phrase was a philosophy, that a catchword was a magical formula, that
an eloquent peroration would be as mighty after he had been found out
as it had been before, that a profession of repentance would erase long
years of deliberate bad conduct;[10.30] and from the hour of setting foot
upon Mexican soil his mistake had been growing every hour more evident.
Only the army felt confidence in him, and that not altogether, for he
now called himself a Federalist, and the Federalists aimed to substitute
for the army a citizen soldiery called the National Guard.[10.31] After
the experience of many sad years, "people" and "army" could no more
unite than oil and water. Owing to suspicions that resembled those of
the army, the moderates also held aloof; and although the country in
general, aware of his preëminent energy and resourcefulness and reduced
to the unhappy necessity of fighting fire with fire, consented to his
resumption of power, it did not, even when somewhat reassured by his
connection with Farías, trust him.[10.32] How can he speak truth who has
no truth in his heart? men asked; and he himself could feel what the
answer was.[10.41]
As to Farías and his party of extreme democrats, who were good enough in
Santa Anna's opinion for servants but not for masters, they evidently
intended to control him, which could not be tolerated long; and as to
relations with the United States, the people seemed far more bent upon
war than a mere gamester could have supposed. Moreover, to declare
now for peace[10.33] looked very much like playing into the hands of
ex-President Herrera, the champion and martyr of that cause, round
whom an opposition party of citizens, military men and journalists was
gathering at the capital; and to do this appeared even to endanger
Santa Anna's personal safety, for as yet he was only a returning exile,
expelled but yesterday from the country like a felon, and ordered never
to come back. The civil authorities of the nation in general seemed
to be unfriendly; and the second city, Puebla, which lay across his
road to Mexico and had the power to wreck his cause, was found to be
ill-disposed. Not only famous and rich, but hardened by extraordinary
reverses--especially that of December, 1844--he was no longer the
hopeful, daring adventurer. His wish now, as he told an American at this
time, was to play a safe game. At Havana, so Campbell said, he had not
fathomed the crisis, but he now realized that he was treading the crust
of a volcano. His plans collapsed; and when the government,[10.34] which
had become alarmed by accounts of his hesitation, deputed Baranda to act
as his escort or custodian, he refused to move.[10.41]
He did, however, send Rejón and Almonte forward to help guide Salas,
who did not relish the tutelage of Farías; and on August 22 with proper
solemnities and a lavish ringing of bells the federal constitution of
1824 came forth from its tomb.[10.35] The people then felt a little
more confidence in the future, though Santa Anna, if at all able to
forecast that future, would probably have felt less. About a week
later, at his instance, Rejón was appointed minister of foreign
affairs, Almonte minister of war, Farías minister of the treasury, and
Pacheco minister of justice;[10.36] and a broad scheme of war measures
went into effect.[10.37] A levy of 30,000 troops was assigned to the
states in quotas; Guardians of the Peace were decreed, so that all the
regulars might be able to take the field; every Mexican between the
ages of sixteen and fifty was ordered to be ready for service; and
steps were taken to buy up the weapons belonging to citizens as well
as promote the importation of arms. The apprehensions of the military
class had recently been assuaged by declarations that the army stood
in no danger of abolition; and they now tolerated not only an order to
enroll National Guards, but an offer of pardon to all deserting from the
regular corps within three months.[10.41]
While these events were taking place, the sort of ability that Santa
Anna possessed and the sort of advice that he could obtain enabled him
to decide firmly upon a policy for the immediate future. He knew that no
way could be seen to meet the present embarrassments of the government;
he knew that the hot-headed radicals, if given a chance, would soon
discredit themselves; he knew that whoever should control the army would
be safe and strong; and he knew that one victory over the Americans
would make him omnipotent. He determined, therefore, to accept no public
share in the government, pose as the single-minded patriot-soldier, and
ask only the privilege of fighting at the head of the troops. At one
time he refused even to enter the capital, but he was notified by the
administration that such marked aloofness from the government would be
regarded as an open breach.[10.41]
September 14, therefore, after several delays on his part, the bell of
the cathedral and a salvo of artillery announced at half-past one that
the professional saviour of Mexico, who never saved her, had entered
the city. Everything possible was done by the authorities to give an
appearance of concord and enthusiasm.[10.38] Watched as he knew he was
by ostensible friends, Santa Anna played out his distasteful rôle, and
so did the rest of the actors. Emblems abounded. Eloquence overflowed.
