behind the bank, here breast-high and masked with trees--Flores greeted
them from the top of the hill with four small guns; but his inferior
powder and sometimes ill-fitting balls proved ineffective.[17.26]
When the Americans were mostly across the river and formed in a square,
he undertook to charge. But the movement seems to have been rather
faint-hearted or badly managed; his left was demoralized by hearing one
of the aides--who seems to have been seized with a panic--shout "Halt!"
as it was advancing; and his right accomplished nothing. Stockton
then cannonaded the hill, particularly with his two 9-pounders, for
about forty minutes, while most of his troops lay down; and finally he
charged. Crying "New Orleans!" in memory of Jackson's great victory,
gained on the same day of the year, January 8, the men rushed on, and
easily took possession of the ground. The Californians made a fruitless
attack on their rear, and then most of them dispersed.[17.27]
[STOCKTON MOVES AGAINST LOS ANGELES]
The next morning Stockton, leaving the road in order to avoid the danger
of ambuscades, pushed slowly on toward Los Angeles; and after a time
some three hundred Californians, whom Flores had managed to rally,
placed themselves upon his line of march. An ineffective cannonade from
a ravine used up the rest of their ammunition, while the Americans
replied with equally meagre results. As a last effort, Flores now
ordered a charge, giving the signal for it--as he himself reported--by
sending forward a white flag.[17.27]
[Illustration: Fight near Los Angeles]
The attack was made with considerable spirit but no success at all on
both of the American flanks, and then Flores took post at a point on
the road to Mexico, where Pasadena now stands. He admitted losing only
five killed and twenty-two wounded during the two days, but probably
these figures needed to be multiplied by three; while Stockton lost one
killed and fourteen wounded. That night the Americans encamped near Los
Angeles; and the next day, January 10, after a deputation had come to
arrange matters, they took possession of the town--annoyed a little by
drunken bullies--and replaced Gillespie's flag on the government house.
Most of the California troops now scattered, and those who remained were
insubordinate. Flores could see there was no hope; and the following
night, leaving to Andrés Pico the chief command and probably about one
hundred men, he set out hastily with a few others for Sonora.[17.27]
[FRÉMONT'S OPERATIONS]
Up to this time nothing had been heard of Frémont's operations during
almost three months. Probably that officer did not wish to take part
in the hostilities. Expecting to be governor and seeing before him
a prospect of brilliant opportunities, he desired to conciliate the
people. Stockton, on learning of the revolt in the south, had ordered
him back from the Sacramento, and about October 12 he sailed for Santa
Barbara with instructions to march from that place to Los Angeles.
Learning on the way, however, that Mervine had been defeated, and that
all the horses and cattle had been driven away from Santa Barbara by
insurgents, he returned on his own responsibility to the Sacramento,
and began to collect not only horses but men.[17.28] By the end of
November he found at his back about four hundred mounted riflemen and at
least three guns, the strongest force in California.[17.32]
The _Savannah_ had been sent north expressly to assist him;[17.29]
but, with little reference to his army commission or his naval
obligations, he now proceeded slowly by land to San Luis Obispo, where
he fortunately captured Jesús Pico, a cousin of Andrés; and after his
prisoner had been sentenced to death for breaking parole, he assumed
the authority of pardoning him. Then, for no discoverable reason unless
to spare about sixty insurgents, whom he could have scattered in ten
minutes, he led his command through the mountains, where it suffered
terribly in the stormy weather. At Santa Barbara he took a week for
repose; and finally, with a nicety of calculation or felicity of luck
that excites wonder, he arrived near the scene of action--three months
after receiving orders to go there--precisely as the Americans were
entering Los Angeles.[17.30] Then with his devotee, Jesús Pico, he
betook himself to the camp of Andrés, and finally, although he knew that
American forces had beaten the Californians and entered Los Angeles,
and understood that a superior officer was near, he arranged with the
insurgents a capitulation, which Stockton had refused to grant.[17.32]
This capitulation, the "treaty" of Cahuenga, conceded substantially
all the insurgents could have asked. They promised to give up the
public arms, go home, obey the laws of the United States, and help
restore tranquillity; but on the other hand they and the rest of the
Californians were to be protected in person and property, to enjoy the
same rights as Americans, to be excused from serving under arms or
taking an oath of allegiance during the war, and to leave the country
freely should they wish to do so.[17.31] Naturally such a settlement
was displeasing to Stockton, but he felt extremely anxious to resume
his proper work as a naval officer, and of course was glad to have this
difficult business off his hands; so after hesitating for a time he
confirmed the pact.[17.32]
It was a singular dénouement. Men defeated, without a hope left, and in
danger of execution for breaking parole, virtually dictated terms to the
conquerors. A brevet captain, just blossoming into a lieutenant colonel,
eclipsed a commodore and a brigadier general; and the arch-ruffian of
the Bear cult reappeared as a fairy godmother to save and bless the
Californians, who detested him. But the ending was after all a happy
