should have adopted: to issue a statement that we would defend Texas,
that Mexico must pay the claims of our citizens, and that we desired
no Mexican territory; next, to take a defensive position in Texas,
perhaps occupy a Pacific port as security for our claims, and then
await developments. [As a military programme this plan of standing on
the defensive was seriously considered by the government and, as we
shall see, was condemned for both political and military reasons. To
say we desired no Mexican territory would have been meaningless unless
we pledged ourselves to take none, and to issue such a promise on the
eve of a war the course of which could not be predicted, and especially
in view of the fact that Mexico could pay no large indemnity except
with territory, would certainly have been imprudent, and the _Review's_
proposition to seize a port as security for our claims suggests as much.
This proposition, by the way, was less justifiable than going to the Rio
Grande, for we had a claim to the intermediate territory and no claim to
a Mexican port. To take a defensive attitude in Texas signified either
going to the Rio Grande in order to obtain a good strategic position,
or maintaining at great expense for an indefinite period an army large
enough to guarantee the Texans against attack at any and every point.
The first of these plans was the one adopted by Polk; the second, on
account of the expense, would have been unjust to our own people, and in
the end would have compelled us to increase our demands for indemnity
against Mexico. Moreover, there were strong objections to waiting
(p. 136); and, had Mexico simply adhered to the policy of passive
resistance, all our trouble and expense would have brought us no nearer
a settlement. Still other objections to the plan of the _Review_ could
be offered.
VIII. PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA
8.1. The account of the Mexican army is based upon Memorias de ...
Guerra, 1844; Mar., 1845; Dec., 1846; =152=Claiborne, Mems.; _Diario_,
May 30, 1845; Balbontín, Estado Militar; Paz, Invasión; =5=Anaya,
Memoria; Peña, Comunicación circular; _Siglo XIX_, Aug. 19, 21, 1845;
S. Miguel, Repúb. Mex., 133-4, 136; Wash. _Globe_, Oct. 15, 1845;
Molina, recolls.; _Hist. Mag._, Feb., 1870 (Deas); Zirckel, Tagebuch,
13, 111; Semmes, Service, 441, note; =75=Memorias drawn up by war
dept. chiefs, Nov., 1847; =81=_Seminario Polít. del Gob. de N. León_;
Moore, Scott's Camp., 19; =76=Report of superior engineer board, Nov.
15, 1845; Balbontín, Invasión, 77-8; _Monitor Repub._, Nov. 30, 1847;
=148=Chamberlain, recolls.; =69=report of spy, Apr. 5, 1846; N. Orl.
_Commerc. Bulletin_, May 21, 1846; =76=Carrera, report on artillery,
Dec, 1847; =76=reports of the powder mills at Zacatecas and Santa Fé.
Dec., 1843, a special school of application for artillery and engineer
officers was decreed, but lack of money prevented its establishment.
There was a normal school, intended to convey the rudiments of military
knowledge to the privates through the corporals and sergeants, but it
signified little or nothing. Attached to the engineer corps was a body
of sappers, miners, and pontoniers; but, owing to lack of funds to equip
it with, it served as infantry. The poorest cannon, especially at first,
were kept at the fortresses. What horses could be had for artillery
service were too light and frisky. Paredes reorganized this arm, and
assigned to it about 250 officers, 5000 privates, and 200 clerks and
workmen. The bronze cannon manufactured in Mexico during 1846-47 were
not satisfactory, and the grape-shot was so poorly made that its range
was considerably reduced. The importance of artillery had never been
appreciated in that country. There was a good arsenal at Mexico, and
there were old-fashioned powder-mills at Santa Fe (near that city) and
Zacatecas. The latter blew up early in 1845, and, though repaired,
worked at a disadvantage. Mexican powder was usually of an inferior
quality. The Active corps contained fewer men than the Permanent. The
infantry musket carried an ounce ball; and the escopeta bullet was even
heavier and went farther. In both cases the very liberal charge of
powder increased the normal range. Many of the escopetas were merely
sawed-off muskets. The shaft of the lance was usually about six feet
long and the head about one foot. The Line infantry included light
companies (_cazadores_), which sometimes had rifles and sometimes
deserved to be called sharpshooters. There were mounted cazadores also.
