assume the leadership in the field, could not logically object now
to his acting according to his rank; but, though time had vindicated
Scott's military policy and he now was viewed--Marcy admitted--as
politically harmless, Polk still deemed him scientific and visionary,
and still resented his allusion to fire from the rear. Long discussions
were held, but Marcy felt satisfied that Scott was the only fit
commander in sight. By rather cunning management he brought Senator
Benton to that opinion; others of the Cabinet reached the same
conclusion; and finally the President admitted with "reluctance" that
such was "the only alternative." Very likely, too, as many believed,
Polk saw a chance to play one Whig leader against the other. Anyhow,
after demanding "Scott's confidence," which--in view of the intention
to grant his dearest wish--Scott easily gave, he appointed him on
the eighteenth of November to command the expedition. An apparently
heartfelt and complete reconciliation followed. Scott almost shed tears
of emotion, recorded the President; and he received assurances in turn
that his confidence would be reciprocated, and that bygones were to
be considered bygones. A new David and a new Jonathan seemed to have
discovered each other.[18.9]
[SCOTT'S VIEWS]
Scott believed that Ulúa, if properly garrisoned, could not be taken
with naval batteries, or even with naval batteries and an escalade,
except at a disproportionate sacrifice of life, and a loss of time
that might subject the troops to the yellow fever, quadruple the
waste of men, and ruin the campaign. He therefore planned to make a
landing near Vera Cruz, capture the town, reduce the fortress--unless,
as appeared quite probable, it could soon be starved out--by naval
operations and land attacks based upon the city, and then escape the
pestilence by advancing promptly toward the capital. In his opinion
the Mexicans were likely to have 20-30,000 troops on the ground, and
therefore he thought 15,000 men desirable. Relying necessarily on
the figures of the adjutant general, he reckoned (November 16) that
7000 regulars and 13,500 volunteers were, or soon would be, under
Taylor's command, making with the new volunteers and recruits for
the regular army over 27,000,[18.10] and he therefore proposed
(November 21) to take about 5000 of these regulars, 6000 of the
volunteers, and the first 4000 of the new regiments. But he deemed
10,000--to be increased later to double that number--an adequate
minimum, and he felt willing, for the sake of gaining time, to launch
the campaign with the first 8000 soldiers that could be set afloat
off Brazos Island. Anticipating a stubborn resistance at the point of
disembarkation, he desired to have 140 surf-boats in order to land
5000 men and eight guns at once, and he made ample requisitions for
transports, ordnance and ordnance stores.[18.11] As for Taylor,
the General proposed that he should retain forces enough to defend
Monterey and his communications,[18.12] and stand for a time on the
defensive.[18.16]
Scott of course desired official instructions of this tenor, and even
drafted them, but Marcy only wrote as follows (November 23): You have
been ordered by the President himself to go to Mexico, take command
there, and set on foot a Gulf expedition, "if on arriving at the theatre
of action you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to
control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you
are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all
the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means
provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it, are committed to you,
in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage. The
objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is
hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them. Of this
you must be the judge when the preparations are made, and the time for
action has arrived."[18.16]
Marcy seldom laughed, but occasionally he shook like a bowlful of jelly,
and as he signed this letter he must have shaken prodigiously. Assuming
no responsibility, making no promises, the government simply unloaded
the whole burden of the expedition upon Scott.[18.13] Should he
succeed, a Democratic administration would reap a great profit; should
he fail, a Whig general would have to bear a great reproach. In order to
obtain the essential troops it would be necessary for him to incur the
odium of taking many of them from Taylor, who in Polk's opinion was not
willing to give them up; and thus not only would Taylor's rising star
become clouded, but a bitter quarrel between these two Whig leaders and
their friends would almost certainly be precipitated. Besides, Taylor
might throw up his command in a fit of temper, and relegate himself to
obscurity. No wonder the President felt remarkably in spirits just after
this.[18.16]
[TAYLOR'S WINTER OPERATIONS]
Scott, however, was determined to forestall the danger of a quarrel.
