(Taylor); 134 (minutes); 1203 (Mejía). =65=Taylor, gen. orders 38-9, 45.
=61=_Id._ to adj. gen., Mar. 29. =66=Mansfield to Totten, Apr. 2, 23.
=285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. =76=_Id._ to Guerra, Mar. 28. Negrete,
Invasión, ii, 120. Smith, To Mexico, 34. =118=Berlandier, diary.
=118=_Id._, memo. Meade, Letters, i, 59.
Taylor, a few minutes after his arrival, deputed Worth to reach an
understanding with Mejía. This proved impossible. Worth demanded
permission to confer with the American consul residing at Matamoros,
but was not permitted to do so. He notified the Mexicans that crossing
the river in armed force would be viewed as an act of war. Taylor's
field-work was called Fort Texas or sometimes Fort Taylor at first.
Taylor offered to let the people of Matamoros continue to use their port
on Brazos Island, which was north of the Rio Grande. =76=Jan. 6 he had
proposed to the Mexicans to agree on measures to prevent "exasperation
on either side."
7.23. See p. 117. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 133, 138-9, 142, 145 (Taylor);
140, 144 (Ampudia). (Leave town) =52=Consul Schatzel, July 18. _Niles_,
May 2, p. 132. _Monitor Repub._, Jan. 28, 1847. _Diario_, Apr. 5,
8, 25. =283=Gen. orders, army of the north, Feb. 18; Apr. 3, 14.
Ampudia, To Fellow-Cits. (and docs.). Negrete, Invasión, ii, 154, 157,
160. =52=Black to Castillo, May 1, 9. =52=Castillo to Black, May 5.
=69=Report from spy. And from =76= the following. Mejía, Feb. 4; Mar.
17, 18; Apr. 2. _Id._ to Ampudia, Apr. 5. To Ampudia, Feb. 18; Mar. 28;
Apr. 4. Ampudia, Mar. 28; Apr. 9, 11, 13, 14. _Id._ to gov. Tamaulipas,
Apr. 12. _Id._ to Schatzell, Apr. 11 (order of expulsion; any American
crossing the river to be shot). _Id._ to Mejía, Mar. 30. _Id._ to
Arista, Apr. 14.
Ampudia was thoroughly Mexican in demanding that he should have all
the advantages and Taylor all the disadvantages of the _quasi_ state
of war that he insisted upon, in protesting against Taylor's action
as a declaration of blockade, which it did not pretend to be, and in
ordering Taylor to go beyond the Nueces, which he knew was regarded by
many Americans (though by no Mexican) as the boundary of Mexico. In two
additional ways he indicated that in his view a state of war existed
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 144, 147). The American consul, seventy years old,
had to set out on foot and spend the first night in a field during a
norther (_República de Rio Grande_, June 6).
7.24. (Ampudia's orders) =73=Bermúdez de Castro, no. 218, res., Mar.
29. México á través, iv, 545. Slidell, Jan. 14. Ramírez, México, 79.
=285=Mejía to Paredes, Apr. 3. Carreño, Jefes, ccii, 141 (Ampudia was a
Cuban by birth). =199=Arista to Paredes, Dec. 15, 1845. =13=Bankhead,
no. 56, 1846. Meade, Letters, i, 61. (Aim) Bustamante, N. Bernal, i,
113. Apuntes, 34-5. And from =76= the following. (A.'s plans) Ampudia,
Mar. 28. _Id._, to Arista, Apr. 14. To Ampudia, Feb. 18. To Arista, Feb.
10; Apr. 4, 20, 22. Arista, Apr. 12, 29. Parrodi, Apr. 29. Ampudia, Apr.
13, 14. _Id._, proclam., Apr. 18. Arista to Ampudia, Apr. 10.
According to Bermúdez de Castro, the Spanish minister, the opposition
writers at Mexico expressed surprise because, after ordering Ampudia
to attack the Americans, the government stated it had not committed
and would not commit an act of aggression against the United States.