The cathedral chanted _Te deums_. "Immense multitudes" (hardly perceived
by ordinary observers) cheered incessantly--in the official journal.
Not only public but private edifices were lavishly decorated--by order.
A hired band perambulated the streets. The General listened patiently
to a lecture from another man of the people, and replied with edifying
humility; and he asked that a well-known statue of himself should be
replaced with the national arms. But it was noticed that he and Farías,
facing each other in the carriage of honor under a huge picture of the
Constitution, looked more like victims than victors; and he would not be
present at the grand banquet.[10.41]
Having complied with the ultimatum of the government, Santa Anna was
now, September 17, appointed commander-in-chief of "The Liberating
Army." "Every day that passes without fighting at the north is a century
of disgrace for Mexico," he then exclaimed; and although he remained in
Tacubaya, a suburb of the capital, and was said to be ill, he exerted
himself to forward troops, hoping to concentrate 25,000 rapidly at San
Luis Potosí. Tidings from the seat of war foreshadowed a battle at
Monterey, and increased his anxiety. He exhorted the war department
unsparingly.[10.41]
But the government was exceedingly poor. According to the _Diario_ only
1839 pesos (dollars) lay in its treasury on September 6. Voluntary
offerings for the war took mostly the form of eloquence.[10.39] The
million raised by Paredes had nearly vanished in his preparations and
the Citadel revolution. Pressure was applied to the clergy, and the
_Diario_ asked, Is it not worth while for the merchant to give 100,000
pesos in order to save 900,000? But both of these classes held back
stubbornly, and managed the affair so as to escape. One brigade formed
on three successive days to march, but had to wait for funds. At length,
however, with extreme difficulty about 90,000 pesos were borrowed;
and on September 28, after piously seeking the Divine Blessing at
Guadalupe,[10.40] Santa Anna with some 2500 men set out. About 3000 were
already on their way, and he expected to find a large force at San Luis
Potosí.[10.41]
As he rolled along in his coach for about 380 miles, drawn by relays
of fleet mules, the General probably congratulated himself upon his
policy. He was on living terms with the radicals, had been accepted by
the Church, had soothed the army, and through Pedraza--recently his
enemy and still the enemy of Farías--had reached an understanding with
the Moderados. Unquestionably he stood much better with the public than
a month before; and he probably did not perceive that his recent course
had ensured for himself and the nation a series of most unpalatable
surprises.[10.41]
Through it all, however, the capital managed easily to be gay, and six
"arrogant bulls" were artistically sacrificed in the Plaza de Toros on
one of these anxious days.[10.42]
XI
TAYLOR SETS OUT FOR SALTILLO
June-September, 1846
Arista had scarcely reached Linares when he began, though he knew
his military standing had been destroyed, to rebuild the army. Mejía
followed in his predecessor's footsteps, adopted a policy that was both
conciliatory and stern to check desertion and bring offenders back to
the colors, kept guards out on the roads leading to the Rio Grande, and
exerted himself to improve the morale of his troops. Though Linares
was a central point within easy reach of all the principal towns of
northeastern Mexico, he justly regarded Monterey, a city of twelve or
fifteen thousand inhabitants and capital of Nuevo León, as the vital
spot, and about the ninth of July transferred his army to that place.
Desertion had now ceased, he reported; morale had been restored; and the
troops were described as eager to avenge the disasters of May 8 and 9,
which in their opinion "they had suffered but not caused."[11.1]
This view of the situation, however, must be described as rather
imaginative and extremely incomplete. It was hard to find money and
hard to find mounts. As late as August 19 Mejía admitted that neither
Mexicans nor foreigners would advance him funds, and even after paying
for horses he could not obtain them. Two of the governors in this
quarter would give him no aid, and still less were the people inclined
to rise for the national defence. Both troops and artillery came far
short of the requirements. Though Arista had called for reinforcements
on April 24, not a man from the south had arrived by August 20.
