infantry began to advance by the southern shore of the river. The road
was in places deep with mud or covered with water; thick chaparral cut
off the friendly breeze; the intense heat felled many a soldier, and
thirst tormented all who retained their senses; but after a time the
plan of moving by night lessened the suffering, and at last the painful
march was achieved. The cavalry and wagons also proceeded in due course
to the general rendezvous;[10.15] and meanwhile Mier, a hill town only a
short distance from the Rio Grande, was occupied without resistance on
July 31.[10.16]
[DREADFUL CAMARGO]
Camargo, a place of perhaps 5000 inhabitants, was said to be some 400
miles from the Gulf by water. It stood well up on the right bank of the
river, here about one hundred yards in width; but the recent freshet,
rising to an unprecedented height, had nearly destroyed it, replacing
houses and gardens with about a foot of mud. This was dug away, and the
banks were cleared of vegetation; "acres and acres" of tents rose; and
by the end of August some 15,000 men were encamped along the San Juan
for a distance of three miles or so up and down and several hundred
yards back, while a quantity of stores that dumfounded the Mexicans and
satisfied Taylor, was gradually piled up. Worth, who had returned to
his brigade at the end of May, commanded the place and insisted on firm
discipline. No American trader was tolerated; and all persons caught
smuggling liquor into camp suffered "a punishment cruel to use on tender
skins."[10.17]
This was well, but it did not redeem the situation. Natives regarded
Camargo as the sickliest point in the region, and the freshets had made
it worse. Every breath of air raised a stifling cloud of dust from the
dried and pulverized mud. Barren hills of limestone cut off the breeze
to a great extent and concentrated the fierce heat, frequently sending
the mercury in "this hottest of all hot places," as a soldier called the
town, to 112 degrees. Scorpions, tarantulas, mosquitos and centipedes
abounded. There was a plague of small frogs. "Last night the ants tried
to carry me off in my sleep," wrote a soldier. The only drinking water
came from the San Juan, and it made trouble. The ignorance of the
volunteers about caring for their health was fairly matched by that of
their officers and medical men. Days of sweltering under a cruel sun,
with nothing to do and apparently nothing to hope for, were followed by
cool nights and heavy dews, the heart-rending groans of the sick, and
the yelping of numberless prairie wolves. In almost all the volunteer
regiments at least one third of the men were ill, wrote Meade, and in
many of them, one half. The three volleys at the graves became well-nigh
a continuous roll; and the "dead march" was played so often that, as an
officer said, the very birds knew it. The First Tennessee, originally
1040 prime young fellows, was reduced by deaths and discharges to less
than 500. "Oh, what a _horror_ I have for Camargo," exclaimed one of the
generals; "it is a Yawning Grave Yard"; a thousand soldiers torn and
mangled on the battlefield would be nothing to its suffering and dying
regiments.[10.17]
And all this appears to have been unnecessary. As we have seen, Taylor
had no intention of using more than about 6000 men in the near future;
and there were salubrious places not only near the Gulf but near
Camargo. No local maladies prevailed in the Rio Grande valley, said
Meade. "There are no causes for disease," wrote Captain Henry. The
climate of that region, said an Illinois officer, equalled in salubrity
the climate of "any Western state." Reynosa was described by the General
Sedgwick of Civil War days as perfectly healthy. Mier, selected the
following year, with a particular view to salubrity, as the site of a
camp for instruction, lay near by on the road to Monterey; and Cerralvo,
farther along on the same route, was a kind of Eden. The best comment
on what the General did is what the General himself said. His first
duty, he told Senator Crittenden, was to place the troops in a healthful
situation.[10.17]
[MEXICAN PREPARATIONS]
During all this while, Mexico, too, had been preparing for the war, and
preparing characteristically. Paredes began with good intentions, a
serious and fairly honorable Cabinet, and sound ideas of economy. Though
he did not seem to be very strong either physically or intellectually,
his many scars and the bull-like expression of his face inspired respect
and caution. He lived quietly and honestly, and the correspondent of
the London _Times_ thought Mexico had a better prospect of being well
governed than at any previous period since 1821. It was the dictator's
hope that such a policy and a bold campaign against the Americans would
rally the country to his banner.[10.20]
About April 1, as we already know, he gave orders to attack Taylor. In
May he severed all consular relations with the United States.[10.18] June
6 the new Congress met; and Paredes, in opening the session, announced
that the time had come to declare war, and summoned all Mexicans to
the support of the country. Six days later he was elected President
as a matter of course, and the action of the American government
regarding war with Mexico was made known by the official _Diario_. On
the sixteenth Tornel--the enemy of the United States and worse enemy
of his own country, who had now wormed himself into the war department
in place of Almonte--proposed to Congress a declaration of war; and on
July 6 Paredes proclaimed, as Congress had voted five days before, that
Mexico would repel the aggression and invasion of the Americans. It was
further stated that besides completing the Permanent and Active corps,
the government would create additional forces to serve during the war.