Immediately on suggesting to the government that as head of the army
he was the proper individual to command the Vera Cruz expedition, he
notified Taylor of this action, and only two days after receiving his
appointment he drafted a letter informing that officer about the matter;
but the President, regarding absolute secrecy as a prime requisite,
would not permit him to mention it.[18.14] A few days later (November
25) he wrote from New York to this effect: I am going to Mexico and
shall conduct operations in a new field; where that is to be I cannot
safely state, but with the aid of advices received from Washington you
can imagine; new forces have been called out, yet--as the season of
yellow fever is at hand--I shall have to take most of your troops; your
victories, however, have placed you on such an eminence that you can
afford to act on the defensive for a time, and before spring I think you
will be able to resume active operations; I desire to consult with you,
and plan to be at Camargo for that purpose about the twenty-third of
December.[18.15] The letter was confidential and cordial; and having
now done what he could to conjure the tempest, as well as to prepare for
his work, the General sailed from New York the last day of November. The
voyage to New Orleans, hindered by the weather, took nearly three weeks.
He made a brief and busy stay in that city, and two days after Christmas
he reached Brazos Island.[18.16]
Certain steps tending to facilitate his enterprise had now been
taken by General Taylor. December 10 the temporary Field Division
organized at Camargo was broken up--the Georgia, Mississippi and First
Tennessee regiments reporting to Quitman, and the Ohio and Kentucky
regiments to Butler; the First Division (regulars) under Twiggs was
reorganized;[18.17] on December 13 and 14, a day apart, this division
and Quitman's brigade set out for Victoria, nearly 200 miles distant;
and on the fifteenth Taylor himself, leaving Butler behind to command at
Monterey, followed them.[18.23]
It was not pleasant marching, for a long drought had burned everything
up, the sun blazed with intense heat, and the road, when not covered
with small, sharp stones, was ankle-deep in light dust; but the
inspiring Saddle Mountain seemed to keep company with the troops all
day, Cerralvo Mountain hung like a dark shadow on the left, the cool
blue line of the Sierra Madre extended on the right farther than the
eye could see, and the town first reached--Cadereita, about twenty-five
miles from Monterey--burying its white houses in orange groves, looking
out over gardens, and looking down from a low bluff into the clear
waters of the Topo Grande, was delightful. December 17 the infantry
arrived at Montemorelos, a small town at the foot of the sierra, planted
beside a swift, cool stream, full of trout, that watered a beautiful
valley, and suggesting at a distance under the blue sky--wrote a
surgeon--a pearl set in an azure stone. Here the command absorbed the
Second Infantry and the Second Tennessee; and it now amounted to some
3500 men, of whom rather more than a third were regulars.[18.23]
But Santa Anna was not asleep. Learning of Taylor's proposed march and
believing that Wool had left Parras for Chihuahua, he determined to
advance about December 24, strike at Saltillo and Monterey in person
with 9000 picked infantry, 4000 cavalry and twelve guns, despatch
troops from Tula against the Americans at Victoria, and finally close
in upon Taylor with his own forces; and a large part of these troops
actually set out. Worth got wind of danger, however, on December
16; in accordance with instructions previously given he called for
help;[18.18] and in the evening of the next day four grimy troopers
burst upon Taylor at Montemorelos with the startling intelligence,
that Santa Anna would attack Worth in three days. Ordering Quitman to
proceed, Taylor therefore set out on December 18 with his regulars for
Saltillo. Butler, calling a regiment from Camargo to Monterey, reached
the front with his own forces on December 19, and Wool arrived there
two days later. Santa Anna, discovering Wool's march by December 24,
countermanded his orders; and Taylor, learning on December 20 while
between Monterey and Saltillo, of Wool's advance and the non-appearance
of the Mexicans, and concluding there was no danger, turned
back.[18.23]
On the twenty-third he again left Monterey, and the next day he received
Scott's New York letter.[18.19] His presence with the forces was
not at all requisite. No serious fight was in prospect, for Quitman
had reported nothing of the sort. There was at least one topographical
engineer in the command, who could make better notes of the country than
he.[18.20] Probably his military engineers also, among whom figured
Robert E. Lee, afterwards the famous Confederate leader, were there; and
as for disposing of the troops, General Scott's letter gave him reason
to believe, that a superior officer was now on the ground with new
plans. His obvious duty was therefore to report at Camargo, the place
mentioned by Scott, or at least await instructions at Monterey. But the
stout old gentleman in the loose olive-brown frock-coat, wool socks and
Mexican sombrero had a temper and several ideas of his own. Probably
he did not wish to arrange matters amicably; and he kept straight on
for ten days, plunging farther and farther toward the remotest portion
of his field, inaccessible from any and every point where Scott might
by any reasonable possibility chance to be. Indeed, Scott's letter was
not answered for two days, and eight more passed before the answer,
which stated that General Taylor was going to Victoria, reached
Camargo.[18.23]
[TAYLOR'S MARCH TO VICTORIA]
Beyond Montemorelos a great deal of the country was rough, and it was
intersected with chilly streams, waist-deep, that cut like a knife as
the hot soldiers plunged in; but an incessant variety of novel scenes
kept up their spirits. Groves of ebony sheltered bears and wolves.