Mar. 7 Ampudia ordered Mejía to attack the Americans, but not to risk a
decisive action (=76=Mejía, Mar. 17). The evidence that Ampudia had been
ordered to attack Taylor is supported by the fact that he tried to do so
even after he knew he had been superseded.
7.25. (Orders) =76=Tornel to Arista, Apr. 4; =76=Arista to Guerra,
Apr. 26; May 7; Washington _Union_, Aug. 27; Bankhead, no. 90, 1846.
=76=Arista to Torrejón, Apr. 24. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 132, 140, 1205
(Taylor); 290 (Thornton); 291 (Hardie); 1204 (Arista). =76=Testimony
in the court-martial of Arista (Jáuregui, Torrejón, Carrasco, Canales,
Mendoza). Smith, To Mexico, 39-42. _Spirit of the Times_, May 23.
Campaña contra, 4. =69=Court of Inquiry on Hardee, May 26. Wash.
_Union_, May 9. _Niles_, May 16, pp. 165, 176. Negrete, Invasión, ii,
147. =65=Taylor, gen. orders 74. =169=_Id._ to Crittenden, Sept. 1.
Taylor had called repeatedly for reinforcements to the regular army
(Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 102, 114, 132). Up to May 8 he received 56 recruits
(_ibid._, 142). The conciliatory policy of the Americans made it
impossible to take military precautions against spies, and Thornton was
doubtless betrayed. He did his best. Taylor, with a view to the vigorous
prosecution of the war, called on Texas for two regiments of infantry
and two of horse, and on Louisiana for two of infantry. The order to
attack Taylor was doubtless recommended by Tornel, the minister of war,
who hated the United States; but perhaps he had a particular motive. He
had been at work for S. Anna when Paredes seized the Presidency, and he
knew that it would cripple Paredes (thus opening the way for S. Anna) to
provide funds and send troops from Mexico City for a war with the United
States (=52=Black, May 26; Dimond, Jan. 15).
7.26. Boston _Atlas_, a strong Whig journal, said, Dec. 11, 1846: "There
is no doubt that the conduct of that government [Mexico] towards us has
been such as might have justified the extreme resort to war." Polk,
Diary, Apr. 21, 25, 28; May 3, 5-9.
7.27. C. J. Ingersoll, chrmn. Ho. com. for affairs (_Cong. Globe_,
29, 2, app., 128): I urged Polk to anticipate invasion by crossing
the Rio Grande, but he would not. (Reasons) _So. Qtrly. Rev._, Nov.,
1850, 434-5. =331=Taylor to Conner, Apr. 3. (Effect) =60=Lieut. Irons,
Apr. 20; =76=Arista, Apr. 27; Negrete, Invasión, ii, 120. (Flimsily)
=312=Mejía to Arista, Oct. 6, 1845; =76=Requena in trial of Arista.
7.28. _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 498; 30, 1, app., 64. Polk, Message, Dec.
8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 484). (Marcy) Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 194.
=52=Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 25, 1847. Jan. 27, 1847, a bill establishing
post-routes south of the Nueces passed the Senate unanimously (_Cong.
Globe_, 29, 1, p. 251). (Six months) _Nat. Intelligencer_, Sept. 4,
1846. (People) _Mo. Reporter_, Jan. 6, 1846. It is true that no right
to go _to_ the Rio Grande was explicitly asserted; but as everybody
held that either that stream or the Nueces was the boundary, a claim
extending beyond the latter extended practically to the former. See
Lumpkin's speech (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, 836). More than a month before
Taylor left Corpus Christi the House voted down a motion to ask the
President whether he had ordered our forces to move against Mexico, and
thus became accomplices of Polk (Von Holst, iii, 214-5). The order of
Jan. 13 soon became known to Congress and the public (_Cong. Globe_, 30,
1, p. 279). Feb. 3 Ashmun of Massachusetts offered a resolution calling
upon the President for information regarding the matter (_ibid._, 280).