A million dollars were supplied by the clergy to pay for a campaign.
Paredes obtained permission to command the army in person, and his
intention to do so was publicly announced.[10.20]
But as usual the war plans ended mostly in talk. Except at the far
distant north, denunciation of the United States moderated somewhat, and
even at Mexico bragging lost a part of its flavor;[10.19] yet, though
really discouraged, people would, not recognize the war as anything
very serious. After news of Arista's defeat arrived at the capital,
the shiver of astonishment and disgust lasted for a time; but the glib
fellows in the cafés were soon remarking, "Well, that's over; that won't
happen again." Explanations abounded. After all, Arista was only making
a reconnaissance in force, it was pointed out. "Such is the fortune of
war; a defeat to-day and glory to-morrow," remarked one of the generals.
The hour chosen by Providence to give the world a lesson by terribly
punishing the aggressive Americans has not yet arrived, explained the
governor of San Luis Potosí. Reverses have occurred, but they can easily
be repaired and will be, the minister of war assured Congress airily;
and moreover the enemy had suffered most severely, it was believed.
Even the evacuation of Matamoros was eclipsed by domestic politics.
The triangular difficulties between Scott, Gaines and the American
government were cited as illustrating the state of discipline in our
army. The wreck-strewn coast near the mouth of the Rio Grande and the
billows laden with boxes and barrels afforded no little encouragement;
and editorials from the London _Times_, proving in detail the
hopelessness and risk of an American attack upon Mexico, were translated
and printed by the official journal.[10.20]
So the nation took heart. Its case did not look desperate after all.
Heroics appeared unnecessary. The military men have seized the country,
thoughtful citizens reflected; let them defend it. The people did not
fly to arms. The departments opened their strong boxes by only a chink
or not at all. "A dreadful and cruel lethargy has buried the Republic,"
exclaimed _El Indicador_. How the Mexicans could be roused, nobody
knew. To proclaim a _levée en masse_ and place a weapon in every hand
seemed politically dangerous. Paredes, observing that his plan to go
north received the cordial endorsement of his enemies, and fully warned
that his departure would be the signal for an uprising, dared not set
out; and as for the idea of British aid, upon which great expectations
had been erected, the minister of England gave lectures instead of
promises.[10.20]
[PAREDES IN DIFFICULTIES]
Indeed, Paredes found himself struggling, not merely to achieve, but
even to survive. Knowing well that his political existence depended
upon paying the army, he devoted all the revenues to it from the first,
and made every exertion to solve the all-important problem of money. In
March he tried to borrow heavily on the security of Church property, but
failed. In May the payment of all treasury obligations was suspended,
and a cut in pensions and salaries made; but the principal results were
to anger multitudes already offended by his economies, destroy credit,
paralyze business, and call forth an emphatic protest from the British
legation. On the principle, perhaps, of setting a thief to catch a
thief, the cynical Iturbe, one of the corrupt jobbers in government
contracts, was appointed minister of the treasury; and extraordinary
powers to raise funds were conferred upon the President by Congress.