Wild turkeys and wild hogs abounded; and almost every evening ten or
twelve deer were brought in. Here flourished pecans, live-oaks and
immense trees of lignum vitæ; there an endless procession of ants
wound along their smoothly worn trail; yonder towered a mountain of
gleaming porphyry set off with dark green foliage, and at all times
fleecy clouds could be seen drifting languidly across the slopes of
the curiously wrought sierra. Finally the troops entered the rich
valley of Linares. On the one hand lay wide cornfields or perhaps a
thousand acres of sugarcane in a single, well-irrigated lot; on the
other apple and peach orchards, orange and lemon groves with tempting
gleams amidst their dark leaves, and half a mile or so of fig-trees.
Then came the gardens and flat houses of the town itself, a dull place,
with some smiling and some tearful eyes looking out from the grated
windows.[18.23]
Then forward again marched the troops, passing out of the valley into
wild country full of chaparral and mesquite, where sometimes wolves
trotted along the road ahead of them like dogs. The need of water
determined the length of the daily march; but usually there was enough
of it, shaded sometimes by noble cypresses dripping with Spanish moss.
Once a real norther set in, and the troops choked for twenty miles in
a driving cloud of dust;[18.21] but through it they caught glimpses
of a high cliff that looked like an immense pink and yellow dome, and
another cheering bit of color now and then was Señor Don So-and-so, the
alcalde, dressed in white and a red sash, with silver coins all over
his clothing, saddle and bridle. Usually the weather held fair, and a
blanket supported by four stakes answered the purpose of a tent well
enough.[18.23]
But the faces of the people grew dark occasionally, and once they
muttered something like "_Fandango poco tiempo_," which signified,
"You'll be fighting pretty soon." Then the soldiers cheered till
they were hoarse. Fatigue and supper were forgotten. "Turn out, turn
out!" was the cry. The column formed, and dashed down the hill at a
double quick; but for enemy it found only the trim white cottage of a
Frenchman, planted beside a rippling stream amid laden orange trees
gilded by the setting sun. There had been rumors of Mexican cavalry
ahead, but no cavalry could be seen;[18.22] and as for irregulars,
both funds and arms were lacking, and the close wall of prickly pear
five or ten feet high, which ran on each side of the road almost without
a break for nearly two hundred miles, would have kept them off as it
did the breeze. And so on January 4 Taylor and the regulars entered
Victoria, a small, neat city at the foot of wooded mountains, which
Quitman had occupied with some formality six days before. "Victoria is
taken. It was a bloodless victory. But where is Victoria?" said the New
York _Herald_.[18.23]
[PATTERSON'S MARCH TO VICTORIA]
Indeed, Victoria was very much taken.[18.24] October 13, when
ordering Taylor to cut short the armistice, Marcy notified Patterson of
this order, and again directed him to occupy southern Tamaulipas as soon
as he could--before December 6 if possible; but Patterson was not able
to set out until General Taylor gave him definite instructions, on the
twenty-eighth of November, to march with the two Illinois regiments and
the regiment of Tennessee horse, about 1500 men, for Victoria. Further
delays occurred because transportation was not promptly furnished
him, and because vessels conveying supplies were lost; and although a
detachment advanced some fifteen miles about the middle of December, the
movement from the point then reached did not begin until one day before
Christmas.[18.26]
[Illustration: General Patterson’s March]
The distance to be covered was nearly 210 miles,[18.25] and all
found the march hard. The chief engineer said his task was "to make
an impassable road practicable." Sometimes it seemed to contain every
possible stone. Difficult streams had to be crossed, and once the
only feasible method was to cut a straight ramp on each of the nearly
vertical banks, which stood about one hundred feet high, and get the
wagons down and up again with ropes--a prodigious task. The usual
thorns were peculiarly troublesome, and some of the water contained
salt. Sweat and dust almost hid the skin of men's faces at more than one
time; and not only did soldiers drop far behind from exhaustion, but in