Mar. 23 Brinkerhoff stated in the House that Taylor's army must be
supposed to be approaching or already upon the Rio Grande; yet no one
in Congress protested (29, 1, 534). Mar. 26, 1846, while discussing an
appropriation bill, McIlvaine of Penn. said that in sending troops to
the Rio Grande Polk had been "invading Mexico" (_ibid._, 558); yet,
though he made a most urgent appeal to the opponents of slavery--in
behoof of which he intimated the step had been taken--and there were
other objections to the bill, it passed the House by 111 to 38 (_ibid._,
573-4). Note also the vote on Delano's motion (chap, ix, note 4). See
chap. xxxiv, note 16, and the corresponding text.
7.29. (1794) Ho. Report 752; 29, 1, p. 44; C. J. Ingersoll in _Cong.
Globe_, 29, 2, app., 129; Chase, Polk Admin., 131-2; Schouler, U. S., i,
296-7. (Fla.) Moore, Amer. Diplom., 163; H. Adams, U. S. v, 310-4, 318.
Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 77 (Pearce). (Hilliard) _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1, p.
148. (Adams) _Ibid._, p. 127.
7.30. (Weakened) Wash. _Union_, Jan. 11, 1848 (Reverdy Johnson in
Senate); =256=Marcy to Wetmore. May 10, 1846; _Cong. Globe_, 29, 1,
app., 934; 30, 1, app., 65. (Wise) =52=Buchanan to Slidell, Jan. 20,
1846. (Argument) =56=W. S. Parrott, Aug. 5, 1845; Slidell, Feb. 17,
1846; =364=Worth to S., Oct. 2, 1845; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107 (Taylor,
Oct. 4); _Niles_, July 18, 1846, pp. 313-4; Polk, Diary, Sept. 1,
1845; =108=Mayer to Bancroft, May 22, 1846; London _Times_, May 30,
1846 (Wash. corr.); Calhoun in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 499 (Those in
power were confident that the march to the Rio Grande would not bring on
war); M. Brown in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 356 (Polk determined to
convince the Mexicans by hostile demonstrations that they must settle
promptly); Hilliard denounced Polk in the House for using a display of
force to intimidate Mexico (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, p. 566), and Calhoun
felt somewhat the same (_ibid._, 497); Boston _Atlas_, May 15, 16, 1846
(Wash. corr.); Howe, Bancroft, i, 282; =345=Poinsett to Van Buren, May
26, 1846; =108=Bradford to Bancroft, Aug. 17, 1845; Coxe, Review, 38.
Public men who talked with Polk probably knew more about his views than
anti-slavery agitators who did not. Calhoun and Brown were criticising,
not defending, Polk. =162=Bancroft to Conner, Jan. 17, 1846. Wash.
_Union_, Oct. 15, 1847. (Conceded) Boston _Atlas_, May 15, 16, 20, 1846.
See also chap. vi, note 22, last paragraph.
7.31. Wash. _Union_, Oct. 15, 1847. =256=Paper indorsed "Projet--Genl.
Scott." Richardson, Messages, iv, 486. (Sabine) =76=Mora, Nov. 15, 1845.
(Prevented) =81=Arista to troops, July 31, 1845; =76=_Id._ to Parrodi,
Dec. 22. Addressing the nation in denunciation of the revolution of
Paredes, Dec., 1845, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies stated that only
his attitude had prevented war upon the United States that year.
=77=Almonte, Sept. 20, 1844. (Mobile) =66=Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15,
1846; Elliot, chap. v, note 6; _Nat. Intelligencer_, May 29, 1845; Sept.
10, 1846. (180) Stevens, Campaigns, 18. =52=Dimond, no. 257, 1845. W. S.
Parrott, July 22, 1845. =297=Polk to Dallas, Aug. 23, 1845. (Accentuate)
=256=Marcy to Wetmore, Aug. 12, 1845; Jan. 21, 1846 (Our relations with
Mexico "have worsened by the change which has undoubtedly taken place
in that country"). =76=Mejía to Canales, Feb. 16, 1846; to Guerra, Mar.