But this very law shielded private and Church property, and there was
no help in laying taxes that could not be collected. Besides, the army
was now but a fragile staff. The defeats of the north had smitten its
confidence and prestige; being badly paid it was unreliable; and it
really preferred Santa Anna, the natural chief of its unprincipled
and rapacious officers.[10.22] Paredes counted upon the monarchical
party. Beyond a doubt he aimed to place it in power.[10.21] Alamán, an
avowed advocate of that policy, was not only his principal adviser
but the chief editor of a monarchist newspaper, _El Tiempo_, set up
at this time and protected by the government; and the _convocatoria_
summoning the new Congress, prepared by Alamán, pointed in the same
direction. But his party had no "substantial plan," as the British
minister well said, and the idea commanded no popular support. To the
army it meant a permanent throne in the place of a Presidential chair
to which every successful general might aspire, and imported troops
instead of Mexicans behind the foreign prince; while the departments,
under the pretence that local interests were neglected but mainly
to facilitate access to the public treasury, turned away from even
the idea of a centralized republic toward a revival of Federalism.
The convocatoria, which denied Congressional representation to six
sevenths of the people, was generally and furiously denounced as an open
rupture with the nation; and Archbishop Posada, the strongest support
of the monarchists, fell sick and passed away. Paredes found it wise,
therefore--in fact, unavoidable--to declare for the Republic. But his
action seemed a confession of weakness, dishonesty and inconsistency;
and this impression was deepened by a futile decree against the freedom
of the press and a vain endeavor to gain the support of Pedraza, who led
the conservative wing of the Federalists.[10.22]
Numerous other difficulties embarrassed the President. Like all the
successful revolutionary leaders, he found it impossible to keep the
promises he had made. It was complained that he did not protect northern
Mexico against the Indians. His adjustment of the foreign debt raised
a loud clamor. Many charged that his bringing the principal military
forces to the capital had laid the frontier open to the Americans, and
he was accused of using them still as his personal bodyguard. The Army
of Reserve is too much reserved, cried the _Monitor Republicano_; and
over and over again the opposition press demanded that he should take
the field, which nobody believed he intended to do.[10.22]
By June the spirit of revolt, which had shown itself early in February,
seemed formidable. Almonte, who had left the Cabinet ostensibly because
opposed to monarchical designs, was believed to be at work for himself,
and Santa Anna was known to be plotting. The President's ability fell
conspicuously short of his needs, and he clouded with drink such talents
as he possessed. His weak and vacillating course fortified every enemy,
and estranged almost every sensible friend; and it came to be felt,
even by those hostile to the monarchical idea, that a more energetic
ruler must be found. In short, six months after taking the reins Paredes
had no real strength whatever. The door stood actually ajar for a new
revolution.[10.22]
Preparations for such a change had then been going on for a long
while. In the London _Times_ of February 10, 1846, its correspondent
at Mexico had said that Santa Anna's coming into power again "would be
regarded by all classes as the greatest affliction that could befall
the nation," and other good observers entertained similar opinions. The
Federalists in particular disliked him. But on February 20 a protest
of his against monarchical schemes appeared in print at Mexico, and
newspapers were soon advocating his return.[10.23] Farías, leader of the
radical Federalists, was easily won over by a patriotic letter full of
penitence and unselfish zeal, and with Rejón as intermediary an alliance
of his faction and the Santannistas, based upon the idea of uniting army
and people, was at length, with much difficulty, brought about. Almonte
joined the combination; by the first of April it planned to "pronounce"
at Vera Cruz; and although disagreement regarding the terms of the plan
and a dispute whether Santa Anna or Almonte should be named the leader
prevented this action, Juan Alvarez, who had been a turbulent partisan
fighter in the Acapulco region ever since 1821, and was cognizant of
this conspiracy, inaugurated a revolution, April 15, in favor of a
provisional triumvirate: Santa Anna, Herrera and Rincón.[10.26]
Santa Anna insisted upon his own views, and Almonte, whom Paredes
appointed minister to France in order to get rid of him and then
obligingly detained at Havana by withholding funds for the journey,
yielded. In May Paredes put Farías and fifteen other suspected men into
prison, and this enabled them to plot at their leisure. On the twentieth
of that month all the scheming came to a head at Guadalajara, where the
people cried, "_Viva la República!_ Death to the foreign prince!" The
officers despatched against them proved unsuccessful.[10.24] The country
was soon like a tossing sea; and insurrections, attempted or planned,
showed themselves at various places.[10.26]
[PAREDES OVERTHROWN]
The government now proceeded to commit suicide. Paredes announced that
he was going to make his long deferred campaign against the Americans.