Each cavalry regiment consisted of four squadrons, and each infantry
regiment included two battalions, one commanded by the lieutenant
colonel, and the other by the major (_comandante de batallón_). There
were mounted corps called hussars, etc., but the difference of name
signified little or nothing, practically. Owing to the smallness of the
horses, the cavalry had not much shock-value. There were 635 cannon on
hand at the end of 1845, 25,789 muskets, 8155 swords, 100,000 artillery
projectiles, and more than 400,000 bullets. Tornel imported 104 new
cannon early in 1846. Differences of caliber interfered greatly with the
usefulness of the muskets. March 9, 1846, the departments were urged to
complete their legal quotas of troops as soon as possible.
8.2. On the first day when volunteers were to enlist only eleven came
forward at Mexico.
8.3. The figures are based upon the =76=official return of April 17
supplemented by a large number of Mexican and American statements.
Most of the latter were exaggerated. The Americans were doubtless
misled often by the statements of prisoners, who wished to please
their captors. "The information obtained from prisoners ought to be
estimated at its proper value" (Napoleon, Maxims, 53). Mejía, the
regular commander of the first brigade, gave way temporarily to García
on account of ill health.
8.4. =69=Reports of spies. _República de Rio Grande_, June 27.
=118=Berlandier, memo., undated. =66=Mansfield to Totten, May 4.
=217=Henshaw papers. =76=Testimony at the trial of Arista. =76=Mejía,
Feb. 28; Mar. 18. =76=Commander of zapadores, Apr. 8. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 68, 70. México á través, iv, 561. Campaña contra, 4.
8.5. _Monitor Repub._, Mar. 17. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 113, 117. _Revue
des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 388-93. =13=Elliot, nos. 12, 14, etc.,
1846. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23. =61=Worth to Taylor, Apr. 2.
=61=Scott to Marcy, May 7. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 42. =65=Marcy, gen.
orders 5. Sen. 230; 29, 1. =224=Hitchcock, diary. =62=Twiggs to Davis,
May 4. The principal causes of the absenteeism were assignment to higher
duties elsewhere and the impossibility (owing to the lack of a retired
list) of replacing invalided or superannuated officers. _Locomotor_,
Mar. 27. Campaña contra, 4. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 129-30. Upton, Mil.
Policy. 206. =285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=Comte. of Zapadores,
Apr. 8. =76=Mejía, Mar. 14, 28; Apr. 2. =76=_Id._ to Arista, Apr. 30.
=76=Ampudia to Arista, Apr. 30.
8.6. =66=Sanders to Totten, Apr. 10 (Ft. B. badly placed). =185=_Id._ to
Duncan, Apr. 27. =69=Requena to Arista, Apr. 30 (might have enfiladed).
Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 217. _República de Rio Grande_, June 27.
_Picayune_, May 10. =118=Berlandier, memo. (Groves) Ampudia, Address
(1846). =52=Wickliffe to Buchanan, May 21, 1845. Giddings, Camp., 36.
_Niles_, May 16, p. 165; 23, p. 179. Kenly, Md. Vol., 42. Polk, Diary,
Apr. 1, 1847. =218=Henshaw narrative. Apuntes, 35. =66=Sanders to
Taylor, May 2. Wash. _Union_, May 9; June 6. Meade, Letters, i, 59-60.
_Journal U. S. Artill._, July, 1892, p. 293. =132=King to Buchanan, June
1. =69=Spy to Taylor, Apr. 11.
Taylor's army lay on the Pt. Isabel road, which connected here with the
principal Matamoros ferry (_Paso Real_). Fort Brown was about a mile and
a half from the site of the present fort. The line of the fort at Pt.
Isabel enclosed about fifty acres, and could not be properly fortified
with the means at hand in the time allowed. May 2 the works were far
from complete. Some at least of the disadvantages of his position were
pointed out to Taylor, but he seemed to feel no concern. Marcy was
surprised that the Mexicans did not cross the Rio Grande near its mouth
and capture Pt. Isabel. The explanation probably was that they believed
the plan they acted upon was better.
8.7. =217=Henshaw papers. =61=Crossman to ... Apr. 23. =66=Mansfield to
Totten, Apr. 23. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138, 142, 288 (Taylor). _Spirit
of the Times_, May 23. Meade, Letters, i, 66 (the murder of Cross caused
intense resentment). México á través, iv, 561. Campaña contra, 4.
=69=Walker to Taylor, May 2. Walker was absent on service when the men
were surprised. =52=Consul Chase, Tampico, May 1. _National_, June 18.