17. Art. 1, sec. 10 of our Constitution and the Act of Feb. 28, 1795,
show that not only invasion but danger of invasion authorized military
measures. Authorization implied a corresponding duty. To neglect this
duty and throw the matter into Congress, where partisan complications
and ignorance regarding the region and the circumstances prevailed,
would have caused the delay which the Constitution aimed to prevent.
Note also _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, app., 209-10, col. 1 (action of com.
for. rels.). Again, had Texas been independent in Jan., 1846, no one
would have censured her for sending troops to the Rio Grande; and the
United States succeeded to all her rights. This right was independent of
our claim to the intermediate region (_Cong. Globe_, 30, 1, app., 425-6).
7.32. _Picayune_, Dec. 12, 1846. (Confessed) =218=Henshaw narrative.
=13=Giffard to Bankhead, May 13, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106.
7.33. =297=Scott, memo., undated.
7.34. Von Holst, U. S., iii, 245, note. _Autograph_, Jan.-Feb., 1912
(Taylor, Apr. 7). The proof that Mexico claimed still to the Sabine is
voluminous: _e.g._ Paredes, proclamation, Mar. 21, 1846 (Mexico "does
not acknowledge the right of the American flag on the soil of Texas, and
she will defend her invaded territory"); =76=Gen. Mora, Nov. 15, 1845
("the contest in which the Republic is engaged with the United States
for the possession of the territory of Texas"); _Diario_, Mar. 25; Sept.
18, 26 (the Sabine "is the boundary"), 1846; _Monitor Repub._, June 28,
1847 (Mexico "neither recognizes nor has recognized any boundary except
the Sabine"); Peña, Comunicación circular, Dec. 11, 1845 (indicates
repeatedly that the object of the war would be the recovery of Texas);
Otero, Comunicación. (After Herrera's fall "reconquest [of Texas] again
became our policy"); Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Wash.
_Union_, Nov. 10, 1847. (Probably) =69=Alba to Taylor, Mar. 6, 1846;
=76=Mejía, Jan. 21; Mar. 28; =76=Mora, May 4; Bankhead, no. 47, 1846:
note Mejía's action in Feb. and March, 1846, _supra_; and Ampudia's
orders to him before Taylor left Corpus Christi (note 24). (Notice)
=76=Relaciones to ministers at London and Paris, July 30, 1845. Benton
in _Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p. 497 (the causes of the war existed before
Taylor advanced, and his advance resulted from them). See also the next
note.
7.35. Otero, Comunicación. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 486, 490.
_Monitor Repub._, Oct. 29, 1847. (Arista) Suárez y Navarro, Alegato, 48.
Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). Paredes to Arista,
Apr. 18 (captured in A.'s baggage, May 9, 1846) in Wash. _Union_,
Aug. 27, 1847, and in _Tex. Democrat_, Nov. 11, 1846. The reader will
not fail to note the decisive bearing of the letter of Apr. 18 on the
question discussed in the preceding paragraph.
7.36. Vattel, Law of Nations, 352. If any substantial arguments against
Polk's course existed, Calhoun, Webster or the _American (Whig) Review_
should have been able to find them. Calhoun (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2, p.