some cases water could be given to the faint only by prying their jaws
open. Once the drinking water was so muddy it could scarcely run, we are
assured--to say nothing of an odor derived from dead horses. On the very
first day the troops were ordered to march without breakfast, and they
went hungry more than once afterwards, with cattle, hogs, and actual
clouds of wild turkeys plainly in sight.[18.26]
Some of these facts appear to reflect upon the commanding officers, and
other facts point the same way. Patterson had an impressive person,
somewhat in the style of the English squire, it was thought, and certain
very agreeable qualities of his Irish race, when he chose to display
them; but although Polk felt disposed to make him generalissimo, he
seems to have lacked a familiar acquaintance with his profession as
well as experience in practising it. He also lacked initiative, and
he lorded it over the troops, they felt, with all the severity of a
satrap.[18.26]
Pillow, the second in command, had come to the war like many others for
his personal advantage; and having been the President's partner in a law
office, having contrived through cunning and secret management at the
Baltimore convention in 1844 to secure Polk's nomination, and being now
in confidential correspondence with the White House, he felt specially
authorized to slake his intense ambition. On the score of ill-health
Pillow had left his command at Monterey for a trip to the United States;
but, finding in this expedition a chance of becoming prominent, he
suddenly recovered. No one could fail to see his determination to be
conspicuous, and it was not commended by all. "Ho for the embryo hero!
Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" exclaimed Captain Caswell, a brilliant
officer. Naturally Pillow felt inclined to look upon the soldiers as
merely coal for his furnace, and they in turn generally detested him.
In one stormy scene he called upon them to shoot him, if they dared,
adding grandly, "I'm not afraid to die!" And after that, when angered
by unnecessary harshness on his part, they obtained some comfort by
growling to one another, "_He's_ some!" "_He_ isn't afraid to die"; but
they remembered the scourge none the less, and when Taylor came over on
a mule to visit their camp the very day he and they reached Victoria
(January 4), looking as plain as they and perhaps no less dirty, the
contrast between his democratic simplicity and the pomp and pomposity
they had been contemplating made them burst forth--when they finally
realized that his more impressive orderly was not the General--into an
ecstasy of delight and admiration.[18.26]
While these marches were taking place, General Scott, leaving the
coast on December 29, proceeded to Camargo in order to arrange matters
amicably with Taylor, if he could; but on January 3, finding it would be
impracticable to get into touch with that officer, he sent instructions
to Butler, carefully explaining why they were given to him directly,
to place at the mouth of the Rio Grande about 4000 regular infantry
under Worth, 4000 volunteer infantry, 500 regular cavalry, the best 500
volunteer cavalry and two field batteries--deducting, however, from
these numbers the troops then at Victoria, except an escort for Taylor,
all those at Tampico except about 500 for a garrison, and one volunteer
regiment at Matamoros. Scott added that he hoped eight new volunteer
regiments would be at the Brazos by the end of January, and that three
or four of these would remain in northern Mexico.[18.27]
[SCOTT TAKES TROOPS FROM THE NORTH]
At the same time he notified Taylor of this action, pointing out that
his inaccessibility and the extreme pressure of time had rendered
necessary the orders given to Butler. Taylor was instructed to
concentrate in Tampico all the troops of Patterson, Quitman and Twiggs
except an escort for himself and, if necessary, a garrison for Victoria,
and return then to Monterey. Scott further explained that on account of
the yellow fever he could not wait for the new volunteers, and stated
plainly that, although he greatly wished the Vera Cruz expedition could
be aided by a diversion in the north, Taylor would have to act "for a
time" on a "strict defensive."[18.27]
These orders were the inevitable sequel of past occurrences. Taylor had
suggested that it was advisable to transfer serious operations to the