Including the scattered and almost worthless Presidials, the total
number of soldiers in the region--outside of Tampico--was less than
3000, and about one third of these could not easily be concentrated at
headquarters. Ill-fed, ill-clothed, soured by misfortune, smarting
under the general contempt, some desiring Mejía and some Ampudia for
commander, still more wishing Arista back, and all wrangling bitterly,
even if less bitterly than at first, over the conduct of their generals
and officers, the army had for chief a little, pockmarked man in blue
glasses, who looked like a sot, and thus far in the campaign had been
distinguished only for bad health and a pompous vocabulary.[11.2]
Mejía's plan was to conduct a guerilla warfare, save the army from
further disgrace in the field, and make a stand at Monterey. General
Canales and the irregulars were, therefore, his first line; but the
"Chaparral Fox," who entertained revolutionary designs for which he
desired American support, had managed so as to do us no harm in the
battles of May 8 and 9, and proposed to continue that policy. Mejía
suspected his intentions, yet could not prove him a traitor, and sent
him funds and horses grudgingly; whereupon Canales, protesting that his
loyal aims were paralyzed by Mejía's personal ill-will and stinginess,
made the cause of Mexico odious by robbing and outraging the people
under cover of her flag. At length, early in August, Mejía concluded to
give him about a thousand men, and ordered him to annoy the Americans in
every possible way; but the General reported that his horses were too
weak to trot three miles, and that he saw little prospect of injuring or
even delaying the enemy. In the northeast, therefore, to all intents and
purposes no aggressive Mexican army existed. The business of the nation
at this time was changing masters.[11.3]
[TAYLOR'S PROCEEDINGS]
Taylor intended to invade Mexico, and having been favored by Providence
and the government with enough men and supplies, his next need was
information regarding the enemy, the roads and the towns. Plenty of
this he could easily have obtained, one must believe. A strong feeling
against the government and even in favor of joining hands with the
Americans now prevailed in this quarter; and a large number of the
inhabitants on the border, long engaged in smuggling operations, had
the training, as well as the natural gifts of disloyalty, daring and
secretiveness, needed by the spy. A well-informed Mexican of this region
stated that some of his fellow-citizens were quite ready to serve the
Americans faithfully. Taylor could have made it for their interest to
do so, and in addition the circumstances gave him countless hostages
for their fidelity. Scott advised him to employ a large force of secret
agents in a systematic way. But this was not done, and his information
continued to be meagre.[11.4]
Another subject of prime importance was, of course, the means of
transportation. Taylor had, as we have seen, a large outfit of
wagons, but not enough of them for the expedition in view. A train
of pack-mules was the natural supplement. Those animals were almost
universally employed in Mexico; the country abounded in them; and it
was the General's obvious duty to use the facilities within his reach.
At Washington the practice of the region was understood, and it could
only be inferred that good wagon roads did not exist. Besides, Taylor
intimated that he expected to follow the usual system, and indeed he
was not aware until August that army wagons could be used where he
intended to go. There is no reason to doubt that by the first of that
month fully 3000 pack-mules could have been at his command. Under such
circumstances, to suppose the war department would expend a million
dollars or so in the manufacture of wagons, without having a requisition
from the army or even definite information as to Taylor's plans, went
beyond reason. But the matter was overlooked at the front; and finally,
gathering barely 1700 of those animals Taylor complained loudly, though
he himself recognized that the fate of the administration depended
upon the success of the war, that departmental neglect had inexcusably
delayed and crippled his advance.[11.5]
Still, the General decided to move, for he knew the public demanded
action; and he wished--as he said--to sustain the government. Indeed,
he now declared it necessary to go forward immediately, "be the
consequences what they may." "I must attempt something," he wrote
privately. The government, however, had not requested him to support
the administration or to incur such a risk; and Taylor--who stood
conspicuous now in the Whig party, and suspected that "Polk, Marcy and
Co." were aiming to discredit and ruin him--can scarcely have felt a
passionate desire to sustain them. In short, as may be inferred from his
correspondence, he understood that he himself was the person chiefly
blamed by the country for inactivity; and, assuming that no serious
resistance would be encountered, he determined--primarily, it would
appear, for his own sake--to occupy Monterey and Saltillo. For the head
of an invading army, both the motive and the assumption were somewhat
improper.[11.6]
He understood, however, that resistance might possibly be offered, and
for that his plan seems to have been ready. As early as the middle of
June there were at his disposal ten 18-pound siege guns, two 10-inch
mortars and four 24-pound howitzers; and we know that at least the
mortars and half a dozen of the 18-pounders were then at Fort Brown.