500) said Polk should have refrained from sending Taylor to the Rio
Grande and have referred to Congress or the Senate the question of
the boundary. But (1) he forgot that as to the boundary near the east
(the only part of it now under consideration) our government stood
committed; (2) he did not seem to know whether Congress or the Senate
was the proper authority on the subject; (3) he refuted his criticism
by saying that Polk should have referred the question on finding he
could not settle it by negotiation; and Polk, instead of having found
he could not do so, had Taylor advance with the hope of thus inducing
Mexico to negotiate; (4) Calhoun had thought it right in 1844 to place
our military forces virtually at the orders of Texas for defensive uses
(Smith, Annex. of Texas, 367), and she would very likely have sent them
to that river (see Wash. _Union_, Feb. 22, 1847); (5) reference of the
question to Congress would almost certainly have caused long delay and
paralyzed the Executive, for about fifteen unsuccessful attempts were
made in the business of annexing Texas to determine the boundary, and
after the war that subject vexed Congress for nearly two years. (See
also the text.) Calhoun's fundamental objection against the President's
policy, however, was that Polk should have let the Mexican difficulties
alone until after settling the Oregon question (_Cong. Globe_, 29, 2,
p. 498). But (1) it was not certain that the Oregon question could be
settled amicably; at one time, as we have noted, Polk believed it could
not be; and therefore it may well have seemed prudent to get rid of
a smaller but annoying affair before the greater one should reach a
crisis; (2) other important reasons for settling with Mexico have been
given on pp. 118, 120-2, 134-7.
Webster, after thinking on the subject for more than half a year, took
it up in a long speech at Philadelphia (Writings, iv), and said: Polk
ordered the occupation of territory to which we had "no ascertained
title" (p. 26). [But a serious claim may be an adequate basis for
pacific joint occupation.] Polk viewed the Rio Grande as the boundary
[being committed to that position], and "intended to extinguish the
Mexican title by force" (p. 27). [Polk desired to extinguish it through
negotiation, and had not abandoned the effort to do so when he ordered
Taylor to advance. Mexican jurisdiction was not to be attacked. There
were other grounds than that alleged by Webster for the instructions
given to our general.] Taylor was ordered to treat every Mexican
assertion of title as an act of hostility (p. 29). [By no means. Taylor
was ordered not to molest the Mexican posts.] Why did not Polk consult
Congress before ordering Taylor to the Rio Grande (p. 29)? [The matter
could not be laid in definite shape before Congress until the fate of
Slidell's mission should have been decided. Polk's diary shows that he
desired to present the matter to Congress as promptly as he could.] Only
"self-defence" could justify sending troops into a territory claimed
and occupied by a power with which at that time no war existed (p. 29).
[This can hardly be admitted. We claimed the territory; Mexico was
believed to have troops there; it was only fair to place ourselves on an
equality with her.] And "there was, I think, no case of such necessity
for self-defence" (p. 30). [Webster admits that for self-defence
(_i.e._ defence of the Texans, now virtually American citizens) we
had a right to send the troops, and it is believed that the necessity
of such defence has been established in the text.] Taylor's letters
prove that there was no danger of a Mexican invasion (p. 30). [Taylor's
outlook extended, and his letters had reference only, to the immediate
frontier, and even to little of that except Matamoros. He could furnish
no opinion regarding the intentions of the Mexican government. Of the
orders actually given to the Mexican generals he was in total ignorance
until after May 9, 1846. The outlook of the authorities at Washington
was broader and clearer than his, and as the text shows they were
warned officially that Mexico was liable to make secret preparations
and a sudden invasion.] "Ordering the army to the Rio Grande was a step
naturally, if not necessarily, tending to provoke hostilities" (p.
31). [Of course the assertion of a claim denied by another power tends
naturally in the direction of hostilities, but no nation can for that
reason forbear to assert its claims. Webster's suggestion that sending
the troops did not necessarily produce hostilities is noteworthy. If the
President can declare war, what becomes of the Constitution, which gives
that power to Congress (p. 32)? [The President may take steps logically
leading to war; but in this case there was reason to believe that
Taylor's advance might tend toward peace.] Was it Polk's object to force
Mexico to treat? If so, it was an "idle hope" (p. 32). [Here Webster
seems to admit that such might have been Polk's intention. The fact that
Polk failed does not prove that such was not his design. Webster failed
to acquire northern California, but he certainly attempted to do so.] It
will be said that Polk's course was sanctioned by "the act of May 11th,"
1846 (the virtual declaration of war against Mexico, the preamble of
which stated that Mexico had brought on the war), but neither a preamble
nor an act of Congress can "create a fact" (p. 32). [But a preamble can
state an opinion; and Congress thus expressed an opinion justifying the
President's course.] "I hardly suppose" Congress by that act "meant more
than to enable the President to defend the country, to the extent of the
limit claimed by him" (p. 32). [He claimed the Rio Grande as the limit;
and if Congress believed the country was to be defended to that river,
it believed the country extended to it, and consequently that Polk had a
right to send troops thus far.