one. The Americans felt a new respect for the people, and they were able
to see that, although destitute of gunpowder, the insurgents, if driven
to extremities, could have done much harm with lance, dagger and torch,
and could have sown the seeds of perennial hate.[17.32]
On the other hand, while the Californians felt well pleased with their
own audacity and valor, they not only realized that it was impossible
to fight the United States, but were thoroughly disgusted with Flores,
who took away hundreds of horses and mules belonging to his friends, and
with Mexico, which in three and a half months had sent neither a man nor
a peso to encourage and sustain them. Indeed, as their agent in Mexico
frankly said, their political attitude had completely changed. Most of
them intended to abide by the terms. They were disposed to look forward
instead of back. And the curtain was already beginning to rise on the
Golden West that we know.[17.32]
XVIII
THE GENESIS OF TWO CAMPAIGNS
July, 1846-February, 1847
The operations described in the preceding chapters were all favorable to
American arms, and they placed under our control a very large portion
of the territory belonging to Mexico; but as they proceeded, it became
evident that she had no thought of consenting to negotiate. Indeed
Santa Anna's course and the utterances of the press were unflinchingly
warlike; and our consul at Mexico wrote, "Nothing but some very severe
blow will ever bring them to their senses." The policy and expectations
of the American government were therefore palpably wrong. The programme
of a short and a brisk war was a mistake and a failure. The nation found
itself in a contest of unforeseen duration and extent.[18.4]
Heedless enthusiasm was consequently sobered, if not exactly chilled.
By the end of September, 1846, Pakenham, the British minister at
Washington, reported that a growing distaste for the war could be seen
more clearly each day. Large expenses had to be faced, and heavy losses
of men seemed inevitable. Many believed that neither troops nor money
enough could be raised; many, besides deploring the loss of precious
lives, complained that needed laborers had already been drawn away; and
many others asked themselves whether the outlay would be really worth
while. Taylor's famous letter to Gaines expressed the opinion that even
complete success would be of no advantage; and his idea of simply fixing
and holding a boundary north of which there would be enough territory
to pay all fair claims for indemnity, and throwing upon Mexico the
responsibility for offensive operations naturally appealed to not a few.
Moreover, he argued, no other sort of a peace could be made, since the
enemy had no government sufficiently stable to treat with. Calhoun took
up eagerly the defensive idea. Buchanan favored it; and Polk himself,
dreading to alarm the country by demanding great numbers of men and
fearful that the credit of the nation would not bear the strain of
active warfare, did the same.[18.4]
On the other hand such a plan was clearly unsuited to the enterprising
temper of the American people, and precisely what the Mexicans, whose
ancestors had fought the Moors of Spain for hundreds of years, desired.
It reminded one of the menaces and forays that had been the policy of
Mexico against the Texans. It would have been received by her as a
cheering confession, on our part, of military impotence. Had it been
adopted, her people would have found a chain of profitable markets
established for them; and at any time she could have dashed either
with regular or with irregular troops upon any part of our line, done
what harm she could, and retired like a wave on the beach, to prepare
fresh assaults in a perpetual series. Only one campaign of the sort now
proposed was on record, said Cass--that of Sisyphus. Besides, every mile
of the boundary would have required its guard; even at that a broad
space along the frontier would have become practically uninhabitable;
expenses approaching those of offensive operations would have mounted
up; we could have laid no contributions upon the enemy; national
honor would have been tarnished and national spirit exasperated by a
succession of small defeats; and no progress whatever toward conquering
a peace would have been made.[18.4]
Politically and commercially the unfavorable condition of things
which the United States had been so anxious to end, would have become
chronic. European nations would soon have gained a monopoly of trade
and influence in Mexico; they would have protested against an endless
blockade; and what further steps they would have taken in regard to
a vexatious and apparently aimless contest it was easy to imagine.
Furthermore, simply to seize and hold, with no legal title, provinces
which Mexico had not been able to protect against the Indians would
have seemed to place the United States in the class of mere pilferers.
Honor--at least military honor--demanded that we should meet the enemy,
whom we had challenged, at the centre of their pride and power.
Finally, the weakness exhibited in "backing out" of a war with Mexico,
begun without a question of triumph, would have excited ridicule abroad,
and compromised our international position. Confronted with such
objections to the defensive plan, Polk was "extremely distressed," said
Pakenham. Evidently some decisive achievement was needed to save the
administration, the party and the country; but he dared not face the
cost nor incur the risk of a still more signal failure.[18.4]
[BOLDER IDEAS]
There was, however, no lack of bolder ideas. Not only did every
newspaper come forward with a "cut and dried" plan, as Marcy rather
bitterly said, but the government itself knew what needed to be done.
