiv. (Offices) Polk, Diary, May 10; June 22, 1846, and _passim_.
=210=Holmes to Hammond, May 10, 1846. Lalor, Cyclop., iii, 1105. (Whig
vote) =260=Winthrop, Mex. War Bill, 108; _Nat. Intelligencer_, May 16,
1846; N. Y. _Journal of Comm._, Dec. 11, 1847; Wheeler, Hist, of Cong.,
i, 411; Von Holst, U. S., iii, 251. Calhoun to Clemson, Jan. 29, 1846;
to A. P. C, May 14; to J. E. C, May 29; to Clemson, July 11; to J.
E. C, July 29, in Calhoun Corres., 679, 691, 693-4, 700-1; also 707.
=345=Welles to Van Buren, July 28, 1846. Polk, Diary, Apr. 18, 21, 1846.
Calhoun in Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 501. Hunt,
Calhoun, 279. _Niles_, May 16, 1846, p. 162. (Endorsed, etc.) _Cong.
Globe_, 29, 1, p. 802 (Crittenden). _Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 367
(Stanton). Johnston and Browne, Stephens, 210. =132=King to Buchanan,
June 1, 1846. Pierce, Sumner, iii, 108, 139. =132=Buchanan, memo. Holmes
of New York proposed in the House, May 11, that sect. one of the war
bill should not apply southwest of the Nueces except for the rescue
of our army. This was rejected by 8--122. May 12 Senator Crittenden,
one of the foremost Whigs, proposed to substitute in the war bill the
words "for the purpose of repelling the invasion" in place of the words
"prosecute said war, etc." This recognized the territory as American.
His proposal was supported by twenty senators (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p.
803).
9.11. Livermore, for example, argued in this way (War, 15): Texas was
annexed for the protection of Southern institutions; the war with Mexico
resulted from the annexation of Texas; therefore the war with Mexico was
due to the slaveholders' interest in slavery. But both of his premises
need qualification; and the conclusion, so far as it suggests that the
war was the necessary and designed consequence of the slaveholders'
action in the Texas matter, does not follow. The abolitionists were
enthusiastic, earnest, and on the outside of things. Hence they were
naturally and almost unavoidably over-suspicious. Von Holst (U. S., iii,
302) says that the radical wing of the southern Democratic party openly
avowed that the war with Mexico was a southern war; but was not Calhoun
the leader and prophet of that wing? A few public men, the Charleston
_Patriot_ and _Courier_, and the _Federal Union_ of Alabama looked upon
the war as for the interest of the South; but it does not appear that
they had any appreciable influence in bringing it about.
9.12. The occasion of the war was Taylor's going to the Rio Grande; but
see chap, vii, p. 154.
9.13. Apparently one might say that--since Polk intended to recommend
redress of our grievances--war was sure, without reference to the
annexation of Texas, to come. But we are tracing the cause of an actual,
not of a possible, war; and the President's recommendation might not
have proved effectual. Benton (View, ii, 679) said that without the
clash of arms it would have been difficult, perhaps impossible, to bring
about war. Calhoun (Sen., Feb. 24, 1847: note 10) said it could not have
been done. This opinion, however, was biased.
9.14. _The cause of the war._ Polk, Diary, Dec. 19, 23, 1846; Jan. 5,
23, 1847. Webster, Private Corresp., ii, 283. =370=Taylor to Davis, Apr.
18, 1848. =32=Buchanan to Shields, April 23, 1847. (Bulwark) Smith,
Annex. of Texas, 132, 134-5, 204-8. (Unsuitable) =132=Donelson to
Buchanan, May 15, 1847. _No. Amer._, Feb. 10, 1847; Thompson in Wash.
_Union_, Oct. 25, 1847, and Greenville (S. C.) _Mountaineer_, Oct. 21.
Bourne, Essays, 227, 235. Charleston _Mercury_, Dec. 30, 1847 (long
argument against annexing Mexican territory). W. Thompson to Calhoun,
Dec. 18, 1847 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 1149 (slavery will
not exist in Mexico). =137=Fisher to Calhoun, Aug. 22, 1847. =137=J.