About 4000 troops marched for the north--really destined, it was
believed, for Guadalajara--and near the end of July Vice President
Bravo reluctantly accepted the reins of government. It was hoped to
rally the conservatives to his support, and to that end he proclaimed
on August 3 the revival of the constitution (_Organic Bases_) that had
been in force during the Presidency of Herrera, while urgent appeals
for union and harmony were put forth by the new ministers. It was hoped
also to conclude the war. Paredes had wished to do this in May, and
a member of the Cabinet had indirectly proposed to Consul Black that
a minister should be sent by the United States; but the government
finally concluded that the matter was "too delicate." The new Executive,
however, had not committed himself in favor of war as the President had,
and it was understood that his administration fully intended to end the
conflict.[10.26]
Bravo's course alarmed the conspirators, for many of the Federalists,
besides distrusting Santa Anna, believed the Organic Bases could be
made over into a satisfactory constitution. Nobody felt sure, however,
that such was the real intention of Paredes; the new Cabinet did not
please the radicals; the revolution had gone so far it could not
easily be stopped; and when word came on the third of August that the
garrison of Vera Cruz had pronounced for Santa Anna, General Salas, the
comandante general at Mexico, who was believed to be a firm supporter
of the government, declared at the "citadel" the following night--with
the concurrence of Farías--for Santa Anna and federation, citing
particularly as excuses the monarchical designs of the administration
and its failure to prosecute the war. Paredes, who had remained secretly
in town, hastily set off now to bring back his troops; but the second in
command of his escort betrayed him, and, overtaken by a cavalry regiment
despatched by Salas, the man who had boasted that at any rate his fall
would be no comedy, was brought back to town by the ear, so to speak,
like a truant schoolboy.[10.26]
Bravo, having few men and no artillery, could not resist, and his
retirement on the sixth of August left Salas in supreme _de facto_
command,[10.25] pledged only to carry on the war against the United
States and assemble Congress, but really destined, as his organ
modestly assured an indifferent public, to open "a new epoch, an epoch
of liberty, of movement and of life, an epoch of deeds and realities
and not of fraudulent and vain promises." "Federation, Santa Anna and
Texas," was his motto. An abundance of reassuring laws, and especially
the annulment of all edicts repressing the liberty of the newspapers, a
restoration of curtailed pensions and salaries, and the proclamation of
a political amnesty relieved anxious minds; and the spring of patriotism
was touched by summoning all Mexicans to unite against the invader.
Salas, however, counted only as a herald; it was time for the hero to
appear.[10.26]
[SANTA ANNA'S RETURN TO MEXICO]
Early in the forenoon on the sixteenth of August, a salvo of artillery
from the fortress of Ulúa at Vera Cruz announced the advent of something
unusual. At about nine o'clock a "crack" regiment, the Eleventh
Infantry, marched down to the customhouse, and after manoeuvring for
some hours was formed by dint of cuffing into two lines, which faced
each other and extended to the "Palace"; and finally, at a quarter
before one, a well-groomed and somewhat portly man in the full uniform
of a Mexican major general came up from the wharf between the lines.