Before July some of the howitzers were certainly at Point Isabel. It
was entirely feasible to carry heavy ordnance to Monterey, for Santa
Anna did a much harder job of the same kind; and Engineer Sanders had
warned Taylor that field pieces would not be effective against the stone
houses of Mexican towns. But, probably quite unaware how much the moral
effect produced by his guns on May 8 had contributed to his victory the
following day, he seems to have retained his low opinion of artillery.
Even while Taylor was protesting against the number of volunteers
thrown upon him, Ridgely complained bitterly that he could not get
enough men for his battery. The cold steel--simple, direct, positive,
unflinching--was a weapon such as Taylor could understand. One required
no book learning to use that. And no doubt he already intended, as we
know he intended later, to overcome resistance at Monterey, should any
be offered, "pretty much with the bayonet."[11.7]
[ADVANCE OF THE AMERICANS]
Careful attention was paid to the choice of a route. That through
Cadereita offered the better grazing; but the General wisely determined
to march by way of Mier and Cerralvo, a distance believed to be 140
miles but in reality only about 125. This route was a little shorter
and better provided with water. The roads were much more satisfactory.
The problem of crossing the San Juan without boats or graded approaches
did not present itself. The groves and ravines where an enemy could
make trouble were few, and but one stream had to be forded. On August
19, therefore, Brevet Brigadier General Worth, commanding the Second
Division of regulars, crossed the river with his first brigade over a
bridge of steamboats, and moved off to establish a dépôt at Cerralvo,
about sixty miles away. All the pack-mules, which were to return under
escort and make a second trip, accompanied the troops. Brigadier General
Persifor F. Smith and the second brigade, Brigadier General Twiggs with
the First Division of regulars and about 180 wagons, and Major General
W. O. Butler with a "Field Division" of volunteers followed. September 5
headquarters moved, and in a day or two the last of the men belonging to
the expedition set out.[11.8]
The advance to Cerralvo did not prove entirely agreeable. At first there
was trouble because the mules could not be loaded until after daybreak,
and it was hard for the troops to march during the hot hours; but after
a little experience the troops moved off at about three o'clock in the
morning, and the train proceeded later under escort. The road proved
to be full of sharp stones most of the way; and everything--even the
frogs and the grass--had thorns, reported the soldiers. Although, as
Worth said, there was no dangerous lack of water, the men suffered not
a little during a part of the time. Some almost raved from thirst, and
brushing the yellow scum aside, would drink eagerly from any pool. The
heat baked them, and in spite of wet cotton in their caps a considerable
number were overcome. Mier, the only town of any importance on the
route, proved to be the roughest and gloomiest sort of a place. Gloomy,
too, was the long line of wooden crosses beside the road, for every
one marked a grave, and not a few signified a murder. After a while,
however, came the inspiring sight of distant mountains--the fantastic,
pale-blue summits of the Sierra Madre, which rose higher and stood out
more boldly day by day; and the occasional inhabitants appeared, as
Worth reported, "cordial in the highest degree."[11.9]
Particularly sunny were the Mexican smiles at beautiful Cerralvo, where
the advance arrived at noon, August 25; and there were still more
substantial reasons for satisfaction. The town, a place of some 1800
people, was built of stone, and hence formed a strong military position.
It had enough springs of excellent water to supply New York City,
declared Taylor. Standing, all in white, on a ridge at the foot of a
spur from the Sierra Madre, surrounded with groves, pastures and fields,
it gave promise of abundance and kept the promise. Sheep, cattle
and goats, watermelons, pecans, half a dozen delicious fruits, ample
grazing, and large stores of corn were to be had, and plenty of oak,
walnut, ebony, cypress and willow for the cooks' fires. By the morning
of September 15, with the exception of the Texas contingent, which had
marched by way of China and Cadereita, all the troops concentrated
here.[11.10]
[MEXICAN PLANS]
Mexico, anticipating Taylor's advance, had now taken steps to meet it.