8.8. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 302 (Taylor). (West Pointers) =224=Bliss
to Hitchcock, June 7. =76=Mejía, Apr. 9. =76=_Id._ to Arista, Apr. 30.
=76=Ampudia, Mar. 28. _Tropic_, May 7 (proclam. of Ampudia). Ballentine,
Eng. Soldier, i, 57-9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 39, 40. (Promises, etc.)
=69=Arista, "Advice," Apr. 20. =69=Report of spy, Apr. 5. Wilhelm,
Eighth Inf., i, 408. Meade, Letters, i, 53. London _Times_, June 8. Ho.
194; 29, 1 (Jones, May 5). _Spirit of the Times_, May 16. _Esperanza_,
Apr. 18. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 11. =69=Mier y Terán to Mejía, May
4. Taylor gave orders to shoot soldiers attempting to cross the river.
Later, British deserters were not accepted.
8.9. =76=Arista, May 1, 7. So. _Advocate_, June 10, 1846. =76=Ampudia
to Arista, Apr. 30. =76=Parrodi, Apr. 8. =69=Arista, "Advice," Apr.
20. =76=Mejía proclam., Mar. 18. (Lasted) Donnavan, Adventures, 102.
=76=Comte. gen. S. L. Potosí, proclam., Mar. 27. =76=Comte. gen.
Zacatecas to troops, Apr. 1. The Mexican press teemed with the ideas
here suggested. To an Indian anything as foreign as a neighboring
estate seemed dreadful. =76=Ampudia, Mar. 28. Apuntes, 33. (Despised)
=162=Conner to wife, May 9; Henshaw narrative; _Niles_, May 16, p. 165;
Sept. 12, p. 22. (Hardee) =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. Ampudia's
troops had mutinied on the way, but an appeal to their patriotism
had brought them round. There had been, as was usual, a good deal of
desertion; but to a certain extent those who stood by the colors were
for this reason above the average (=76=Ampudia, Mar. 10, 11, 12).
Taylor's method--uniformly despising the enemy and teaching his troops
to do so--was contrary to the practice of Cæsar, Napoleon and the Duke
of Wellington (Napol., Maxims, 49, note).
8.10. (Obvious) Henshaw narrative. =63=Marcy, Jan. 13. =69=Friend, [Apr.
11]. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 138, 140, 142 (Taylor). =65=Taylor, gen. orders
45. (Seven) =69=McCall, report, Apr. 30. May 3 Taylor reported that his
lack of light troops had helped to keep him in ignorance of the enemy's
movements as if that lack had been due to some one else. He did not call
on Texas for troops until Apr. 26. Ripley (War with Mexico, i, 133) says
he did not call in February because such troops could serve only three
months. But had a call been issued then, the troops would probably not
have begun to serve for a month or two; and later he could have called
for a second small body.
8.11. México á través, iv, 561. =76=Arista, Apr. 27; May 1. =76=_Id._
to Ampudia, May 5. _Revue des Deux Mondes_, Aug. 1, 1847, 394-6.
_Republicano_, June 5. Campaña contra. =76=Arista to Mejía, May 1, 2.
=76=Mejía to Arista, May 1, 3. =69=Diary captured in Arista's papers.
=76=Plana mayor diary. Apuntes, 35-7. Bustamante, N. Bernal, ii, 16.
=76=Testimony at trial of Arista. People in the United States could not
believe Taylor would permit the enemy to get between him and his base
(_e.g._ Mobile _Herald and Tribune_, May 3). At first Arista left only
1007 men at Matamoros, but, becoming anxious about the town, he sent
back the Morelia battalion.
8.12. Henshaw narrative. Mansfield, Mex. War, 35. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 288
(Taylor). Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 175. _Picayune_, May 12. Nebel and
Kendall, 1. _Niles_, May 23, p. 178. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1161 (Conner).
=62=Twiggs to Davis, May 4. (Lowd, etc.) Meade, Letters, i, 74-5.
Appleton's Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). _Autograph_,
May-June, 1912 (Taylor). Smith, To Mexico, 44. Fry and Conrad, Taylor,
109-10. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 86. =76=Diary of plana mayor. =76=To
Arista, May 15.
Mejía notified Arista that Taylor was preparing to move, but the news
arrived so late that the guns of Matamoros did not open fire upon him.