He stood about five feet and ten inches in height, looked forty years
old though really fifty-one, seemed capable of great endurance, and
bore himself with an air of blended suavity and command. "The Flower of
Mexico," a very young and very pretty little blonde, his wife, preceded
him on the arm of an officer, and a retinue followed in his wake.[10.28]
The guns of Ulúa boomed again; such of the soldiers as chose, fired
their muskets or saluted; but not a viva was heard. The young and
pretty woman pouted at the cool reception. The glittering dark-gray
eyes of her husband clouded; his dignified and courtly manner seemed a
little disturbed; and his tawny face, whereon a studied graciousness
and self-control could not hide from a close observer the marks of
duplicity, treachery, avarice and sensuality, seemed to grow black. But
he went on to the palace; and presently, as he sat there surrounded by
officers in more or less brilliant uniforms, a tinman, speaking in the
name of the people, lectured him roundly on his past misdeeds. Such was
the home-coming of "The Illustrious General, Benemérito de la Patria,
the Most Excellent Señor, Don Antonio López de Santa Anna," "Champion of
Independence, Hero of Tampico, Immortal Commander," as he was officially
styled;[10.27] and such was "the most pronounced enthusiasm" with which,
according to Almonte, the people received him.[10.28]
Santa Anna put forth at once an allocution to the troops, which
exhibited in proper style the ecstatic joy that he experienced on
finding himself among such devoted patriots; and a manifesto, composed
by Rejón, laid his programme before the public. The latter address
rambled somewhat, and even J. F. Ramírez said he could not gather its
meaning; but it declared plainly against monarchy and ecclesiastical
domination. "Habits of passive obedience no longer exist," the paper
said; "and if there remains a sentiment of religion, time has undermined
the power of the directors of consciences." Peace, democracy and "the
concert of the army and the people" were said to be the General's
political principles, and he declared himself "the slave of public
opinion." As for the past, his mistakes as a ruler had been due to
circumstances and errors of judgment; and in regard to the future,
"Mexicans," he exclaimed, "there was a day, and my heart expands with
the recollection, when, leading forward the popular masses and the
army to demand the rights of the nation, I was hailed by you with
the enviable title, Soldier of the People. Allow me again to take
it, nevermore to be given up, and to devote myself, until death, to
the defence of the liberty and independence of the republic." At the
same time, as a pledge of sincerity, he advised restoring the federal
constitution of 1824, and giving the new Congress full control over the
executive.[10.28]
Having thus placed himself before the country, Santa Anna proceeded to
his pretty house at Manga de Clavo, about sixteen miles from Vera Cruz,
and thence to his more pretentious country-seat, El Encero, a little way
below Jalapa. By this time--so it was reported to excuse the suspension
of his journey and perhaps to remind the public of his part in the war
with France--the stump of his leg had become painful; but in reality he
paused to consider the situation. In that he did well. His position was
extremely critical.[10.28]
Santa Anna did not merely enjoy an occasional game of chance; he was a
gambler through and through. He did not merely stoop now and then to see
two game birds prove their mettle; he was essentially a "sporting man."
Not without reason did the London _Atlas_ refer to him as "that very
sorry hero but most determined cock-fighter." Possessing the strong, he
possessed also the weak points of this type. He was not only uneducated,
but incapable of study. He could improvise variations on a given theme
with astonishing volubility, throwing back--wonderfully elaborated--an
idea suggested to him; but he was not a thinker. He could shuffle and
deal current political notions most shrewdly, but his only principle,
either political or moral, was that having accidentally proclaimed the
republic of Mexico, he owned it. He understood the shallow and selfish
manoeuvres in the midst of which he lived, but had no deep insight,
and found it much easier to do things than to perceive what needed to
be done. His power to dupe others grew mainly, perhaps, from being a
dupe himself. He was in statesmanship only by force of circumstances;
and he always hated a business like that, for it perplexed and wearied
his passionate, untrained character. In a critical Mexican situation
his narrow but intense perspicacity, his unreflecting but unequalled
quickness, his reckless but ingenious adaptation of means to ends,
and his magnetic skill in "reaching" and combining men governed by
self-interest gave him for the time being an immense advantage, and,
when viewed under the dazzling arc lights of prestige and power, seemed
truly brilliant; but his ability was essentially thin, short-sighted
and weak. Indeed Consul Campbell, who saw him at Havana without his
trappings, declared that in any American village of a thousand persons
he would be thought intellectually feeble. Intellectually undeveloped he
certainly was.[10.29]
[SANTA ANNA'S POLICY]