The most plausible criticisms made by the _American (Whig) Review_
(July, 1846) were the following: Buchanan informed Slidell that the army
had been ordered to advance in view of his probable rejection, and
hence Taylor's advance was not, as Polk asserted, due to the urgent
necessity of defending Texas. [But the probable rejection of Slidell
meant probable fighting of a more or less serious nature north of the
Rio Grande.] Attempts were made from time to time, by throwing out
hints, to induce Taylor to advance on his own responsibility to the Rio
Grande [note 15]. As he did not, Slidell was sent to precipitate the
issue. [There is no evidence in support of this theory and much evidence
against it, as we have seen.] As Slidell failed to do so, Taylor was
positively ordered to the Rio Grande. [January 13 there was every reason
to believe that Slidell would be rejected, and that thus an issue would
be precipitated. December 20 Peña y Peña wrote to Slidell that unless
the pending difficulties were settled by negotiation there must be war.
In January, 1847, the _Review_ repeated Webster's argument that Taylor
reported no danger of invasion. [Note the comment made above.] October
16, Marcy wrote to Taylor that no serious danger from Mexico was
feared, yet gave him authority to advance to the river. [A foray would
not be considered a serious military operation, but it was necessary
to guard against forays.] On January 13, Polk had no reason to expect
that Paredes intended to open hostilities. [He had grave reasons for
expecting hostilities. See p. 100.] He had Slidell's despatch of
December 17, which intimated that it might be more possible to negotiate
with Paredes than with Herrera. [Slidell only said that he might
have greater chances of accomplishing something with a less friendly
but more efficient government.] Besides, it was known that war would
have to proceed from the Congress, not from the President of Mexico.
[Holding that Texas was a part of Mexico and the presence of American
troops there an invasion, Paredes took the ground that attacking us
would not be making war, but merely defending the country as it was
his duty to do. (See his manifesto of April 23, 1846.) Consequently
no action by Congress was necessary.] Polk says the Mexicans did not
place their hostilities on the ground of our occupying non-Texan
territory, but they did do so. [Certain Mexicans took this ground for
the purpose of embarrassing the Americans, among whom there was known
to be a difference of opinion on this point; but the national Mexican
authorities regarded as our essential offence the presence of our troops
on Texan soil: note 34.
In February, 1847, the _Review_ said that on January 13, 1846, Polk did
not know Slidell would be rejected. [Polk carefully avoided stating that
at that date Slidell's rejection was certain. He spoke of it as "highly
probable," which was rather less than could have been said.] April 6,
Taylor referred to the Mexicans of Matamoros as "the enemy." [As the
word occurred in a report to our government it did no harm, even if not
well chosen; but at that date Taylor had been given by the Mexicans
sufficient ground for using it.] Taylor pointed guns at Matamoros for
the purpose of stinging the Mexicans into hostility. [See p. 151.] The
intention of the American government was to manage things so as to make
Taylor the scapegoat if matters should go ill, and take the credit if
they should go well. [The orders of the war department were probably as
definite as they could safely be made. See p. 142.] Polk ordered Taylor
to advance because he did not believe the failure of Slidell would be a
pretext for war that Congress would accept. [This does not agree with
the charge made by Polk's enemies (_e.g. supra_) that he sent Slidell in
order to have him rejected and thus bring about a war. It is also wide
of the mark. In Polk's mind the essential ground for action was not the
rejection of Slidell but our grievances, and his diary shows that he
believed this ground would be accepted by Congress, or at least believed
so to such an extent as to decide upon raising the issue squarely.