Arista pursued the Americans but could not overtake them; and a body of
dragoons that he ordered on was equally unsuccessful. On the morning
of May 3 the boom of heavy guns in the direction of Fort Brown (Grant,
Mems., i, 92; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88) alarmed Taylor, and he gave
orders to set out at one o'clock (Henry, Camp. Sketches, 88; Smith,
To Mexico, 44), which showed that he felt no great confidence in its
defensibility even then; but he desired to strengthen the base and to
receive some ordnance and reinforcements that he then expected (Ho.
60; 30, 1, p. 288), and hence sent Capt. Walker with a small party to
communicate with Brown (Henshaw narrative). This was a hard task; but
after some fighting, Walker reached the fort, stated that Taylor would
return as soon as possible, obtained a reassuring report (Ho. 60; 30, 1,
p. 293), and with great difficulty made his way back (Henshaw papers;
Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 289, 293). May 1 Pt. Isabel had a force, including
civilians who took up arms, of 400-500 (_Niles_, May 16, p. 165; 23, p.
179; _Picayune_, May 10; Wash. _Union_, May 9).
8.13. Meade, Letters, i, 74-8, 93. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 56, 58.
_Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xli, 94. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 288, 292-4
(Taylor); 527 (spec. orders 60). _Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor).
Nebel and Kendall, 2. Grant, Mems., i, 167-8. Henry, Camp. Sketches,
88-9. (Leaving train, etc.) =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13. Wash.
_Union_, May 9, 29, 30. _Niles_, May 16, p. 162. =62=Twiggs to Davis,
May 4. French, Two Wars, 49. Some of the officers were anxious to wait
for larger reinforcements (=185=L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 21), but Taylor
feared Fort Brown was getting short of ammunition.
8.14. _The battle of Palo Alto._ Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers).
=65=Taylor, gen. orders 58. _Id._, Letters (Bixby), 1. Campaña contra.
México á través, iv, 561-3, 566. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, July 23.
=61=Arthur to brother, May 10. Meade, Letters, i, 79, 80. =13=Pakenham,
no. 54, 1846. McCall, Letters, 449-54. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock,
June 13. Eyewitness, Complete History, 23. =210=Alvord to Hammond,
May 22. Wash. _Union_, May 30. Map in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. _Nat.
Intelligencer_, May 11, 18; Sept. 3, 10. N. Y. _Journ. of Commerce_,
Feb. 24, 1847. _Diario_, May 29. _Tex. Democrat_, June 24. _Spirit of
the Times_, May 30. Portrait of Arista, city hall, Mex. =350=Weber,
recolls. =213=Hatch, letters. _Picayune_, Aug. 1, 1845; Sept. 24, 1846.
_Delta_, May 24. =118=Berlandier, diary and map. =185=Duncan to adj.
gen., June 19. =185=Marcy to Duncan, July 27. Nebel and Kendall, 2-3.
Smith, To Mexico, 45, 47-9. Fallo Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal [_re_
Arista's conduct]. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16. _Niles_, June 6, pp.
215-16; Oct. 24, p. 122. Frost, Taylor, 81. _Hist. Mag._, Feb., 1870,
101-2. Haskin, First Artill., 80. _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xli,
96. Ampudia ante ... la Opinión Pública. (Stepped aside) Grant, Mems.,
95. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57. Sierra, Evolution, i, 214. _Esperanza_, May
23. _Monitor Repub._, June 2. _Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor).
Ampudia to Fellow-cits. =285=Arista to Paredes, May 14. =285=Segura
to Escudero, June 4. Ramsey, Other Side, 39, note, 48. (Losses) Ho.
24; 31, 1. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393 (Taylor); 392 (Marcy); 1102
(McIntosh); 403. =185=Duncan to Belknap, May 12. French, Two Wars, 49,
50. =364=Worth to S., June 13. Donnavan, Adventures, 102. Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 90-3, 95. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 36, 39. Sumaria mandada
formar ... J. L. Uraga. Negrete, Invasión, ii, 233. Wilhelm, Eighth
Inf., i, 414-9. Apuntes, 38-41. _So. Qtrly. Rev_., Nov., 1850, p. 446.
And from =76= the following. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista.
To Arista, May 17. Arista, May 7, 8, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. Ampudia,
May 14. Requena to Arista, May 8. Vázquez to sister, May 25. Arista to
Ampudia, May 5; to Parrodi, May 9. Ampudia to Arista, May 11. Plana
mayor diary.