In July Paredes had sent three brigades of regulars from the capital to
operate against the revolutionists of Guadalajara, and on August 6 these
were ordered to Monterey. Ampudia, who was to supersede Mejía, received
instructions to make haste; and the commander of the third brigade, on
leaving San Luis Potosí, went so far as to destroy all baggage that
could hinder the march. News of the revolution, which overtook these
forces tardily, delayed the advance, for of course many of the officers
felt they must "pronounce"; and almost the whole of one brigade,
abandoning their general, went back to Mexico. The number deserting was
quite serious, for besides the usual reasons for leaving a distasteful
service, the troops were alarmed by the prospect of real fighting, and
the sombre monotony of the deserts that had to be crossed disheartened
them.[11.11]
But on August 29 the first brigade, about 1400 infantry with three
8-pounders, arrived at Monterey. The second came on September 6, and
the third only a few days later. The garrison was now strong. Mejía
had concentrated some 4000 regulars and auxiliaries, and according to
the detailed official report there were in all, on September 10, 7303
officers and men. The arrival of the new forces greatly encouraged the
soldiers of Palo Alto and the Resaca--who had felt little desire to meet
the Americans again--and hence checked their deserting. As the cavalry
had now been re-mounted, it seemed likely to be efficient; and when
the Señorita Dosamantes, equipped as a captain, volunteered to fight
the invader, and was exhibited on horseback to the entire army, its
enthusiasm rose high.[11.11]
From the forced march of Ampudia and his troops one might infer that the
government had positively decided to make a stand at Monterey, but such
was by no means the fact. Before leaving Vera Cruz and again later Santa
Anna warned both Salas and the minister of war emphatically against
this idea, and on August 20 Ampudia was therefore notified that unless
Mejía's troops and the fortifications were certainly of sufficient
strength to check the enemy, he should "on no account risk an action."
Three days later the department informed him that the general-in-chief
was "convinced" that Monterey could not be defended, and that his
forces were "not strong enough to resist the Americans"; and in view of
this opinion he was directed to halt at Saltillo, and order Mejía by
special express to demolish his fortifications, and remove his army and
military effects to that city "without loss of time"--the purpose of the
government being "to gather an army capable of winning a victory without
risking the honor and great interests of the nation."[11.12]
The new commander at the north, however, was doubtless thinking for
himself. In view of Santa Anna's purpose to organize a grand army
under his personal orders, this was Ampudia's last opportunity to
shine independently, and he did not wish to lose it. On learning the
strength of Mejía's and Taylor's armies and the condition of the
fortifications, he believed he could not only repulse the Americans but
drive them beyond the Rio Grande. Mejía took the ground that it would
be dishonorable to give up Monterey and the pass between that city and
Saltillo without a fight, and that it might be very hard to recover the
road through the mountains after giving the Americans an opportunity
to fortify it. His officers, who met by Ampudia's order in a council
of war, appear to have shared this opinion; and the comandante general
of Nuevo León, "as a Mexican and an officer in the national army,"
protested "before God and men" against the instructions to retreat,
leaving twenty guns that could not be taken away, and permitting the
enemy to triumph "without hearing a shot from the Mexican arms." So the
die was cast; and on learning of Ampudia's decision, together with his
reasons, the war department endorsed it.[11.13]
[MONTEREY MADE READY FOR DEFENCE]
On reaching the ground, Ampudia proceeded to inspect Mejía's works. The
importance of erecting fortifications at Monterey had been clearly seen.
May 27 the minister of war gave orders accordingly, and Mejía promptly
sent an engineer there to reconnoitre and draw a plan. Since, however,
he could not afford to hire or even feed laborers, only soldiers carried
on the work, and little was accomplished before the end of July; but
people were then required to labor without pay, and the progress became
more rapid. Ampudia now brought men from the neighboring towns also;
and Monterey, excited by the news of Taylor's advance, became a hive of
industry.[11.14]