A. Campbell to Calhoun, Mar. 1, 1848. (Aiken) Boston _Courier_, Dec.
2, 1847; Mar. 9, 1848. =132=King to Buchanan, June 11, 1847. N. Y.
_Tribune_, Nov. 26, 1847. =157=Lamar to Cobb, June 24, 1846. (Toombs)
_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, app., 133. _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov., 1850, 427-34.
(Benton) Abr. Deb., xvi, 87; Benton, View, ii, 678. (Clay) Schurz,
Clay, ii, 290. (Winthrop) Wash. _Union_, Sept. 30, 1846; Oct. 25, 1847;
Winthrop, Winthrop, 59. (Douglas) Cutts, Questions, 154. (Johnson)
Brown, _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 354. (Van B.) Wilson, Rise and Fall,
ii, 9; Smith, Annex. of Texas, 243. Amer. Historical Association Rep.,
1911, ii, 95 (Glenn). (Organs) Mr. Winthrop's Vote. (Sumner) Sumner,
report, 30. (Report) Wash. _Union_, Feb. 25, 1847. (Agree) Winthrop
in Wash. _Union_, Sept. 30, 1846. (Paredes) _Diario_, July 30, 1846.
(Almonte) N. Y. _Sun_, Nov. 26, 1846 (Caractacus); _Monitor Repub._,
May 9, 1847. Gordon, Aberdeen, 183. Mofras, Expédition, 8. Polk,
Message, May 11, 1846 (Richardson). Cole, Whig Party, 121. See also the
conclusion of chap. v.
At the end of March Paredes said: "Peace is not compatible with the
maintenance of the rights and independence of the nation" (Roa Bárcena,
Recuerdos, 22).
9.15. The dates are those of approval.
9.16. The action of Congress was promulgated by the adj. gen. in
=65=gen. orders 14, 18, 21, 34. See an article on the engineer company
by Captain Willing, published by the U. S. engineer school, Washington
Barracks. See also U. S. Statutes at Large, ix, 9-13, 17, 20; Upton,
Milit. Pol., 204; Richardson, Messages, iv, 603-4.
9.17. Polk, Diary, May 13, 1846. Wash. _Union_, May 21. =65=Gen. orders
12. =59=Circular. With the freedom that has commonly marked authors
dealing with the unpopular Polk Von Holst says (U. S., iii, 339) that
his profession of seeking only a peace was a "falsehood." But Polk meant
of course a peace satisfactory to the American government, for a peace
satisfactory to Mexico would not have had to be "conquered," and this
implied in general about the terms that we actually imposed.
9.18. "Germanicus" stated in the N. Y. _Commercial Advertiser_ that in
the Florida war the ratio of expense between regulars and militia was 1
to 6; of efficiency, 1 to 0 (_Nat. Intell._, Nov. 7, 1846). Of course
the volunteers, who wished and expected to fight, were in general better
than the militia, who wished and expected to remain at home. Had the
regular army been increased to 50,000 privates (giving, say, 30,000 in
the field), there would no doubt have been a great saving of time, blood
and treasure (Stevens, Campaigns, 14). Taylor's position gave him a
special responsibility. He should have pointed out the disadvantages of
the volunteer system, recommended enlisting such troops (if at all) for
the duration of the war, and continued to demand regulars.
9.19. _The military measures._ Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 141. =65=Gen. orders
57, Dec. 22, 1846. Upton, Mil. Pol, 195, 202, 204 (sequel showed).
(1838) R. Johnson in Sen., Jan. 11, 1848 (Wash. _Union_, Jan. 12). _Nat.
Intelligencer_, Nov. 7, 1846. (Cowardly, etc.) =354=Welles papers.
=63=Marcy to Wright, June 3, 1846. =63=Circ. letter, May 19, 1846.
Webster, Letters, 346. Sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 46-7. Wash. _Union_, June
25, 1846. (Stimulated) Sen. 4; 29, 2, p. 53. Johnson, Douglas, 114.
Polk, Diary, June 20, 22, 1846. (Vacancies) Richardson, Messages, iv,
513-7. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 554 (Jesup). (Might have been) Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 75.