REMARKS. When first seen, the Mexicans were probably two or
three miles from the Palo Alto pond, but they advanced until about a
mile and a half from that point. Both lines of battle were too long. The
batteries on both sides used solid shot mostly. On the placing of our
gunners in advance of the troops, see Napoleon, Maxims, 45. The Mexican
gunners fired mostly at the American artillery, but the American gunners
mostly at the Mexican infantry. It was said that not more than a dozen
Mexicans were killed with bullets. Many of the Americans were ordered to
sit down or lie down (particularly the Eighth Infantry); and as most of
the Mexican balls approached at a ricochet it was not very difficult to
dodge them. Whatever the Americans accomplished was almost wholly due to
their cannon. Not only the excellence of the ammunition and the accurate
fire, but the boldness and rapidity of the manoeuvres astonished the
Mexicans. It is not known why Taylor decided to rely on artillery, to
which (it was stated) he had referred contemptuously on the morning
of the battle as mere "gun wagons"; but presumably, as the field was
peculiarly well suited for that arm, Ringgold and Duncan, supported
by Bliss, urged him to let it have a chance. The American officers,
though they had not over-much confidence in Taylor, felt a great deal
in one another, and so had a vast advantage over the Mexicans (México
á través, iv, 566). Ringgold was mortally wounded, but would not let
his men leave their work to care for him. During the intermission the
Americans removed their wounded, replenished caissons, and made repairs.
Commodore Conner, hearing Taylor was likely to be attacked, sailed for
that quarter, and on May 8 and 9 landed 500 seamen and marines at Point
Isabel (=166=Conner Letter-book. See also =65=Taylor, gen. orders 60.).
The chief Mexican surgeon and a number of assistants made an early and
rapid retreat. The Mexican loss was estimated by Taylor as 200 killed
and 400 wounded; by Arista as 252 killed, wounded, and missing.
8.15. (May 8 indecisive) =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13; Giffard to
Pakenham, May 28; McCall, Letters, 454; Meade, Letters, i, 80; Wilhelm,
Eighth Inf., i, 416-7. Sen. 388; 29, 1. Taylor, Letters (Bixby),
1. (Consulted) Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 418; Stevens, Campaigns,
20; Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 16; _Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit._, xli,
98; =185=L. C. to Duncan, Nov. 24; Article by J. Davis on Taylor in
Appleton's Biog. Dict. Accounts of this conference differ so much that
little can be said of it. Some of the officers were for entrenching and
awaiting reinforcements. It was known that Conner's fleet had arrived
(note 14). (Defend) Taylor, _supra_; Henry, Camp. Sketches, 94; map
of P. Alto in Map Div., Lib. of Cong. Churchill's 18-pounders and two
12-pounders taken from the baggage were left here. The wounded were sent
to Pt. Isabel. Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 153) states that Taylor
marched early May 9 to Resaca de la Palma and parked the train there,
but this is incorrect (Taylor in Sen. 388; 29, 1, p. 6; Henry, Camp.
Sketches, 94; =369=map of Palo Alto; Ripley, War with Mexico, i, 124;
etc.). The point is important because troops were left with the train to
protect the wagons--not as a rear guard (Rives). Rives (p. 154) states
incorrectly that the Eighth Infantry was left with the train.
8.16. _The battle of May 9._ Sen. 388; 29, 1 (Taylor and officers).
Apuntes, 42-7. Suárez y Navarro, Alegato. Campaña contra. Negrete,
Invasión, ii, 230, 233. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 295, 393, 396, 403 (Taylor);
392, 395 (Marcy); 1104 (McIntosh). =69=Canales to Arista, May 9.
=13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13. Henshaw narrative. =147=Chamberlain,
diary. Taylor, Letters (Bixby), 1. =210=Alvord to Hammond, May 22.
=210=Hammond to Simms, Apr. 1, 1847. =213=Hatch, letters. Wash.
_Union_, July 25, 1846. =369=Map of P. Alto. _Spirit of the Times_,
May 30; June 20. _Picayune_, May 19; June 3. Berlandier, diary and
map. Nebel and Kendall, 3-4. México á través, iv, 564, 566. Fallo
Definitivo del Supremo Tribunal, 19. Sen. 4; 29, 2. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p.