south, and that a large body of regulars would be needed for a campaign
there; the government ordered the Vera Cruz expedition; Scott--not at
all, however, because he so desired--was appointed to command it; he
possessed full authority over all the troops in the field under one
condition proposed by himself--that Taylor must be left sufficiently
strong for defence--and, as Taylor admitted, this condition was met;
Scott could only obtain an adequate army in season by taking a large
part of it from the field; he endeavored to effect the necessary
division in a kind and friendly manner, spending ten days in travel for
that purpose, although extremely pressed for time; and, when Taylor went
deliberately beyond reach, he simply made such use of his authority as
duty required, taking for the offensive a relatively smaller army--in
view of the prospect, recognized by Taylor himself, that Santa Anna
would meet him at the beach--than he left with that officer for a strict
defensive.[18.27]
Taylor, however, was furious. He alleged that Scott had "wormed himself"
into the command by promising to kill Taylor off as a Presidential
candidate. Of Scott's New York letter he said, "A more contemptible and
insidious communication was never written." Although it was his own
suggestion that volunteers were unfit for the mainstay of an expedition
against Vera Cruz, and that regulars for it should be drawn from the
northern army, he complained now that an underhand "intrigue" had
stripped him of his regulars; and, not satisfied with describing himself
as outraged and degraded "in the most discourteous manner that could be
devised" by "Scott, Marcy and Co." for the purpose of accomplishing his
ruin, he charged, though really not expecting an attack, that he was in
danger of being "sacrificed" on the soil of Mexico. Policy concurred
with fury; political strategy with personal resentment. The idea of
brave Taylor, the People's Pride, thrown to the merciless Mexicans by
partisan Polk and scheming Scott was one to fire the masses; and thus
we see concocted a bit of electioneering melodrama that contributed
powerfully, and perhaps decisively, to bring about one of the chief
consequences of the Mexican war--the overthrow of the Democratic party
and the accession of Taylor to the Presidential chair.[18.27]
Scott now returned to the Brazos, where he arrived on January 8, about a
week before the date fixed by him for the assembling of his expedition
off that point; and there he was forced to endure nearly six weeks of
what he well termed "cruel uncertainties." To combine in haste the
men and material for such an expedition; to do so when the necessary
elements had to be drawn from distant and widely scattered points; to
do it while the waterways, largely relied upon for transportation, were
to a considerable extent frozen; and to do it without the telegraph
and mainly without railroads--this was a most difficult and hazardous
undertaking; and accidents, misunderstandings and errors of judgment
were additional embarrassments.[18.30]
[SCOTT DELAYED]
The prime need was troops; and Worth, acting with notable energy--even
precipitation--placed the first of the regulars at the mouth of the
Rio Grande about three weeks after Scott issued the orders to Butler.
But here the second need, that of vessels, checked them. Scott's
requisitions had been timely and ample; but there was an active
commercial demand for ships, rates were high, and the government,
anxious to economize, did not allow sufficiently for delays and other
contingencies.[18.28] A considerable number of vessels were chartered
at New Orleans, but a month of heavy rains, a scarcity of sailors, a
demand for higher wages from those engaged, a week of fog, and a series
of northers, which were usually only about four days apart, prevented
the first of the vessels from arriving off Brazos Island before February
11, and the storms, frequently very sudden, as well as the loss of
not a few of the indispensable lighters hampered operations there.
"This terrible coast," wrote the General; and for days together ships
would lie off shore, pitching "like mad" and fortunate if they did no
worse, quite unable to communicate with the island. For a week and a
half no mails arrived from New Orleans. As the Rio Grande water proved
unsuitable for the troops, extra casks were ordered to be made and
filled at New Orleans; and this consumed additional time.[18.30]