In fact mere animal instinct was enough to suggest that a blow should
be struck at the enemy's heart, and as the project of maintaining a
line of operations from the Rio Grande to the capital--more than 800
miles--was out of the question, the idea of attacking Mexico City by the
way of Vera Cruz came forward early. On July 4, 1846, Benton formally
suggested landing beyond the range of Ulúa, the island fortress which
guarded that port, attacking the town in the rear, and after its fall
advancing to the capital. Santa Anna advised through Mackenzie almost
exactly that method of approach, adding that three or four thousand men
could easily capture the port; and at nearly the same time a letter from
Taylor, arguing that a lunge from the Rio Grande base would be unwise,
reinforced this project;[18.1] but there was no certainty that an
army could be placed in the rear of Vera Cruz, and a number of other
difficulties had to be considered.[18.4]
In 1838 a French squadron had been unable in six hours to injure
Ulúa seriously, though it had been permitted to choose its positions
unmolested. Such an advantage could not be expected now, and besides, as
Conner reported, the number of guns in the fortress had been increased
fourfold. The parapet of the main work had an elevation of forty feet
above the water; three 10-inch guns throwing shells were twenty feet
higher, and there were outworks--connected with the principal fort only
by drawbridges--commanded so thoroughly by the gun and musketry fire
of the garrison that it would be fatal to enter them, reported the
Commodore.[18.2] In short, said that prudent officer, Ulúa could
certainly, if well garrisoned, resist successfully any naval force
brought against it; while in the opinion of Pakenham, formerly the
British minister to Mexico, a combined army and naval attack on Ulùa and
Vera Cruz would be "a very hazardous undertaking," and, in consequence
of "the deadly nature of that Climate to foreign constitutions, success
would probably prove in the end as disastrous as failure." Moreover,
Conner pointed out, Vera Cruz would be of value solely as a dépôt, and
from that point of view he considered Tampico preferable. Consequently,
although at the end of August Polk brought up the subject of attacking
Mexico City by way of Vera Cruz, nothing was done about it save to ask
the Commodore for additional information.[18.4]
Not long before October 10, however, it was ascertained beyond a doubt
that Vera Cruz could be approached in the rear by a landing force, and
beginning immediately Polk and his advisers, aided by Dimond, recently
our consul at that city, and by other experts, labored on the question
of future operations for nearly two weeks. The result was, first, a
decision that since a farther advance in the north would be hazardous
and would accomplish nothing towards bringing about peace, Monterey and
its vicinity should be the limit of serious operations in that quarter.
Such was the deliberate and unanimous conclusion of the President and
his official family after long discussions. Instructions to General
Taylor were then carefully drafted, studied, amended and agreed upon. To
make sure that he should understand their significance, Major McLane,
son of the minister to England and a graduate from West Point, was taken
into the full confidence of the Executive regarding this matter, and
was then despatched to Monterey with the letter of October 22, which,
as well as the explanations of the envoy, Taylor interpreted, we have
already learned, according to his own ideas. So much for the first
point.[18.4]
The second was a decision to attack Vera Cruz. This did not mean,
however, a decision to proceed against the capital. Though Scott argued,
as Conner had, that gaining possession of the city and then reducing or
starving out Ulúa would practically be sterile triumphs, unless the army
should go farther, it was intended at this time to do no more in that
quarter, and three or four thousand men were thought sufficient for the
undertaking.[18.4]
[A NEW PLAN OF CAMPAIGN]
November 7, however, Benton made an evening call at the White House,
drew the President's attention to the unfavorable results of the
Congressional elections, declared that a bold stroke must be delivered
upon the Mexicans at once, and urged that after capturing Vera Cruz
and Ulúa the army should execute "a rapid crushing movement" against
the capital. Two days later he repeated the lesson, and on the tenth
he amplified it. Polk began to realize now that while it might be
dangerous to call for men and funds, it was even more dangerous not to
do so.[18.4]
Benton kept on calling, and finally he submitted a written plan. Scott
presented a memorial of the same tenor. Taylor wrote that in order to
strike a decisive blow troops must land at Vera Cruz or near that point;
and Conner reported that a descent could be made under cover of the
fleet, batteries could be planted on sand-hills behind the city, and
Ulúa, if not Vera Cruz also, could probably be reduced by starvation. As
early as November 14 Polk decided to call out 6750 men--that is to say,
nine volunteer regiments--for the duration of the war, and to capture
Vera Cruz immediately.[18.3] Yet even this involved no determination
to strike at the capital. Polk was distinctly in favor of so doing,
should that course be necessary to obtain peace; but Buchanan strongly
opposed it, insisting upon the cost of such an expedition, the chances
of failure, and the danger that by leading to a national, racial and
religious conflict it would militate against a settlement; Marcy had no
faith in the project; others of the Cabinet agreed with him; and hence
this question remained open, to be answered by circumstances.[18.4]