1162. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 253. _Journ. Mil. Serv. Instit._, xvii
(Van Deusen); xli, 98. =370=Taylor to ----, June 18. Taylor, Letters
(Bixby), 175. Ampudia ante ... la Opin. Púb. (Uraga). McCall, Letters,
455. Sen. 378; 29, 1, p. 57 (Bliss). Grant, Mems., i, 93, 96-8. Meade,
Letters, i, 81-2, 149. =72=Reales Ordenes, Serie de Gobernación, leg.
43. Appleton's Biog. Dict. (art. by J. Davis on Taylor). (Losses) Ho.
24; 31, 1. =285=Arista to Paredes, May 9, 14. French, Two Wars, 51-4.
_Autograph_, May-June, 1912 (Taylor). =210=Bragg to Hammond, Dec. 20,
1847. Ampudia to Fellow-cits. =285=Segura to Escudero, June 4. Smith,
To Mexico, 49-52. =185=Duncan to Belknap, May 10. Eyewitness, Complete
Hist., 25-6. Wilhelm, Eighth Inf., i, 422-3. _Niles_, June 6, pp. 211-7;
July 4, p. 277; Sept. 26, p. 57. =224=Larnard to Hitchcock, June 13.
Henry, Camp. Sketches, 96-9. =61=Arthur to brother. _Puritano Mex._,
May 26. =224=Bliss to Hitchcock, June 7. =61=Patton to Polk, July 18,
and enclosure. México á través, iv, 564, 566. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos,
48. The verse is by José de Saltillo, trans. by C. F. Hoffman. And from
=76= the following. Arista, May 9, 10, 13, 1846; July 12, 1847. _Id._ to
Mateos, May 31; to Parrodi, May 13; to Taylor, May 10. Carrera, May 25.
Requena to Arista, May 10. Testimony at the court-martial of Arista. R.
Vázquez to sister, May 25. Plana mayor diary. Ampudia to Arista, May 11,
14. Canales to Tornel, May 10.
REMARKS. It would be unsafe to give fuller information than that of
the text with reference to the positions of the Mexican corps. All
the accounts are unsatisfactory. Owing to the nature of the ground
and the irregular shifting of the troops, this was natural. The
Mexican leaders thought their position would ensure victory. Horses
were unsaddled and mules relieved of their packs. The chief danger to
Ridgely's battery was from Mexicans ambushed--as Taylor had reason
to suppose they would be--on both sides of the road. May, very tall
and straight, with long black hair and a black beard that reached to
his waist, became a newspaper hero, and for reasons that are rather
hard to understand, was promoted several times during the war; but he
seems clearly to have been essentially a cowardly sham. In this fight
he seized a cannon, but only the infantry prevented the enemy from
recapturing it. He claimed the credit of making Gen. Vega his prisoner,
but the real captor was a bugler. By his own account, he could rally
only six of his men after running through the batteries. The horses
appear to have "run away" with the men. Taylor's report laid stress
upon what occurred at the road, and he does not seem to have known--at
that time, to say the least--what mainly caused the sudden collapse of
the enemy; but an abundance of Mexican evidence, partly given under
oath, makes the matter clear. See also Henry, Camp. Sketches, 98. After
Americans were seen at the _placeta_ Arista's secretary went to where
the road crossed the resaca, and found May's dragoons there. This fixes
the order of events. Duncan's battery did nothing during the battle,
for Ridgely had the only opportunity to use artillery without injuring
Americans. Duncan and Kerr followed the Mexicans at some distance; the
Third Infantry coöperated; and so did the Artillery Battalion, after it
reached the scene; but the Mexicans were not aware of any real pursuit.
Fort Brown fired on the throngs of fugitives, but no sally was made.
One might imagine the garrison feared the guns of Matamoros; but they
watched the Mexican fugitives from the parapet. Mejía's ammunition had
been almost used up. Paredes informed Congress, June 6, that after May
9 Arista had 4000 regulars (Memoria de ... Relaciones, Dec., 1846).
May 13 Arista gave the number as 3758 "men." Arista's chief of staff
estimated the captured, drowned, and dispersed as 500. Arista informed
Parrodi, May 13, that the total number of men, including the wounded,
taken by Taylor was less than 200, and this seems to have been true.
May 11 prisoners were exchanged. Arista reported the number in American
hands as 144, including the wounded.