The next problem was the choice of a commander. In October Patterson, a
good Democrat, had been selected; but it had been found that, as he was
not a native American, he could not be developed into a Presidential
candidate, that his experience had not been adequate, that his
appointment would involve the retiring of both Taylor and Scott, and
that, as Buchanan learned at this time from Slidell, he did not possess
the confidence of the army. Butler, another Democrat, was Polk's next
choice, but he clearly held no titles to the position.[18.9]
Taylor had to be considered then; but he was regarded by the Executive
and his advisers as professionally unequal to the task and personally
unfitted for it, and both of these opinions were fully warranted. While
events had proved him a born leader of men and a splendid fighter, they
had also demonstrated plainly his lack of generalship and executive
efficiency. He distrusted, loathed and misconstrued the administration,
failed to supply it with plans and information, endeavored to throw upon
it the responsibility for mistakes of his own, lectured it harshly for
misdeeds it had not committed, and frustrated the cardinal intent of its
policy and orders by failing to press the campaign with all possible
vigor during the summer and autumn.[18.5] "I have not the slightest
respect," he wrote, for any member of the Cabinet except the secretary
of the navy. "Evil men bear sway," was another of his remarks.[18.9]
Indeed, the General's natural kindliness and sober judgment seem to have
become largely perverted by this time. He knew that for several months
friends of his had been at work to gain for him the political place long
occupied by Scott, and to use him as a battering ram against the party
in power;[18.6] and it was easy to assume that he would be repaid
in kind. Stories of intrigues and machinations, doubtless exaggerated
in his mind through inexperience and remoteness from the scene, must
have been a constant subject of thought, and he seems to have fallen
gradually into an abnormal state of sensitiveness and suspicion.[18.9]
His private correspondence contained the harshest opinions regarding
nearly all of the chief men thus far prominent in the war. Of Commodore
Perry he entertained "a contemptable opinion." Shields, who was a good
man and officer as men and officers went, he described as "without one
particle of principle to restrain him, save the laws of his country
and ready to minister body and soul to the vilest passions of a vile
administration." Quitman, who deserved high respect, appeared to him
unreliable, of mediocre ability and "afflicted with unbounded vanity."
The quartermaster general, he said, was partially deranged. Of Scott
he had written in August, "He means well on all occasions," but now
he was able to view his superior officer as a military "humbug" and
low politician, eager to advance himself and ruin others by the most
nefarious arts; and he could no longer see, what the administration
fully recognized, that it was essentially for its advantage to have
the generals win victories. So far as the government was concerned,
Taylor had some grounds for apprehension, perhaps. In all probability it
entertained by this time unfriendly feelings toward him. The veteran F.
P. Blair had warned Marcy distinctly that, as even the novice could see,
a Democratic administration was waging war to make a Whig President,
and under our system it was legitimate as well as natural to look for
an avenue of escape. Scott, however, seems to have been his friend,
privately exerting a strong influence in his favor on several occasions;
and while the lawful rights of superior rank were made use of by the
commander-in-chief, the same thing was done by Taylor himself with far
less considerateness.[18.9]
Finally Taylor had a particular moral disability, for he did not
believe in the Vera Cruz expedition actually contemplated. The season
of yellow fever--in his opinion a worse enemy than 100,000 Mexican
bayonets--was now too near, he wrote, and an army besieging that port
would be swept away by the pestilence.[18.7] He lacked, therefore,
some of the most necessary qualifications, and was not in a state of
mind to work harmoniously and effectively with the administration, the
commander-in-chief or his own principal subordinates in the exceedingly
difficult and delicate situations which the proposed expedition was
liable to create.[18.9]
[A COMMANDER SELECTED]
Gaines being out of the question, there was but one man left, and
he moreover, as an officer of experience and the head of the army,
possessed exceptional claims to the appointment. Scott seems to have
accepted his professional and political reverses of May very quietly,
illustrating that fine aphorism of King Stanislaus, "A man greater than
his misfortunes shows that he does not deserve them." Friends fell away
rapidly, yet he kept up his courage. To one of them indeed he wrote,
"Perhaps you might do well to imitate the example of that heathen who
touched his hat to the fallen statue of Jupiter--saying, 'Who knows
but he may be replaced upon his pedestal?'" and about the middle of
September, having learned through several channels that his presence in
Mexico had been desired by Taylor, to whom he generously referred as
"that gallant and distinguished commander," he reminded the government
that he was ready still to serve at the front.[18.8] This merely
brought him another curt rebuff; but when the Vera Cruz expedition
became a practical question he took part in the discussion without
pique, and he suggested incidentally that he, as the highest officer in
the service, was the proper individual to divide the troops between the
two fields of activity, and to command personally in the more important
one.[18.9]